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Uit: Geert Mak (1996), Hoe God verdween uit Jorwerd, Uitgeverij Atlas, Amsterdam, 
pp. 121-122 
 
“Bepaalde boeren begonnen zich te richten op zogenaamde ‘duurzame landbouw’. Zij 
streefden ernaar om op natuurvriendelijke wijze aardappels, peen, witlof en appels te 
produceren, en ook melk, vlees en eieren. Ze zwoeren kunstmest en bestrijdingsmiddelen 
af, en begonnen biologisch te boeren. Ze lieten hun varkens weer scharrelen en 
propageerden ouderwetse omgangsvormen met hun koeien. 
Zulke boeren verdienden vaak best een aardige boterham omdat de mensen in de stad 
langzamerhand graag wilden betalen voor echte natuur. Bovendien hadden ze meestal 
weinig te vrezen van alle milieumaatregelen die de overheid nog in petto had: ze vold-
eden daar allang aan. Voor de verkoop van hun producten bleven de ecoboeren echter 
afhankelijk van het netwerk van natuurwinkels in de grote steden. En die natuurwinkels 
eisten weer een natuurkeurmerk, een felbegeerd embleem dat de boeren alleen met veel 
geld en moeite konden verwerven. Maar ze moesten wel, wilden ze toegang krijgen tot 
de alternatieve markt van de natuurvrienden. Op deze wijze ontsnapten de boeren aan de 
reguliere bureaucratie van Brussel en Den Haag, om door de alternatieve bureaucratie uit 
Harderwijk en Marum weer gevangen te worden.”   
 
Part I The research approach 
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1. The challenge of pesticide risk reduction 
1.1 Introduction 
Synthetic pesticides have become widely used in the past century to combat agricultural 
pests and diseases, and hence to achieve higher yields.1 However, their inherently toxic 
properties are also the reason that pesticides may cause harm to the environment and 
human health. For example, several highly toxic persistent organic pollutants are now 
omnipresent in the global environment. These so-called POPs have been found from the 
icecaps in the Arctic to the rainforests in the tropics, and from the soil to the human 
body.  
Although pesticide risks have long been recognised and less hazardous pesticide prod-
ucts and lower input agricultural production methods have become available, regulatory 
approaches by state actors have thus far failed to achieve a significant reduction of pesti-
cide risks world-wide.2 However, it seems that the present broad concern about the qual-
ity and safety of food products, fuelled under the influence of increased economic glob-
alisation and international trade, can provide an impetus for the conversion to more sus-
tainable agricultural practices.  
The main reasons for this broad concern about food quality and safety have been the oc-
currence of several food scares during the 1990s, the economic need to prevent new cri-
ses emerging, and, more in general, society’s commitment to sustainable development.3 
In order to deal with current quality and safety challenges, state and non-state actors 
have developed a plethora of initiatives that aim to move from an agrifood system with 
several negative externalities to a system with more beneficial properties. The European 
Union (EU), for example, has performed a thorough revision of its law and policy on 
food and agriculture, including the publication of a General Food Law, the establishment 
of the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), and the review of the Common Agricul-
                                                   
1
  See for an analysis of the state-of-affairs in conventional agriculture: T. Lang & M. Heasman 
(2004). Food Wars: The global battle for mouths, minds and markets. London and Sterling: 
Earthscan, 365 p. See for a historical overview of the rise of pesticide-based agriculture: P. 
Hough (1998). The global politics of pesticides. Forging consensus from conflicting interests. 
London: Earthscan, 226 p.; J. Pretty (ed.) (2005). The pesticide detox: towards a more sus-
tainable agriculture. London: Earthscan, 240 p. 
2
  See for an early diagnosis of the negative impacts of pesticide use: R.L. Carson (1962). Silent 
spring. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 400 p. 
3
  The concept of sustainable development was first broadly endorsed at the international level 
by: WCED (1987). Our common future. Oxford: Oxford University Press, and UNCED 
(1992). Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. Report on the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development, Annex I. 
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tural Policy (CAP).4 Environmental and social organisations are organising campaigns to 
raise public awareness about the environmental, social and health risks of present agri-
cultural practices and to put pressure on public authorities and food industry for more 
stringent action to stimulate safe and sustainable agricultural techniques. Companies in 
the food and retail trade, for their part, are increasingly trying to reduce the risk of con-
tamination of food products by actively managing the supply chains of food products.  
In order to contribute to the discussion about the management of pesticide risks, the pur-
pose of this study is to investigate the efforts of state and non-state actors to reduce those 
risks, and make a transition towards the production of safe and sustainable food prod-
ucts. Many of these efforts have regulatory features and can be considered forms of regu-
lation, and arguably an expression of legal pluralism. In this context, the study aims to 
provide insights in the different manifestations of current regulatory approaches by state 
and non-state actors, their effectiveness in realising pesticide risk reduction, the level of 
involvement of the stakeholders concerned, the consequences for competition and trade, 
the interaction between the different approaches, and the resulting regulatory pattern.  
This chapter explains the design of the study. Section 1.2 focuses on the environmental 
and human health risks of pesticides. Section 1.3 introduces the main elements of the 
theoretical approach. Section 1.4 elaborates the research objectives and questions. Sec-
tion 1.5 describes the methodological approach. Section 1.6 outlines the structure of the 
study. 
1.2 The environmental and human health risks of pesticides  
The basis for modern conventional farming has been established in the early 20th cen-
tury, when new developments in chemical and biological sciences and increased mecha-
nisation created the conditions for a major transformation towards increased farm pro-
ductivity by the scaling up of production practices.5 This transformation was again fur-
ther accelerated by technological advances that had been made during World War II, in-
cluding the introduction of a range of synthetic pesticides, such as DDT, which led to 
widespread pesticide use.  
Focusing on synthetic pesticides, it is apparent that pesticide use, measured in kilograms 
of active ingredient per hectare (kg AI/ha), is by far the highest in developed countries 
                                                   
4
  This study uses the term European Union (EU) where it concerns the regional economic inte-
gration organisation of European countries that was established in 1958. This means that the 
term EU is also used in cases which would strictly speaking fall under the heading of Euro-
pean Community (EC). See for the EU General Food Law and EFSA: Council Regulation 
(EC) 178/2002 laying down the general principles and requirements of food law, establishing 
the European Food Safety Authority and laying down procedures in matters of food safety, 
OJ L031, 01.02.2002. See for the CAP reform e.g.: Communication from the Commission to 
the Council and the European Parliament. Mid-term review of the common agricultural pol-
icy, COM(2002) 394 final, 10.07.2002; Council Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003 of 29 Sep-
tember 2003 establishing common rules for direct support schemes under the common agri-
cultural policy and establishing certain support schemes for farmers and amending several 
regulations, OJ L270, 21.10.2003. 
5
  See for a historical overview e.g.: P. Hough (1998), and J. Pretty. (ed.) (2005).  
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when compared to countries with economies in transition and developing countries.6 
Taking a closer look at the trends in pesticide use during the 1990s, there has been a rela-
tive decrease in developed countries and in countries with economies in transition. This 
decrease is, however, compensated by the increased use in developing countries, mainly 
in Asia and Latin America.  
According to the definition used in the Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme, a 
pesticide is: 
“any substance intended for preventing, destroying, attracting, repelling, or controlling 
any pest including unwanted species of plants or animals during the production, storage, 
transport, distribution and processing of food, agricultural commodities, or animal feeds 
or which may be administered to animals for the control of ectoparasites.”7 
Pesticides are often classified as fungicides, herbicides, insecticides and growth regula-
tors.8 Fungicides are compounds used to protect crops from diseases caused by fungal 
pathogens. ‘Classical’ fungicides, that need to be applied frequently to maintain a protec-
tive layer of active ingredient, still form the backbone of fungal disease control. Modern 
fungicides are also used for curative action, as they are systemic, i.e. they are able to 
penetrate the plant tissue and attack the mycelium in the plant cells.  
Herbicides are used to control undesirable or noxious plant growth, generally called 
weeds, in areas dedicated to crop production or in non-crop areas where plant growth is 
unwanted. Herbicides can be either selective or non-selective in their action. Insecticides 
are used against insects that threaten the crop. They are applied when a pest incidence is 
manifest or as protective measure in seed treatments. Growth regulators, a relatively new 
group of pesticides, are organic compounds that modify or control one or more specific 
physiological processes within a plant in order to accelerate or retard the rate of normal 
growth, flowering or reproduction. 
The active ingredients in pesticides belong to different classes of chemicals, each with 
their own toxicological characteristics. The PAN Pesticides Database, for instance, dis-
tinguishes 11 different chemical classes of fungicides, 33 classes of herbicides, and 12 
                                                   
6
  This paragraph is based on an interpretation of the statistical data presented in: FAO Statis-
tics Division (2003). Compendium of agricultural-environmental indicators. 1989-91 to 
2000. FAO Rome. In comparison, the trends concerning fertiliser use are highly similar, ex-
cept that the consumption growth in developing countries more than compensates the reduc-
tion in developed countries and countries with economies in transition. 
7
  Codex Alimentarius Commission (2006). Procedural manual (16th edition). Rome: Joint 
FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme. The term ’pesticide’ also includes any substance in-
tended for use as a plant growth regulator, defoliant, desiccant, fruit thinning agent, or 
sprouting inhibitor and substances applied to crops either before or after harvest to protect the 
commodity from deterioration during storage and transport. The term normally excludes fer-
tilizers, plant and animal nutrients, food additives, and animal drugs. 
8
  The definitions are based on the ones used in: Eurostat & ECPA (2002). The use of plant pro-
tection products in the European Union, data 1992-1999. Luxembourg: Office for Official 
Publications of the European Communities, pp. 107-108, with a reference to the definitions 
in: C. Tomlin (1997). The pesticide manual: a world compendium. British Crop Protection 
Council. 
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classes of insecticides.9 These classes differ in terms of toxicity, persistence and bio-
accumulation. Well-known for their hazardous environmental and/or health characteris-
tics are the classes of carbamates, halogated organics, organochlorines, organophos-
phates, and triazines.  
Focusing on the EU, the picture is such that regions with the highest pesticide use rates 
tend to have an important production of fruit and vegetables.10 Moreover, pesticide use 
in fruit and vegetable production in the EU-15 has actually grown significantly during 
the 1990s. According to a report by Eurostat and the European Crop Protection Associa-
tion (ECPA), the volume of pesticides used has increased from 193,788 to 242,735 ton-
nes of active ingredients in the period between 1992 and 1999.11 
The same report shows that the preferences for the four different product groups and the 
patterns of pesticide use differ significantly between the EU countries, partly depending 
on climatic zones, pest pressure, and the types of crops being produced. However, even 
in countries with similar conditions and crops, the choice of pesticide and rate of applica-
tion may vary considerably, which suggests that there are other conditions that determine 
the level and type of pesticide use.12 
The problem with agricultural pesticides is that they are associated with several envi-
ronmental and human health risks during the different stages of their life-cycle, that in its 
simplest form consists of the stages of production, marketing, use, and residues.13 In the 
production stage, site-specific emissions to the environment may occur as the result of 
production processes of pesticide substances and products, and workers in pesticide 
plants and people living in the neighbourhood of such production facilities may be at risk 
of exposure to hazardous emissions and industrial accidents. 
                                                   
9
  See at: http://www.pesticideinfo.org.  
10
  Report from the Commission to the Council on the state of implementation of Regulation 
(EC) No 2200/96 on the common organisation of the market in fruit and vegetables, 
COM(2001) 36 final, 24.01.2001. 
11
  This paragraph is based on data provided in Eurostat & ECPA (2002). In absolute terms, 
France and Italy consumed the largest amounts of active ingredients, their shares amounting 
to 36% and 22% of the total in 1999, respectively. In relative terms of kilograms of active in-
gredient per hectare, Portugal and Italy were on top of the list. Countries with the lowest con-
sumption levels included the Scandinavian countries. Austria and Denmark were the only 
countries where pesticide use actually decreased during the 1990s. 
12
  The most obvious examples of this phenomenon are the relatively extremely high use of: 
fungicides in Greece, herbicides in Finland, insecticides in Spain, and growth regulators in 
Ireland. 
13
  See e.g.: R.L. Carson (1962), 400 p.; Th. Colborn, D. Dumanoski & J. Peterson Myers 
(1996). Our stolen future: are we threatening our fertility, intelligence, and survival? A scien-
tific detective story. New York: Dutton, 306 p.; P. Hough (1998); J. Pretty (1999). The living 
land: agriculture, food and community regeneration in rural Europe. London: Earthscan, 336 
p.; S. Krimsky (2000). Hormonal chaos: the scientific and social origins of the environmental 
endocrine hypothesis. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 256 p.; M. Jacobs & B. 
Dinham (2003). Silent invaders: pesticides, livelihoods and women’s health. London/New 
York: Zed Books, 342 p., and J. Pretty (ed.) (2005).  
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In the marketing stage, emissions may take place during transport and by leaching from 
storage depots. Such depots may form a considerable risk for the local population, espe-
cially in developing countries and countries with economies in transition.14 In the use 
stage, emissions are related to the fact that pesticides are never used entirely efficiently 
by the receiving crops. Small but significant quantities of pesticides are lost directly to 
the environment. Some is vaporised, eventually to be deposited in rainfall, some remains 
in the soil, while some reaches surface and groundwater by runoff or leaching. Pesticides 
in groundwater, surface water and drinking water are the most serious environmental 
problems associated with pesticide use, and may also indirectly result in negative im-
pacts on biodiversity, climate conditions and the ozone layer. People working at farms 
and those living next to fields and greenhouses may experience damage to their health 
due to pesticide exposure.15  
In the residue stage, consumers may be exposed to critical levels of pesticide residues in 
food that could cause chronic or acute health effects. Despite scientific effort in this area, 
the debate on the health implications of pesticide residues is still surrounded with many 
scientific uncertainties.16 Such uncertainties inter alia include the potential of pesticides 
to cause cancer, to disrupt the hormone and reproductive system, and to bring damage to 
the nervous system. In general, there is a lack of reliable data on the long-term conse-
quences of exposure to pesticide residues and on the ‘cocktail’ effects of multiple resi-
dues. Children are considered to be most vulnerable to the risks of pesticide residues, be-
cause their bodies are still developing and they are exposed to relatively higher doses 
than grown-up people. 
In order to help limiting pesticide risks, a wide range of regulatory options for pesticide 
risk reduction is in principle available, such as pesticide bans, pesticide authorisation de-
cisions, agricultural production standards, traceability schemes, and pesticide maximum 
residue levels (MRLs). Importantly, agricultural production standards may define several 
innovative agricultural methods, including: 1) applying good agricultural practice 
                                                   
14
  In the past decades, stockpiles of pesticides have accumulated in developing countries and 
countries with economies in transition as the consequence of government procurement poli-
cies, development assistance programmes, and dumping of outdated products by pesticide 
companies. 
15
  See e.g.: The annual world health reports by the World Health Organization (WHO), avail-
able at: http://www.who.int., and more specifically: WHO (2002). The World Health Report 
2002 – Reducing risks, promoting healthy life. Geneva: WHO. According to WHO estima-
tions, there are worldwide three million severe cases of pesticide poisoning each year and as 
many as 20,000 unintentional deaths, primarily in developing countries. In addition to unin-
tentional deaths, there are an estimated 200,000 intentional deaths annually, as a number of 
pesticides are used for committing suicide, with the highest incidence levels in South-East 
Asia. See e.g.: M. Eddleston, L. Karalliedde, N. Buckley et al. (2002). Pesticide poisoning in 
the developing world – a minimum pesticides list. In: The Lancet, vol. 360, pp. 1163, and F. 
Konradsen (2007). Acute pesticide poisoning – a global public health problem. In: Danish 
Medical Bulletin, vol. 54, no. 1, pp. 58-59. 
16
  See the comprehensive overviews of research as presented in the three-monthly Research 
Monitors of PAN UK. See also: Th. Colborn, D. Dumanoski & J. Peterson Myers (1996); S. 
Krimsky (2000); L. Reijnders (2004). Food safety, environmental improvement and eco-
nomic efficiency in The Netherlands. In: British Food Journal, vol. 106, no. 5, pp. 393-395. 
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(GAP); 2) keeping control over inputs by systematic registration; 3) applying ‘fewer 
chemical inputs’, or integrated control, including, for example, integrated pest manage-
ment (IPM), integrated crop management (ICM), and integrated production, and 4) ap-
plying ‘no chemical inputs,’ or organic farming. Notably, the precise definitions and in-
terpretations of these methods may considerably vary, as this study will demonstrate. 
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 extensively elaborate on the efforts by state and non-state actors to 
regulate pesticide risks. 
1.3 The theoretical approach 
The theoretical approach of this study is based on the concept of legal pluralism that 
stretches the boundaries of law in response to the emergence of new sites and forms of 
governance in which non-state actors are performing prominent regulatory roles.17 Such 
a conception of law implies “a multitude of partial legal orders, both territorial and func-
tional, that cohabit, cooperate and compete within one global legal system”.18 It thus 
challenges the monopoly of state law creation. Consequently, legal pluralism promotes a 
dynamic and flexible interpretation of the sources of law and draws attention to the role 
of other actors than the state in law-making. It furthermore stresses the importance of in-
teraction between different sites of governance, their procedures and normative output.  
One of the main reasons for choosing the theoretical concept of legal pluralism is that the 
application of legal concepts may deepen the understanding of forms of governance in 
which non-state actors are involved. Using the words of MacDonald, legal pluralism 
could offer in the first place “a means to ask the central questions of positive legal analy-
sis across a broader range of normative activity.”19 In the second place, legal pluralism 
opens inquiry into the impact of, often conflicting, implicit normative frameworks, since 
it denies “the local hegemony of national legal orders and [instead] argues for multiple, 
overlapping, often non-geographically defined legal systems.”20 In the third place, legal 
pluralism asks whether more energy ought to be directed to informal regimes, as “the is-
sue is not so much one of constructing new ‘quasi-official’ regimes” but to recognise 
those regimes that already exist.21  
                                                   
17
  See e.g.: B. de Sousa Santos (1995). Toward a new common sense: law, science and politics 
in the paradigmatic transition. New York/London: Routledge, 614 p.; G. Teubner (1997) 
(ed.). Global law without a State. Aldershot/Brookfield: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 
350 p.; K. Günther (2003). Legal pluralism and the universal code of legality: globalization 
as a problem of legal theory (English version of: K. Günther (2001), Rechtspluralismus und 
universaler Code der Legalität: Globalisierung als rechtstheoretisches Problem. In: L. 
Wingert & K. Günther (eds.), Die Öffentlichkeit der Vernunft und die Vernunft der Öf-
fentlichkeit, essays in honour of Jürgen Habermas, Frankfurt am Main, pp. 539-567). 
18
  G. Teubner (1997). Foreword: legal regimes of non-state actors In: G. Teubner (ed.), Global 
law without a State. Aldershot/Brookfield: Dartmouth Publishing Company, p. xiii.
 
19
  R.A. MacDonald (1998). Metaphors of multiplicity: civil society, regimes and legal plural-
ism. In: Excerpt from Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law, vol. 15, pp. 78-
79. 
20
  Ibidem, p. 79. 
21
  Ibidem, p. 79. 
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Chapter 2 further explains the theoretical concept of legal pluralism and proposes a re-
search approach consisting of distinct steps. 
1.4 The research objectives and questions 
As mentioned above, the study identifies, analyses, and assesses current regulatory ap-
proaches by state and non-state actors that aim for pesticide risk reduction. It aims to 
provide insights in the different manifestations of such approaches, their effectiveness in 
realising pesticide risk reduction, the involvement of the stakeholders concerned, the 
consequences for competition and trade, the interaction between the different ap-
proaches, and the resulting regulatory pattern. The geographical focus is mainly on the 
EU, but seen in the larger context of global developments and impacts.  
The study has the following research objectives: 
• To identify, analyse, and assess current regulatory approaches by state and non-state 
actors aimed at pesticide risk reduction; 
• To analyse the interaction between the different regulatory approaches, and  
• To construct the resulting pattern of regulation and identify options for improvement.  
 
Based on these research objectives, the main research question is as follows: 
How are pesticide risks regulated considered from the perspective of legal pluralism 
and sustainable development and what are the options for improvement? 
In order to address this overarching question, a set of research questions has been devel-
oped that will be answered in successive chapters. 
• How are pesticide risks regulated at the international level and what assessment can 
be made of the multilateral approach in terms of effectiveness, inclusiveness and 
fairness? 
• How are pesticide risks regulated at the EU level and what assessment can be made 
of the European approach in terms of effectiveness, inclusiveness and fairness? 
• How are pesticide risks regulated at the transnational level and what assessment can 
be made of the non-state actor approach in terms of effectiveness, inclusiveness and 
fairness? 
• How do the different regulatory approaches interact with each other and what are the 
main synergies and conflicts? 
• What pattern of global legal pluralism emerges from the combination of the regula-
tory approaches at different levels? What are the main gaps and overlaps? 
• What are the options for improvement? 
1.5 The methodological approach 
The methodology combines conventional legal analysis with qualitative approaches from 
the social sciences. The legal analysis focuses on rules and regulations created by state as 
well as non-state actors at the international, EU, and transnational level. The study uses 
legislative and standards documents as main sources, complemented with material from 
policy documents and literature. Interpretational and comparative techniques have been 
used for the analysis of regulatory documents. Additional research material has been col-
  
10
lected through participation in workshops, conferences, and seminars that focused on 
regulatory processes in the non-state actor domain. 
Two non-comparative case studies have been part of the research design in order to pro-
vide insights in the perspectives of state as well as non-state actors that are being con-
fronted with the plethora of rules in daily practice. The first case study focuses on the 
development of the national law and policy on pesticides in the Netherlands, using the 
the perspective of a national government as it is increasingly confronted with European 
and non-state actor regulation. A major reason for choosing the Netherlands is that it is 
one of the major producing and exporting countries of horticultural products in the world 
and belongs to the most intensive users of pesticides measured in kilograms of active in-
gredients per hectare.22 However, the situation in the Netherlands cannot be considered 
representative for the situation in other countries, as many variables are country-specific, 
such as political culture, regulatory styles, the organisation of government, and the divi-
sion of responsibilities. This case study aims to illustrate how regulatory pluralism can 
impact on governmental policy, and vice versa, in a country with a strong agricultural 
lobby as well as high environmental ambitions. The case study focuses especially on as-
pects of interaction between the national government and other stakeholders. 
The second case study focuses on the perspective of agricultural producers. It uses the 
example of tomato production to explain what the impacts are of legal pluralism for ag-
ricultural producers and how it affects the conditions for production and trading. The 
tomato is chosen because it is one of the vegetables most produced, traded and consumed 
on a global basis, and its production circumstances are highly relevant from a social, en-
vironmental and economic point of view. In this respect, it can be assumed that the to-
mato fulfils an exemplary function for other perishable and seasonal products: what hap-
pens with the tomato is likely to happen with other fruits and vegetables and also with 
(agricultural) products in a broader sense. As Harvey et al. put it: “The tomato reveals 
multifaceted changes in contemporary society, but only as one food amongst many, sub-
ject to similar changes and in analogous contexts.”23 The case study focuses especially 
on aspects of competition and market access. 
1.6 Outline 
The study is organised in four parts. The first part presents the research approach and 
consists of the two chapters. The current Chapter 1 focuses on the challenge of pesticide 
risk reduction in agriculture. Chapter 2 explains the theoretical concept of legal plural-
ism, and develops a structured, step-wise research approach .  
The second part is devoted to the components of legal pluralism in the issue-area of pes-
ticide risk reduction, and contains three chapters. Chapter 3 describes the evolution of 
                                                   
22
  See e.g.: Eurostat & ECPA (2002). 
23
  M. Harvey, S. Quilly, and H. Beynon (2002). Exploring the tomato. Transformations of na-
ture, society and economy. Cheltenham/Northampton: Edgar Elgar, p. 9. Indeed, similar de-
velopments as in tomato production can be noticed in the production of salads, peppers and 
strawberries, but also in the chicken meat industry. See also: W.H. Friedland (2006). Toma-
toes: a review essay. In: Agriculture and Human Values, vol. 23, no. 2, pp. 253-262. 
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the international law and policy on pesticides focusing on the legal tenets of the interna-
tional approach, including the FAO International Code of Conduct on the Distribution 
and Use of Pesticides (1985), the Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent 
Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade (1998), 
and the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (2001). Chapter 4 de-
scribes the evolution of the EU law and policy on pesticides focusing on the legal tenets 
of the EU approach, including Directive 91/414 concerning the placing on the market of 
plant protection products, Regulation No 396/2005 on maximum residue levels of pesti-
cides in or on food and feed of plant and animal origin, and the proposed Directive estab-
lishing a framework for Community action to achieve a sustainable use of pesticides. 
Chapter 5 describes the evolution of regulatory initiatives by non-state actors, focusing 
on two major transnational certification programmes, including the IFOAM organic 
guarantee system (1980) and the GlobalGAP programme for fruit and vegetables (2001). 
The third part explores the practice of legal pluralism by elaborating two non-
comparative case studies that aim to provide insights in the perspective of different 
stakeholders. Chapter 6 elaborates the case of the Netherlands to illustrate how legal plu-
ralism affects the role of a national government and its interaction with non-state actors. 
Chapter 7 uses the example of tomato production to explain how legal pluralism affects 
agricultural producers by influencing the conditions for production and trading. 
The fourth part investigates the dynamics of legal pluralism and consists of two chapters. 
Chapter 8 provides an inventory of regulatory interaction in vertical, horizontal and di-
agonal directions. In addition, it uses a more dynamic perspective upon regulatory inter-
action, focusing on the different stages of the life-cycle of pesticides, including produc-
tion, marketing, use and residues. Chapter 9 draws conclusions about the pattern of regu-
lation in relation to legal pluralism and sustainable development, and formulates the out-
lines of a normative and procedural framework that could help to achieve a further re-
duction of pesticide risks. 
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2. The theoretical concept of legal pluralism and its 
application 
2.1 Introduction 
Legal pluralism as a concept is closely related to the governance approaches that have 
become dominant in the social sciences in the past 15 years, and can be seen as its legal 
counterpart.24 Due to its appeal, governance in all its dimensions is currently being ex-
plored by researchers from various disciplines that have given different interpretations of 
the concept and used it in different contexts.25 The concept is, for example, being at ap-
plied at various levels (from international to local) and from various theoretical perspec-
tives (e.g. international relations, economics, law). Despite this diversity, Van Kersber-
gen en Van Waarden (2004) argue that the concept could function as a bridge between 
disciplines and that it can become a vehicle for comparison and for mutual learning and 
theoretical inspiration.26 One of their arguments is that most of these interpretations have 
some characteristics in common, such as a pluricentric focus and an emphasis on net-
works and participatory methods.  
This chapter aims to explain the concept of legal pluralism and to elaborate a structured 
research approach. The concept of legal pluralism recognises different types of norma-
tive activity without discriminating between them on the basis of their origin and source. 
Hence, the concept of legal pluralism advocates a more “liberal” understanding of the 
sources of law in comparison with traditional legal theory. The chapter is structured as 
follows. Section 2.2 explains the concept of governance in relation to regulation, and 
provides a typology of regulation. Section 2.3 elaborates on the concept of legal plural-
ism and its more specific manifestation that is called ‘global legal pluralism’. Section 2.4 
translates the concept of legal pluralism into a structured research approach. Section 2.5 
presents conclusions. 
                                                   
24
  See e.g.: J.N. Rosenau & E.O. Czempiel (1992) (eds.). Governance without government: or-
der and change in world politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 323 p.; L. Finkel-
stein (1995). What is global governance? In: Global Governance, vol. 1, no. 3, pp. 367-372, 
L.A. Kornhauser (2003). Governance structures, legal systems and the concept of law. In: 
Chicago-Kent Law Review, vol. 79, pp. 355-381, and I.F. Dekker & W.G. Werner (eds.) 
(2004). Governance and international legal theory. Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publish-
ers, 380 p. 
25
  K. van Kersbergen & F. van Waarden (2004). ‘Governance’ as a bridge between disciplines: 
Cross-disciplinary inspiration regarding shifts in governance and problems of governability, 
accountability and legitimacy. In: European Journal of Political Research, vol. 43, pp. 143-
171. 
26
  Ibidem, pp. 152-153. 
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2.2 Governance and regulation 
Governance can be understood as the rules, processes and practices that affect how pow-
ers are exercised.27 This definition implies that governance is meant as a broader cate-
gory than government. More specifically, the concept of governance highlights the in-
volvement of state as well as non-state actors in the pursuit of objectives that are gener-
ally associated with public policy. These non-state actors actors are, broadly speaking, 
represented by business and industry, environmental and social organisations, and the 
scientific community.  
Several authors, for example, have observed that non-state actors are playing an increas-
ing role in shaping the international human rights doctrine.28 Similarly, it has been ar-
gued that in the case of international environmental affairs the roles of non-state actors 
have shifted.29 More precisely, this evolution can be characterised by four distinct 
phases: first, non-state actors acquired the right to be consulted; second, they obtained 
observer status at international negotiations; third, they were allowed to participate in 
decision-making, and, arguably fourth, they are increasingly performing a semi-
regulatory role.  
Apart from engaging in individual activities, societal actors have also joined forces in 
specific initiatieves with regulatory features.30 Business firms are increasingly cooperat-
ing in networks, such as associations, working groups and councils, in order to combine 
resources and to play a role in governance. Similar considerations have led environ-
mental and social NGOs to strengthen their political and bargaining power by creating 
alliances and umbrella organisations. A clear signal of the latter is the considerable 
growth of transnational NGOs over the past two decades.31 
Moreover, partnerships and coalitions uniting divergent interests have been increasingly 
established in recent years. Several social and environmental organisations, for example, 
have been willing to engage in a dialogue with the private sector, resulting in concrete 
                                                   
27
  European Commission (2001). European governance. A white paper, COM(2001) 428 final, 
25.07.2001. 
28
  See e.g.: A. Bianchi (1997). Globalization of human rights: the role of non-state actors. In: G. 
Teubner (ed.), Global law without a State, Aldershot/Brookfield: Dartmouth Publishing 
Company, p. 180; R. Sullivan (ed.) (2003). Business and human rights: dilemmas and solu-
tions. Sheffield: Greenleaf Publishing, 335 p.  
29
  J. Gupta (2003). The role of non-State actors in international environmental affairs, Heidel-
berg Journal of International Law, no. 63, pp. 459-486.  
30
  See e.g.: A.C. Cutler, V. Haufler, and T. Porter (eds.) (1999). Private authority and interna-
tional affairs. New York: SUNY, 416 p.; J. Bendell (2001). Civil regulation: A new form of 
democratic governance for the global economy. In: J. Bendell.(ed.) (2001), Terms of En-
dearment. Sheffield: Greenleaf Publishing, pp. 239-255, and V. Haufler (2001). A public role 
for the private sector: industry self-regulation in a global economy. Washington: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 157 p. 
31
  See e.g.: B. Arts (1998). The political influence of global NGOs. Case studies of the Climate 
and Biodiversity Conventions. Academic dissertation. Utrecht: International Books, 352 p.; 
B. de Sousa Santos (1995). Toward a new common sense: law, science and politics in the 
paradigmatic transition. New York/London: Routledge, p. 267. 
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initiatives.32 This new approach of cooperation and collaboration has been further 
strengthened by the impetus that the 2002 Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable 
Development has given to the idea of partnerships – the so-called Partnerships for Sus-
tainable Development.33 
The increased emergence of sites of governance where non-state actors are performing 
regulatory roles has been accompanied by the creation, implementation and enforcement 
of new forms of governance.34 They typically include codes of conduct, standards for 
corporate reporting, and certification programmes. Importantly, many of these new 
forms of governance have regulatory features. 
These developments raise the question why these sites and forms of governance have 
started to proliferate in the first place. It has been argued that an important reason for 
non-state actors to become involved in governance has been the weakness of governance 
at the international and national government levels in relation to environmental, social 
and health issues. In this respect, some put the emphasis on so-called ‘regulatory’ gaps, 
others on ‘compliance’ gaps, and a third group points at the occurrence of both.35 Meid-
inger, for example, states that “progress through the Westphalian system of nation-state 
negotiations has been painfully slow, while the growth of serious transnational environ-
mental problems has been remarkably rapid.”36 He furthermore observes that where trea-
ties exist, their enforceability and adaptability to change often are subject to serious 
doubt.  
A second reason explaining the rise of private actors in governance arrangements is re-
lated to the protection and support of economic interests. On the one hand, companies 
may wish to pre-empt state intervention by developing private governance arrangements. 
Scholars have called this mechanism ‘the shadow of hierarchy’.37 On the other hand, 
                                                   
32
  See e.g.: V. Haufler (2003). New forms of governance: certification regimes as social regula-
tions of the global market. In: E.E. Meidinger, Chr. Elliott and G. Oesten (eds.), Social and 
political dimensions of forest certification, Remagen-Oberwinter: Forstbuch, p. 241. 
33
  Report of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, 2002, A/CONF./199/20. 
34
  See e.g.: V. Haufler (2003), p. 237; M.A. Hajer, J.P.M. van Tatenhove, & C. Laurent (2004). 
Nieuwe vormen van governance: een essay over nieuwe vormen van bestuur met een em-
prirische uitwerking naar de domeinen van voedselveiligheid en gebiedsgericht beleid. Bilt-
hoven: RIVM rapport 500013004/2004, and R.D. Lipschutz & J.K. Rowe (2005). Globalisa-
tion, governmentality, and global politics: Regulation for the rest of us? London: Routledge, 
272 p.  
35
  V. Haufler (2003), p. 240; D. Leipziger (2003). The corporate responsibility code book. Shef-
field: Greenleaf Publishing, p. 134; E.E. Meidinger (2003). Forest certification as environ-
mental law making by global civil society. In: E.E. Meidinger, Chr. Elliott and G. Oesten 
(eds.), Social and political dimensions of forest certification. Remagen-Oberwinter: 
Forstbuch, p. 309. 
36
  E.E. Meidinger (2003), p. 309. 
37
  K. van Kersbergen & F. van Waarden (2004). Governance’ as a bridge between disciplines: 
Cross-disciplinary inspiration regarding shifts in governance and problems of governability, 
accountability and legitimacy. In: European Journal of Political Research, vol. 43, pp. 146-
147. 
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regulatory initiatives may be used as a strategic instrument of competition, and as a 
means to influence the division of power in economic relationships.38 
In order to classify the current forms of regulatory governance by state and non-state ac-
tors, Table 2.1 presents a typology of regulation based on source of authority and iden-
tity of regulator and regulated.39  
Table 2.1 Typology of regulation 
Type of actor Own authority By delegation 
State actor (formal) Primary legislation Secondary legislation 
Non-state actor (informal) Self-regulation 
Single-actor regulation 
Multi-actor regulation 
Co-regulation 
 
At the formal level, this typology distinguishes between primary and secondary legisla-
tion. Primary legislation is developed, implemented and enforced by national govern-
ments, either on their own or in cooperation with other governments. Secondary legisla-
tion is the product of legislative activity by actors from the state administration to whom 
authority has been delegated within a specific mandate. At the informal level, the typol-
ogy distinguishes between private own-authority regulation and co-regulation. Private 
own-authority regulation is developed, implemented and enforced by non-state actors, 
either on their own or in cooperation with other private actors, whereas co-regulation is 
developed under the responsibility of non-state actors that have been given a specific 
regulatory task by state authorities. 
Focusing on private own-authority regulation, the typology can be refined by focusing 
on the identity of the regulator and regulated. In case regulator and regulated are identi-
cal, the type of private regulation can be classified as self-regulation. If regulator and 
regulated are not identical, the type of regulation can be considered either single-actor or 
multi-actor regulation, depending on the number and type of regulating actors involved. 
Multi-actor regulation typically concerns regulatory activities of partnerships and coali-
tions that bring stakeholders from various backgrounds together. 
The next section will explore how state and non-state actor forms of regulatory govern-
ance relate to law according to the concept of legal pluralism. 
                                                   
38
  See e.g.: G. Gereffi (1999). International trade and industrial upgrading in the apparel com-
modity chain. In: Journal of International Economics, vol. 48, issue 1, pp. 37-70; R. Kap-
linsky (2000). Globalisation and unequalisation: What can be learned from value chain 
analysis? In: The Journal of Development Studies, vol. 37, no. 2, pp. 117-146, and T. 
Reardon, J.-M. Codron, L. Busch, J. Bingen & C. Harris (2001). Global change in agrifood 
grades and standards: Agribusiness strategic responses in developing countries. In:  Interna-
tional Food and Agribusiness Management Review, vol. 2, no. 3/4, pp. 421-435. 
39
  The following references have been used as a starting point for developing the typology of 
regulation: V. Haufler (2003), pp. 237-247, and T. Havinga (2006). Private regulation of food 
safety by supermarkets. In: Law and Policy, vol. 28, no. 4, pp. 515-533. 
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2.3 The concept of legal pluralism 
Over the past decade, several legal theorists have developed concepts that try to cope 
with an emerging body of transnational regulation that has little to do with the law of na-
tion-states. Some believe that the idea of absolute, but geographically fragmented, sover-
eignties is no longer tenable, since “the number of legal phenomena existing in juxtapo-
sition and superposition to the traditional framework of national sovereignties is multi-
plying.”40 It is argued that the understanding of this new world order requires an expla-
nation of its legal structure in pluralist terms, because such a conception of law acknowl-
edges the possibility of the existence of several legal orders equivalent or superior to that 
of the state, or collaborating with it on an equal footing.41 Consequently, the constitu-
tional structure of the world is considered one of a global order where various territorial 
and functional legal orders cohabit in relationships of competition or cooperation in their 
mission to regulate social life, and hence of legal pluralism.42 
The concept of legal pluralism was initially developed by legal anthropologists. This so-
called ‘classic’ legal pluralism focused on ‘primitive’ societies with more than only one 
central agency making law, resulting for example in governmental and tribal law.43 
Along similar lines, legal pluralists have been paying attention to colonial, and also post-
colonial, legal systems with pluralistic characteristics, where the law of both the colo-
nized and the colonizers coexisted.44 In the past decade, several legal pluralists have 
shifted their focus, and discovered strong pluralist traces in the present global societal 
order. This ‘new’ legal pluralism, or global legal pluralism, holds the view that legal plu-
                                                   
40
  J.-P. Robé (1997). Multinational enterprises: the constitution of a pluralistic legal order. In: 
G. Teubner (ed.), Global law without a State, Aldershot/ Brookfield: Dartmouth Publishing 
Company, p. 47.  
41
  Ibidem, p. 49 and p. 68, with references to Gurvitch, 1931.  
42
  Ibidem, pp. 69-70.  
43
  See e.g.: F. von Benda-Beckmann (1970). Rechtspluralismus in Malawi - Geschichtliche 
Entwicklung und heutige Problematik eines ehemals britischen Kolonialgebietes . München: 
Weltforum Verlag; K. von Benda-Beckmann (1985). The use of folk law in West Sumatran 
State Courts, in: A.N. Allott and G.R. Woodman (eds.): People’s law and state law. The Bel-
lagio Papers. Dordrecht: Foris Publications, pp. 77-95, and F. von Benda-Beckmann, K. von 
Benda-Beckmann & A. Hoekema (1997) (eds.). Natural resources, environment and legal 
pluralism. In: International Yearbook for Legal Anthropology, vol. 9, 325 p. 
44
  See e.g.: L. Benton (2002). Law and colonial cultures: legal regimes in world history, 1400-
1900. Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press. 
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ralism is a common social feature and claims that we witness today an increase of legal 
pluralism and differentiation under the influence of increased economic globalisation.45   
The Portuguese socio-legal theorist Boaventura de Sousa Santos was one of the first 
scholars who used the ideas about legal pluralism developed by legal anthropologists in a 
global context. In his book “Toward a new common sense” from 1995, he first applied 
the theoretical concept of legal pluralism in his description of the law in a Brazilian 
favela and then used it in his analysis of the emerging transnational law. According to 
Santos, the present situation is such that “[R]ather than being ordered by a single legal 
order, modern societies are ordered by a plurality of legal orders, interrelated and so-
cially distributed in different ways.”46 He further argued that we are now entering the pe-
riod of postmodern legal pluralism that focuses on “suprastate, transnational legal orders 
coexisting in the world system with both state and infrastate legal orders.”47  
In his work, Santos makes a distinction between (a) legal forms which are transnational 
in origin or which, though national or even local in origin, reproduce themselves transna-
tionally by mechanisms other than those typical of interstate relations; and (b) national 
legal fields as they are transformed by transnational legal movements.48 With regard to 
the latter, he observes that “the national legal field is increasingly interpenetrated by 
transnational legal forms which unfold in complex relations with both the state legal or-
der and the local legal orders.”49 However, Santos does not conceive of this “globaliza-
tion of the legal field”, as he calls it, as a radically new phenomenon but considers that 
its roots are located in a historical development that has taken place over the past centu-
ries. What is new is the dramatic intensification of transnational practices and interac-
tions, leading to an increased transnationalization of, inter alia, the legal field.  
When applied to present-day reality, Santos distinguishes seven areas where legal trans-
nationalisation takes place, including nation-state law, law of regional integration, lex 
mercatoria, the law of migrant people, the law of indigenous peoples, human rights law, 
                                                   
45
  S.E. Merry (1988). Legal pluralism. In: Law and Society Review, vol. 22, no. 5, pp. 869-896; 
B. de Sousa Santos (1995). Toward a new common sense: law, science and politics in the 
paradigmatic transition. New York/ London: Routledge, 614 p.; G. Teubner (ed.) (1997). 
Global law without a state. Aldershot/Brookfield: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 350 p.; F. 
Snyder (1999). Governing economic globalisation: global legal pluralism and European Law. 
In: European Law Journal, vol.5, no. 4, pp. 334-374; R.A. MacDonald (1998). Metaphors of 
multiplicity: civil society, regimes and legal pluralism, excerpt from 15 Ariz. J. Int’l & 
Comp. Law p. 69; K. von Benda-Beckmann (2002). Globalisation and legal pluralism. In: In-
ternational Law FORUM du droit international, vol. 4, pp. 19-25, and K. Günther (2003). 
Legal pluralism and the universal code of legality: globalization as a problem of legal theory, 
p. 9 (English version of: K. Günther (2001), Rechtspluralismus und universaler Code der Le-
galität: Globalisierung als rechtstheoretisches Problem, in: L. Wingert & K. Günther (eds.), 
Die Öffentlichkeit der Vernunft und die Vernunft der Öffentlichkeit, essays in honour of Jür-
gen Habermas, Frankfurt am Main, pp. 539-567. 
46
  B. de Sousa Santos (1995), p. 114. 
47
  Ibidem, p. 116.  
48
  Ibidem, p. 250.  
49
  Ibidem, p. 250.  
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and the law governing the global commons.50 Within these areas, Santos basically ob-
serves the emergence of two types of transnationalisation that are, in fact, opposing 
forces.51 The first one is organized by world capitalism in its search for a new global re-
gime of accumulation. The second one is organized “in the name of dominated, exploited 
or oppressed social groups and interests, as well as degraded, exploited or destroyed 
natural resources.” 
Santos goes on to argue that the transnationalisation of the legal field contains seemingly 
contradictory elements, such as top-down imposition and bottom-up creation, formal and 
informal manifestations, and objectives of uniformity as well as differentiation. He 
thinks that this diversity makes it attractive from a research perspective to analyse the 
transformation of the legal field in a certain area and to focus on the plurality and diver-
sity of laws (and conceptions of law) within the same geopolitical space. Moreover, the 
analysis of such transnational legal fields may give an impression of the diversity, com-
plexity, complementarity and conflictuality of transnational interactions.52 
In the mid-1990s, German socio-legal theorists also adopted the theoretical concept of 
legal pluralism and started to elaborate it in a global context. In his book “Global law 
without a state” of 1997, Günther Teubner launched the thesis that “globalization of law 
creates a multitude of decentred law-making processes in various sectors of civil society, 
independently of nation-states.”53 He argued that lex mercatoria, the transnational law of 
economic transactions, is the most successful example of global law without a state, but 
also observed that various other sectors of world society are developing a global law of 
their own in ‘relative insulation’ from the state, official international policies and public 
international law.54 Among the examples he mentioned are labour law, human rights law, 
and environmental law. In order to underpin his thesis, Teubner developed three argu-
ments:55 
1. Global law can only be adequately explained by a theory of legal pluralism. 
2. The emerging global (not inter-national!) law is a legal order in its own right which 
should not be measured against the standards of national legal systems.  
3. Its relative distance from international politics will not protect global law from its re-
politicization. Yet this will occur in new and unexpected ways.  
Teubner believes that “contemporary law will grow mainly from the social peripheries, 
not from the political centres of nation-states and international institutions [italics by 
Teubner].”56 The new ‘living law’ of the world is nourished not from stores of traditions 
but from the ongoing self-reproduction of highly technical, highly specialized, often 
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formally organized and rather narrowly defined, global networks of an economic, cul-
tural, academic or technological nature.57 It is therefore logical to expect global law to 
have characteristics that are significantly different from our experience of the law of the 
nation-state in relation to boundaries, sources of law, independence, and unity of the law. 
The phenomenon to be identified, in Teubner’s words, is a self-reproducing, worldwide 
legal discourse which closes its meaning boundaries by the use of the legal/illegal bi-
nary code and reproduces itself by processing a symbol of global (not national) validity 
[italics by Teubner].58 The first criterion – ‘binary coding’ – delineates global law from 
economic and other social processes. The invocation of the legal code excludes merely 
social conventions and moral norms. The second criterion – ‘global validity’ – delineates 
global law from national and international legal phenomena.  
More recently, Teubner proceeded with his argument of global legal pluralism and 
launched the thesis of the emergence of a multiplicity of civil constitutions, alongside 
traditional state constitutions.59 In his article, he aimed to demonstrate that a situation 
along the lines of constitutional pluralism beyond the nation-state is moving forward. 
More specifically, he believes that “civil constitutions are formed in underground evolu-
tionary processes of long duration in which the juridication of social sectors also incre-
mentally develops constitutional norms, although they remain as it were embedded in the 
whole set of legal norms.”60 
In the same spirit as Teubner, other legal pluralists have also been searching for over-
arching concepts that do justice to the reality of law-making by a plurality of actors and 
give a common foundation to it. These efforts to define principles that regulate all law-
making bodies are essentially a quest for a constitution for functional as well as territo-
rial law-making. Günther, for example, suggests a legal meta-language of basic legal 
concepts and rules or, in other words, a universal code of legality61, Sand argues for 
polycontextuality62, Schepel notices the development of global principles of ‘private ad-
ministrative law’63, whereas Meidinger speaks in terms of an emerging global public law 
of principles that “regulate plural law-making bodies so as to make their workings suffi-
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ciently compatible to achieve functional governance.”64 This concise overview shows 
that the debate among legal pluralists has not crystallised as yet, and has, in fact, just 
started to evolve. 
2.4 The application of legal pluralism in research 
The application of legal pluralism in research requires a translation of the concept in a 
concrete research approach. This section outlines such a structured research approach, 
distinguishing five different stages in its application: 
1) Identification of sites of governance; 
2) Description of rule systems;  
3) Evaluation of rule systems; 
4) Analysis of interaction between rule systems, and 
5) Construction of the pattern of legal pluralism. 
2.4.1 Identification of sites of governance 
The first stage of the research approach focuses on the delineation of the issue-area un-
der consideration and the identification of the sites of governance where regulatory ac-
tivity takes place. A relevant question relates to the characteristics that distinguish a site 
of governance from an average organisational entity. As a point of departure, the defini-
tion of a “semi-autonomous social field” has been used which is a related concept that 
was introduced by Sally Falk Moore in 1973.65  
In her famous article, she explained that a semi-autonomous social field is defined by a 
processual characteristic, namely that “it has rule-making capacities, and the means to 
induce or coerce compliance; but [that] it is simultaneously set in a larger social matrix 
which can, and does, affect and invade it, sometimes at the invitation of persons inside it, 
sometimes at its own instance.66 The operation of such a social field is to a significant 
extent self-regulating, self-enforcing, and self-propelling, however within a certain legal, 
political, economic and social environment.67 Falk Moore furthermore observed that 
some semi-autonomous fields are quite enduring and others only exist briefly, that some 
are consciously constructed, while others evolve in the marketplace or the neighbour-
hood or elsewhere out of history of transactions.68 
Hence, a semi-autonomous social field can be considered a site of governance avant la 
lettre and is in fact a largely identical phenomenon. Based on the definition of Falk 
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Moore, the following criteria can be used in order to identify sites of regulatory govern-
ance: 
• A sphere of territorial, functional or sectoral competence; 
• A membership with rights and obligations; 
• An institutional structure to govern internal and external relations; 
• An explicit regulatory discourse and output, and 
• A mechanism for stimulating compliance. 
2.4.2 Description of rule systems 
The second stage of the research approach focuses on the description of rule systems that 
are the product of regulatory activity undertaken by the sites of governance identified in 
the previous stage. A rule system is, in this respect, defined as a comprehensive set of 
procedural and normative rules aiming to deal with a certain issue in a coherent way. 
Such a rule system can be created, implemented and enforced by state as well as non-
state actors and can include for example a convention, a directive or a certification pro-
gramme. Although a rule system and a regulatory instrument will often be identical, a 
rule system is, in principle, more encompassing as it can unite multiple instruments.  
In order to place these rule systems in a certain context, this study will first describe their 
evolution within a certain period of time. This description will subsequently provide the 
basis to make a selection of rule systems that qualify for further analysis focusing on the 
various stages in the regulatory process, including rule-making, rule-implementation and 
rule-enforcement. In this study, rule-making is defined as the creation of rules and their 
revision and adaptation. Rule-implementation refers to the transposition, interpretation 
and operationalisation of rules. Rule-enforcement refers to the monitoring and control of 
compliance and, in case of non-compliance, the application of sanctions.  
2.4.3 Evaluation of rule systems 
The third stage of the research approach concerns the evaluation of selected rule systems 
on the basis of predefined criteria. This evaluation uses criteria that are based on an in-
terpretation of the concept of sustainable development and its environmental, social and 
economic dimensions.69  
To achieve a workeable result, each dimension of sustainable development will be con-
nected with a specific evaluation criterion. The point of departure have been the princi-
ples that are listed in the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development of 1992 and 
those promoted in the ILA New Delhi Declaration of Principles of International Law re-
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lating to Sustainable Development.70 Several linkages can be made between these prin-
ciples and the triple dimensions of sustainable development. Taking into account the par-
ticularities of the issue-area of pesticide risk reduction in agriculture, the following link-
ages are proposed. The environmental dimension will be linked with the principle of ef-
fectiveness as well as the principle of a precautionary approach to human health, natural 
resources and ecosystems. The social dimension will be combined with the principle of 
public participation and access to information and justice, and the economic dimension 
with the principle of equity as well as the principle of common but differentiated respon-
sibilities. More concisely, the proposed three linkages can be summarised as the criteria 
of effectiveness, inclusiveness, and fairness. They will be further elaborated below, ex-
plaining their origins in international law, and the interpretations used in this study. Sub-
sequently, these criteria will be used for a qualitative assessment of rule systems at the 
international, EU and transnational level in the Chapters 3, 4, and 5, respectively. 
Effectiveness 
The criterion of effectiveness is interpreted in this study as the extent to which a regula-
tory approach delivers a contribution towards the objective of reducing the environ-
mental and human health risks associated with pesticide use. This criterion has been de-
rived from Principle 11 of the Rio Declaration, as far as it states that States shall enact 
effective environmental legislation. This principle has not returned explicitly in the ILA 
New Delhi Principles, but can be assumed to be an element of several of them, most no-
tably of the principle of good governance. 
In a general sense, the criterion of effectiveness relates to goal accomplishment. Conse-
quently, measuring effectiveness is about assessing progress towards that specific goal. 
Although this may sound straightforward, measuring effectiveness in a concrete case can 
be a complicated matter, raising a number of questions.71 The first question is about 
choosing an appropriate goal against which progress can be assessed. In principle, there 
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is a choice between goals that are internal or external to the rule system investigated. If a 
goal is internal to a rule system it will be derived from the explicit or implicit objective 
of that system. If a goal is external to a rule system, it is usually based upon an objective 
chosen by those performing the evaluation. In this study, the predefined external goal 
against which effectiveness will be measured is the reduction of pesticide risks in terms 
of human health and the environment.  
The second question is about how to measure progress towards the predefined goal. This 
requires that the goal needs to be operationalised into measurable indicators. For pesti-
cide risk reduction, there are several indicators conceivable, referring to different stages 
in the pesticide life-cycle. Such indicators may for example include: figures on produc-
tion, sales and use of pesticide substances and products, the level of implementation of 
innovative production methods, the incidence of pesticide residues in food products, the 
level of emissions to air, water and soil, and the negative impacts on the environment 
and human health. However, these indicators have in common that they all say some-
thing about risk reduction but do not provide a definite answer to the question of goal at-
tainment. In this study, the assessments concerning effectiveness will be based on vari-
ous indicators, depending on the availability of information. These indicators will at best 
indicate trends, but do not provide any ‘hard’ scientific evidence.  
The third question is about how to establish causality between the observed impacts and 
a particular regulatory approach. This is the most difficult question to tackle, because a 
positive correlation is in most cases almost impossible to prove and it will rather come 
down to a matter of excluding other explanations.  
Inclusiveness 
The criterion of inclusiveness is interpreted as the extent to which a regulatory approach 
is based upon involvement of the stakeholders concerned in processes of rule-making, 
rule-implementation, and rule-enforcement. In this respect, a high level of inclusiveness 
is not considered as a value in itself but as a means to improve the quality of decision-
making and more efficient implementation. 
The criterion of inclusiveness has been derived from Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration, 
and has been expanded with a view to the principle of good governance in the ILA New 
Delhi Declaration and the procedural criteria articulated in the WTO Agreement on 
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement). Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration states 
that:  
Environmental issues are best handled with the participation of all concerned citizens, at 
the relevant level. At the national level, each individual shall have appropriate access to 
information concerning the environment that is held by public authorities, including in-
formation on hazardous materials and activities in their communities, and the opportu-
nity to participate in decision-making processes. States shall facilitate and encourage 
public awareness and participation by making information widely available. Effective 
access to judicial and administrative proceedings, including redress and remedy, shall be 
provided.  
Hence, the Rio principle has a strong national focus and is restricted to participation of 
the public. This means that it does not formulate a general principle of stakeholder par-
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ticipation in decision-making. The ILA principle of public participation has kept the 
same restricted focus as the Rio principle, but has added several new elements, consider-
ing public participation a condition for responsive, transparent and accountable govern-
ance, and stressing the freedom of opinion and the right of access to information.72 Fur-
thermore, the restricted focus of the participation principle is partly compensated by the 
inclusion of the principle of good governance that emphasizes the adoption of democ-
ratic and transparent decision-making procedures and respect for the rule of law and hu-
man rights in a broader context.73  
At the specific level of technical regulations and standards, it is also important to refer to 
the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement) and its Annex 3 that in-
cludes a Code of Good Practice for the preparation, adoption, and application of stan-
dards.74 More specifically, this Code articulates a set of procedural quality criteria that 
inter alia aim to enhance transparency, participation and accountability in rule-making 
processes, which are important conditions to stimulate inclusiveness. These criteria re-
quire, for example, that rule-makers provide copies of draft standards on request to inter-
ested parties (provision M); promptly publish adopted standards (provision O); allow in-
terested parties a certain period for the submission of comments on draft standards (pro-
vision L), and take the comments they have received into account in the further process-
ing of the standards (provision N). 
Fairness 
The criterion of fairness is interpreted as the extent to which a regulatory approach has 
impacts on the distribution of costs and benefits in the supply chains of agricultural 
products, and ultimately on the marketing opportunities for agricultural producers. The 
criterion of fairness has been derived from Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration, which 
states that: 
States should cooperate to promote a supportive and open international economic system 
that would lead to economic growth and sustainable development in all countries, to bet-
ter address the problems of environmental degradation. Trade policy measures for envi-
ronmental purposes should not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimi-
nation or a disguised restriction on international trade. Unilateral actions to deal with en-
vironmental challenges outside the jurisdiction of the importing country should be 
avoided. Environmental measures addressing transboundary or global environmental 
problems should, as far as possible, be based on an international consensus. 
In order to promote this supportive and open international economic system, trade in ag-
ricultural products is subject to the rules that have been established in the WTO Agree-
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ment on Agriculture of 1995.75 The Agreement provides for the following liberalisation 
measures: the elimination of non-tariff barriers by converting them to tariffs (so called 
tariffication); the binding of all tariffs and their subsequent reduction, and the cutting 
back of domestic support. It also seeks to prohibit export subsidies as much as possible. 
In accordance with Article 20 of the Agreement on Agriculture, the General Council of 
the WTO launched negotiations to continue the process of trade reform in agriculture in 
2000.76 The agricultural issue constituted the pivotal element of the multilateral trade ne-
gotiations, billed as the ‘Development Round’, that was originally due to be concluded 
by 1 January 2005, but was stalled after a deadlock was reached in the negotiations.77   
Significantly, with the increased liberalisation of agricultural trade, there is growing con-
cern that WTO members will increasingly use (or: abuse) measures based on non-trade 
concerns as a compensation for the loss of quantitative trade restrictive measures.78 Pes-
ticide risk reduction measures are an example of such measures as they focus on the pro-
tection of human health and the environment. Importantly, they can have different mani-
festations, as they are initiated by state and non-state actors, function at various geo-
graphical levels, and focus on various issues in the pesticide life-cycle.  
The WTO agreements allow to a certain extent that member states take measures based 
on non-trade concerns, but provide several safeguards to prevent trade discrimination 
and unnecessary restrictive measures through provisions in GATT 1994, the TBT 
Agreement, and the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agree-
ment). Importantly, the TBT and SPS Agreements are also applicable on forms of regu-
lation by non-state actors, but it is not fully clarified as yet how far this applicability 
goes. 
Despite the principle of non-discrimination, it has been argued by Oxfam that interna-
tional trade rules are currently loaded against the poor and the environment.79 More spe-
cifically, the report also states that power imbalances in markets at all levels are a lead-
ing contributor to the denial of economic rights and that reversing such imbalances can 
lift millions out of poverty. It is therefore important to focus on the question whether 
trade flows of agricultural products have changed, or are expected to change, under the 
influence of the implementation of pesticide risk reduction measures, and, if yes, 
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whether this will result in extra barriers to trade for specific groups of suppliers, for ex-
ample from certain regions or countries. 
2.4.4 Analysis of interaction between rule systems 
The fourth stage of the proposed research approach focuses on the interaction between 
rule systems. The study of interaction is still in a relatively early stage, but, as argued 
above, certainly deserves attention when looking through the lens of legal pluralism. One 
of the more systematic and comprehensive efforts so far has been performed by the po-
litical scientists Sebastian Oberthür and Thomas Gehring, who have developed a concep-
tual framework that allows for a systematic and comparative investigation of the phe-
nomenon of institutional interaction.80 More precisely, the study by Oberthür and Ge-
hring focuses on interaction between institutions at the international and EU level, and 
distinguishes horizontal and vertical interaction.81  
The conceptual framework developed in their book has been applied to ten different is-
sue-areas in the field of global environmental governance. The issue-areas under investi-
gation did not include those of chemicals and/or pesticides, although some of them may 
have some commonalities with it. In this light, it can be considered an interesting exer-
cise to perform a similar analysis focused on regulatory instruments aimed at pesticide 
risk reduction. However, before performing such an analysis, this section will first exam-
ine to what extent the terminology and perspective used by Oberthür and Gehring need 
to be adapted to the purposes of a study of interaction that takes the concept of legal plu-
ralism as a starting point.  
Oberthür and Gehering’s framework is based on what Oran Young calls a ‘reductionist’ 
approach where interaction is dissected in its separate components, and where the single 
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case of interaction is the principal unit of analysis.82 According to this framework, insti-
tutional interaction essentially refers to a causal relationship between two institutions, 
with one of these institutions (“the source institution”) exerting influence on the other 
(“the target institution”) through a unidirectional causal pathway connecting the two in-
stitutions.83 In the absence of any causal influence, there exists a mere co-existence of 
two or more institutions.  
Underlying the causal pathway connecting two institutions are mechanisms at work that 
may explain how, and under which conditions, governance institutions are capable of 
exerting influence on each other.84 Basically, Oberthür and Gehring distinguish interac-
tion affecting the decision-making process of the target institution and interaction affect-
ing the effectiveness of the target institution.85 Each of these two basic forms of interac-
tion is supposed to be driven by different causal mechanisms. On the one hand, interac-
tion influencing decision-making can be driven by cognitive processes (learning) or 
through commitment. On the other hand, interaction affecting the effectiveness of an-
other institution takes place at the behavioural or impact-level. 
In relation to interaction influencing decision-making, cognitive interaction means that 
an institution triggers a learning process based on the transfer of information, knowl-
edge, or ideas that leads to purely voluntary adaptation by the other institution.86 Such 
processes may occur because in the present-day world the rationality of actors is usually 
“bounded”, either because the actors do not have all relevant information available or 
because their information processing capacity is limited. Cognitive interaction may take 
place between institutions as long as there is a similarity of problems that allows for 
learning across institutional borders. In contrast, interaction through commitment fea-
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tures the effects of commitments on the part of members of one institution upon the pref-
erences of those associated with another institution.87 
With regard to interaction influencing effectiveness, behavioural interaction implies that 
behaviour taking place within one institution affects the operation of the other institution. 
Differently, interaction on the impact level directly affects the ultimate policy goal of the 
target institution. In the study by Oberthür and Gehring, the latter type of interaction is 
not considered any further, because patterns of causality in the physical world are 
deemed too complicated for analysis by social scientists.  
The effects of a case of institutional interaction may be beneficial, adverse, or neutral for 
the institutions involved.88 Whereas beneficial effects will create synergy between the 
two institutions involved, adverse effects will result in disruption or conflict because 
they undermine an institution’s effectiveness. Finally, effects may also be indeterminate 
or neutral. In response to the effects of interaction, the actors concerned may decide to 
formulate a response action, in order to mitigate disruption or to enhance synergy.89 The 
latter is, however, not seen as a necessary component of a case of interaction. Such re-
sponse actions by the institutions concerned may differ, including several options such as 
collective decision-making, coordinated decision-making, administrative coordination 
and exchange of information.  
Comparing the conceptual framework developed by Oberthür and Gehring with the ap-
proach envisaged in this study, several adaptations of the terminology and perspective 
are necessary. On the one hand, this study uses a more narrow perspective by focusing 
on forms of regulation, instead of institutions. Following from this, the term ‘regulatory 
interaction’ seems more appropriate than ’institutional interaction’. On the other hand, 
this study takes a broader perspective on the phenomenon of interaction by including ac-
tors from state as well as non-state origin in the analysis. This means that an additional 
direction of interaction will come into view that will be called diagonal interaction, as 
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  T. Gehring & S. Oberthür (2006). Comparative empirical analysis and ideal types of institu-
tional interaction. In: S. Oberthür & T. Gehring (eds.). Institutional interaction in global envi-
ronmental governance. Synergy and conflict among international and EU policies. Cam-
bridge/London: The MIT Press, p. 325. 
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  S. Oberthür & T. Gehring (2006). Conceptual foundations of institutional interaction, In: S. 
Oberthür & T. Gehring (eds.). Institutional interaction in global environmental governance. 
Synergy and conflict among international and EU policies. Cambridge/London: The MIT 
Press, p. 46. 
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  T. Gehring & S. Oberthür (2006). Comparative empirical analysis and ideal types of institu-
tional interaction. In: S. Oberthür & T. Gehring (eds.). Institutional interaction in global envi-
ronmental governance. Synergy and conflict among international and EU policies. Cam-
bridge/London: The MIT Press, p. 315. 
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the regulatory approaches concerned do not relate in a horizontal or vertical manner with 
each other, but follow a different logic.90  
In sum, these changes in perspective are expected to have certain consequences for the 
forms of regulatory interaction to be identified and the mechanisms that underlie them. 
2.4.5 Construction of the pattern of legal pluralism 
The fifth stage of the proposed research approach pulls the different threads together in 
order to determine the pattern of legal pluralism in the specific issue-area of pesticide 
risk reduction in agriculture. As Van Kersbergen and Van Waarden (2001) have ob-
served, present-day governance can be characterised by a “complex interweaving of ac-
tors operating at different levels of authority”.91 At best, the different approaches 
strengthen each other, but it is also possible, as the objectives of the actors concerned do 
not always converge, that the mutual influences are less favourable, and moreover there 
is a chance of regulatory competition and even a risk of over-regulation leading to exces-
sive costs for both regulators and regulated.  
The analysis of the resulting regulatory pattern will especially focus on the changes that 
have taken place in the configuration of sites and forms of governance. These shifts in 
governance will be considered, using several perspectives, such as the division of roles 
in regulation, the dominant steering modes, the objectives of regulation, and the level of 
sustainability. Furthermore, the emerging pattern will be used as a point of departure to 
identify future options for improvement, taking into account the possible roles of state 
and non-state actors. 
2.5 Conclusions 
This chapter has explained the theoretical concept of legal pluralism and elaborated it in 
a structured research approach consisting of five different stages. Compared with con-
ventional approaches in legal analysis, the merit of the concept of legal pluralism is that 
it recognises different types of normative activity without discriminating between them 
on the basis of their origin and source. By offering such a perspective upon legal phe-
nomena in contemporary society, the concept of legal pluralism emphasises the role of 
non-state actors in processes of rule-making, rule-implementation, and rule-enforcement. 
It thus aims to cope with the new phenomena of globalisation of law and transnationali-
sation of regulation, and increased interaction between different normative orders. 
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Recapitulating the structured research approach, the first stage focuses on the delineation 
of the issue-area under consideration and the identification of the sites of governance oc-
cupying it. The second stage includes the description of rule systems created and oper-
ated by the sites of governance concerned. The third stage concerns the evaluation of 
rule systems on the basis of predefined criteria based on an interpretation of the concept 
of sustainable development, including effectiveness, inclusiveness and fairness. The 
fourth stage focuses on the interaction between rule systems. The fifth stage concerns the 
construction of the pattern of legal pluralism and the identification of options for im-
provement. 
This stage-wise research approach has the following implications for the structure of the 
study. The second part identifies the components of legal pluralism at the international, 
EU and transnational level. It furthermore describes and assesses a selection of these 
components. The third part illustrates the practice of legal pluralism from the perspec-
tives of national government as well as agricultural producers. The fourth part focuses on 
the interaction between the components of legal pluralism, and constructs the pattern of 
legal pluralism in the issue-area of pesticide risk reduction. It also discusses the contribu-
tion of legal pluralism for understanding current forms of regulation, and the lessons to 
be learnt about the applied research approach. 
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Part II The components of legal pluralism 
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3.  The multilateral approach to pesticide risk reduction 
3.1 Introduction 
The first international agreement with relevance for plant protection and pesticide use 
was the Phylloxera vasatrix Convention that was agreed by 12 countries in 1891, and 
contained regulatory measures for grapevines.92 This agreement evolved into a text with 
a broader scope at the International Conference for Plant Protection held in Rome in 
1929 and was finally adopted as the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) in 
1951 by the Conference of FAO.93 It came into force one year later.  
The 1952 IPPC had the objective of “securing common and effective action to prevent 
the introduction and spread of pests and diseases of plant and plant products and to pro-
mote measures for their control …”.94 Its key obligations concerned the establishment of 
national organizations for plant protection and the use of model phytosanitary certificates 
for exports of plants and plant products.95 Most importantly, the contracting Govern-
ments were given full authority to regulate the entry of plants and plant products, as long 
as such measures were made necessary by phytosanitary considerations.96 Hence, the 
1952 Convention aimed at finding a balance between the sovereignty of countries to pro-
tect themselves against pests on the one hand and the facilitation of international trade in 
plants and plant products on the other hand. At that time, the reduction of pesticide risks 
was not an issue at all. However, this began to change in the 1960s and 1970s when pes-
ticide risks for human health and the environment were first broadly recognised.97  
This chapter aims to analyse the international law and policy on pesticides.98 Section 3.2 
describes its evolution against the background of the diverging policy objectives at stake. 
Section 3.3 focuses on the legal tenets of the international approach with explicit objec-
tives of risk reduction, including the FAO International Code of Conduct on the Distri-
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  Report of the Conference of FAO, 6th Session, Rome, 6 December 1951. 
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  IPPC, Article I. 
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  IPPC, Articles IV and V. 
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Carson (1962). Silent spring. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 400 p. 
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  See for discussions of the international environmental law on chemical substances: P. Birnie 
& A. Boyle (2002). International law and the environment (2nd edition). Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 798 p.; D. Hunter, J. Salzman & D. Zaelke (2002). International environmental 
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In: D. Bodansky, J. Brunnée & E. Hey (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International Envi-
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on the law of toxic substances: M. Pallemaerts (2003). Toxics and transnational law: interna-
tional and European regulation of toxic substances as legal symbolism. Oxford: Hart Publish-
ing, 767 p.  
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bution and Use of Pesticides, the Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent 
Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade, and 
the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants. Section 3.4 assesses the in-
ternational law approach to pesticide risk reduction in terms of effectiveness, inclusive-
ness, and fairness. 
3.2 The evolution of the international law on pesticides 
The first global measures with a potential limiting impact on pesticide risks were interna-
tional standards set by the Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC) that was established 
in 1963 as a subsidiary body of FAO and WHO.99 The CAC was given the mandate to 
execute the joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme, and to develop standards and 
codes dealing with basic principles, technical specifications for products and good manu-
facturing practices, aiming at the protection of consumer health and the promotion of fair 
practices in food trade.100 The resulting Codex Alimentarius inter alia comprised limits 
for pesticides residues in traded food products. 
During the 1970s, the first environmental agreements with an impact on pesticide use 
were agreed in the form of a number of regional conventions for the protection of the 
marine environment.101 They were established with the objective of reducing emissions 
of various hazardous substances, including a considerable number of pesticides. These 
agreements still exist today, but they have all been drastically amended or substituted by 
new conventions.102 
UN Conference on the Human Environment 
The UN Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE), held in Stockholm in 1972, 
formed the impetus for a global approach to the environmental problems caused by pes-
ticides.103 At the conference, the idea of an International Register of Potentially Toxic 
Chemicals (IRPTC) was launched. The initial aspirations of the newly established 
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) were ambitious about this idea, seek-
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  Resolution 16.42, May 1963. Membership is open to all member states of FAO and WHO. 
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ing to develop rules ‘as a first step towards a global convention’, but ultimately the 
IRPTC developed more humbly as a body for facilitating information exchange.104 
The increasing international trade in chemicals, including pesticides, prompted further 
efforts by the international community to safeguard people and the environment from the 
harmful results of such trade.105 These efforts were not only motivated by concern about 
the dangers that pesticides could pose in developing countries but also by the recognition 
of the “circle of poison”, the phenomenon that pesticides of which the use is banned in 
developed countries are sold to developing countries and return as residues in food prod-
ucts. The growing international concern resulted in the development of the International 
Code of Conduct for the Distribution and Use of Pesticides by FAO and, more or less in 
tandem, the London Guidelines for the Exchange of Information on Chemicals in Inter-
national Trade by UNEP, respectively in 1985 and 1987.106 Both used as a key reference 
point the WHO Classification by Hazard of 1975 which distinguishes several classes of 
pesticide substances based on acute toxicity, including extremely hazardous (IA), highly 
hazardous (IB), moderately hazardous (II) and slightly hazardous (III) substances, and a 
class of substances unlikely to present acute hazard in normal use.107
 
Early drafts of the FAO Code had provided for a prior informed consent mechanism for 
each shipment of pesticides banned or severely restricted in exporting countries, but 
pressure from industry and a number of producing countries resulted in its deletion.108 
However, in response to continuing concerns of developing countries and NGOs, FAO 
adopted a resolution in November 1987 that prior informed consent should be incorpo-
rated into the Code within two years.109 In 1989, the Code and also the London Guide-
lines were amended to include a voluntary prior informed consent procedure, managed 
jointly by FAO and UNEP, to help countries make informed decisions on the import of 
chemicals that have been banned or severely restricted in other countries.110  
With regard to the management of hazardous wastes, which includes waste from pesti-
cide production, states adopted the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary 
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal in 1989.111 The Convention entered 
into force in 1992. The overall goal of the Basel Convention is to protect human health 
and the environment from generation and transboundary movements of hazardous 
wastes, with as main instrument a prior informed consent procedure for waste transport 
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that was largely similar to the one embedded in the FAO Code of Conduct and the Lon-
don Guidelines.  
The 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer became rele-
vant in relation to pesticides with the Copenhagen meeting in 1992 when the Parties 
agreed to freeze the production and use of the soil fumigant methyl bromide, which is a 
significant ozone-depleting agent.112 Two years later, this provision was turned into a 
complete phase out of methyl bromide production and use with different deadlines for 
developed and developing countries.113 
UN Conference on Environment and Development 
The international approaches of the 1970s and 1980s dealt with a few specific aspects of 
pesticide use related problems. A turning point towards a more encompassing interna-
tional approach was the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development 
(UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro.114 Besides the Rio Declaration, the participating countries 
agreed upon Agenda 21 that contained an action programme in preparation for the 21st 
century.115 In general terms, Agenda 21 promoted the idea of a global partnership for 
sustainable development, in which international, regional and national governmental and 
non-governmental organisations should play a role, and the broadest participation of all 
other stakeholders should be encouraged. In concrete terms, Agenda 21 included objec-
tives, activities, and means of implementation in relation to specific programme areas. 
Agenda 21 contained two programme areas with specific relevance for the further devel-
opment of the international law and policy on pesticides. The programme area of sus-
tainable agriculture and rural development (SARD) mentioned integrated pest manage-
ment (IPM) as the emerging agricultural method of preference, observing that “inte-
grated pest management, which combines biological control, host plant resistance and 
appropriate farming practices and minimizes the use of pesticides, is the best option for 
the future, as it guarantees yields, reduces costs, is environmentally friendly and contrib-
utes to the sustainability of agriculture.”116 Furthermore, it was stated that IPM should go 
hand in hand with appropriate pesticide management, including pesticide regulation and 
control according to the life-cycle concept, and accordingly, that States should imple-
ment the FAO International Code of Conduct on the Distribution and Use of Pesticides 
no later than the year 2000.117 
The second relevant programme area of Agenda 21 elaborated an international strategy 
for action on sound management of chemicals and called on States to achieve, by the 
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year 2000, full participation in and implementation of the prior informed consent proce-
dure.118 As a follow-up, the FAO Council agreed in November 1994 that the FAO Secre-
tariat should proceed with the preparation of a draft prior informed consent convention 
as part of the joint FAO/UNEP programme.119 In May 1995, the UNEP Governing 
Council authorized the Executive Director to convene, with the FAO, an international 
negotiating committee (INC) with a mandate to prepare an international legally binding 
instrument for the application of the prior informed consent procedure in relation to the 
international trade in pesticides.120 The negotiation of the Convention has subsequently 
been completed in five sessions of the INC, and the Rotterdam Convention on the Prior 
Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in Interna-
tional Trade was adopted on 10 September 1998.121  
The international strategy on sound management of chemicals, as outlined in Agenda 21, 
also formed the impetus for the development of another treaty dealing with the manage-
ment of chemicals. More precisely, Agenda 21 called for the “phasing out or banning of 
toxic chemicals that pose an unreasonable and otherwise unmanageable risk to the envi-
ronment or human health and those that are toxic, persistent and bio-accumulative and 
whose use cannot be adequately controlled.”122 
The momentum to conclude an international convention on these so-called persistent or-
ganic pollutants (POPs) further grew with the creation of the Intergovernmental Forum 
on Chemical Safety (IFCS) in Stockholm in 1994, and the Washington Conference on 
Land-based Sources of Marine Pollution in 1995.123 Moreover, the Inuit indigenous peo-
ple have been strongly advocating the case of a convention on POPs since the levels of 
these substances turned out to be extremely high in the ecosystems and food chains in 
the Arctic and Antarctic regions.124 In early 1997, UNEP adopted Decision 19/13, rec-
ommending that the Governing Council establish an INC to negotiate a global instru-
ment regulating persistent organic pollutants.125 Subsequently, the negotiation of the 
Convention has been completed in five sessions of the INC, and the Stockholm Conven-
tion on Persistent Organic Pollutants was adopted on 22 May 2001.126  
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Agenda 21 furthermore provided the official mandate for the development of a Globally 
Harmonized System of Classification and Labelling of Chemicals (GHS).127 This non-
binding system that was finally introduced in 2002 aims to provide an internationally 
comprehensible system for hazard communication and facilitate international trade in 
chemicals and will replace the WHO Classification by Hazard scheme.128 
UN World Summit on Sustainable Development 
Similarly as 1972 and 1992, the year 2002 was again an important landmark for the de-
velopment of the international law and policy on pesticides. At the UN World Summit 
on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg in 2002, the international com-
munity renewed its commitment to the sound management of chemicals, “aiming to 
achieve, by 2020, that chemicals are used and produced in ways that lead to the minimi-
zation of significant adverse effects on human health and the environment.”129 In order to 
achieve this aim, the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation considered several actions 
necessary, including: the ratification and implementation of the Rotterdam and Stock-
holm Conventions; the further development of the Strategic Approach to International 
Chemicals Management (SAICM); the implementation of the new Globally Harmonized 
System for the classification and labelling of chemicals (GHS) ultimately by 2008, and 
the prevention of illegal trade of hazardous chemicals and wastes.  
As a complementary outcome, the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation encouraged the 
establishment of so-called partnerships for sustainable development. These partnerships, 
being voluntary, multi-stakeholder initiatives, are specifically linked to the implementa-
tion of commitments outlined in Agenda 21, the Programme for the Further Implementa-
tion of Agenda 21, and the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation.130 According to the 
criteria and guidelines agreed upon at the eleventh session of the Commission on Sus-
tainable Development (CSD), registered partnerships should be new and should add con-
crete value to the implementation of sustainable development. Several of the partner-
ships that have been set up, aim to promote sustainable agriculture, and some of them fo-
cus on the implementation of international multilateral obligations.   
The Johannesburg Summit also formed the impetus to move the multi-stakeholder proc-
ess that had been launched under the strategic approach to international chemicals man-
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agement (SAICM) a step forward.131 Although it was evident during the preparatory 
process that countries had different visions of what an integrated international chemicals 
management regime should eventually look like, a commonly agreed approach has been 
adopted in February 2006.132  
An additional landmark in the year 2002 was the revision of the FAO Code of Conduct 
in order to bring it up to date with the entry into force of the Rotterdam Convention, 
which made the prior informed consent provisions redundant. With this revision, more 
emphasis has been put on the implementation of IPM, introducing a revised definition 
and plans for implementing guidelines.133  
Concluding remarks  
Looking back at several decades of law and policy-making at the international level, it is 
apparent that the international law on pesticides has evolved from a limited focus on as-
pects of national plant health protection and trade facilitation towards broader regulatory 
approaches promoting also objectives of environmental and human health protection. 
The successive UN Conferences in the areas of environment and sustainable develop-
ment have performed an important role in this evolutionary process by advancing the de-
velopment of international legal instruments into new directions. They have also repeat-
edly made a case for formulating environmental and human health objectives, and link-
ing legal instruments with targets and timetables.  
In addition, the UN institutions of FAO and UNEP have fulfilled a crucial role in the de-
velopment of the international law and policy on pesticides. They have been initiators of 
many new activities and approaches to pesticide issues and carry responsibility for the 
facilitation and monitoring of the implementation of several international instruments. 
Initially working separately, they have increasingly sought cooperation in order to en-
hance synergies. Furthermore, several other international organisations have performed 
important roles in shaping a framework of rules and regulations that influence the pro-
duction, marketing, use, and residue stage of pesticides. As a result, the current instru-
ments cover in principle all stages of the life-cycle of pesticides, but as the Rotterdam 
and Stockholm Conventions have a limited scope this does not account for the full width 
of all pesticide substances. 
3.3 The relevant WTO arrangements 
Under WTO law, measures based on non-trade concerns, such as pesticide risk reduction 
measures, are commonly referred to as ‘technical barriers to trade’, and can be in conflict 
with the provisions of GATT 1994, the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT 
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Agreement) or the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agree-
ment).134 Although these three agreements are based on the same principle of non-
discrimination, they differ in their elaboration in concrete provisions. More precisely, the 
rules of the TBT Agreement and the SPS Agreement go beyond the GATT obligations 
not to discriminate among or against imported products. The relevant WTO arrange-
ments are elaborated below, referring to the outcomes of recent trade disputes and ex-
plaining their mutual relationships.135 
GATT 1994 
It is a basic principle of GATT 1994, and other WTO agreements, that ‘like’ products 
should not be discriminated between nations.136 This principle of non-discrimination 
means that countries are not allowed to discriminate between domestic products and im-
ports, between imports from different countries and between products sold in the domes-
tic market and those exported. It is inter alia articulated in the ‘most-favoured nation’ 
and ‘national treatment’ provisions.137 It does not allow measures based on so-called 
process and production measures (PPMs) that involve a restriction on imports based not 
on the potentially harmful characteristics of the product, but rather by reference to the 
harm that has been caused by the way in which it has been produced. Different produc-
tion methods will in general not affect the nature of the product and the resulting prod-
ucts are therefore considered ‘like’ products. Such PPMs are certainly relevant in rela-
tion to agricultural products.  
However, this non-discrimination principle is not absolute, allowing PPMs under the 
condition that they meet the criteria of the general exceptions, as provided in Article XX. 
The first relevant exception is contained in para b, and applies to measures “necessary to 
protect human, animal or plant life or health”. This exception has been interpreted very 
narrowly, requiring WTO members to show that there was no alternative, less trade-
restrictive, way of achieving similar protection.138 The second exception, contained in 
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para g, applies to measures “relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources 
if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic produc-
tion or consumption”. This exception has been interpreted less restrictively than the first 
exception, as is evident from the analysis by the Appellate Body in US- Shrimp/Turtle.139  
However, in this case the measure did not satisfy the requirements of the introductory 
chapeau to Article XX which provides that such measures are not to be applied “in a 
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination be-
tween countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on interna-
tional trade.” The Appellate Body in US-Shrimp Turtle expressed a clear preference for 
issues relating to PPMs to be resolved by negotiation and, wherever possible, by the 
conclusion of multilateral agreements. More precisely, the Appellate Body has decided 
that trade measures of the WTO Members, designed to follow a legitimate non-economic 
interest, should be ‘effective’, ‘necessary’, and ‘reasonable’, thus referring to the classi-
cal three requirements of the principle of proportionality.140 
TBT Agreement 
According to the TBT Agreement, the national treatment and the most favoured nation 
treatment obligations, as incorporated in GATT 1994, also apply to technical regulations, 
standards and conformity assessment procedures.141 In this respect, Annex 1.1 defines a 
technical regulation as: 
“… [a] document which lays down product characteristics or their related processes and 
production methods including the applicable administrative provisions, with which com-
pliance is mandatory. It may also include or deal exclusively with terminology, symbols, 
packaging, marking or labeling requirements as they apply to a product, process or pro-
duction method.”  
Hence, according to this definition, technical regulations contain mandatory rules estab-
lished by state actors. In contrast, a standard is a voluntary measure set by state or non-
state actors. More precisely, Annex 1.2 of the TBT Agreement defines a standard as: 
“… [a] document approved by a recognized body, that provides, for common and re-
peated use, rules, guidelines or characteristics for products or related processes and pro-
duction methods, with which compliance is not mandatory. It may also include or deal 
exclusively with terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or labelling requirements as 
they apply to a product, process or production method.”   
Furthermore, Annex 1.3 defines a conformity assessment procedure as “any procedure 
used, directly or indirectly, to determine that relevant requirements in technical regula-
tions or standards are fulfilled.” This means that auditing, inspection and certification 
processes fall under this latter category. 
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As is evident from these definitions, the TBT Agreement applies to measures relating to 
products (both industrial and agricultural), and processes and production methods 
(PPMs). It is, however, a question of much debate whether they include the so-called 
non-product related processes and production methods, or unincorporated PPMs. The 
latter term refers to PPMs that do not affect the characteristics of the final product put on 
the market. It has been argued, that the definitions in the TBT Agreement seem to indi-
cate that technical regulations, standards and conformity assessment procedures relating 
to unincorporated PPMs do not fall within the scope of application of the TBT Agree-
ment.142 This means that they should be examined under the more lenient provisions of 
GATT 1994. 
In the cases of EC-Asbestos and EC-Sardines, the WTO Panels and the Appellate Body 
have examined whether the contested measures were technical regulations falling within 
the scope of the TBT Agreement. A key issue in this regard is the interpretation of the 
term ‘product characteristics and related process and production methods’, as the crucial 
criterion for a technical regulation is that it must lay down product characteristics. Ac-
cording to the Appellate Body in EC-Asbestos, the technical characteristics of a product 
include:  
“… any objectively definable “features”, “qualities”, “attributes”, or other “distinguish-
ing mark” of a product. Such “characteristics” might relate, inter alia, to a product’s 
composition, size, shape, colour, texture, hardness, tensile strength, flammability, con-
ductivity, density or viscosity. … [Furthermore, they may] include, not only features and 
qualities intrinsic to the product itself, but also related “characteristics”, such as the 
means of identification, the presentation and the appearance of a product.”143  
The Appellate Body has confirmed this ruling in EC-Sardines by developing a three-tier 
test for determining whether a measure is a ‘technical regulation’ under the TBT Agree-
ment: 1) the measure must apply to an identifiable product or group of products, 2) the 
measure must lay down product characteristics, and 3) compliance with the product 
characteristics laid down in the measure must be mandatory.144 However, the rulings in 
EC-asbestos and EC-sardines did not elaborate on the notion of related process and pro-
duction methods. 
It is furthermore important to note that, although the TBT Agreement is mainly ad-
dressed to central government bodies, it explicitly aims to extend its application to ‘other 
bodies’ responsible for the establishment of technical regulations, standards, or execu-
tion of conformity assessment procedures, including local government and non-
governmental bodies. Non-governmental bodies are defined as bodies other than central 
or local government bodies that “have legal power to enforce a technical regulation.”145  
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The TBT Agreement extends its application to those ‘other bodies’ by imposing, on 
WTO Members, the obligation to take such reasonable measures as may be available to 
them in order to ensure compliance with the TBT Agreement by local government bod-
ies and non-governmental bodies, and to refrain from taking measures that could encour-
age actions by these other bodies that are inconsistent with the provisions of the TBT 
Agreement.146 In addition, Members have, the obligation to take reasonable measures as 
are available to them to ensure that local and non-governmental standardising bodies 
also accept and comply with the Code of Good Practice for the Preparation, Adoption 
and Application of Standards included in Annex 3 to the Agreement.  
The core of the TBT Agreement is the provision that technical regulations, standards and 
conformity assessment procedures “are not prepared, adopted or applied with a view to 
or with the effect of creating unnecessary obstacles to international trade.”147 Concerning 
technical regulations, the TBT Agreement further requires that technical regulations 
“shall not be more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective, taking 
account of the risks non-fulfilment would create” and “shall not be maintained if the cir-
cumstances or objectives giving rise to their adoption no longer exist or if the changed 
circumstances or objectives can be addressed in a less trade-restrictive manner.”148 
In order to provide guidance, the TBT Agreement provides a non-exhaustive list of le-
gitimate objectives, which inter alia includes the protection of human health and safety, 
animal or plant life or health, and the protection of the environment, and mentions sev-
eral elements that help substantiate the necessity of a technical regulation. In addition, 
the TBT Agreement obliges WTO Members to “take into account the objective of mini-
mizing negative trade effects”, when determining the appropriate level of protection.149 
Importantly, the TBT Agreement requires members to use relevant international stan-
dards as a basis for their technical regulations.150 More precisely, it states that a technical 
regulation that is adopted to achieve one of the legitimate objectives explicitly men-
tioned and that is in accordance with a relevant international standard is “rebuttably pre-
sumed not to create an unnecessary obstacle to international trade.” Following from this 
emphasis on international standards, members are required to play a full part, within the 
limits of their resources, in the preparation of international standards for products for 
which they either have adopted, or expect to adopt, technical regulations.151  
The TBT Agreement furthermore includes provisions about equivalency of technical 
regulations, mutual recognition of conformity assessment procedures, and multilateral 
recognition agreements. With regard to notification, the requirements for technical regu-
lations, standards, and conformity assessment procedures are highly similar, except that 
there is an additional requirement for central government standardising bodies to pub-
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lish, at least every six months, their work programme and report on the progress regard-
ing the preparation and adoption of standards.152 In addition, these government bodies 
are obliged to take measures to ensure that local and non-governmental standardising 
bodies in their territory also fulfil this requirement.153 
SPS Agreement 
The aim of the SPS Agreement is to ensure that when sanitary and phytosanitary meas-
ures are applied, they are used only to the extent necessary to ensure food safety and 
animal and plant health, and not to unduly restrict market access for other countries.154 
According to Annex A sub 1, the SPS Agreement defines sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures as any measure applied: 
“… (a) to protect animal or plant life or health within the territory of the Member 
from risks arising from the entry, establishment or spread of pests, diseases, disease-
carrying organisms or disease-causing organisms; (b) to protect human or animal life 
or health within the territory of the Member from risks arising from additives, con-
taminants, toxins or disease-causing organisms in foods, beverages or feedstuffs; (c) 
to protect human or animal life or health within the territory of the Member from 
risks arising from diseases carried by animals, plants or products thereof, or from the 
entry, establishment or spread of pests; or (d) to prevent or limit other damage within 
the territory of the Member from the entry, establishment or spread of pests.” 
In short, this means that SPS measures include a broad range of approaches allowing 
Members to protect themselves against pests, diseases, and contaminants from other 
countries, and that it is the purpose of the measure that qualifies it as a sanitary or phyto-
sanitary measure. With regard to pesticides, SPS measures include pesticide risk reduc-
tion measures, such as maximum residue levels (MRLs) of pesticides and other food 
safety measures such as HACCP guidelines. However, they also include plant protection 
measures that are aimed at preventing or controlling the spread of invasive pests and dis-
eases, and hence may encourage the use of pesticides. 
Similarly as the TBT Agreement, the SPS Agreenment extends its application to the be-
haviour of non-state actors. With regard to the latter category, Article 13 specifies that 
“Members shall take such reasonable measures as may be available to them to ensure 
that non-governmental entities within their territories, as well as regional bodies in which 
relevant entities within their territories are members, comply with the relevant provisions 
of this Agreement”.155 
The main substantive provisions of the SPS Agreement can be found in Articles 5 and 6. 
According to Article 5.1, Members shall ensure that their sanitary and phytosanitary 
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measures are based on an assessment, as appropriate to the circumstances, of the risks to 
human, animal or plant life or health, taking into account risk assessment techniques de-
veloped by the relevant international organizations. Article 5.2 provides a number of 
minimum scientific criteria that Members must take into account in such a risk assess-
ment, whereas Article 5.3 includes economic criteria. Article 5.4 explicitly stipulates 
that:  
“Members should, when determining the appropriate level of sanitary and phytosanitary 
protection, take into account the objective of minimizing negative trade effects.”  
Article 5.5 requires that “… each Member shall avoid arbitrary or unjustifiable distinc-
tions in the levels [of protection] it considers to be appropriate in different situations, if 
such distinctions result in discrimination or a disguised restriction on international 
trade.” Article 5.6 stipulates that “Members shall ensure that … [sanitary or phytosani-
tary] measures are not more trade-restrictive than required to achieve their appropriate 
level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection, taking into account technical and economic 
feasibility.” 
Furthermore, they should be based on international standards, guidelines or recommen-
dations, where they exist.156 More precisely, international standards are presumed to be 
consistent with the SPS Agreement.157 Such international standards are defined in an an-
nex to the Agreement.158 For food safety, the relevant standardising body is the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission, while for plant health this is the Secretariat of the Interna-
tional Plant Protection Convention in cooperation with regional organisations operating 
within its framework. 
An important question is whether countries are allowed to establish SPS measures that 
are stricter than those prescribed by international standards. The Agreement indeed per-
mits the establishment of measures resulting in a higher level of sanitary or phytosanitary 
protection, but stipulates that there must be ‘a scientific justification’ for doing so or a 
justification on the basis of a risk assessment.159 However, in general terms, the SPS 
Agreement can be considered to limit countries’ sovereignty to impose their own rules 
and standards. 
The interpretation of the provision about international standards, and more precisely the 
term ‘based on the relevant international standards’, has been contested in the EC-Beef 
Hormones case.160 Interestingly, the Panel’s interpretation of ‘based on’ was reversed by 
the Appellate Body which held that the SPS Agreement entitled a party to take health 
measures that adopt more stringent standards than the international standards set out in 
the Codex recommendations. In particular, the Appellate Body decided that ‘based on’ 
does not mean the same as ‘conform to’. 
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This decision by the Appellate Body is considered of importance in that it justifies, at 
least in theory, the adoption of higher SPS standards than ‘the relevant international 
standards’, provided that a valid ‘risk assessment’ is performed. However, in practice it 
may be very difficult to conduct a risk assessment as specific as that required by the Ap-
pellate Body. 
In the Australia-Salmon case, the Appellate body articulated the criteria for a valid risk 
assessment, and decided that the Australian measure focusing on the import of fresh, 
chilled or imported salmon did not fulfil them as it was based on an arbitrary discrepancy 
with measures concerning the imports of other fish which posed at least an equal risk of 
the introduction of the diseases to which the contested measure was directed.161 In con-
trast, in EC-Beef Hormones, the Appellate Body had concluded that there was not such 
an arbitrary discrepancy because of the absence of any evidence of protectionist intent 
behind the measure.  
In the Japan-Varietals case, the Appellate Body decided that there must be a rational re-
lationship between a SPS measure and the available scientific information, which in case 
did not exist.162 It furthermore explained that a provisional measure should fulfil four 
cumulative requirements.163 First, there must be a situation where the relevant scientific 
information is insufficient. Second, the measure must be adopted on the basis of avail-
able pertinent information. Third, a member might not maintain a provisional measure 
unless it sought to obtain the additional information necessary for a more objective as-
sessment of risk. Fourthly, the member must review the measure accordingly within a 
reasonable period of time. 
In sum, the SPS Agreement aims to balance economic interests and human health risks 
by promoting the use of scientific evidence. Focusing on the performance of the SPS 
Agreement in practice, opinions diverge about its impacts. On the one hand, some argue 
that it has successfully facilitated international trade, judging from the number of dis-
putes that has been settled. On the other hand, others claim that it has weakened national 
protection against foreign pests and diseases as is signalled by the increasing global 
spread of unwanted pests and diseases, and their control costs. 
Relationships between WTO agreements 
Focusing on a particular non-trade measure, it is important to determine which of the 
WTO arrangements are applicable. Most importantly, a distinction should be made be-
tween the general category of technical barriers to trade, for which rules have been set 
out in the TBT Agreement, and the special category of sanitary and phytosanitary meas-
ures, for which rules are provided in the SPS Agreement. 
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Overlap between the TBT and SPS Agreements is regulated in the TBT Agreement by 
the explicit exclusion of SPS measures from its scope.164 This has been confirmed in the 
EC-Hormones dispute.165 However, the relationship between the TBT Agreement and 
the GATT is not ruled by WTO law. It has been somewhat clarified in the EC-Asbestos 
case.166 In this case, the Panel held that where both the GATT 1994 and the TBT 
Agreement appear to apply to a given measure, a Panel must first examine whether the 
measure at issue is consistent with the TBT Agreement since this agreement deals ‘spe-
cifically and in detail’ with technical barriers to trade. However, should a Panel find a 
measure to be consistent with the TBT Agreement, it must still examine whether the 
measure is also consistent with the GATT 1994. In the same case, the Appellate Body 
pointed out that the TBT Agreement is a specialised legal regime that applies solely to a 
limited class of measures. However, as the Appellate Body felt unable to complete the 
analysis of the contested decree’s conformity with the TBT Agreement, the relationship 
between the TBT Agreement and the GATT must await further clarification. 
There can be further complications when a contested measure actually consists of vari-
ous measures with different characteristics. In such situations, it cannot be excluded that 
more than one agreement is applicable to the measure as a whole. More precisely, the 
Panel in the EC-Biotech noted that there may be situations where a measure is only 
partly an SPS measure.167 In such a case, the SPS part of the measure needs considera-
tion under the SPS Agreement, while the non-SPS parts have to be considered under an-
other WTO agreement, such as the TBT Agreement or the GATT. This is certainly rele-
vant in relation to pesticide risk reduction measures taken by non-state actors, because 
these are often complex programmes serving various goals. 
 
3.4 The legal tenets of the international approach 
As Section 3.2 described the broader picture of the international law on pesticides, the 
current section elaborates on the three instruments, having most relevance from the per-
spective of environmental and human health protection, including: 
• FAO International Code of Conduct on the Distribution and Use of Pesticides 
(1985); 
• Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazard-
ous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade (1998);  
• Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (2001). 
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Considered from a life-cycle perspective, these three international instruments have a 
complementary character. The Stockholm Convention is primarily oriented on the pro-
duction stage of pesticides, the Rotterdam Convention on the marketing stage, and the 
FAO Code of Conduct on the use stage. 
3.4.1 FAO International Code of Conduct on the Distribution and Use of 
Pesticides 
The FAO International Code of Conduct on the Distribution and Use of Pesticides was 
adopted by the FAO Member States in 1985.168 According to the Code itself, it is a dy-
namic text and consequently Governing Bodies should periodically review the relevance 
and effectiveness of the Code and update it as required.169 The Code has thus far been 
amended twice, in 1989 and 2002, respectively.170  
Rule-making 
According to Article 1.1 of the 2002 version, the Code aims “to establish voluntary stan-
dards of conduct for all public and private entities engaged in or associated with the dis-
tribution and use of pesticides, particularly where there is inadequate or no national leg-
islation to regulate pesticides.” Hence, the Code aims to give interim guidance and pro-
tection until a country has its own regulations in place.  
The 2002 revision of the FAO Code of Conduct included many substantial changes.171 In 
comparison with its predecessor, the revised Code puts more emphasis on the use stage 
of pesticides and especially on the implementation of IPM as the agricultural production 
method of preference.172 The definition of IPM has been extended to include the objec-
tive of risk reduction in relation to both human health and the environment, and the en-
couragement to apply natural pest control mechanisms. The revised definition is as fol-
lows:  
“Integrated Pest Management (IPM) means the careful consideration of all available pest 
control techniques and subsequent integration of appropriate measures that discourage 
the development of pest populations and keep pesticides and other interventions to levels 
that are economically justified and reduce or minimize risks to human health and the en-
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vironment. IPM emphasizes the growth of a healthy crop with the least possible disrup-
tion to agro-ecosystems and encourages natural pest control mechanisms.”173  
Furthermore, the 2002 Code introduced the concepts of good agricultural practice, a life-
cycle approach to pesticide management, and product stewardship by the pesticide in-
dustry. Other new elements included the establishment of national programmes to moni-
tor pesticide residues in food and the environment, and action plans for the disposal of 
obsolete and unusable stocks of pesticides and used containers.  
Rule-implementation 
As the membership of FAO to date amounts to 187 nations, this means that nearly all 
countries in the world are committed to comply with the provisions of this voluntary and 
thus non-binding code. However, the crucial question is how far does this commitment 
of governments go and what does it mean in practice. This question is not easy to an-
swer, as governmental commitment will differ according to place and time and govern-
mental behaviour is influenced by a myriad of factors. However, the overall conclusion 
is that many more countries have rules and regulations concerning pesticide management 
in place than 20 years ago when the code was first adopted. For many of them, the Code 
and its technical guidelines have been the basis for the development of policies and 
measures for pesticide management. 
The addressees of the Code are primarily governments and the pesticide industry, but 
also include other stakeholders that are in a position to influence good agricultural prac-
tices.174 Significantly, the revised Code now considers the food industry as a stakeholder 
and calls on it to help implement its recommendations. More precisely, the food indus-
try, among all other stakeholders, should play a proactive role in the development and 
promotion of IPM.175 
With the re-orientation of the FAO Code of Conduct in 2002, and the shifting emphasis 
toward the use phase of pesticides, the implementation process had to start largely anew 
at both the FAO and the national level. To start with, the former FAO Panel of Experts 
on Pesticide Specifications, Registration Requirements, Application Standards and Prior 
Informed Consent was replaced by a FAO Panel of Experts on Pesticide Management, 
with an amended mandate to reflect its new tasks.176 During its final meeting in 2003, the 
former panel made several recommendations for high priority activities, such as the de-
velopment of a FAO strategic plan for the implementation of the revised version of the 
Code, the adoption of a new framework for technical guidelines supporting the Code, the 
improvement of the process of making guidelines, a review of existing guidelines and 
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the development of several new ones.177 However, FAO expected already from the onset 
that the full realisation of the new framework and the guidelines would come under pres-
sure considering the lack of available finances.178  
Therefore, it is an open question whether the Code will gain a new significance by the 
promotion and facilitation of IPM as the agricultural production method of the future. A 
development in this direction is not very plausible though in the short term, as the im-
plementation of the revised Code is not making swift progress.179 More specifically, due 
to restricted financial resources, the realisation of the technical guidelines on IPM has 
been given a relatively low priority, which means that the first guidelines cannot be ex-
pected before 2010.180  This also means that the implementation process of the necessary 
provisions at the national level has become delayed.   
Rule-enforcement 
According to the FAO Code of Conduct, governments are expected to monitor its obser-
vance and report on progress made to FAO, whereas the latter should periodically review 
the relevance and effectiveness of the Code.181 In order to provide guidance and to moni-
tor the implementation process of the Code, the FAO Panel of Experts, in its previous as 
well as its current form, has been meeting on an annual basis to discuss matters related to 
the Code. In both 1986 and 1993, the Expert Panel has sent out questionnaires to the 
FAO member countries on the state of implementation of the Code. The major findings 
included that although significant progress had been made towards compliance with vari-
ous provisions of the Code, at the same time several serious deficiencies still existed in 
many countries.182 Moreover, FAO observed in its 2004 report that overall use of pesti-
cides and particularly their use in developing countries had been steadily increasing over 
the past decade, and that the use of several more toxic compounds was on the rise.  
In addition to the provisions about governmental and FAO monitoring activities, the re-
vised Code gives some concrete suggestions about the assistance that other stakeholders 
can provide in the monitoring process. For example, the pesticide industry is invited to 
provide reports on its product stewardship activities related to observance of the Code, 
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and other interested parties are invited to monitor activities related to the implementation 
of the Code and report these to the Director-General of FAO.183 
The pesticide industry, by way of the industry association CropLife International, has 
endorsed the previous as well as the current version of the Code.184 This implies that 
CropLife demands from its member companies that they observe the spirit as well as the 
letter of the Code. To stimulate compliance with the Code, CropLife has developed a 
guide for its member companies, which highlights the most important responsibilities 
and actions for industry.185  
Interestingly, the first complaint ever about violation of the Code was delivered by re-
gional groups of the Pesticide Action Network (PAN) in 2004, targeting Syngenta’s ad-
vertising behaviour on paraquat in Thailand.186 However, three years later this complaint 
had not been settled between the parties concerned. Subsequently, NGOs from Asia, 
Latin America, and Europe submitted a similar complaint to FAO about Syngenta’s mar-
keting and sales practices in 2007.187 In reponse, the Panel of Experts on Pesticide Man-
agement requested FAO invited the pesticide industry to develop a code of ethics regard-
ing pesticide advertising and ensure that no differences exist in these standards among 
industrialised and developing countries.188  
3.4.2 Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for 
Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade 
The Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Haz-
ardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade was adopted on 10 September 
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1998.189 On the occasion, representatives from 61 countries signed the Convention.190 
The Convention entered into force five and a half years later on 24 February 2004 after 
50 countries had ratified it.191 During the transition period between 1998 and 2004, there 
was a voluntary prior informed consent procedure in place in which 172 countries par-
ticipated. This interim procedure was extended for 2 years from the date of entry into 
force, i.e. until 24 February 2006, to give more countries the chance to fulfil the ratifica-
tion requirements of the Convention.192 More than two years later, the number of partici-
pating countries amounted to 120.193 This is still significantly less than the 172 countries 
that participated under the voluntary regime. It is expected that several of the so-called 
Participating States will never become Parties to the Convention.194  
As decision-making body, the Convention has established a Conference of the Parties 
(COP) with the task to keep the implementation of the Convention “under continuous re-
view and evaluation.”195 The COP is being supported by a Secretariat whose functions 
are jointly performed by UNEP and FAO.  
Rule-making 
The Rotterdam Convention aims “to promote shared responsibility and cooperative ef-
forts among Parties in the international trade of certain hazardous chemicals in order to 
protect human health and the environment from potential harm and to contribute to their 
environmentally sound use, by facilitating information exchange about their characteris-
tics, by providing for a national decision-making process on their import and export and 
by disseminating these decisions to Parties.”196 These objectives largely correspond with 
those previously incorporated in Article 9 of the FAO Code of Conduct, as the Rotter-
dam Convention is essentially a legally binding version of the earlier non-binding proce-
dure operated by UNEP and FAO since 1989. 
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The main provisions of the Rotterdam Convention concern the implementation of the le-
gally binding prior informed consent (PIC) procedure for certain substances and formu-
lations listed in Annex 3. More precisely, the PIC procedure applies to substances for 
which final regulatory action has been taken in two or more countries in order to ban or 
severely restrict the use of the substances concerned for human health or environmental 
reasons, as well as for certain severely hazardous pesticide formulations. The inclusion 
of the environment in the definitive text is considered to represent a breakthrough, as op-
position was considerable during the negotiations of the Convention.197  
Importantly, the Convention includes a mechanism for the inclusion of additional sub-
stances and formulations. The Convention distinguishes two types of procedures, one for 
banned or severely restricted chemicals, and another for severely hazardous pesticide 
formulations.198 The first procedure obliges Parties to the Convention to issue notifica-
tion of final regulatory action in case a chemical is banned or severely restricted in their 
country.199 When the Secretariat has received at least two of such notifications from dif-
ferent regions concerning the same chemical and these are verified to meet the require-
ments of Annex I, a procedure is being started to make the chemical in question subject 
to the prior informed consent procedure and to include it in Annex III. The second pro-
cedure is only open to a developing country or a country with an economy in transition 
that is experiencing problems caused by a severely hazardous pesticide formulation un-
der conditions of use in its territory.200 In this case, there is only one notification re-
quired.  
The prior informed consent (PIC) obligations of the Convention are thus made depend-
ent on the listing in Annex III. However, there is one major exception to this rule: prior 
informed consent obligations also attach to chemicals and pesticides that, not listed in 
Annex III, are banned or severely restricted in the State seeking to export them.201 
The PIC procedure itself is based on national decisions taken by Parties as to whether or 
not they wish to import the chemicals listed in Annex III. In case of the listing of a sub-
stance or formulation, Parties should give an import response in the form of a final deci-
sion or an interim response.202 The options for final decisions include ‘consent’, ‘no con-
sent’ and ‘conditional consent’. Interim responses may vary between an interim final de-
cision, a request for further information, and a request for assistance in evaluating the 
chemical. 
Once a chemical is listed in Annex III, each Party to the Convention has nine months to 
review the listing and decide whether to consent to import, not to consent, or consent un-
der restrictions.203 Importantly, if the importing country has not responded after the nine-
month review period, the exporting country must assume the importing country does not 
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consent unless the chemical is registered in the importing country, or consent to the im-
port has been given implicitly or explicitly.204  
The Convention now covers 39 chemicals, including 24 pesticides, 4 severely hazardous 
pesticide formulations and 11 industrial chemicals.205 However, since the entry into force 
of the Convention the subsequent meetings of the COP have not been able to agree on 
the inclusion of additional substances. This is the more notable in light of the fact that 
more than 160 substances are on the ‘waiting’ list, having been notified by one or more 
countries, which has raised doubts about the effectiveness of the Convention. 
During the preparatory process of the Convention, the number of notifications necessary 
to start the procedure of the inclusion of a substance in Annex III has been the subject of 
heated debate.206 After all, this number has a major influence on the nomination of po-
tential substances to be included in Annex III. Under the FAO Code, the listing standard 
had required the regulatory action of five or more countries, independent of their geo-
graphical location. During the negotiations on the Rotterdam Convention, however, there 
were several arguments raised for a different foundation of the inclusion procedure. In 
the end, a compromise was reached that two notifications from different regions would 
trigger the process. The related issue of the number and composition of these so-called 
PIC regions was postponed to be decided upon in a later stage.207 
The Convention had delegated the task of installing a Chemical Review Committee 
(CRC) to the COP. The CRC consists of 31 members, and was established pursuant to 
decision RC-1/6 of the Rotterdam Convention adopted at COP-1 as the successor of the 
Interim Chemical Review Committee that had operated since 2000.208 It is composed of 
government-designated experts in chemicals management taking into account equitable 
geographical distribution and a balance between developed and developing countries.209 
The CRC performs an important preparatory role in the decision-making process.210 Its 
main tasks relate to the evaluation of notifications by Parties in order to assess whether 
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the substances and formulations concerned qualify to be brought under the Convention’s 
regime and, if appropriate, to prepare draft decision guidance documents. Much of the 
work that needs to be done is being prepared by the Bureau of the Committee, consisting 
of five members. Furthermore, the Committee makes use of so-called open-ended task 
groups (on individual chemicals) and drafting groups. The meetings of the CRC are open 
to observers. 
For the first meeting of the CRC (CRC-1) in 2005, 29 notifications for eight different 
candidate pesticide subtancess had been listed for review.211 Only three of them were 
positively reviewed and, hence, accepted as complying with the criteria of the Conven-
tion. The Committee noted that many of the new notifications on candidate chemicals 
did not meet the criteria of Annex II, in particular the criterion that regulatory action 
must be taken on the basis of a risk evaluation involving prevailing conditions in the no-
tifying Party.  
At CRC-2 in 2006, 18 notifications concerning eight different pesticide substances were 
reviewed, with several of them relating to the same substances as were considered for 
CRC-1.212 This time, the acceptance rate had increased as 6 out of 18 notifications were 
accepted as meeting all the necessary qualifications. Among the accepted notifications 
was the first one from a developing country, namely Thailand on endosulfan. At CRC-3 
in 2007, seven notifications were scheduled and three of them accepted.213 At CRC-4 in 
2008, eight notifications were scheduled and four of them accepted, including one notifi-
cation from Jamaica on aldicarb.214 Annex 1 contains a comprehensive overview of the 
substances for which notifications have been reviewed by the successive CRC meetings, 
including details about notifying countries and results of the review. 
On the basis of its reviews, the CRC makes recommendations to the COP about inclu-
sion of a chemical or pesticide formulation in Annex III, and prepares a draft decision 
guidance document.215 The COP subsequently makes the final decision whether to add 
the substance to Annex III and approve the decision guidance document.216 Decisions by 
the COP to add a substance to Annex III are to be made by a consensus of the Parties.217 
Thus, essentially each Party to the Convention has the power to veto the inclusion of a 
particular chemical or pesticide formulation.  
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In order to move on from the interim to the Convention regime, the first meeting of the 
COP took place in Geneva in 2004.218 At this meeting, representatives of Parties to the 
Convention were present as well as several observers of other States and of 11 non-
governmental bodies and agencies.219 This first COP especially focused on a number of 
organisational and procedural matters that needed to be solved to make the legally bind-
ing PIC procedure operational.220 With regard to content, COP-1 added 14 chemicals to 
Annex III of the Convention, and adopted their decision guidance documents.221 The 
COP furthermore decided that the functions of the Secretariat were to be performed 
jointly by UNEP and FAO.222 
During COP-1, several discussions proceeded with difficulty, especially between devel-
oped and developing countries, but overall the conference took place in ‘a spirit of com-
promise’.223 The most controversial issues can be placed in two groups. The first group 
related to representation and decision-making power, and focused on voting procedures 
in cases of non-consensus, the number and composition of the PIC regions, and the size 
and composition of the CRC. The second group of controversies related to distributive 
arrangements. Many developing countries were angered about the financial contributions 
they had to pay as Parties to the Convention and demanded that a technical assistance 
strategy would be developed and a financial mechanism created to specifically support 
capacity building activities in developing countries and also in countries with economies 
in transition. At the closure of COP-1, several of the difficult issues from the first group 
were solved, with the exception of a decision on voting procedures. The issues of the 
second group, however, stayed largely unresolved and were postponed to COP-2.  
During COP-2 in Rome in 2005, similar tensions emerged between developed and de-
veloping countries, focusing on the need for a financial mechanism and technical assis-
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tance.224 Moreover, the developing countries linked these distributive issues to the debate 
on the development of a non-compliance mechanism, arguing that they could not adopt a 
non-compliance mechanism without a financial mechanism to help supporting their im-
plementation of the Convention. The same issues also influenced the discussion on a 
procedure for adding new chemicals under the Convention regime, as the CRC at its first 
meeting had not accepted any of notifications of banned or severely restricted chemicals 
coming from developing countries, for the reason of not meeting the criteria con-
cerned.225 These rejections strengthened the developing countries in their opinion that 
they needed additional resources to be able to take part in the regime on an equal basis.  
As COP-2 already lacked in progress, COP-3 in 2006 can be considered a near failure, as 
the Parties did not agree on the inclusion of the industrial chemical chrysotile asbestos in 
Annex III although it met all the necessary criteria.226 Its non-inclusion has raised serious 
doubts about the implications for the further development of the Convention and the 
other chemicals on the waiting list. Underlying this conflict are different points of view 
about the meaning of a listing: does a listing only entail a technical measure based on 
scientific evidence or does it provide a political verdict about the substance concerned? 
This issue has not been solved as yet and has been postponed to a future COP.227  
Rule-implementation 
In order to implement the Rotterdam Convention at the national level, the Parties are 
obliged to take “such measures as may be necessary to establish and strengthen its na-
tional infrastructures and institutions.”228 This provision is one of the greater obstacles 
for proper implementation because many developing countries do not have the necessary 
resources to conduct risk assessments of hazardous chemical substances and are depend-
ent on financial and technical assistance provided by developed countries. However, the 
Convention does not contain any binding requirements concerning the provision of such 
assistance. Moreover, the provisions about technical assistance to developing countries 
and countries with economies in transition are formulated in non-committal terms, as is 
evident from the following fragment: “Parties shall … cooperate in promoting technical 
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assistance for the development of the infrastructure and capacity … to enable implemen-
tation of this Convention.”229  
Following from this lack of a robust commitment, developing countries have argued that 
without adequate financial and technical assistance many of them will lack the necessary 
resources to evaluate risks.230 The latter argument is being underpinned by the fact that 
most notifications are made by developed countries and that the CRC so far has turned 
down most notifications from developing countries due to lack of information.231 This 
lack of capacity is also being reflected by the fact that many developing countries fail to 
react to notifications of planned exports of listed chemicals.  
To meet the developing countries’ call for assistance, the Secretariat of the Convention 
started to facilitate and support the development of national action plans for the ratifica-
tion and implementation of the Rotterdam Convention in 2005. In two years time, more 
than 50 countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Near East have submitted such 
plans.232 
In order to keep all Parties well-informed on the implementation of the Rotterdam Con-
vention, the Secretariat publishes a PIC Circular every six months, containing detailed 
information about: designated national authorities, notifications of final regulatory action 
to ban or severely restrict a chemical, proposals for inclusion of severely hazardous pes-
ticide formulations, import responses to listings in Annex III, and cases of failure to pro-
vide an import response. A screening of the June 2005 PIC Circular showed that the 
number of notifications of final regulatory action received during the interim PIC proce-
dure and the Convention PIC procedure (September 1998 to 30 April 2005) and verified 
as meeting the information requirements of Annex I of the Convention, amounted to 475 
in total.233 The majority of these notifications concerned pesticides, 178 of which related 
to substances or pesticide formulations included in Annex III and 125 to substances or 
formulations not (yet) included. A further analysis of the data in the PIC Circulars re-
vealed that most notifications are inspired by considerations of human health, or human 
health in combination with environment. It is apparent that the protection of the envi-
ronment as such is a less frequent reason for regulatory action. 
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The PIC Circulars also give information about the import responses of Parties to the 
Convention and those of Participating States in case a new substance or formulation is 
listed in Annex III. The PIC Circular of June 2005 provides evidence that even for the 
pesticides that have been under the mechanism for a longer period of time, the numbers 
of failures to respond and also interim decisions are often considerable. Overall, the rate 
of final decisions by the Parties to the Convention amounted to 65%, whereas, not unex-
pectedly, this rate was much lower in the group of Participating States (40%). The reason 
for a failure to respond is not always a lack of information in the country concerned. For 
example, the US, with its extensive chemical industry, is a notorious non-respondent, as 
it never reacts to the notifications of listings in Annex III. 
As the information in the PIC Circular of June 2005 showed, the overwhelming majority 
of the final decisions taken by Parties to the Convention and Participating States include 
a ‘no consent’ to the import of the substances concerned. However, there were certain 
Parties with a relatively liberal import policy, such as the Democratic People’s Republic 
of Korea, Ethiopia, the United Republic of Tanzania, and Thailand. 
Rule-enforcement 
The Rotterdam Convention itself does not contain provisions about rule-enforcement, 
but has asked the COP to develop the procedural and institutional mechanisms for de-
termining non-compliance with the provisions of the Convention, and for treatment of 
Parties found to be in non-compliance.234 However, the progress on formulating a non-
compliance mechanism has been marginal. The disagreement especially focuses on the 
nature of the trigger mechanism (binding or non-binding) for non-compliance and the 
corrective measures to be taken in case of non-compliance. Developing countries have 
stated several times that they feel less inclined to develop such a mechanism if they are 
not given additional technical and financial support in order to participate on an equal 
level in the Convention. This means that definitive arrangements have not been made as 
yet. 
3.4.3 Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants 
The Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants was adopted on 22 May 
2001, and signed by representatives from over 120 countries.235 It entered into force 
three years later on 17 May 2004 after 50 countries had ratified it.236 As of 1 April 2008, 
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the Parties numbered 153, which is significantly more than the 120 Parties to the Rotter-
dam Convention.237  
Similarly as with regard to the Rotterdam Convention, major non-ratifying countries in-
clude Indonesia, Israel, the Russian Federation, Turkey and the US.238 The government 
of the latter repeatedly announced its willingness to ratify the Convention, but ultimately 
failed to deliver a complete legislative proposal to Congress.239 Other important non-
ratifying countries, that had instead ratified the Rotterdam Convention, include Pakistan, 
and Saudi Arabia, and the EU Member States Estonia, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Malta, 
and Poland. 
The Convention has established a Conference of the Parties (COP) with the task of keep-
ing the implementation of the Convention “under continuous review and evaluation.”240 
The COP is being supported by a Secretariat whose functions are performed by UNEP. 
Rule-making  
The Stockholm Convention aims to protect human health and the environment from per-
sistent organic pollutants (POPs).241 These substances “possess toxic properties, resist 
degradation, bioaccumulate and are transported, through air, water and migratory spe-
cies, across international boundaries and deposited far from their place of release, where 
they accumulate in terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems.”242 The required protection of hu-
man health and the environment should take place “mindful of the precautionary ap-
proach as set forth in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Develop-
ment ...”243  
The inclusion of the precautionary principle as a basis for decision-making can be con-
sidered as a breakthrough in the international law on chemicals, and has happened in 
spite of strong resistance from certain countries that were in favour of a strict, science-
based criterion. The Convention mentions the principle in the preamble and the objective 
of the Convention, and it returns as part and parcel of the procedure for the inclusion of 
new substances. The preamble also includes two other principles from the Rio Declara-
tion, including the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities between de-
veloped and developing countries, and the polluter-pays principle.  
The Convention’s main provisions concern measures to reduce or eliminate releases 
from intentional production and use of persistent organic pollutants (pesticides) and from 
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their unintentional production (industrial chemicals).244 Since unintentional production is 
not relevant in relation to pesticides, this section does not elaborate on the provisions 
concerned in the Convention. 
In relation to intentional production and use, the Convention distinguishes chemicals 
listed in Annex A of which the production, use, import and export should be eliminated, 
and those in Annex B of which the production and use should be restricted.245 Since the 
Convention’s entry into force, Annex A contains seven pesticide substances, including 
aldrin, chlordane, dieldrin, endrin, heptachlor, mirex, and toxaphene, and Annex B only 
one, namely DDT.246 Early on in the negotiations, the decision had been made not to opt 
for a broad-based toxics treaty, but to choose for a regime targeting specific sub-
stances.247 However, the scope of the Convention may be extended in the future, as it 
contains a mechanism for the inclusion of new substances. Presently, several chemicals 
are under review in order to assess if they fulfill the criteria for inclusion.248 
Decisions by the COP concerning amendments to the Annexes A and B basically follow 
the same rules as any other amendment of the Convention.249 This means that they are 
preferably adopted by consensus, and otherwise by a three-fourths majority vote.250 
However, Parties may make a declaration when becoming a Party to the Convention that 
each amendment to these Annexes will be subject to a separate ratification procedure.251 
Several Parties have indeed made such a declaration.252 Similarly, Parties are allowed to 
declare that they are unable to accept an additional annex that is proposed after they be-
came Party to the Convention.253 Both these exceptions thus provide mechanisms to opt 
out of the Convention regime in due course and have as a consequence that the binding-
ness of future amendments is not fully secured. This has as a consequence that the com-
mitment of Parties to the Convention can differ, and it may eventually undermine its ef-
fectiveness if these exceptions are used on a larger scale. 
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  Stockholm Convention, Articles 3 and 5, respectively. The 12 POPs, the so-called Dirty 
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During the preparatory negotiations, the procedure for the inclusion of additional chemi-
cals was one of the more contentious issues, especially as regards the interpretation of 
the precautionary principle.254 The agreed procedure gives every Party the right to sub-
mit a proposal for the listing of additional chemicals in one of the Annexes.255 After a 
verification of the proposal, it will be forwarded to the Persistent Organic Pollutants Re-
view Committee (POPRC) that performs a central role in the subsequent procedure.256 
This Committee will subsequently decide on the basis of a so-called risk profile whether 
the chemical is “likely as a result of its long-range environmental transport to lead to 
significant adverse human health and/or environmental effects such that global action is 
warranted …”257 With respect to this procedure, the precautionary principle is explicitly 
mentioned twice. First, the POPRC is being addressed in the sense that: “Lack of full 
scientific certainty shall not prevent the proposal from proceeding.”258 Second, the COP 
is being instructed that “including any scientific uncertainty, [it] shall decide, in a pre-
cautionary manner, whether to list the chemical … in Annexes A, B and/or C.”259 
The obligations of Parties concerning substances listed in the Annexes A (elimination) 
and B (restriction) are not absolute. The Convention allows for country-specific exemp-
tions to be included in a Register.260 These exemptions will expire five years after their 
entry into force, but may be extended as the result of a review process. Moreover, for 
substances listed in Annex B, there is in addition the more general exception of ‘accept-
able purpose’. Besides these potentially limiting provisions, the Convention also in-
cludes obligations with a broadening effect, including export restrictions that apply to 
Parties to the Convention vis-à-vis non-Party States.261 
In contrast to the Rotterdam Convention, the Stockholm Convention contains substantive 
arrangements concerning the provision of technical and financial assistance by devel-
oped countries to developing countries and countries with economies in transition.262 
Most importantly, the Convention prescribes that the developed country Parties shall 
provide “new and additional financial resources” to the other countries to help them im-
plement the necessary provisions.263 In order to distribute these resources, a financial 
mechanism needs to be created that in first instance will be operated by the Global Envi-
ronment Facility (GEF).264 During the preparatory negotiations about the Convention, 
there has been considerable friction between developed and developing countries about 
the funding commitments and the role of the GEF in the financial mechanism. This fric-
                                                   
254
  D. Hunter, J. Salzman & D. Zaelke (2002), p. 886; P.L. Lallas (2001), p. 704. 
255
  Stockholm Convention, Article 8. 
256
  Stockholm Convention, Article 19. According to 19(6) sub a, the POPRC is composed of 
government-designated experts in chemical assessment or management, taking into account 
equitable geographical distribution. 
257
  Stockholm Convention, Article 8(7). 
258
  Stockholm Convention, Article 8(7) sub a. 
259
  Stockholm Convention, Article 8(9). 
260
  Stockholm Convention, Article 4. 
261
  Stockholm Convention, Article 3(2) sub c and d. 
262
  Stockholm Convention, Articles 12, 13 and 14. 
263
  Stockholm Convention, Article 13(2). 
264
  Stockholm Convention, Articles 13(6) and 14. 
  
65 
tion arose again at COP-1 and the whole issue, that is generally considered a prerequisite 
for a successful Convention, has been postponed until a later stage. 
In order to lay down the basis for the implementation process, the first meeting of the 
COP was held in Punta del Este, Uruguay, in 2005.265 At this meeting, representatives of 
Parties to the Convention were present as well as observers from other States, UN bodies 
and specialised agencies and more than 60 non-governmental organisations.266 COP-1 
especially focused on a number of organisational and procedural matters, as indicated in 
the Convention.267 With regard to content, the Secretariat announced the nomination of 
four new chemicals, two of them being pesticides.268 Furthermore, WWF International 
circulated a list of 20 candidate substances that it deemed suitable for future listing under 
the Convention.269  
Similarly as regards the Rotterdam Convention, there were heated debates between de-
veloped and developing countries at COP-1 of the Stockholm Convention. These debates 
essentially centred upon the same issues of representation and distribution of financial 
resources. With regard to representation, the discussion focused on composition of the 
POPRC and its terms of reference. However, the learning experiences of the Rotterdam 
Convention helped to solve the representation problems in a smoother fashion. The dis-
tribution issues concerned the role of the GEF and the future financial assistance needs 
of developing countries. They were more difficult to solve and were largely postponed to 
COP-2. 
During COP-2, taking place in Geneva in 2006, similar tensions emerged between de-
veloped and developing countries as had occurred during COP-1.270 As a result, the ne-
gotiations proceeded with difficulty and progress was less than expected. During COP-3, 
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International, Environmental Health Fund, Greenpeace International, International POPs 
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  Press release WWF International, 28 April 2005: WWF lists 20 chemicals to be added to the 
POPs treaty. Seven of them are pesticides, including chlordecone, hexachlorocyclohexane 
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  Report of the Conference of the Parties of the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic 
Pollutants on the work of its second meeting, UNEP/POPs/COP.2/30, 15 May 2006. See 
also: IISD Earth Negotiations Bulletin, vol. 15, no. 149, 8 May 2006. 
  
66
taking place in Dakar in 2007, progress has been made on the issues of effectiveness 
evaluation (Global Monitoring Programme) and technical assistance, but the issue of 
non-compliance could not be resolved.271 However, these three elements together are 
considered the necessary basis for a succesfull treaty. Therefore, some doubt has arisen 
whether the Convention has enough momentum to continue progressing during the two-
year intersessional period. Significantly, COP-3 represented the last annual COP of the 
Stockholm Convention, after which, the Parties will convene only every two years. This 
means that COP-4 will take place in 2009. 
Rule-implementation 
In order to implement the Stockholm Convention at the national level, the Parties are 
obliged to develop national implementation plans (NIPs), describing how they will meet 
their obligations under the Convention and integrate these plans in their sustainable de-
velopment strategies where appropriate.272 These NIPs needed to be submitted to the Se-
cretariat within two years of joining the Convention.273 They are in particular meant to 
establish particular national priorities and to set out detailed action plans. After submis-
sion of their NIPs, governments should report every two years on progress towards 
achieving their goals. In order to give guidance to the development process of NIPs, 
UNEP in collaboration with the World Bank and the GEF published several documents 
that outlined the process.274 The earliest deadline for submission of NIPs was set at 17 
May 2006. However, more than half of the Parties that should have submitted their plans 
failed to do this in time. More than one year later, the percentage of Parties that had not 
complied had been reduced to 30%.275 A preliminary analysis of some of these plans 
showed that the process of collecting information and determining priorities in a partici-
pative context can be seen as a major contribution of the planning effort. In several coun-
tries, this process has helped to create awareness about the problems to be solved and a 
first identification of stockpiles of obsolete pesticides. 
Rule-enforcement 
Similarly as the Rotterdam Convention, the Stockholm Convention itself does not con-
tain provisions about rule-enforcement, but has asked the COP to develop the procedural 
and institutional mechanisms for determining non-compliance with the provisions of the 
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Convention, and for treatment of Parties found to be in non-compliance. However, de-
finitive arrangements have not been made as yet, as has been explained above. 
3.5 Assessment 
This chapter has focused on the instruments of international law that aim to regulate pes-
ticides in the different stages of their life-cycle, including production, marketing, use and 
residues. Based on this description, the current section makes an assessment of the multi-
lateral regulatory approach in terms of effectiveness, inclusiveness and fairness.  
Effectiveness 
The instruments of the multilateral approach can be considered important achievements 
from the perspective of pesticide risk reduction, although they have perhaps modest am-
bitions in their current form. Significantly, the potentially most important instrument is 
the voluntary, non-binding FAO Code of Conduct, because of its life-cycle approach and  
periodical review and update.  
The current international instruments have a largely complementary character. However, 
this complementarity does not mean that all risks related to agricultural pesticides are 
adequately covered. First, the present hard law instruments focus on a selection of haz-
ardous substances and have barely any influence on the availability of other harmful pes-
ticides. Second, the instruments do not provide an enforceable impetus to reduce the de-
pendency on pesticides in agriculture. Third, the instruments provide several options for 
veto-ing decision-making processes and to opt out from decisions taken. As a conse-
quence, there are gaps in the pattern of regulation, providing loopholes and facilitating 
the occurrence of negative side-effects, such as the increased use of other hazardous pes-
ticides, and the increased trade in banned pesticides.276  
Inclusiveness 
Non-state actors from civil society, business, and the scientific community have per-
formed important roles in the processes that have shaped the international law and policy 
governing pesticides in the past decades. Civil society has been actively engaged through 
the international environmental and social NGOs, such as Friends of the Earth, World 
Wildlife Fund, and Oxfam. Furthermore, several organisations are specifically dedicated 
to pesticide issues and several of them have grouped themselves in network structures, 
such as the Pesticide Action Network (PAN) and the International POPs Elimination 
Network (IPEN).277 From the business side, the pesticide manufacturers are organised in 
CropLife International which calls itself the global federation for the plant science indus-
try, and is led by companies such as BASF, Bayer Crop Science, Dow Agro Sciences, 
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Du Pont, FMC, Monsanto, Sumitomo and Syngenta.278 In comparison, the scientific 
community has a more dispersed character and is not being represented by a specific in-
terest organisation. It consists of a multitude of researchers with various disciplinary 
backgrounds and operating within different institutional contexts.  
Importantly, non-state actors have exercised their influence in the different stages of 
regulatory processes at the international level, including agenda setting, rule-making, 
rule-implementation and rule-enforcement. With regard to agenda setting, for example, 
civil society NGOs have pushed several issues onto the global agenda. In general they 
have succeeded in bringing human health issues to the fore, focusing public attention, for 
example, on the many cases of pesticide poisoning in developing countries.279 To this 
date, NGOs have been less successful in bringing environmental issues to the table. 
Concerning rule-making, non-state actors have become increasingly involved in the 
preparation and negotiation of legal instruments. This was already the case for the FAO 
Code of Conduct and the Rotterdam Convention, as PAN and Oxfam, for example, lob-
bied successfully for the inclusion of the prior informed consent procedure in the 1989 
version of the FAO Code of Conduct, and subsequently its adoption in binding law. The 
most recent case in point is the treaty process of the Stockholm Convention that has been 
marked by an extraordinary level of participation and contribution by persons, entities, 
and organizations outside government, and also by representatives of indigenous com-
munities. In order to include as many perspectives as possible in the negotiations, UNEP 
had invited NGOs as observers in the negotiation process and encouraged to actively 
participate which has led to concrete results.280 IPEN, for example, as the forum for de-
veloping country NGOs, has performed an important role in the shift in emphasis from 
management of POPs to their elimination in the final text of the Convention.  
As regards rule-implementation, non-state actors are increasingly considered to have 
their own responsibility for the implementation of internationally agreed measures, and 
several examples show indeed that a number of them have accepted their new tasks. The 
FAO Code of Conduct, for example, addresses governments as well as the pesticide in-
dustry, but also asks the help of all other stakeholders to promote its implementation. In 
response to this appeal, the pesticide industry has officially endorsed the Code and has 
taken responsibility for the implementation of specific parts. Similarly, the Rotterdam 
Convention promotes shared responsibility and suggests for example the encouragement 
of initiatives by industry to promote chemical safety and the promotion of voluntary 
agreements concerning technical assistance to developing countries and countries with 
economies in transition.281 The Stockholm Convention explicitly recognises in its pre-
amble the important contribution that the private sector and non-governmental organiza-
tions can make to achieve the goals of the Convention, and also underlines the specific 
responsibility that the manufacturers of persistent organic pollutants should take. Fur-
thermore, the Convention obliges the Parties to consult national stakeholders and organ-
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ise participatory processes, when developing, implementing and updating national im-
plementation plans.282  
Concerning rule-enforcement, non-state actors are increasingly given the opportunity to 
provide assistance in the monitoring process. The 2002 version of the FAO Code of 
Conduct, for example, invites non-state actors to monitor activities related to the imple-
mentation of the Code and report these to the Director-General of FAO.283 With respect 
to the Rotterdam and Stockholm Convention, however, the procedures and institutional 
mechanisms for determining non-compliance have still to be developed and approved, 
but are expected to include non-state actors.  
The conclusion is that the participation of non-state actors at the international level has 
expanded enormously, especially in the last decade. However, increased participation 
may also have its downsides. First, a higher level of participation may conceal the fact 
that not all stakeholders are organised in such a way that they are able to voice their in-
terests sufficiently. In the case of pesticide risk reduction, agricultural producers and 
their organisations in developed as well as developing countries are the remarkably ab-
sent party, and the same accounts for consumers. Second, increased participation may 
also have counterproductive effects. In relation to the Stockholm Convention, for exam-
ple, it has been remarked that perceived over-involvement of non-state actors in sessions 
of the POPRC reviewing new substances might hinder Parties’ willingness to accept the 
committee’s conclusions.284 In sum, it remains to be seen whether the input of non-state 
actors will continue to be welcomed as the implementation of the Rotterdam and Stock-
holm Conventions moves forward. 
Fairness 
The instruments of international law contribute in principle to the harmonisation of law 
and policy worldwide. With its technical guidelines, the FAO Code of Conduct is likely 
to stimulate harmonisation of national laws and policies. At the same time, the Code 
states that countries should recognize each others good agricultural practices and accept 
the accompanying pesticide residues, thereby providing a certain level of flexibility to 
the system.285 
The situation is somewhat different for the Rotterdam Convention. Although the Con-
vention has a harmonising effect by creating more equal levels of information, it allows 
at the same time, or even promotes, the development of national policies and measures. 
Such national measures may have trade distorting effects, because certain substances 
may be allowed for use in some countries but prohibited in others. More specifically, the 
Rotterdam Convention explicitly states that Parties have the right to take action that is 
more stringently protective of human health and the environment than called for in the 
Convention.286 This means that ultimately the decisions relevant to the trade in pesticides 
and other hazardous chemicals are not taken at the international level but still at the level 
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of national governments. In comparison, the Stockholm Convention has a stronger har-
monising impact because it provides for worldwide prohibitions of production, trade and 
use. However, this global applicability is partly undermined by the exemptions allowed 
to specific countries as well as non-ratifications. 
With regard to the creation of equal opportunities, recent developments concerning the 
Rotterdam Convention provide indications that a shift is taking place towards exerting 
increased pressure upon developed countries to meet their obligations vis-à-vis develo-
ping countries. First, the Secretariat of the Rotterdam Convention has started with a 
“naming-and-shaming” policy by publishing data about the financial pledges of the Par-
ties to the Convention and the extent to which they are being met. Second, the same Se-
cretariat has launched a programme to help developing countries implement the Conven-
tion through regional workshops and the development of national action plans.  
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4. The European Union approach to pesticide risk 
reduction 
4.1 Introduction 
In its first Environment Action Programme (EAP) of 1973, the European Union (EU) al-
ready recognised pesticides as a priority area for action.287 The programme put the em-
phasis on the need for further research on pesticides and their effects in order to establish 
environmental quality objectives. The programme furthermore observed that consumers 
were increasingly paying attention to the quality of foodstuffs and that there was ample 
evidence to suggest that demand for quality products would further expand. In the same 
context, it remarked that agricultural producers were increasingly developing so-called 
‘biological’ products or products obtained by methods which are ‘closer to natural proc-
esses’. Consequently, the programme argued that there was a need to encourage such 
producers and also to protect consumers against misleading claims about environmental 
advantages. Following this first EAP, the pesticide issue stayed a priority in EU envi-
ronmental policy in the decades after, as is demonstrated by the successive EAPs and a 
range of legislative measures that affect the use of pesticides, either directly or indirectly.  
This chapter aims to analyse the EU law and policy on pesticides.288 Section 4.2 de-
scribes its evolution against the background of the diverging policy objectives at stake. 
Section 4.3 focuses on the legal tenets of the current EU approach, including Directive 
91/414 concerning the placing on the market of plant protection products, Regulation No 
396/2005 on maximum residue levels of pesticides in or on food and feed of plant and 
animal origin, and the proposed Directive establishing a framework for Community ac-
tion to achieve a sustainable use of pesticides. Section 4.4 assesses the EU regulatory 
approach to pesticide risk reduction in terms of effectiveness, inclusiveness and fairness. 
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4.2 The evolution of the EU law and policy on pesticides 
The very first EU proposal for legislation potentially limiting pesticide risks included a 
draft Directive on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provi-
sions of Member States relating to the classification, packaging and labelling of pesti-
cides, published in 1975.289 Focusing more substantively on the marketing and use stages 
of pesticide substances and products, the European Commission put forward in 1976 two 
complementary proposals that were meant to form the basis of the EU legislation on pes-
ticides.  
The first proposal included a Council Directive concerning the placing of EEC-accepted 
plant protection products on the market.290 The second proposal concerned a Council Di-
rective prohibiting the placing on the market and the use of plant protection products 
containing certain active substances.291 With regard to both proposals, the Commission 
considered that “one of the most important methods of protecting plants and plant prod-
ucts and of increasing the productivity of agriculture is to use plant protection products”, 
but that at the same time “their use may involve risks for man and the environment since, 
in the main, they are toxic substances or preparations having dangerous effects.” The 
Commission further remarked that most Member States had established rules governing 
approval to place plant protection products on the market and a number of them had also 
introduced restrictions or prohibitions concerning the marketing and use of certain plant 
protection products. It argued that these national regulations contained differences that 
constituted obstacles to trade which directly affected the establishment and functioning 
of the common market. Therefore the Commission saw it as desirable to eliminate these 
obstacles and to align the legislation of the Member States. 
Both proposals were thus primarily aimed at the harmonisation of national legislation of 
the Member States. However, the Council considered that the Directive outlining an au-
thorisation procedure also had the potential to improve the protection given to the users 
of plant protection products, to the consumers of plants and plant products, and to the 
environment. 
The proposal concerning the prohibition of certain substances was passed in a relatively 
high speed. It was first approved without amendment by the European Parliament and 
then formally adopted by the Council in a more or less unchanged form except for a 
sharpening of the wording of several articles. Consequently, Council Directive 
79/117/EEC of 21 December 1978 prohibiting the placing on the market and use of plant 
protection products containing certain active substances was published in 1979.292  
Article 3 formed its core, stating that “Member States shall ensure that plant protection 
products containing one or more of the active substances listed in the Annex may neither 
be placed on the market nor used.” This means that although their marketing and use was 
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not any longer allowed in the Community, the production of the substances concerned 
could proceed under the condition that they were marketed and used outside the Com-
munity.  
At the Directive’s entry into force, the Annex contained 13 active substances or groups 
of them.293 The Directive further opened up the possibility to include additional sub-
stances by amendment if their use gave rise or was likely to give rise to: (a) harmful ef-
fects to human or animal health; or (b) unreasonable adverse influence on the environ-
ment.294 In the period from 1983 until 1991, in total 11 substances have been added to 
the Annex.295 With respect to these substances, the Directive provided several deroga-
tions from the absolute prohibition that was worded in Article 3. Some of these deroga-
tions were temporary, others had a more permanent character.  
In contrast to the pesticide products containing substances listed in the Annex, other pes-
ticide products could be marketed and used without any authorisation procedure except 
for the limitations posed by national law. Hence, the first EU legislation was based on 
the “yes, unless banned” principle: the marketing and use of pesticides was permitted 
unless the pesticide contained a substance that was banned (negative list). 
The other proposal concerning a Community authorisation system for pesticides had a 
much longer genesis. The original text aimed at a voluntary scheme in which pesticide 
producers were free to ask for an EEC-acceptance of their products in case they intended 
to have market access in more than one Member State.296 Thus, the proposal did not aim 
for full harmonisation, but was only meant to initiate a first stage in such a process. It ar-
gued that “a considerable proportion [of the plant protection products already in circula-
tion in the Member States] were intended only for local or regional agricultural and eco-
logical conditions and needs and therefore should be regulated by the Member States 
concerned which reflects the application of the principle of subsidiarity.”  
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One of the core provisions of the proposed Directive was Article 4(1) that listed the cri-
teria for EEC-acceptance of plant production products. Under the condition of proper 
application for the purpose intended, such products should be sufficiently effective and 
should not have an unacceptable effect on plants or plant products, a harmful effect on 
human or animal health or an unreasonable adverse influence on the environment. 
The active substances whose inclusion in EEC-accepted plant protection products was 
permitted were listed in an annex that contained 135 substances. Article 19(2) opened up 
the possibility to include additional substances if it could be expected that plant protec-
tion products based on them would meet the conditions of Article 4(1) and their residues, 
if constituting a danger to human or animal health, could be measured by methods in 
general use. 
After several consultations and a first reading by the European Parliament, the legislative 
process came to a halt. This delay was caused by sovereignty claims made by several 
Member States.297 It took ten years before the work was continued with a change of the 
legal basis of the proposal.298 The new proposal put the emphasis on the establishment of 
a Community authorisation scheme for active substances to be supplemented by harmo-
nised national authorisation procedures for pesticide products containing approved sub-
stances. The legislative process was finalised in due course and Council Directive 
91/414/EEC of 15 July 1991 concerning the placing on the market of plant protection 
products was published in 1991.299  
Common Agricultural Policy 
An important policy area influencing pesticide risks is the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP), which was initiated by the Treaty of Rome in 1958 and went into effect in 
1963.300 The CAP focused on an increase of production and has been very successful in 
this respect. Increasingly, however, the EU started to recognise that the intensification of 
production had led to a significant increase in the use of pesticides and chemical fertilis-
ers.301 With the 1992 reforms of the CAP, some measures have been introduced that 
promoted more environment-friendly farming practices, such as subsidies for set-aside 
agricultural land and agri-environment measures.302 The latter, for example, created the 
legal basis for the provision of subsidies to agricultural producers aiming to convert to 
organic agriculture or integrated control, thus helping to reduce pestide use related risks. 
This policy focus has been strengthened with Agenda 2000 that considers farming prac-
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tices that protect the environment and preserve the countryside as an integral element of 
the agreed package of measures.303  
As a next step, and under the mid-term review of the CAP, the Commission proposed to 
aim at a decoupling of CAP support and agricultural output, compulsory cross-
compliance, and increased expenditure on rural development and agri-environment 
measures.304 The final compromise preserved many features of the original proposal but 
included much greater flexibility for Member States with regard to decoupling and 
budget restrictions, and consisted of a series of regulations in which the measures were 
further elaborated. Particularly relevant is Regulation 1782/2003 that provides agricul-
tural producers with annual income support, the Single Farm Payment (SFP), independ-
ent of any production they undertake, but conditional upon respecting certain environ-
mental, food safety, animal and plant health and animal welfare standards in EU legisla-
tion.305 
Matching with this aim at more sustainable agricultural practices is the European Action 
Plan for Organic Food and Farming that the Commission presented in June 2004.306 The 
plan sets out 21 actions in relation to the development of the organic production and con-
sumption, but does not provide any timeframe or quantitative targets for the actions pre-
sented, thus giving the plan a noncommittal character. 
Hence, with the reform of the CAP, a transition has been started from a policy based on 
quantity towards a policy focused on quality, which inter alia favours agri-environment 
measures such as low-input farming and organic farming. Most importantly in relation to 
pesticide use, cross-compliance requirements for direct payments under the CAP have 
been introduced in 2006, which oblige agricultural producers to comply with the princi-
ples of good agricultural practice as mentioned in Article 3 of Directive 91/414/EEC.307 
What is important about this latter measure is that it targets in principle all agricultural 
producers. 
Water policy  
An additional impetus to reduce pesticide risks has been provided by the Water Frame-
work Directive (WFD) that marked a change in EU water policy, as it provides a coher-
ent and integrated framework for the management of all surface waters and groundwa-
ter.308 More precisely, this legislation distinguishes between priority substancess for 
                                                   
303
  COM(1998) 158 final, 04.06.1998. 
304
  Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament - Mid-
Term Review of the Common Agricultural Policy, COM(2002) 394 final, 10.07.2002.  
305
  Council Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003 of 29 September 2003 establishing common rules for 
direct support schemes under the common agricultural policy and establishing certain support 
schemes for farmers and amending several regulations, OJ L270, 21.10.2003.  
306
  COM(2004) 415 final, 10.06.2004. 
307
  Council Regulation 1782/2003/EC of 29 September 2003 establishing common rules for di-
rect support schemes under the common agricultural policy and establishing certain support 
schemes for farmers, OJ L270, 21.10.2003, p. 1. 
308
  Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000 es-
tablishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy, OJ L327, 
22.12.2000, p. 1.  
  
76
which measures should be taken that are aimed at their progressive reduction, and prior-
ity hazardous substances for which measures should be taken aimed at the cessation or 
phasing out of discharges, emissions and losses within 20 years after their adoption at 
Community level. A list of 33 priority substances was adopted in 2001, 13 of which are 
active substances used in pesticide products.309 Full implementation of the Water 
Framework Directive is expected to make a considerable contribution to an overall re-
duction of risks from pesticides in the aquatic environment. 
Food safety 
With regard to the residue stage of the pesticide life-cycle, the European Commission 
has put in place since 1976 a body of legislation permitting the setting of maximum resi-
due levels (MRLs) based on a shared responsibility between the Commission and the 
Member States.310 This EU legislation aimed to facilitate trade in food products by set-
ting common standards. The first directive of 1976 laid down optional MRLs for 43 pes-
ticide substances in combination with specified fruit and vegetables.311 It was followed 
by two other directives in 1986 that set MRLs for cereals and foodstuffs of animal ori-
gin.312 A later directive from 1990 embodied a new approach providing the basis for 
mandatory rather than optional MRLs that were subsequently established in dozens of 
daughter Directives.313 Additional major amendments in the residues legislation were re-
alised with Council Directive 97/41/EC that inter alia provided for a system to set MRLs 
in processed products and composite foodstuffs, introduced a coordinated Community 
monitoring programme, and transferred the competence for setting MRLs from the 
Council to the Commission.314 
In response to growing concerns about the adequacy of the level of protection for babies 
and young children, the Commission established a separate directive for baby food with 
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stricter standards in 1991.315 This directive on so called ‘infant formulae’ and ‘follow-on 
formulae’ was fundamentally amended in 1999, placing severe restrictions on the use of 
pesticides in the production of those foods, and set a common MRL of 0.01 mg/kg for all 
residues in infant formulae and follow-on formulae. 316 It also prohibited the use of cer-
tain pesticides in agricultural production intended for such formulae. In 2003, the Com-
mission further tightened MRLs in infant-formulae and cereal-based baby foods for 
some particularly toxic pesticides.317 The new legislation set zero detectability limits for 
eleven substances being phased out and close to zero limits for another five. Considering 
the MRLs in the different categories, the remarkable inconsistency is that prepared baby 
food falls under stricter rules than home-made baby food. 
The law and policy concerning pesticide residues has been increasingly influenced by 
policy measures established in the area of consumer health and more particularly food 
safety. Due to several food scares in the late 1990s, the development of food safety law 
and policy became a priority of the European Commission in recent years which resulted 
in the White Paper on food safety.318 In this paper, the Commission announced new 
framework legislation for food relating to all stages of the production, processing and 
distribution of food and the establishment of an independent European Food Safety Au-
thority (EFSA).319 The new Regulation inter alia contained important provisions about 
traceability of food products and the division of responsibilities within supply chains. 
Furthermore, Regulation 852/2004/EC on food hygiene prescribed that as of 2006 any 
use of pesticides should be recorded in special registers at farm level.320  
Based on the 6th EAP, the European Commission has stepped up its actions in the area of 
environment and health, having adopted a communication on the issue in June 2003.321 
The communication outlined an integrated approach to address environment and health 
interactions and their impacts on more vulnerable groups such as children. Subsequently, 
                                                   
315
  Commission Directive 91/321/EEC of 14 May 1991 on infant formulae and follow-on formu-
lae, OJ L175, 04.07.1991. 
316
  Commission Directive 1999/39/EC of 6 May 1999 amending Directive 96/5/EC on processed 
cereal-based foods and baby foods for infants and young children, OJ L174, 18.05.1999, and 
Commission Directive 1999/50/EC of 25 May 1999 amending Directive 91/321/EEC on in-
fant formulae and follow-on formulae, OJ L139, 02.06.1999.  
317
  Commission Directive 2003/14/EC of 10 February 2003 amending Directive 91/321/EEC on 
infant formulae and follow-on formulae, OJ L041, 14.02.2003. 
318
  COM(1999) 719 final, 12.01.2000. 
319
  Regulation (EC) 178/2002 laying down the general principles and requirements of food law, 
establishing the European Food Safety Authority and laying down procedures in matters of 
food safety, OJ L031, 28.01.2002.  
320
  Regulation (EC) No 852/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 
2004 on the hygiene of foodstuffs, OJ L139, 30.04.2004, and Corrigendum to Regulation 
(EC) No 852/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the 
hygiene of foodstuffs, OJ L139, 30.04.2004. 
321
  Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the 
European Economic and Social Committee, A European Environment and Health Strategy,  
COM(2003) 338 final, 11.06.2003, and Communication from the Commission to the Coun-
cil, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee, The European 
Environment & Health Action Plan 2004-2010, COM (2004) 416 Vol. I final, 09.06.2004. 
  
78
the Commission prepared an Action Plan for the period 2004-2010 that was presented at 
the 4th WHO Ministerial Conference on Environment & Health in Budapest in 2004. Part 
of the strategy has been the proposal for a new EU regulatory framework for chemicals, 
the so-called REACH Regulation, with as guiding principles precaution and substitution, 
which has been finalised at the end of 2006.322  
Concluding remarks 
Looking back at more than thirty years of EU law and policy on pesticides, it is apparent 
that the focus has shifted from the facilitation of internal trade of pesticide products and 
agricultural produce towards a more encompassing approach in which environmental 
and health objectives have become increasingly important. Important landmarks in this 
evolution were the establishment of the dual authorisation system for active substances 
and pesticide products in 1991, and the new legislation on pesticide residues in 2005. 
Significantly, the European Parliament has fulfilled an important initiating role in the 
shift in regulatory emphasis. 
4.3 The legal tenets of the EU approach  
As the previous section described the broader picture of EU law and policy related to 
pesticides, the current section elaborates on the three instruments that have most rele-
vance from the perspective of environmental and human health protection, including: 
• Directive 91/414/EEC concerning the placing on the market of plant protection prod-
ucts;  
• Regulation (EC) No 396/2005 of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
maximum residue levels of pesticides in or on food and feed of plant an animal ori-
gin. 
• Proposal for a Directive establishing a framework for Community action to achieve a 
sustainable use of pesticides. 
Considered from a life-cycle perspective, these three instruments have a complementary 
character. Directive 91/414/EEC focuses on the marketing and use stages of pesticides, 
the proposed framework directive is oriented on the use stage of pesticides, and Regula-
tion (EC) No 396/2005 aims to limit the risks of pesticide residues in food products.  
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4.3.1 Directive 91/414/EEC concerning the placing on the market of plant 
protection products 
Rule-making 
Council Directive 91/414/EEC concerning the placing of plant protection products on the 
market was established in 1991, and entered into force two years later.323 The Directive’s 
main instrument is an authorisation procedure that is dual in nature: active substances are 
evaluated at Community level whereas the Member States evaluate and authorise pesti-
cide products containing those substances. Authorisation of pesticide products is granted 
pursuant to either Article 4 or Article 8, to be obtained from the competent authority of 
each Member State in which a pesticide covered by the Directive is placed on the mar-
ket.324 
This Authorisation Directive was a new departure for the Community in two important 
respects. In the first place, it explicitly placed the protection of human health and the en-
vironment above the needs of improving agricultural production. In the preamble to the 
Directive, the Council formulated this priority as follows: “Whereas the provisions gov-
erning authorization must ensure a high standard of protection, which, in particular, must 
prevent the authorization of plant protection products whose risks to health, groundwater 
and the environment and human and animal health should take priority over the objective 
of improving plant production.”  
In the second place, the underlying principle of the legislation changed from ‘yes, unless 
banned’ in ‘no, unless approved’: the marketing and use of pesticides were not permitted 
unless both the active substances and the pesticide products involved were authorised 
according to the appropriate procedures. Thus, Directive 91/414 provided for the estab-
lishment of positive lists of active substances and pesticide products for the use in plant 
protection products, which had been evaluated to be safe for humans and which did not 
present an unacceptable risk to the environment. 
The ‘no, unless approved’ principle, however, was not a hard principle. The directive 
provided for several provisional arrangements, derogations and exceptions. Firstly, Arti-
cle 8(1) contained provisional authorisation arrangements for new active substances. 
Secondly, Article 8(2) provided for a transitional 12-year programme of reassessments 
for substances that were already on the market at the moment of the Directive’s entry 
into force in July 1993. Thirdly, Article 8(3) provided for an exception in case of an un-
foreseeable danger which cannot be contained by other means. Thirdly, Article 9 pre-
scribed a relatively flexible system for extensions of authorisations of plant protection 
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products for minor uses. Fourthly, Article 22 provided for an exception in case of re-
search or development purposes. Fifthly, Regulation (EC) No 2076/2002 provided a list 
of derogations for so-called essential uses of certain substances withdrawn from the 
market with the argument that efficient alternatives were not yet available.325 Sixthly, a 
certain delay is inherent to the update of pesticide authorisations to current scientific 
standards.326 
The Directive provided for a transitional 12-year programme of re-assessments for the 
substances that were already on the market at the moment of the Directive’s entry into 
force in July 1993.327 This programme concerned 834 active substances (or so-called  
“existing” substances). Pending the decisions on their inclusion, the pesticide products 
concerned were permitted to remain on the market ultimately until 26 July 2003 under 
certain conditions. 
The Commission split the review programme into four phases based on the level of con-
cern and use: phase 1 included 90 of the most widely used substances that caused clear 
concern; phase 2 included 149 substances comprising all those organophosphates and 
carbamates that were not on the first list as well as other substances of concern and sub-
stances for which the pesticide industry had indicated early availability of dossiers; 
phase 3 comprised the 402 remaining substances of concern but not as widely used as 
those of phase 2, and phase 4 comprised the 193 remaining substances identified as be-
ing of lower concern. The relevant legislation about the review programme is included in 
Annex 3.  
In order to harmonise the authorisation procedures of pesticide products by the national 
authorities in the Member States, the Directive prescribed the development of a uniform 
set of risk assessment principles and decision-making criteria that Member States must 
apply when evaluating products. They were adopted by Council Directive 97/57/EC.328 
An additional harmonisation measure concerned the mutual recognition mechanism 
which means that a pesticide product authorised in one country should also be authorised 
in another country “to the extent that agricultural, plant health and environmental (in-
cluding climatic) conditions relevant to the use of the product are comparable in the re-
gions concerned.”329  
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Directive 91/414 furthermore provided in Article 3(3) that Member States should pre-
scribe that pesticide products must be used properly.330 Such proper use includes compli-
ance with the conditions established during the evaluation procedure and specified on the 
label of the pesticide product. Moreover, the article requires “the application of the prin-
ciples of good plant protection practice as well as, whenever possible, the principles of 
integrated control”. However, this requirement has remained a rather empty clause since 
the principles of good plant protection practice as well as those of integrated control 
have not been elaborated, and furthermore the application of the latter, has been weak-
ened by the addition of the words ‘whenever possible’.331 Consequently, Member States 
had the leeway to make their own interpretation or not. 
In a progress report on the functioning of Directive 91/414, the Commission observed 
that the harmonisation of the market for pesticide products hampered, due to the failure 
of the mutual recognition provisions.332 Furthermore, it remarked that several important 
niche pesticide products were in danger of disappearing from the market. In response, 
the Council and the European Parliament called on the Commission to bring forward 
proposals for amendments. In order to prepare the legislative proposal, the Commission 
organised an extensive consultation process of stakeholders and the public.  
One of the main issues under debate concerned the introduction of a zoning system to 
stimulate the further harmonisation of the authorisation of plant protection products and 
which was meant to solve the failure of the mutual recognition mechanism of Directive 
91/414. A zone in this respect is a group of Member States for which it is assumed that 
the agricultural, plant health, and environmental conditions are relatively similar. Such a 
zoning structure would simplify the market situation for plant protection products. In-
stead of as many markets as Member States, there would remain as many markets as 
zones. A second major issue during the consultation concerned the possible introduction 
of a substitution principle, including a comparative assessment of substances and prod-
ucts and requiring regulators to favour the least hazardous product for a given use, which 
could eventually lead to the refusal or withdrawal of authorisations. A third major issue 
concerned the simplification of the system for protection and sharing of data from indus-
try. 
                                                   
330
  The full text of Article 3(3) is as follows: Member States shall prescribe that plant protection 
products must be used properly. Proper use shall include compliance with the conditions es-
tablished in accordance with Article 4 and specified on the labelling, and the application of 
the principles of good plant protection practice as well as, whenever possible, the principles 
of integrated control. 
331
  According to Article 2(13), integrated control is defined as: the rational application of a com-
bination of biological, biotechnological, chemical, cultural or plant-breeding measures 
whereby the use of chemical plant protection products is limited to the strict minimum neces-
sary to maintain the pest population at levels below those causing economically unacceptable 
damage or loss.  
332
  Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. Evaluation of the 
active substances of plant protection products (submitted in accordance with Article 8(2) of 
Council Directive 91/414/EEC on the placing of plant protection products on the market), 
COM(2001) 444 final, 25.07.2001. 
  
82
In July 2006, the Commission finally published its proposal for a Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council concerning the placing of plant protection prod-
ucts on the market. 333 The Commission argued that the use of a regulation, instead of a 
directive, was justified because it ensures that the provisions are implemented at the 
same time and in the same way in all Member States.334 The proposed legal basis of the 
regulation is Article 37(2) (common agricultural policy) and Article 152(4)(b) (protec-
tion of public health). Significantly, the protection of the environment is not mentioned 
as an explicit objective of the regulation. This has had repercussions for the applicable 
decision-making procedure. 
The proposal maintains the dual system of Directive 91/414 that is based upon authorisa-
tion of substances at EU level and of pesticide products at Member State level. However, 
the new system deviates from Directive 91/414 in a number of ways. First, it distin-
guishes open field and greenhouse production, and introduces for the former a zoning 
system and for the latter an EU-wide regime.335 Under the new zoning system, the terri-
tory of the EU will be divided into three separate markets for pesticide products based on 
zones with comparable geographical conditions, each of which will be governed by fully 
harmonised authorisation rules. Consequently, mutual recognition of pesticide products 
within authorisation zones is compulsory, and in case of use in greenhouses or as post-
harvest treatment, regardless of zones. Second, the proposal outlines specific procedures 
for substances of low risk and those of concern. Third, it introduces a mandatory com-
parative assessment for plant protection products containing a candidate for substitution 
which is a substance that fulfils a number of health, environmental, economic and resis-
tance criteria. Fourth, it provides stricter rules on packaging, labelling and advertising, 
and prescribes stricter criteria for approval of active substances.  
Concerning the use of plant protection products, the proposed regulation stipulates that 
plant protection products shall be used properly and that proper use includes compliance 
with the conditions in the authorisation decision and specified on the labelling, and ap-
plication of the principles of good plant protection practice as well as, whenever possi-
ble, the principles of IPM and good environmental practice, as will be elaborated in a so-
called comitology procedure.336  
In March 2008, the Commission presented an amended proposal for a Regulation con-
cerning the placing of plant protection products on the market, taking into account a 
number of the amendments proposed by the European Parliament, most notably the in-
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clusion of the explicit purpose of ensuring a high level of protection of both human and 
animal health and the environment, the mentioning of the precautionary principle, the 
definitions of substance of concern and of low risk, additional pesticide use prescrip-
tions, and provisions concerning parallel trade.337 However, the Commission did not in-
clude several of the more radical, concrete amendments proposed by the Parliament and 
also did not agree with the proposed change of the legal basis of the Regulation. 
Rule-implementation 
As mentioned above, the Commission presented a progress report on the implementation 
of Directive 91/414 ten years after its adoption.338 By then, it was clear that at least 367 
out of the 834 existing active substances were going to be withdrawn from the market 
because the pesticide producers concerned were not interested to start an authorisation 
procedure. However, the progress made in reviewing the remaining 467 substances was 
far behind the expectations, as examinations had only been finalised for 13 substances 
and started for another 61. Not surprisingly, the report concluded that the 12-year review 
programme needed to be extended and that 2008 seemed a more appropriate end date 
than 2003.  
Furthermore, the report predicted that the market would experience a sharp change after 
July 2003, with the loss of up to 500 substances, although this would be partly offset by 
a progressive increase in the availability of new active substances. More specifically, the 
Commission remarked that the market for insecticides could become under stress be-
cause of a discordance between needs and available products, but that market forces 
should correct this situation.  
Directive 91/414 had to be transposed by the Member States before 26 July 1993. Most 
Member States adopted the Directive in time or with a moderate delay. A few excep-
tions, however, urged the Commission to start infringement procedures. Greece was 
summoned before the ECJ on the grounds that it had failed to fulfil its obligations under 
the Directive and was in due course condemned.339 The Commission started a similar ac-
tion against Germany.340 Although the federal government was in the process of amend-
ing its existing legislation, the Court argued that such legislation cannot be regarded as 
ensuring transposition into domestic law of a directive, which expressly requires the 
Member States to adopt provisions containing a reference thereto or accompanied by 
such reference. Consequently, Germany was found to be in non-compliance. 
Other Member States have been summoned before the ECJ on the grounds of not having 
properly implemented the Directive. The Netherlands, in particular, has been sued sev-
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  COM(2008) 93 final, 11.03.2008. 
338
  Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. Evaluation of the 
active substances of plant protection products (submitted in accordance with Article 8(2) of 
Council Directive 91/414/EEC on the placing of plant protection products on the market), 
COM(2001) 444 final, 25.07.2001. 
339
  Case C-380/95, Commission of the European Communities v. Hellenic Republic, ECR 1996, 
p. I-04837. 
340
  Case C-137/96, Commission of the European Communities v. Federal Republic of Germany, 
ECR 1997, p. I-06749. 
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eral times about its interpretation of the Directive by environmental NGOs (see Chapter 
6). 
Rule-enforcement 
The responsibility for the enforcement of Directive 91/414 lies mainly with the Member 
States. They have to perform market controls and see to it that agricultural producers are 
using pesticide products in accordance with the legal requirements and label instructions. 
The Commission’s Food and Veterinary Office (FVO) carries out audits and inspections 
in the Member States to control if the appropriate food control systems are in place. Data 
collected by the European Crop Protection Association (ECPA) show that the enforce-
ment of the legislation is rather weak, which is signalled by the growing illegal trade, 
marketing and use of pesticides.341 The incidence of counterfeiting and illegal traffic in 
plant protection products has increased substantially over the past years, currently ac-
counting for approximately 5 to 7% of the European market for pesticides. 
4.3.2 Regulation No 396/2005 on maximum residue levels of pesticides in or 
on food and feed of plant and animal origin 
Rule-making 
Regulation No 396/2005 on maximum residue levels of pesticides in or on food and feed 
of plant and animal origin was established in 2005, and entered into force in the same 
year.342 This Residues Regulation was developed as a result of the so-called SLIM exer-
cise that inter alia focused on reducing the regulatory burden and cost of the legislation 
in the area of pesticide residues.343 In the SLIM report, the Commission observed that 
over the years, 17,000 Community MRLs had been set, relating to 133 active substances, 
out of a possible total of 160,000 (160 crops in combination with 1,000 pesticides).344 
This meant that for the majority of pesticide/commodity combinations the Member 
States set and used their own national MRLs, resulting in different MRLs for the same 
active substance in the EU countries. According to the Commission, this had led to “con-
                                                   
341
  ECPA Position Paper (2006). Counterfeiting and illegal trade in plant protection products 
across the EU and European region. Brussels: ECPA. According to ECPA, in China and In-
dia, illegal plant protection products make up about 30% and 20% of the markets, respec-
tively. 
342
  OJ L070, 16.03.2005, pp. 1-16. 
343
  SLIM is the acronym for Simpler legislation for the internal market. The objective of SLIM 
is to streamline the operation of the Internal Market by identifying ways in which relevant 
Community legislation can be simplified and improved. SLIM is being executed under the 
responsibility of the DG Internal Market. Selected legislation is examined by SLIM teams of 
experts from different backgrounds. Germany nominated the pesticide residues legislation as 
a candidate for simplification. The SLIM team consisted of experts from the Member States 
of Denmark, Germany, Greece, Belgium and Italy and from the interest organisations of 
ECPA (pesticide producers), PAN Europe (consumers), CEELCA (traders) and COPA-
COCEGA (agricultural producers), assisted by DG SANCO. 
344
  Report on the outcome of the 5th phase of SLIM, SEC(2001) 1997 , 17.12.2001. 
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tinuing trade problems in the internal market.”345 The Commission also recognised the 
existence of trade problems for third countries, and suggested finding solutions for these 
problems as well.   
In order to diminish internal and external trade problems, the draft regulation proposed 
to set all future MRLs at the European level, to set temporary MRLs for the transitional 
period, and to use a default value for all substances withdrawn from the market.346 For 
produce from third countries, the EU proposed to maintain the current system of ‘import 
tolerances’ that allows higher MRL limits for imported products in case a Community 
MRL cannot be reasonably met and hence hampers international trade. 
In response to the Commission’s proposal, key stakeholders were encouraged to give 
their comments. The European Crop Protection Association (ECPA) welcomed the pro-
posal, considering MRLs primarily as trading standards based on the alara-principle.347 
With regard to the proposed default approach, ECPA stated that: “It must be ensured that 
this tough approach is proportionate to all legitimate and justified human health goals; 
that procedures are foreseen for widely communicating to the public that, due to their 
stringent nature, where MRLs are reported as being exceeded there is not necessarily any 
real cause for health concerns; and finally the consequences of the approach with respect 
to ensuring free trade must also be carefully considered.” 
The Pesticide Action Network Europe (PAN Europe) had already articulated a minority 
position about the Regulation in the SLIM report stating that the reduction of the expo-
sure of consumers to pesticide residues should prevail in all instances and that the overall 
objective should be to aim at ‘zero’ level MRLs.348 PAN Europe remarked that a big ad-
vantage of such an approach is that it is in line with market developments where parts of 
supermarkets and food industry aim for a residue-free product. Furthermore, MRLs 
should be based on ICM or IPM by giving priority to preventive measures of crop grow-
ing and the use of non-chemical practices and methods.  
On the occasion of the first reading by the European Parliament, a resolution was drafted 
that put much stronger emphasis on consumer protection, stating that “the existing legis-
lative proposal risks compromising public health for the sake of trade.”349 The resolution 
called for including consumer protection as an explicit aim of the Regulation, and to pri-
oritise public health over crop protection. 
Furthermore, the resolution supported the establishment of aggregate MRLs for the 
combined effects of multiple residues, stating that: “There is an extensive body of scien-
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  COM(2003) 117 final, 14.03.2003, p. 7. 
346
  Proposal for a Regulation on maximum residue levels of pesticides in products of plant and 
animal origin, COM(2003) 117 final, 14.03.2003 
347
  Press release ECPA, 20 March 2003: ECPA welcomes Commission proposal for a Regula-
tion on pesticide MRLs.  
348
  Minority position of PAN Europe on residue legislation, as formulated in Annex 1 to the 
draft SLIM report on legislation concerning pesticide maximum residue levels (MRLs), 7 
November 2001. 
349
  Resolution European Parliament, 1st reading, P5_TA(2004)0299, 20.04.2004, and report by 
the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Consumer Policy, rapporteur R.W. 
Sturdy, A5-0260/2004 final, 07.04.2004. 
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tific literature pointing towards additive and synergistic effects of different plant protec-
tion products (for instance paraquat and maneb), and their residues in food. Furthermore, 
new scientific findings have to be taken into account that indicate the particular vulner-
ability of children and the unborn.”350 The resolution explicitly mentioned IPM as the fu-
ture norm in agricultural practice. In order to give body to the definition of IPM, the 
European Parliament recommended a priority ladder of alternative methods and practices 
of crop protection that should have preference over the use of chemicals. 
During the second reading, the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission 
entered into negotiations and proposed a series of amendments.351 The majority of them 
aimed to strengthen the position of consumers. Most notably, the objective of ensuring a 
high level of consumer protection was inserted in Article 1, requiring that MRLs are set 
at the lowest level achievable when applying good agricultural practice as defined in the 
Regulation.352   
Regulation No 396/2005 was published in February 2005 and entered into force on 5 
April 2005.353 Its legal basis is provided by Article 37 (common agricultural policy) and 
Article 152(4)(b) (protection of public health). The preamble to the Regulation mirrors 
its compromise character, as it is based on different and, arguably, opposing lines of ar-
gumentation.  
The Residues Regulation is aimed to function as umbrella legislation, requiring further 
elaboration through follow-up regulations.354 In order to achieve full harmonisation of 
MRLs, it establishes uniform MRLs for specific combinations of crops and pesticides 
applicable in all Member States, distinguishing regular, temporary, and default value 
MRLs. The existing category of import tolerances will stay in place for imported prod-
ucts from third countries. Notably, the legal figure of the temporary MRL may give the 
impression of an escape clause because it opens up the possibility to postpone decision-
making about definitive MRLs. 
The Regulation has three noteworthy features that indicate a break with the past. First, 
the range of parties allowed to submit an application for a MRL has been extended be-
yond the pesticide industry to include all parties demonstrating a legitimate interest in 
health, including civil society organisations, as well as commercially interested parties 
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  Ibidem. 
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  Opinion of the Commission, COM(2005) 22 final, 25.01.2005. 
352
  Resolution European Parliament, 2nd reading, P6_TA(2004)0098, 15.12.2004, and recom-
mendation by the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Consumer Policy, rap-
porteur R.W. Sturdy, A6-0049/2004 final, 30.11.2004. 
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  Regulation (EC) No 396/2005 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 February 
2005 on maximum residue levels of pesticides in or on food and feed of plant and animal ori-
gin and amending Council Directive 91/414/EEC, OJ L070, 16.03.2005. According to Article 
50, the Chapters II, III, V shall apply as from six months from the publication of the last of 
the Regulations establishing Annexes I, II, III and IV. 
354
  The first of these regulations includes: Commission Regulation (EC) No 178/2006 of 1 Feb-
ruary 2006 amending Regulation (EC) No 396/2005 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council to establish Annex I listing the food and feed products to which maximum levels for 
pesticide residues apply 
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such as manufacturers, agricultural producers, importers, and producers of products.355 
Second, the Regulation has given a fiat for a “naming-and-shaming” policy by the Mem-
ber States, allowing the publication of the names of those parties involved trading or 
marketing agricultural products exceeding MRLs.356 Third, the distinction between risk 
assessment and risk management has become more clear-cut. The European Food Safety 
Authority (EFSA) has been authorised to give reasoned opinions regarding the assess-
ment of applications for MRLs and evaluation reports, whereas the decision-making 
power stays with the European Commission.357 
In order to make the Regulation fully operational, EFSA has performed an initial risk as-
sessment screening of proposed temporary MRLs based on available data provided by 
the European Commission.358 According to the risk assessment, 92 of the 236 active sub-
stances are unlikely to present a chronic or acute risk to consumers. However, for the 
remaining 144 substances, the first screening could not exclude a potential consumer risk 
and therefore further scientific assessment and/or risk management considerations were 
deemed necessary.359  
Rule-implementation 
The EU and its Member States have established programmes to monitor the incidence of 
pesticide residues (MRLs) in fresh and processed food products. The monitoring pro-
grammes of the Member States differ with regard to sampling methods, number of sub-
stances targeted, and laboratory expertise. In addition, MRLs may differ between coun-
tries and are being changed on a regular basis as a result of new insights as well as deci-
sions made in authorisation procedures. This lack of consistency makes it difficult to ob-
tain a realistic picture of the residue situation in the EU Member States that could form a 
solid basis for comparison, and moreover it may obscure less favourable monitoring re-
sults. 
A comparison of the monitoring results over the period 1996-2005, as presented in Table 
4.1, indicates that the percentage of samples containing residues increased from 40 to 
48%. Those with residues above national and EU MRLs rose from 3 to 5%. Moreover, 
the share of samples with multiple residues increased from 13.0 to 26.7%. The highest 
reported variety of different pesticides in one sample increased to 23 in 2005. 
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  Regulation No 396/2005, Article 6(2). 
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  Regulation No 396/2005, Article 30(3). 
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  Regulation No 396/2005, Articles 6-17. 
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  See press release EFSA, 15 March 2007: EFSA evaluates proposed temporary EU Maximum 
Residue Levels for Pesticides, and EFSA (2007), Reasoned opinion on the potential chronic 
and acute risk to consumers’ health arising from proposed temporary EU MRLs. The press 
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across Europe and considered specific vulnerable subgroups of the population such as chil-
dren and infants.  
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  110 pesticides will be further assessed for potential chronic health risks, and 109 pesticides 
for potential acute health risks, which means that 75 of them will be evaluated for both. 
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It is a general rule that the more pesticide substances are monitored, the more of them are 
found. Therefore, the increased residue incidences can be partly explained by the im-
proved analytical capabilities of laboratories.360 However, the figures from the monitor-
ing exercises demonstrate that this relationship is not always straightforward. As is evi-
dent from the data, countries can have a high coverage of substances in their monitoring 
programmes and at the same time a relatively high share of pesticide-free produce. 
Table 4.1 Levels of detectable pesticide residues in fresh fruit and vegetables and cereals in the 
EU (1996-2005) 361 
Samples 1996 
(%) 
1997 
(%) 
1998 
(%) 
1999 
(%) 
2000 
(%) 
2001 
(%) 
2002 
(%) 
2003 
(%) 
2004 
(%) 
2005 
(%) 
 
Without resi-
dues 
 
 
60.0 
 
61.0 
 
61.0 
 
64.0 
 
61.0 
 
59.0 
 
56.0 
 
56.0 
 
53.0 
 
52.0 
With residues 
below or at the 
national and 
EU MRLs 
37.0 36.0 36.0 32.0 35.0 37.0 38.0 38.0 42.0 43.0 
With multiple 
residues 
 
13.0  14.0 14.0 14.1 14.7 18.0 
 
20.7 20.5 23.4 26.7 
With residues 
above national 
and/or EU 
MRLs 
  3.0   3.4   3.3   4.3   4.5   3.9 5.5 5.5 5.0 5.0 
With residues 
above EU 
MRLs 
  1.0   2.3   2.1   3.5   3.2   3.2  3.4 3.5 3.0 3.1 
 
A closer look at the monitoring results for the different Member States shows a wide 
variation, which can be partly explained by the differences in national monitoring pro-
grammes concerning, for example, the choice of pesticides, analytical methods, and sam-
pling. However, the data suggest that a major explanation for this variation are diverging 
patterns of use and agricultural practices. 
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  The enhanced analytical capabilities of the laboratories are reflected by the continuously in-
creasing numbers of pesticides sought in the analytical screens since 1997. In 2004, the ana-
lytical capabilities of laboratories in the participating states ranged from 41 to 595. On aver-
age 135 substances were sought in the samples. The 2004 monitoring results showed that 
around 50% of the 677 pesticides analysed for were detected, whereas 33% of them were 
found relatively frequently, which means that it is particularly important to target the right 
substances. 
361
  Based on the following monitoring reports: report 1996; report 1997; 1998 report, 
SANCO/2597/00 final; 1999 report, SANCO/397/01 final; 2000 report, SANCO/687/02 fi-
nal; 2001 report, SANCO/20/03 final; 2002 report, SANCO/17/04 final; 2003 report, 
SEC(2005) 1399; 2004 report, SEC(2006) 1416, and 2005 report, SEC(2007) 1411.  
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Besides the national monitoring programmes focusing on pesticide residues in food 
products, the European Commission also co-ordinates an EU monitoring programme es-
timating the actual dietary pesticide exposure throughout Europe.362 The choice of com-
modities included in this programme is based on the major components of the Standard 
European Diet of the World Health Organisation (WHO). However, monitoring only 
takes place as far as values for Acceptable Daily Intake (ADI) and Acute Reference 
Dose (ARfD) have been established for specific pesticide-crop combinations. The out-
comes of the EU co-ordinated monitoring programme of the past few years show that the 
intake of pesticide residues has remained below the ADI in the examined cases, and that 
there was no concern of chronic toxicity.363 However, the indicative assessment of acute 
exposure, based on worst-case scenarios, showed exceedances of several ARfDs which 
means that acute health risks cannot always be excluded, especially for vulnerable 
groups, but also more sporadically for adults. 
Apart from the regular national and EU monitoring programmes, residue testing also 
takes place in case of imports of food products from other Member States and third 
countries. Where too high pesticide residues are found in imported samples of produce, 
the EU Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed (RASFF) is set in operation.364  This sys-
tem, which is based on notification, is primarily a tool for the exchange of information 
about serious direct or indirect risks to human health.365 The Commission evaluates the 
notifications received and decides whether the criteria for notification are met or if the 
                                                   
362
  These programmes have been annually published by the Commission in the form of recom-
mendations, starting in 1996, including: Recommendation 96/199/EC, OJ L064, 14.03.1996; 
Recommendation 97/822/EC, OJ L377, 09.12.1997; Recommendation 1999/333/EC, OJ 
L128, 21.05.1999; Recommendation 2000/43/EC, OJ L014, 20.01.2000; Recommendation 
2001/42/EC, OJ L011, 16.01.2001; Recommendation 2002/1/EC, OJ L002, 04.01.2002; Rec-
ommendation 2002/663/EC, OJ L 225, 22.08.2002; Recommendation 2004/74, OJ L016, 
23.01.2004; Recommendation of the EFTA surveillance authority No 55/04/COL, OJ 
L139/20, 02.06.2005; Recommendation 2005/178/EC, OJ L61/31, 08.03.2005; Recommen-
dation 2006/26/EC, OJ L19/23, 24.01.2006. 
363
  See the footnote above for a complete listing of the EU monitoring reports. 
364
  A first embryonic version of the alert system was established in 1979, followed by a more 
comprehensive version in 1992 when Council Directive 92/59/EEC on General Product 
Safety, OJ L 228, 11.08.1992, was introduced. This Directive was later replaced by Directive 
2001/95/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 3 December 2001 on general 
product safety, OJ L011, 15.01.2002. Since 2002, the legal basis of the RASFF is Article 50 
of the Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 laying down the general principles and requirements of 
food law, establishing the European Food Safety Authority and laying down procedures in 
matters of food safety, OJ L031, 01.02.2002 (General Food Law).    
365
  The RASFF system distinguishes alert and information notifications. Alert notifications are 
sent when the food or feed presenting the risk is on the market and when immediate action is 
required. Alerts are triggered by the Member State that detects the problem. Products subject 
to an alert notification have been withdrawn or are in the process of being withdrawn from 
the market. Information notifications concern a food or feed for which a risk has been identi-
fied, but for which the other Member States do not have to take immediate action, because 
the product has not reached the market. Consequently, the status of a notification does not 
say anything about the nature of the hazard involved but indicates the risk of its further 
spreading. 
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information transmitted is sufficient. Furthermore, notifying Member States may decide 
to withdraw a notification if it turns out to be unfounded. 
The annual reports about the functioning of the RASFF show that the number of notifi-
cations concerning pesticide residues has significantly increased since the system was in-
troduced. 366 However, this does not necessarily mean that the residue situation has wors-
ened. Instead, the Commission has suggested that the increase of notifications could also 
be due to an increased awareness within the Member States with regard to the use of the 
RASFF.367 
Rule-enforcement 
In order to ensure compliance with the legislation on pesticide residues, the 1990 Direc-
tive obliged the Member States to inspect produce by check sampling, to draw up pro-
grammes laying down the nature and frequency of inspections, and to report about the 
results. Failure to implement these provisions has urged the Commission to issue several 
recommendations calling for Member States to take action.368 In addition, the Commis-
sion’s experience setting out and implementing the recommendations led to the adoption 
of a regulation which established detailed rules to ensure the proper functioning of the 
arrangements for monitoring pesticide residues.369 
With the new Regulation 396/2005, the enforcement of the legislation on pesticide resi-
dues is backed up by “naming-and-shaming” polices of the Member States, providing a 
powerful instrument to stimulate retailers, traders and agricultural producers to make 
their products comply with MRLs.  
4.3.3 Proposal for a Directive establishing a framework for Community action 
to achieve a sustainable use of pesticides 
The proposal for a Directive establishing a framework for Community action to achieve 
a sustainable use of pesticides was published in July 2006, as part of the Thematic Strat-
egy on the sustainable use of pesticides.370 Previously, in July 2002, the Commission had 
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  See e.g.: European Commission (2006). The Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed 
(RASFF). Annual Report 2005. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the Euro-
pean Communities. 
367
  Some Member States are significantly more active in sending notifications. In 2005, Italy, 
Germany and Spain were responsible for more than 50% of all notifications in the EU. 
368
  See the footnote above for a complete listing of recommendations by the Commission. 
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  Commission Regulation (EC) No 645/2000 of 28 March 2000 setting out detailed imple-
menting rules necessary for the proper functioning of certain provisions of Article 7 of Coun-
cil Directive 86/362/EEC and of Article 4 of Council Directive 90/642/EEC concerning the 
arrangements for monitoring the maximum levels of pesticide residues in and on cereals and 
products of plant origin, including fruit and vegetables, respectively, OJ L078, 29.03.2000. 
370
  Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. A Thematic Strategy on 
the Sustainable Use of Pesticides, COM(2006) 372, 12.07.2006, and Proposal for a Directive 
of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework for Community ac-
tion to achieve a sustainable use of pesticides, COM(2006) 373, 12.07.2006. 
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published a Communication outlining the key objectives and means of the Thematic 
Strategy.371 
The proposed objective of the Thematic Strategy was to reduce the impacts of pesticides 
on human health and the environment, and more in general to achieve a sustainable use 
of pesticides, as well as a significant overall reduction in risks and use of pesticides con-
sistent with the necessary level of protection against pests.372 The proposed objectives of 
the future strategy were:  
• To minimize the hazards and risks to health and environment from the use of pesti-
cides; 
• To improve controls on the use and distribution of pesticides; 
• To reduce the levels of harmful active substances, in particular by replacing the most 
dangerous by safer (including non-chemical) alternatives; 
• To encourage the use of low-input or pesticide-free crop farming, in particular by 
raising users’ awareness, by promoting codes of good practices and consideration of 
the possible application of financial instruments; 
• To establish a transparent system for reporting and monitoring progress including the 
development of appropriate indicators. 
For each of these objectives, the Commission proposed a number of measures that were 
subsequently discussed in an extensive two-step process, involving all relevant stake-
holders.373 The first step included a consultation of the European institutions, a public 
consultation and a stakeholders conference. The second step consisted of an assessment 
of the economic, social and environmental impacts of the strategy, a public consultation, 
several technical expert meetings, and a final public consultation about specific options.   
Concerning the consultation of the European institutions, the Commission invited them 
to comment on the Communication and received opinions from the Environment Coun-
cil, the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) and a resolution from the 
European Parliament. In its reaction, the Environment Council welcomed the Communi-
cation and called for national reduction programmes with quantifiable objectives and a 
proposal for an EU framework for the development of IPM and ICM as one of the tools 
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  Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the Eco-
nomic and Social Committee. Towards a thematic strategy on the sustainable use of pesti-
cides, COM(2002) 349 final, 01.07.2002.  
372
  Decision No 1600/2002/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 July 2002 
laying down the Sixth Community Environment Action Programme, OJ L242 10.09.2002, 
Article 1. 
373
  These measures inter alia included: the establishment of national plans to reduce hazards, 
risks and dependence; the development of environmental and health indicators; specific re-
strictions on pesticide use in environmentally sensitive areas; a general ban on aerial spray-
ing; monitoring of actual use patterns; increased monitoring of user and consumer health; 
promotion and development of alternatives to chemical control; and the introduction of the 
substitution principle. Most importantly, the Commission suggested to link support to farm-
ers under the CAP to compliance with a number of mandatory requirements concerning train-
ing of users, safe use and disposal of pesticides and regular inspection of application equip-
ment. 
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to achieve the sustainable use of pesticides.374 It furthermore asked the Commission to 
explore how different stakeholders, such as producers, distributors, users and consumers 
might contribute to achieving sustainable use of pesticides and to keep in mind the situa-
tion in third countries concerning the use of pesticides and to ensure consistency between 
internal and external policies and relevant international agreements. 
The EESC supported in general the Commission’s effort to draw up a Thematic Strategy 
on pesticides along the lines set out in the Communication.375 It emphasized that the 
strategy should operate as an umbrella framework for all pesticide policy and that ulti-
mately the long-term objective should be to make farming less dependent on synthetic 
pesticides. It expressed its hope for a clearer and more detailed description of the bene-
fits and dangers associated with pesticides. More specifically, the Commission should 
spell out how food prices are influenced by pesticide use. Interestingly, the EESC drew 
attention to the fact that consumers’ choices and, hence, the specific requirements made 
by commerce and the food industry have a decisive impact on farm production methods 
and that “market-driven development can encourage reduced use and sustainable devel-
opment of pesticides, as compared with legislation-driven development.” It remarked 
that the food and retailing industry had its own schemes and regulations in place making 
demands on pesticide use in agriculture. 
The Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Consumer Policy of the Euro-
pean Parliament drew up a report in which it (a) condemned the Commission’s lack of 
ambition in the Communication, the lack of legally binding measures, as well as the pro-
posed timeframe, (b) urged the Commission to design its Thematic Strategy as an um-
brella for existing and future legislation, and not as a mere complement to it, and (c) 
called for clear goals and timetables for each Member State, with a 50% cut in use within 
10 years as an overall and indicative target.376 Furthermore, it argued that the application 
of IPM, ICM and organic farming should be the cornerstone of the EU-strategy, and that 
the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) should be made compatible with the goals of the 
strategy. The Committee argued that agricultural producers all over the world have 
shown that adopting alternative pest control methods can be beneficial in economic 
terms and that such measures will be essential to enhance soil quality, to minimise resis-
tance problems and to reduce secondary pest outbreaks.  
On the basis of the report, the European Parliament adopted a resolution along similar 
lines, but did not include the 50% reduction objective, the levy on pesticides, and the re-
jection of genetically modified plant varieties as an alternative form of plant protec-
tion.377 The EP’s resolution stressed the need for mandatory national programmes aimed 
at pesticide use and risk reduction, including quantitative reduction targets to be 
achieved by adopting a mix of mandatory and voluntary measures. The Parliament urged 
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  274rd meeting of the Environment Council, 15101/02 (Presse 379), 09.12.2002. 
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  OJ C085, 08.04.2003. 
376
  The Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Consumer Policy of the European 
Parliament adopted an own-initiative report drawn up by rapporteur Kathleen van Brempt. 
PE A5-0061/2003, 19/02/2003. 
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  The resolution was adopted by 239 votes to 192 with 29 abstentions. PE T5-0128/2003, 
27.03.2003. 
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the Commission to provide clear definitions of IPM and ICM as well as minimum crite-
ria and set deadlines for their mandatory application. It further called on the Commission 
to amend European trading standards relating to the shape, size and aesthetic qualities of 
fresh fruit and vegetables, which encourage the intensive use of pesticides. With regard 
to development cooperation with third countries, the Parliament stressed that the Com-
mission should focus on capacity building and on minimisation of pesticides use by 
promoting the adoption of organic agriculture, ICM or IPM in developing countries.       
In tandem with the consultation of the Community institutions, the Commission organ-
ised a public consultation asking for reactions about the Thematic Strategy from all in-
terested parties.378 More than half of the reactions came from the pesticide industry or af-
filiated persons and organisations. The industry’s main point of criticism concerned the 
imposition of quantitative reduction targets as it argued that such generic targets would 
not lead to risk reduction because they do not target the use of the most hazardous pesti-
cides and, hence, would not stimulate innovation. A second and related point of concern 
of the industry related to an expected worsening of resistance problems if the choice of 
available products would be restricted. NGOs were represented by several nature and 
consumer organisations, and PAN Europe. The latter, together with the European Envi-
ronment Bureau (EEB), used the occasion to present a draft directive on Pesticides Use 
Reduction in Europe, the so-called PURE directive.379 Significantly, the reactions from 
agricultural producers were minimal, with only minor comments from German, Italian, 
Spanish and Swedish producer organisations. There were no reactions at all from agri-
cultural producers from developing countries or development organisations. Most nota-
bly absent were reactions from the food and retailing industry.  
During the second step of the preparation process, and as required under the Better 
Regulation initiative380, the Commission asked an independent consultancy to carry out 
an assessment of the economic, social and environmental impacts of a number of con-
crete measures for the future strategy.381 The resulting assessment concluded that with 
the proposed measures a reduction in pesticide use between 11 to 16% could be achieved 
in the mid- to long-term for the EU-25.382 It estimated that the largest reduction potential 
could be realised by (in decreasing order): the implementation of IPM as a basic re-
quirement, a mandatory check of spraying equipment, and a mandatory training for pes-
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  All reactions are available at: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/ppps/1st_step_consul.htm.  
379
  Suggested text for a directive on pesticides use reduction in Europe, presented by PAN 
Europe and the EEB, 29/05/02. This PURE directive inter alia included: mandatory national 
pesticide use reduction studies and programmes, mandatory application of IPM/ICM stan-
dards, and the establishment of research programmes concerning pesticide impacts on human 
health and the environment. 
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  European governance: better lawmaking, COM(2002) 275 final, 05.06.2002. 
381
  The following measures have been assessed: aerial spraying; reduced or PPP-free zones; sys-
tematic data collection on use; training and certification of users; technical check of spraying 
equipment; common framework for IPM; enhanced protection of water, and quantitative use 
reduction. 
382
  BiPRO (2004). Assessing economic impacts of the specific measures to be part of the The-
matic Strategy on the Sustainable Use of Pesticides. ENV.C.4/ETU/2003/00094R. 
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ticide users. Moreover, a reduction in pesticide use would lead to an even more pro-
nounced reduction of environmental and health risks and would bring financial benefits 
to European agricultural producers, the certification industry and training institutes. 
However, the consultants expected that the pesticide industry would suffer severe losses 
in turnover. The consultancy was not in favour of quantitative reduction targets, since 
this can lead to the substitution with lower dosage, but higher risk pesticides.  
In order to collect comments on the consultant’s study, the Commission organised a sec-
ond round of public consultation. The overall pattern of reactions resembled that of the 
first round, with the pesticide industry accounting for more than half of the contribu-
tions.383 Agricultural producers were more broadly represented than in the first round, as 
the National Farmers Union from the UK and the European agricultural producers’ or-
ganisation COPA/COGECA joined the discussions. 
Subsequently, the Commission decided to organise an extra round of public consultation, 
focusing on the possible introduction of quantitative national targets to reduce overall 
risk posed by pesticides, producer responsibility for collecting obsolete pesticide stocks 
and used packaging, and an EU pesticide tax.  
Based on the outcomes of the consultation exercise, the European Commission published 
the long awaited EU Thematic Strategy on sustainable pesticide use in 2006, two years 
later than planned.384 The proposed Thematic Strategy contains various measures that 
can be integrated into existing legal instruments and policies. In addition, the Commis-
sion also proposed a Directive establishing a framework for Community action to im-
plement those parts of the Thematic Strategy requiring new legislation.385 It furthermore 
announced two separate proposals to be adopted at the latest by 2008, concerning a regu-
lation concerning statistics on the marketing and use of plant protection products and a 
directive on the certification of pesticide application equipment.  
A feature of the Thematic Strategy’s design is its fragmented approach of the issues at 
stake. Although it claims to allow the development of a horizontal and cross-cutting ap-
proach, well beyond the relatively limited scope of specific legal instruments, its practi-
cal elaboration provides evidence of the opposite.386 Furthermore, the Thematic Strategy 
does not contain any concrete targets and timetables with respect to the use of pesticides, 
despite the fact that Article 4(2) of the 6th EAP Decision called for their inclusion.387  
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Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. A Thematic Strategy on 
the Sustainable Use of Pesticides, COM(2006) 372, 12.07.2006. 
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  Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a frame-
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  COM(2006) 372, pp. 6-7. 
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  According to European Commission, there are a number of legal questions about enforce-
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The proposal for the framework Directive on the sustainable use of pesticides had Article 
175(1) EC Treaty about environmental protection as legal basis. Its stated objective is to 
protect human health and the environment from the possible risks associated with the use 
of pesticides.388 In line with the Thematic Strategy, the Directive proposes several new 
measures, including the establishment of national action plans to “reduce hazards, risks, 
and dependence on chemical pesticides”, the provision of training facilities for profes-
sional users, the inspection of application equipment, a prohibition of aerial spraying, the 
protection of vulnerable areas, and the promotion of IPM.  
Regarding the latter, Article 13 of the proposed Directive stipulates that Community-
wide standards of IPM will be developed in a comitology procedure and become manda-
tory as of 2014. Crop-specific standards for IPM will also be developed at Community 
level, but their implementation will remain voluntary. In parallel, a system of informa-
tion exchange will be set up to collect details provided by the Member States about IPM 
schemes which can be used in a later stage as a basis for guidance documents for the 
main crops. 
In response to the Thematic Strategy and the proposed framework Directive, members of 
the European Parliament drafted two resolutions giving evidence of the widely diverging 
points of view between agricultural and environmental interests. On the one hand, the 
resolution of the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety called 
for a stricter approach consisting of quantitative targets for pesticide use reduction and 
clear definitions and minimum criteria for IPM and urging the member states to promote 
low pesticide-input farming and organic farming.389  
On the other hand, the resolution of the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Develop-
ment suggested instead a softer two-level approach consisting of uniform binding criteria 
for good professional practice in pest management and voluntary guidelines for IPM.390 
In order to create a ‘level playing field’ for farmers, these uniform criteria and guidelines 
were subsequently spelt out in two proposed annexes that put the emphasis on the correct 
and responsible use of pesticides. In short, these proposed amendments gave a green 
light for business-as-usual and could at best only lead to a relatively small improvement 
in risk reduction. 
4.4 Assessment 
This chapter has focused on the instruments of EU law that aim to regulate pesticides in 
the different stages of their life-cycle, including production, marketing, use and residues. 
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The current section assesses the EU approach in terms of effectiveness, inclusiveness 
and fairness.  
Effectiveness 
The EU has developed a complex system of rules and regulations to deal with pesticide 
risks in the past decades. However, despite these legislative measures, the progress in 
pesticide risk reduction has been slow. First, several of the issues that came on the politi-
cal agenda in the 1970s are still not solved 30 years later. In addition, new issues have 
emerged, such as pesticide resistance, soil deterioration, and the risks of residues for 
vulnerable groups 
Second, the monitoring data concerning pesticide residues can be considered as indica-
tors of compliance with good agricultural practice, as exceedances may point at the in-
correct use of pesticides in terms of non-conformity with prescribed application quanti-
ties and rates, and pre-harvest intervals. The data over the period from 1996-2004 sug-
gest that pesticide use in fruit and vegetables production is increasing and more specifi-
cally that agricultural producers are using greater quantities or stronger pesticides, and 
increasingly do not apply them correctly as required by good agricultural practice. 
Moreover, the data concerning multiple residues suggest that producers are using a 
growing number of pesticides on each crop. 
Third, the delay in the assessment of existing substances at EU level and the establish-
ment of MRLs has been counterproductive to the creation of a consistent and uniform 
EU law and policy on pesticides. It has also resulted in a situation in which the Member 
States have been pursuing, to a greater or lesser extent, their own laws and policies on 
pesticides, with some countries being pro-active in reducing pesticide risks and others 
lagging behind. In practice, it means that the same substances may be allowed in some 
Member States but be banned in others. Consequently, the harmonisation of the market 
for pesticide products has been hampered, as well as the creation of an equal protection 
level for human health and environment.  
Fourth, he EU provisions concerning the application of the principles of good plant pro-
tection practice and integrated control have not had any legal implications, as they did 
not articulate any concrete criteria. Consequently, some Member States have established 
regulations defining forms of integrated control, such as integrated pest or crop man-
agement, but others have not. As a result of these varying policies and measures, pesti-
cide use differs between Member States and significant but uneven changes have oc-
curred among them.391 More precisely, pesticide use has declined in some Member 
States, but shown a sharp increase in others. Furthermore, the enforcement of the legisla-
tion is weak in several Member States, which is signalled by the increased use of illegal 
pesticides. 
Fifth, the newly planned legislation cannot be expected to speed up the developments in 
the short term as most of the proposed measures will come into effect several years from 
now. For example, the deadline for the application of general principles of IPM is set for 
2014. Other measures such as the substitution principle and improved control measures 
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need to be realised through legislation that still has to be established. Measures for the 
short term aim to minimise the hazards and risks to health and environment through soft 
measures, such as voluntary training of professional users and the use of appropriate ap-
plication equipment. 
Inclusiveness 
The EU pesticide legislation can be characterised by an increased stakeholder involve-
ment in the past decades. When the first directives on pesticides were elaborated in the 
late 1970s, the Commission asked for the assistance of national governmental experts in 
the fields of agriculture, health and environment, and consulted organisations represent-
ing the pesticide industry, traders and consumers on draft versions of the directives. Ab-
sent from these consultations were agricultural producers and environmental groups. 
Nowadays, and under the influence of EU initiatives aimed at better governance and 
law-making, stakeholder involvement has become an ambitious endeavour. This has 
culminated in the approach set out for the thematic strategies in the 6th EAP, as it re-
quires that such strategies are developed and implemented in close consultation with the 
relevant parties, such as NGOs, industry, other social partners and public authorities.392 
Moreover, such strategies aim to incorporate new ways of working with the market, in-
volving citizens, enterprises and other stakeholders to induce changes in production and 
consumption patterns. 
Clearly, the Commission has invested in increased stakeholder involvement and partici-
pation in decision-making. However, how far does this commitment go and will this ex-
ercise deliver a meaningful contribution to the end result? First, the analysis makes clear 
that there are stakeholders with a voice and those without. During the consultation 
rounds, the majority of the reactions came from the pesticide industry. Agricultural pro-
ducers and consumers, as strongly affected parties, were far less represented in the dis-
cussions. Second, the outcomes of several stakeholder consultations and participatory 
processes suggest that the interests of the pesticide industry and agribusiness have a 
more profound influence on decision-making than those of civil society. Third, the EU 
seems not to be actively seeking to make the best of possible synergies with non-state ac-
tor initiatives focusing on pesticide risk reduction. 
Fairness 
The instruments of EU law have had a considerable impact on the competitive position 
of agricultural producers from EU Member States as well as non-EU countries. For agri-
cultural producers within the EU, the national differences in the law and policy concern-
ing the authorisation of pesticide products and MRLs have thus far not resulted in a har-
monised market for pesticide products. However, this situation is expected to change un-
der the influence of the new Regulation on pesticide residues and the proposed Authori-
sation Regulation for pesticide substances and products, which will force a practically to-
tal harmonisation of authorisation decisions and residue norms.  
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For agricultural producers from outside the EU, the regulatory situation with all kinds of 
different requirements has not been transparent and has created market barriers for spe-
cific groups of producers. Despite the general obligation of trade liberalisation for agri-
cultural products, the EU still has in place an elaborate framework of protectionist meas-
ures for fresh and processed agricultural products, consisting of various quantitative and 
qualitative restrictions for non-EU suppliers. Notably, the marketing standards for fruit 
and vegetables and the phytosanitary requirements of the EU may function as additional 
barriers to trade.393   
With the proposal for the new Residues Regulation, it was initially envisaged to solve 
third-country trade problems. However, this objective has been watered down during the 
negotiations. As a consequence of the definitive text of Regulation No 396/2005, the sys-
tem will become simpler and more transparent, because all MRLs will be set at the EU 
level. At the same time, several norms will become stricter as the default value for pesti-
cide substances withdrawn from the EU market has been established at the lowest level 
of determination (LOD). Although this measure may break the so-called circle of poison, 
it seems unreasonable and unfair as long as the same substances and products are still 
produced by pesticide manufacturers in the EU and exported to non-EU markets.  
The scale of the impacts of Regulation No 396/2005 on market access should be particu-
lary seen in the light of the EU review programme of existing substances. Consequently, 
hundreds of these substances have been, or are in the process of being, withdrawn from 
the EU market. This means that for all these substances the EU MRLs have been, or will 
be, set at the default value of 0,01 mg/kg. As a consequence, non-EU suppliers are con-
fronted with very strict residue requirements concerning these withdrawn substances, 
unless they request an import tolerance.394  
Moreover, with regard to the substances that remain on the market, it is plausible that in 
the future several MRLs will be set at a stricter level because consumer protection has 
become an explicit objective of the regulation. In fact, the new Regulation with its focus 
on a high level of consumer protection requires a revision of all existing MRLs to adapt 
them to the higher standards, which eventually could lead to the creation of extra non-
tariff trade barriers for farmers located outside the EU. The potential consequences of the 
Regulation thus make clear that the health concerns of consumers in the North can create 
trade barriers for agricultural producers in the South. It is an open question whether the 
new arrangements are acceptable under the SPS Agreement, as the EU monitoring re-
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sults of 2005 indicate that many of the MRL exceedances notified for imported food re-
late to commodity/pesticide combinations, where the MRL was set at the LOD.395  
In order to increase transparency, the Commission has suggested in its 2001 report on the 
state of implementation of Regulation 2200/96 on the common market organization for 
fruit and vegetables to regroup all rules and regulations of the EU, including marketing 
standards and food safety standards, under the same legal framework.396 According to 
the Commission, this would not only increase clarity and transparency, but might also 
lead to a better consistency and co-ordination between different rule systems and control 
procedures. In this respect, Article 13 of the General Food Law concerning international 
standards is of additional interest, as it obliges the Community and the Member States to  
“contribute to the development of international technical standards for food and feed and 
sanitary and phytosanitary standards” and, most importantly, “give particular attention to 
the special development, financial and trade needs of developing countries, with a view 
to ensuring that international standards do not create unnecessary obstacles to exports 
from developing countries”. Concerning the latter, the conclusion is that the EU per-
forms inadequately.397 
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5. The non-state actor approach to pesticide risk 
reduction 
5.1 Introduction 
In order to enhance the quality and safety of food products, non-state actors have devel-
oped a plethora of regulatory initiatives that aim to remedy the negative impacts of con-
ventional agricultural and food systems.398 Until the late 1990s, the impetus for these ap-
proaches was mainly inspired by a concern about environmental and social issues. Ini-
tially, agricultural producers’ organisations, non-conventional food companies and scien-
tists played a dominant role in them, but under the influence of the emerging concepts of 
sustainable development and corporate social responsibility, the conventional food and 
retailing industry became increasingly involved, often framing their initiatives as quality 
assurance schemes.  
The emphasis as regards content started to shift from environmental and social issues to 
consumer health issues around the year 2000. Initially, this shift was prompted by the 
urge felt by the food and retailing industry to deal more rigorously with the traditional 
food safety risks of chemical and bacterial contamination in the face of increased inter-
national trade. After the 9/11 attacks in New York and Washington, the consumer health 
focus was further strengthened out of fear of biological terrorism. More recently, several 
non-state actors have begun to develop a new strand of regulatory initiatives that pro-
mote healthy eating habits in the struggle against obesity and food related diseases, inter 
alia to increase the well-being of people and curb the exploding costs of health care. 
This chapter aims to analyse regulatory approaches by non-state actors that are relevant 
from the perspective of pesticide risk reduction. Section 5.2 describes their evolution, 
distinguishing the stages of conceptualisation, institutionalisation and harmonisation. 
Section 5.3 compares major non-state actor approaches at the transnational level. Section 
5.4 focuses on two specific transnational programmes, including the IFOAM organic 
guarantee system and the GlobalGAP programme for fruit and vegetables. Section 5.5 
assesses these transnational approaches in terms of effectiveness, inclusiveness, and fair-
ness.  
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5.2 The evolution of non-state actor regulation 
The stage of conceptualisation 
The first non-state actor initiatives in response to the rapid takeover by agricultural pro-
duction methods based on chemical inputs were taken in the 1920s and 1930s.399 In 
1924, the anthroposophist Rudolf Steiner gave a series of eight lectures in Silesia in 
Germany, marking the beginning of the biodynamic agriculture movement.400 In these 
“Spiritual foundations for the renewal of agriculture”, Steiner explained the principles of 
an alternative approach to agriculture that put the emphasis on the condition of the soil, 
and that focused on the use of certain preparations for fertilisation purposes, and the 
positive effects of cosmic forces on crop production. Steiner’s followers subsequently 
elaborated this agricultural production method and named it biodynamic agriculture. 
The concept of organic agriculture has been developed more or less in tandem with that 
of biodynamic agriculture. It is also a reaction to chemical-based farming practices and 
focuses on a healthy soil as the basis of sound agricultural production systems. Organic 
agriculture relies on ecosystem management and favours agronomic, biological, and me-
chanical methods, as opposed to using external agricultural inputs, such as synthetic fer-
tilisers and pesticides. The British botanist Sir Albert Howard is often referred to as the 
father of organic agriculture, although the term organic farming is usually credited to 
Lord Northbourn, who published the book ‘Look to the Land’ in 1940.401  Initially, or-
ganic farming was especially practised in the UK and the US, but it soon received ac-
claim on the European mainland and in Japan. 
Several decades later, the biological control of pests emerged as an alternative to chemi-
cal-based control. Biologists, and more precisely entomologists, were its founding fa-
thers.402 Biological control means the use of living organisms or their products to prevent 
or reduce the losses or harm caused by pest organisms.403 Although their focus was on 
biological control, the scientists involved became soon interested in the development and 
application of broader concepts that aimed to offer solutions for dealing with pests and 
diseases in agriculture. These concepts can be summarised under the heading of inte-
grated control, inter alia including IPM, ICM, and integrated production. These are all 
multifaceted strategies that consider a broader range of crop protection measures than 
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synthetic pesticides in a more or less integrated context. From these three approaches of 
integrated control, integrated production is considered to be the production method with 
the highest level of integration, taking all aspects of farm management into account.404 In 
comparison, ICM and IPM aspire to relatively lower levels of integration.  
The 1970s also saw the development of the concept of fair trade by a Dutch social NGO 
rooted in the Catholic church.405 This happened in response to the growing recognition 
that benefits from international trade were not necessarily shared by people in all coun-
tries, especially those in the so-called Third World. Fair trade products distinguished 
themselves from regular products in the sense that producers received a guaranteed price 
reflecting an adequate return on their input of skill, labour and resources. 
In the mid-1980s, a group of Italian people interested in gastronomic culture launched 
the Slow Food concept, as a reaction to fast food culture and the standardisation of 
food.406 The Slow Food movement aimed to formulate a response to health, social, ethi-
cal and environmental concerns about conventional food production, to ‘organoleptic 
boredom’, and to the gradual loss of peoples’ cultural identity.407 The Slow Food move-
ment became an officially international endeavour in 1989, when representatives from 
15 countries approved the Slow Food Manifesto at a conference in Paris. 
Essentially, the common themes of the Slow Food movement are (a) the education of 
consumers about taste and (b) the preservation of the global agricultural and food heri-
tage. According to the founder, Carlo Petrini, the world has lost more than 75 percent of 
agricultural biodiversity since the beginning of the twentieth century, and human con-
sumption is today restricted to 150 plant varieties whereas fewer than 30 plants nourish 
95 percent of the world population.408 The Slow Food movement seeks stronger linkages 
between producers, consumers and local communities in an effort to challenge the power 
of the fast food industry. It sees globalisation as an opportunity rather than a threat to 
promote its own ideas about food of excellent quality.  
During the 1990s, under the influence of the Brundlandt report and the Earth Summit in 
Rio de Janeiro, sustainable development in all its different dimensions became a com-
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mon subject on the agenda of state and non-state actors.409 For many companies, the 
broad endorsement of the new concept meant that they needed to react to specific re-
quirements from public policy makers, civil society NGOs, consumers and their partners 
in supply chains. At the same time, several companies started to recognise the advan-
tages of actively shaping the transition towards sustainable production and consumption, 
using terms such as corporate social responsibility and corporate citizenship.410  
Most of the concepts and approaches that were developed to promote sustainable devel-
opment in the business context (e.g. eco-efficiency and industrial ecology) had a broader 
or different focus than agriculture or food production but can be supposed to have had a 
more or less indirect impact on creating an overall climate for business action that also 
influenced the agrifood industry. For example, national organisations of agricultural pro-
ducers started to interpret sustainable development in the agricultural context and 
launched the concept of integrated farming, or integrated farm management, which they 
regarded as an approach to sustainable farming that would be realistic and achievable for 
the majority of agricultural producers.411 
The stage of institutionalisation 
Following the conceptualisation of alternative and innovative agricultural approaches, 
non-state actors began to embed the new concepts in regulatory settings, elaborating 
them in further detail. In the 1920s and 1930s, several national biodynamic associations 
were set up that formulated the first standards for biodynamic agriculture and started to 
use the Demeter logo which still symbolises the movement today.412 In the late 1960s, 
the British agricultural producers’ organisation Soil Association was the first entity that 
developed standards for organic production.413 Soon organic producers’ associations in 
other countries followed.  
Switzerland was the pioneer in standard setting for approaches based on integrated con-
trol, with a group of fruit producers establishing standards for apples in the late 1970s.414 
Several producers’ associations in other countries followed the Swiss example, and by 
the end of the 1980s production under integrated control had became more broadly insti-
tutionalised. Several ambitious programmes were set up and accompanying certification 
schemes were developed. Most of them were private single-party schemes, based on ini-
tiatives of retailers or producer cooperatives, but there were also the first examples of 
third-party verified schemes in countries, such as the Netherlands (AgroMilieukeur) and 
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the UK (Assured Produce).415 In the same period, and from a scientific perspective, the 
International Organization for Biological Control of Noxious Animals and Plants 
(IOBC) became involved in the elaboration of integrated production by formulating a 
framework of principles and general guidelines.416 In addition to this framework and its 
revisions, the IOBC published crop specific guidelines for all major crops in Europe.  
As distinct from integrated control, the concept of integrated farming gained support 
among farmers, as organisations of agricultural producers in several European countries 
(e.g. the labelling scheme set up by LEAF (Linking Environment And Farming) in the 
UK and the Farre Charter in France).417 
The Dutch fair trade movement started to institutionalise its activities in the late 1980s, 
by creating a labelling scheme in order to be able to enter the mainstream market and 
distinguish its products. This so-called ‘Max Havelaar’ scheme was launched in 1989, 
and its example has since then been followed by many other national fair trade organisa-
tions in developed countries.418  
The Slow Food movement launched the so-called Ark of Taste on the occasion of the 
first Salone del Gusto in Turin in 1996.419 The Ark of Taste is based on the ‘Noah prin-
ciple’, and is meant to save the ‘universe of flavors’ by documenting traditional prod-
ucts. It is based on a regional approach and aims to prevent the imminent loss of fruits 
and vegetables, animal species, and food products by trying to resurrect older modes of 
production and revitalize local economies.420  
The first criteria for Slow Food’s Ark of Taste were published in the Ark’s official Mani-
festo in 1997.421 Interestingly, the Manifesto remarks that “protecting typical and/or tra-
ditional quality food and agricultural products must become a transnational operation, 
given the fact that markets and strategies are growing increasingly globalized and stan-
dardized.” Two years later, a scientific committee was formed with the task of further 
                                                   
415
  The AgroMilieukeur certification programme is being operated by Stichting Milieukeur. 
More information is available at http://www.milieukeur.nl. The Assured Produce certification 
programme is being operated by the joint British retailers. More information is available at 
http://www.assuredproduce.co.uk. 
416
  A. El Titi, E.F. Boller & J.P. Gendrier (1993). Integrated production: Principles and technical 
guidelines. IOBCwprs Bulletin, vol. 16, no. 1, 96 p.   
417
  More information about these initiatives is available at http://www.leafuk.org and 
http://www.farre.org, respectively. 
418
  In October 2007, there were twenty of such organisations in Europe, North America and 
Australia. See at http://www.fairtrade.net. 
419
  The Salone del Gusto is the biannual international exhibition of food products organised by 
Slow Food. 
420
  Petrini (2001), p. 16. Central to the movement is the concept of territory defined as ‘the com-
bination of natural factors (soil, water, slope, height above sea level, vegetation, microcli-
mate) and human ones (tradition and practice of cultivation) that gives a unique character to 
each small agricultural locality and the food grown, raised, made and cooked there (Petrini 
(2001), p. 8). 
421
  Manifesto Ark of Taste by the Slow Food Foundation for Biodiversity. Available at 
http://www.slowfood.com. 
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elaborating criteria for products that are being proposed to bring on board of the Ark.422 
At the end of 2005, the Ark of Taste contained more than 750 products from all over the 
world. In order to strengthen the position of the products in the Ark of Taste, regional 
‘Presidia’ have been set up to protect and encourage specific local products inter alia by 
the creation of market opportunities for them. The Presidia widely diverge in the ways 
they work. Several of them are using product and production standards and certification 
as instruments to further their objectives. 
Food safety schemes started mushrooming in the late 1990s after several food scandals 
were feared to damage consumer confidence in the agrifood industry.423 In reaction to 
these scandals, several stakeholders from the agrifood industry developed food safety 
schemes with regulatory features, fuelled by the realisation that the industry lacked con-
trol over the previous links in the supply chains of food products and that the commercial 
risks due to incidents would be difficult to insure. This counted relatively strongly for the 
large retailers with thousands of products on offer and their special responsibility for re-
tailer own brands, constituting a considerable share of their turnover.424 For them, the 
task of managing food safety within their own quality departments was simply too big.  
The British Retail Consortium (BRC) has been at the forefront with the development of 
an integrated safety and quality system for the leading British retailers. This system was 
based on the HACCP approach developed for the US space programme.425 This ap-
proach focused on preventing hazards that could cause food-borne illnesses by applying 
science-based controls, from raw material to finished products. The system became 
known as Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP), and consists of a step-
wise approach to identify risks and take preventive measures.426 
The stage of harmonisation 
As the number of non-state actor standards and guidelines increased, the call for har-
monisation became stronger, primarily prompted by trade concerns about the functioning 
of the market. Harmonisation aims at a convergence of regulatory approaches through 
                                                   
422
  International Ark Commission Guidelines. Available at http://www.slowfood.com. 
423
  For example, the discovery of dioxin in animal feed produced in Belgium and the BSE crisis 
in the UK. See e.g.: T. Lang & M. Heasman (2004). Food Wars: The global battle for 
Mouths, minds and markets. London and Sterling: Earthscan, 365 p., and L. Reijnders 
(2004). Food safety, environmental improvement and economic efficiency in The Nether-
lands. In: British Food Journal, vol. 106, no. 5, pp. 388-405, and Chr. Ansell & D. Vogel 
(eds.) (2006). 
424
  Presentation Fons Schmidt (Ahold and chairman GFSI) at ISO 22000 seminar, Ede, October 
2005. 
425
  FDA (2001). HACCP: A state-of-the-art approach to food safety. Available at 
http://www.cfsan.fda.gov.  
426
  HACCP involves seven principles: 1) Analyze hazards, 2) Identify critical control points, 3) 
Establish preventive measures with critical limits for each control point, 4) Establish proce-
dures to monitor the critical control points, 5) Establish corrective actions to be taken when 
monitoring shows that a critical limit has not been met, 6) Establish procedures to verify that 
the system is working properly, 7) Establish effective recordkeeping to document the 
HACCP system. 
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the creation of an extra layer of overarching rules in order to make content and proce-
dures of participating schemes of standards more uniform.  
The International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements (IFOAM) was the first 
non-state actor that formulated international standards as a bottom line and common 
ground for national initiatives.427 In 1980, it published the first version of the IFOAM 
basic standards for organic production and processing.428 These standards have been re-
vised many times since. 
The other transnational initiatives for harmonisation were mainly established in the late 
1990s, and are still being initiated today. In 1997, the national Demeter organisations for 
the promotion of biodynamic agriculture formed together Demeter International and de-
veloped a system of international standards.429 Furthermore, Demeter International, as a 
member of IFOAM, is committed to incorporate the international standards for organic 
agriculture in its own system. This means that a biodynamic agricultural production op-
eration has to fulfil all requirements of the IFOAM system, and moreover has to comply 
with specific Demeter criteria.  
From the side of business, several initiatives have been launched by coalitions of leading 
companies in the agrifood sector, representing what Fulponi calls ‘an industry grassroots 
harmonisation effort’, and indicating that the industry was starting to take a global ap-
proach to managing the food system.430 One of the larger initiatives by the industry was 
the foundation of the European Retailer Produce Working Group (EUREP) in 1996 by a 
group of 13 large European retailers aiming to make a first step towards European-wide 
harmonisation of minimum standards for good agricultural practice.431 EUREP’s retailer 
membership has grown over the years, and its aspirations have become global instead of 
European. It aims to publish sector-oriented protocols of standards for good agricultural 
practice (GAP) that cover food safety, environmental protection and worker welfare. Ini-
tially, they were called EurepGAP protocols but in line with EUREP’s increasingly 
global ambitions the name of the organisation as well as the programme has been 
changed into GlobalGAP.432 
                                                   
427
  IFOAM is the international umbrella organisation for organic agriculture that was founded by 
five national organic farmers’ organisations, and now has more than 700 member organisa-
tion in more than 100 countries. More information is available at http://www.ifoam.org. 
428
  D. Crucefix (2001). IFOAM accreditation: organic industry self-regulation. In: The Organic 
Standard, issue 2, pp. 15-17. 
429
  The Demeter International programme of standards currently consists of the following docu-
ments: production standards (June 2005); processing standards (June 2004); labelling stan-
dards (June 2004); standards for beekeeping and hive products (June 2004), and standards for 
the certification of Demeter-beer (June 2005). Available at http://www.demeter.net. 
430
  L. Fulponi (2006). Private voluntary standards in the food system: the perspective of major 
food retailers in OECD countries. In: Food Policy, vol. 31, issue 1, p. 3. 
431
  EUREP (1998). Integrated production of fruit and vegetables, Cologne: EUREPGAP c/o 
FoodPlus. 
432
  Press release GlobalGAP, 7 September 2007: EUREPGAP now GLOBALGAP. Available at 
http://www.globalgap.nl. Currently, the protocols of standards cover aquaculture, coffee, 
combinable crops, cotton, fruit and vegetables, flowers and ornamentals, livestock, and tea. 
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Meanwhile, the multinational food processing industry developed its own strategy. 
Unilever, Groupe Danone, and Nestlé officially launched the Sustainable Agriculture 
Initiative Platform (SAI Platform) in May 2002, to deal with quality and safety problems 
in food supply chains and to diminish adverse effects on the environment.433 Increas-
ingly, several other food companies joined the SAI Platform, aiming to jointly develop 
sustainable agriculture principles and standards through the assessment of practices and 
experiences.434 However, the Platform did not aim to set up a certification system. In-
stead of a top down approach, it claimed to put the priority on creating the right mindset 
for the implementation of sustainable agricultural practices and to cooperate with pro-
ducers in order to find practical solutions. 
In 2002, the umbrella organisation Fairtrade Labelling Organizations International 
(FLO) introduced common standards and a common product logo for the national fair 
trade organisations that were operating labelling schemes.435 FLO has developed detailed 
standards on a crop-by-crop basis, distinguishing between small agricultural producers 
and workers at plantations. The crops covered are all relevant from a developing country 
perspective.436 Besides social and trade conditions, the standards also contain environ-
mental criteria focusing especially on pesticide use.  
Similarly in the early 2000s, several European organisations of agricultural producers 
promoting integrated farming joined forces in the European Initiative for Sustainable 
                                                   
433
  SAI Position paper: Principles, strategy & organisation (SAI Platform, 2002). Available at: 
http://www.saiplatform.org. In this joint statement the founding companies defined sustain-
able agriculture as ‘productive, competitive and efficient while at the same time protecting 
and improving the natural environment and conditions of the local community.‘ 
434
  In October 2007, the membership of the SAI Platform consisted of: Campina, CIAA, CIO, 
the Coca Cola Company, Danisco, Dole, Ecom, Efico, Elders, Fonterra, Findus, Fonterra, 
Friesland Foods, Groupe Danone, Kemin, Kraft, Lamb Weston Meijer, McCain Europe, 
McDonalds’s, Nestlé, Neumann Kaffee Gruppe, Sara Lee, Tchibo, Unilever, VOLCAFE. 
Working groups have been established for cereals, coffee, dairy, fruits, and potatoes and 
vegetables. 
435
  FLO was established in 1997 as an umbrella organisation for national fair trade organisa-
tions. More information is available at http://www.fairtrade.net. 
436
  In October 2007, the following crops and products were being covered by FLO standards: 
bananas, cocoa, coffee, dried fruit, fresh fruit and vegetables (except bananas), fruit juices, 
herbs and spices, honey, nuts and oil seeds, quinoa, rice, cane sugar, tea, wine grapes, and 
seed cotton. See at http://www.fairtrade.net. 
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Development in Agriculture (EISA).437 The EISA members claimed to be committed to 
integrated farming, which they defined as “a common sense whole farm management 
approach that combines the ecological care of a diverse and healthy environment with 
the economic demands of agriculture to ensure a continuing supply of wholesome, af-
fordable food.”438 In 2001, EISA published a Common Codex for Integrated Farming 
listing principles and suggestions for agricultural practice. This Codex has been further 
elaborated in subsequent years and this resulted in the publication of the EISA Integrated 
Farming framework in 2006.439 According to EISA, this framework is not meant as an 
auditing scheme, but aims to provide guidelines to agricultural producers.440  
The EISA framework compares the perspectives of good agricultural practice and inte-
grated farming, with the latter supposed to be much more stringent than the former. Con-
cerning the aspect of crop protection, however, the formulation of the integrated farming 
perspective is ambiguous since it is unclear whether priority is given to the use of pesti-
cides or to other means of crop protection.441 This means that the guidelines are not ex-
plicit how to diminish the environmental impacts of pesticide use. 
With regard to food safety, the Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) 
system was initially seen as the ideal basis for a global food safety standard, and was as 
                                                   
437
  The European Initiative for Sustainable Development in Agriculture e.V. (EISA) was 
founded in 2001. EISA members today are: Arbeitsgemeinschaft Integrierter Pflanzenschutz 
Österreich, FARRE (Forum de L'Agriculture Raisonnée Respectueuse de L'Environnement, 
France), FILL (Fördergemeinschaft Integrierte Landbewirtschaftung, Luxemburg), FMTS 
(Fentartható Mezgazdasági Termelés Szövetsége), FNL (Fördergemeinschaft Nachhaltige 
Landwirtschaft, Germany), LEAF (Linking Environment and Farming, UK) and Odling i 
Balans (Sweden). The work of EISA is supported by the associate members ECPA (Euro-
pean Crop Protection Association), EFMA (European Fertilizer Manufacturers Association), 
European Landowners Organisation (ELO), and IFAH-Europe (International Federation of 
Animal Health), all four of them being located in Brussels. More information is available at 
http://www.sustainable-agriculture.org. 
438
  This definition has been presented in: EISA (2001). A common codex for integrated farming. 
Bonn: EISA. 
439
  The framework was first launched at an EISA congress in 2003. The current version in-
cludes: EISA (2006). European integrated farming framework. A European definition and 
characterisation of integrated farming as guidline for sustainable development of agriculture. 
Bonn: EISA. Available at http://www.sustainable-agriculture.org. 
440
  See preface of EISA (2006). European integrated farming framework. A European definition 
and characterisation of integrated farming as guidline for sustainable development of agricul-
ture. Bonn: EISA. 
441
  Concerning crop protection, the EISA integrated farming framework states that: Crop protec-
tion relies principally on cultural, biological and mechanical control mechanisms as a first re-
sort, together with a considerate use of registered crop protection products. These are used 
with regard to environmental and economic considerations. The framework refers to preci-
sion farming as the method of preference in one of its guidelines. It mentions the following 
advantages of integrated farming above good agricultural practice: the formulation of indi-
vidual crop protection management plans, staff training in disease and weed identification, 
and strategies to avoid build-up of resistance. 
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such recognised by the Codex Alimentarius Commission.442 However, the food and re-
tailing industry did not consider the HACCP system as a complete answer to their food 
safety concerns as the system provides a methodology for risk analysis but does not pro-
vide a solution for risk management.  
Consequently, the retailing industry initiated the Global Food Safety Initiative (GFSI) in 
the context of the retailer-led business organization CIES – The Food Business Forum.443 
The GFSI originally intended to develop one common food safety standard but did not 
succeed to develop such a standard that could replace all existing standards. The main 
reason for this failure is the high value that stakeholders in food supply chains attach to 
the ownership of a standard, being not easily inclined to give up their own system.444 In 
addition, it was not in the interest of the highly competitive certification industry to re-
duce the number of standards, as the industry’s commercial success largely depends on 
the demand for auditing and certification services.  
The GFSI then decided to develop a benchmark system to be able to assess existing 
schemes against ‘a global set of voluntarily but universally accepted standards for food 
safety, quality and security.’445 Its Guidance Document of 2001, being repeatedly revised 
since, is a mix of both public rules and private standards, with the HACCP principles be-
ing its core. Interestingly, agricultural producers are required to have an integrated crop 
management (ICM) or equivalent system in place for the purpose of ‘the judicious use of 
agricultural chemicals during growing and post harvest treatment and to control resi-
dues.’ The term ‘integrated crop management’, however, is not further elaborated, nor is 
reference made to a (minimum) definition elsewhere. Thus far, five standards have been 
officially recognised by the GFSI.446 
As the GFSI is dominated by the world’s largest retailers, other stakeholders in the agri-
food industry felt less inclined to affiliate with the initiative.447 The International Stan-
dardization Organization (ISO) picked up the signal that there was a market opportunity 
for an international food safety standard which would make other standards superfluous. 
ISO has chosen to develop a standard on the basis of already existing standards, such as 
HACCP, and does not contain any new elements. It is complementary to the ISO 9001 
series on quality management and the ISO 14001 series on environmental management.  
                                                   
442
  The Codex Alimentarius Commission adopted a Recommended International Code of Prac-
tice General Principles of Food Hygiene including Annex on Hazard Analysis and Critical 
Control Point (HACCP) System and Guidelines for its Application in 1997. 
443
  The number of participants in the GFSI represents more than 65% of food retail revenue 
world-wide. The GFSI is strongly dominated by retailers in the EU and North America. See 
for a full list of participants at http://www.ciesnet.com. 
444
  Presentation of Fons Schmidt (Ahold, chairman of the GFSI) at ISO 22000 seminar, Ede, Oc-
tober 2005.  
445
  Press communication of CIES – The Food Business Forum, 31 May 2000. 
446
  The GFSI recognised standards include the food safety standards of  British Retail Consor-
tium (BRC), International Food System (IFS), Safe Quality Food (SQF), Netherlands 
HACCP, and EIFIS. 
447
  The paragraphs about ISO 22000 are based on the presentations and materials distributed 
during the ISO 22000 seminar, Ede, October 2005. 
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The ISO 22000 standard was published in 2005 after agreement was reached between all 
participating countries, followed by an auditing protocol containing technical specifica-
tions for the certification process. The future success of the ISO 22000 standard will de-
pend on its acceptance and implementation by public authorities and business.448 On the 
one hand, it is a must for the food processing industry to keep the initiative in its own 
hands by accepting a harmonised standard that governs its partners in supply chains. On 
the other hand, one of the major drawbacks of the ISO 22000 standard is that although it 
provides a common baseline for the agrifood industry, it does not offer a complete solu-
tion. For example, it does not contain elaborated models of good practices for specific 
agrifood sectors. Therefore, it seems plausible that state and non-state actors will de-
velop additional sector-specific standards in addition to the ISO 22000 standard, and that 
the well-established retailer-led British BRC standard and the German IFS will continue 
to play a role in the market. This means that the final impact of ISO 22000 could be that, 
instead of reducing the number of standards, it will be the impetus for a new explosion of 
standardisation initiatives.  
5.3 The transnational approaches by non-state actors compared 
Historically, IFOAM, the umbrella organisation of organic agricultural producers, was 
the first non-state actor that formulated international standards, which happened in 1980. 
Nineteen years later, in 1999, Demeter International launched its international standards 
for biodynamic agriculture. The Slow Food movement, uniting producer groups in order 
to protect agro-biodiversity, followed in 2000, when it developed international criteria 
for its Ark of Taste. EUREP, a working group of European retailers, followed suit with 
the promotion of harmonised standards for good agricultural practice through the publi-
cation of a production protocol for fruit and vegetables in 2001, first called EurepGAP 
and later renamed as GlobalGAP. The year 2002 was a culminating point and saw the 
launch of three different international harmonisation initiatives: the GFSI benchmark 
system by a global food business network of retailers; the SAI Platform guidelines by 
multinational food processing corporations, and the FLO international fairtrade standards 
by national fair trade organisations. The corporate interest organisation ISO published 
the ISO 22000 food safety standard in 2005, and the European agricultural producers’ 
organisation EISA published its framework for integrated farming in 2006. 
Focusing on the dominant stakeholders in these initiatives, it is evident that they have 
diverse backgrounds. Agricultural producers have prominent roles in the initiatives of 
IFOAM, Demeter, FLO, Slow Food and EISA and to a lesser extent in GlobalGAP and 
the SAI Platform. Retailers dominate in the GlobalGAP and GFSI initiatives, whereas 
the multinational food corporations have taken the lead in the SAI Platform. The crop 
protection industry is being represented in the initiatives of GlobalGAP and EISA. Sci-
entists contribute to almost all initiatives as they assist in developing new agricultural 
techniques. Environmental, social, and development NGOs have a supporting role in 
several initiatives and are, for example, relatively influential in the initiatives of IFOAM, 
FLO, and Slow Food. However, despite their broad stakeholder involvement, the major-
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  Based on discussions during the ISO 22000 seminar, Ede, October 2005. 
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ity of these initiatives cannot be qualified as multi-stakeholder programmes, because 
their decision-making tends to be dominated by a specific type of stakeholder.  
Comparing the content of the larger international programmes for safe and sustainable 
agriculture, it is evident that most of them claim to elaborate the concept of sustainable 
development but use diverging interpretations. Furthermore, the emphasis in many of 
these programmes has evolved over time. The basic standards of IFOAM, for example, 
were initially focused on the protection of the environment and agricultural ecosystems, 
but since the last revision of the protocol the paragraph on social justice has got more 
substance. A similar scaling up of ambitions has taken place concerning the FLO fair 
trade standards, as they now encompass not only trade conditions, but also include envi-
ronmental and labour criteria. The GlobalGAP initiative has strengthened its food safety 
and hygiene focus. Both SAI Platform and GFSI are in an early stage of development 
and have largely the same focus as when they started: the former claims to pursue an in-
tegrated approach based on a balanced interpretation of sustainable development, 
whereas the latter has predominantly a food safety focus.   
Concerning the agricultural production method of preference, IFOAM, Demeter Interna-
tional, Slow Food and FLO all adhere to a greater or lesser extent to organic agriculture. 
In contrast, GlobalGAP, SAI Platform, EISA, and GFSI are advocates of integrated con-
trol, although they are not always explicit about the practical interpretation of the con-
cept and more specifically what it means for pesticide use. 
With regard to procedural aspects, the programmes have different characteristics. First, 
they differ in their instrumental approaches. IFOAM and FLO are both operating certifi-
cation programmes. The GlobalGAP programme is a certification scheme as well as a 
benchmark system for existing standards. The overarching GFSI is only meant for 
benchmarking purposes. The system of the SAI Platform is based on a partnership model 
and first and foremost meant to induce a learning process for both food industry as well 
as agricultural producers. Slow Food operates a system that is based on granting a certain 
status to specific agricultural products. 
Second, the programmes use different hierarchies of standards with varying conse-
quences. IFOAM distinguishes between binding requirements and recommendations. 
GlobalGAP makes a distinction between major musts, minor musts and recommenda-
tions. Recommendations in both systems have the potential to turn into binding require-
ments in the future, or vice versa, on the occasion of the periodical revisions of stan-
dards. FLO distinguishes minimum requirements (or in fact binding requirements or 
musts) and process requirements, the latter requiring continuous improvement. Instead of 
standards, the SAI Platform uses guidelines and indicators for monitoring which is a 
more flexible and less imposing option. 
Third, the programmes differ in their specificity. IFOAM and GlobalGAP have both de-
fined bottom line standards that should provide a framework to governmental and non-
governmental certification bodies to establish their own standards that are adapted to 
specific regional and national circumstances. The SAI guidelines and FLO fair trade 
standards are focused on specific crops, and need no further elaboration. Slow Food cri-
teria are relatively the most specific, focusing on particular varieties of crops. 
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Fourth, the programmes differ in their communication objectives. The IFOAM and FLO 
certification systems provide a means of communication with business partners as well 
as consumers, whereas GlobalGAP and GFSI are essentially focused on business-to-
business communication. The SAI Platform and the Slow Food movement do not grant 
an official certificate or logo to a product. 
5.4 The transnational certification programmes of IFOAM and 
GlobalGAP 
As the previous sections described the broader picture of non-state actor regulation re-
lated to pesticides, this section focuses on two transnational certification programmes, 
including the IFOAM organic guarantee system, and the GlobalGAP programme for 
fruit and vegetables. Both are relatively well-developed and sophisticated systems, and 
have considerable market success. However, the two programmes have a different issue-
focus, and consequently a diverging way of dealing with pesticide issues. More pre-
cisely, the IFOAM system is based on the principles of organic agriculture, whereas the 
GlobalGAP programme aims to interpret good agricultural practice.  
5.4.1 IFOAM organic guarantee system 
Structure of the programme 
The organic guarantee system of the International Federation of Organic Agriculture 
Movements (IFOAM) is a farmer-led international certification programme for organic 
production and processing that was introduced in 1980.449 Since then, the system has 
been repeatedly adapted to societal and market developments. The core of the system is 
formed by the so-called IFOAM norms, including the IFOAM basic standards for or-
ganic production and processing (IBS) and the IFOAM accreditation criteria for certifi-
cation of organic production and processing (IAC).450  
The IFOAM basic standards reflect the current state of organic production and process-
ing. Consequently, they are seen as work in progress that contributes to the development 
of organic farming. The standards are revised every two or three years. They emphasise 
the protection of the environment and the preservation of agricultural ecosystems, and 
more recently also the social aspects of production.  
The IFOAM basic standards provide a framework for certification bodies and standard 
setting organizations worldwide to develop their own certification standards and cannot 
be used for certification on their own. They should therefore be considered as ‘standards 
                                                   
449
  Extensive information about the IFOAM organic guarantee system is available at 
http://www.ifoam.org. 
450
  The current versions of the IFOAM norms include: 1) IFOAM basic standards for organic 
production and processing, version 2005, ratified by the IFOAM General Assembly in Ade-
laide, 27th of September 2005 (IBS 2005), and 2) IFOAM accreditation criteria for bodies 
certifying organic production and processing, version 2005, approved by the IFOAM World 
Board, Bonn, 2nd of July 2005 (IAC 2005). 
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for standards’. Member organisations of IFOAM must follow the IFOAM basic stan-
dards when defining their own standards and adapting them to local conditions. 
In order to ensure equivalency of organic certification programmes worldwide, IFOAM 
started with an accreditation programme for certification bodies by publishing the 
IFOAM accreditation criteria for bodies certifying organic production and processing in 
1992. In a later stage, IFOAM transferred the programme to the so-called International 
Organic Accreditation Service (IOAS). Since 1999, the accreditation programme has 
been strengthened by a label that performs a double function by providing assurance to-
wards business partners as well as consumers.  
IFOAM’s membership consists of more than 750 affiliated organisations from more than 
100 countries.451 Nearly half of them is located in Europe. Over the years, IFOAM has 
participated in international forums to promote organic agriculture by, for example, high-
lighting the positive role it can fulfil in response to global issues, such as food insecurity, 
loss of biodiversity and climate change. IFOAM has observer status or is other wise ac-
credited by the following international organisations: FAO, UNCTAD, CAC, UNEP and 
OECD.  
Framing of the programme 
In order to position organic agriculture more clearly in the globalised agrifood system, 
the framing of the IFOAM programme has been under thorough review since the early 
2000s. This framing is determined by (a) the mission of the federation, (b) the principles 
of organic agriculture, and (c) the definition of organic agriculture. These components 
have strong interlinkages, and can be considered the normative constitution of the or-
ganic movement.  
IFOAM’s mission has evolved to include the worldwide adoption of ecologically, so-
cially and economically sound systems that are based on the principles of organic agri-
culture.452 This mission is radically different from the previous one, combining a higher 
ambition level with an external orientation. 
As the new mission highlights the importance of the principles of organic agriculture, 
IFOAM decided that they required a thorough review. Subsequently, the basic principles 
of the movement have been reformulated in a two-year participatory process. They have 
been made more prominent by placing them in a separate document called Principles of 
                                                   
451
  According to the IFOAM Statutes of 2002, there are three categories of affiliation with the 
Federation: members (with voting right), associate and supporter (both without voting right). 
452
  IFOAM’s new mission was adopted at the Federation’s General Assembly in March 2003. It 
is in fact two-fold: Leading, uniting and assisting the organic movement in its full diversity. 
Our goal is the worldwide adoption of ecologically, socially and economically sound systems 
that are based on the principles of Organic Agriculture. Previously, IFOAM’s mission in-
cluded the following: 1) We represent the worldwide movement of organic agriculture and 
provide a platform for global exchange and co-operation, 2) We are committed to a holistic 
approach in the development of organic farming systems including a sustainable environment 
and the needs of humanity, 3) By the expertise of its members IFOAM opens the way for im-
plementation of above aims in every day’s life. 
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Organic Agriculture.453 Previously, the principles had been part of the document with the 
basic standards and were called the ‘Principal Aims of Organic Production and Process-
ing’, being a collection of more or less loose principles and ideas with relevance for 
standard setting.  
The newly articulated principles of organic agriculture are meant to form the guiding 
principles for the IFOAM basic standards as well as for other rule systems from both 
state and non-state origin. They are defined as follows: 
• Principle of health: Organic agriculture should sustain and enhance the health of soil, 
plant, animal, human and planet as one and indivisible. 
• Principle of ecology: Organic agriculture should be based on living ecological sys-
tems and cycles, work with them, emulate them and help sustain them. 
• Principle of fairness: Organic agriculture should build on relationships that ensure 
fairness with regard to the common environment and life opportunities. 
• Principle of care: Organic agriculture should be managed in a precautionary and re-
sponsible manner to protect the health and well-being of current and future genera-
tions and the environment. 
Arguably, the principles interpret the concept of sustainable development and its differ-
ent dimensions, as ecology represents its environmental dimension, health and care the 
social one, and fairness the economic one. The document mentions pesticides in relation 
to the principle of health, stating that organic agriculture “should avoid the use of fertil-
izers, pesticides, animal drugs and food additives that may have adverse health effects.”  
It furthermore mentions precaution as a key concern but fails to clarify this term in rela-
tion to other terms such as care, responsibility, and prevention. Interestingly, the docu-
ment declares that scientific knowledge alone is not sufficient and that practical experi-
ence, accumulated wisdom and traditional and indigenous knowledge offer valid solu-
tions, tested by time. This points at a rather unconventional interpretation of precaution 
when compared to the usual science-based interpretations in international law.454 
Focusing on the IFOAM basic standards (IBS), the section called “Pest, disease, weed 
and growth management” is of interest. This section has been thoroughly adapted in 
2002 and this has resulted in a fundamentally different approach to inputs in organic ag-
riculture. Before 2002, the emphasis was put on what was not allowed, such as the pro-
hibition to use synthetic pesticides, growth regulators and genetically engineered organ-
isms or products thereof.455 Since 2002, the emphasis is on the biological and cultural 
                                                   
453
  The Principles of Organic Agriculture were adopted at the Federation’s General Assembly in 
Adelaide, Australia, in 2005. The principles are available in 13 languages at 
http://www.ifoam.org. See for a discussion about the IFOAM reformulation process: L.W.M. 
Luttikholt (2007). Principles of organic agriculture as formulated by the International Federa-
tion of Organic Agriculture Movements. In: NJAS Wageningen Journal of Life Sciences, vol. 
54, no. 4, pp. 347-360. 
454
  See e.g.: W.T. Douma (2004). The precautionary principle. Its application in international, 
European and Dutch law. The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Institute, and G.E. Marchant & K.L. 
Mossman (2005). Arbitrary and capricious. The precautionary principle in the European Un-
ion courts. London: International Policy Press, 108 p.   
455
  IBS 2000, Articles 4.5.5, 4.5.6 and 4.5.7.  
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means that are available to prevent unacceptable losses from pests, diseases and weeds 
and these means have been elaborated in greater detail than before. 
As a general principle, the IBS 2005 states that organic farming systems should use 
crops and varieties that are well-adapted to the environment and a balanced fertility pro-
gramme to maintain fertile soils with high biological activity, locally adapted rotations, 
companion planting, green manures, and other recognised organic practices.456 More 
specifically, all organic production systems must display a set of positive processes and 
mechanisms capable of accounting for management of significant pests, weeds and dis-
eases under normal circumstances. In case these measures are not sufficient, inputs pre-
pared at the farm are allowed as far as they are listed in an appendix on crop protectants 
and growth regulators. This list of approved inputs is not intended to be definitive and 
therefore IFOAM has elaborated criteria for amending it.457 It distinguishes substances 
from plant and animal origin, mineral origin, micro-organisms and other origins plus 
traps, barriers and repellents. These inputs need to be evaluated against so-called produc-
tion input criteria that are based upon the precautionary principle.458 In the past, it was 
prohibited to use products carrying a brand name. This is, however, no longer the case, 
which has opened up new marketing opportunities for the agricultural input industry. 
The definition of organic agriculture is the third component framing IFOAM’s organic 
guarantee system. For many years, the definition of organic agriculture used by IFOAM 
mentioned soil fertility, natural processes, and the exclusion of chemo-synthetic fertilis-
ers, pesticides, and pharmaceuticals as key terms.459 However, IFOAM changed this 
definition with the revision of the IBS in 2005 and brought it up to date by putting a 
stronger emphasis on the positive impacts of applying organic production techniques. 
Significantly, IFOAM now emphasises that organic agriculture, instead of a production 
method that excludes certain inputs, is a whole system approach based upon a set of 
processes resulting in a sustainable ecosystem, safe food, good nutrition, animal welfare 
and social justice. Currently, the definition of organic agriculture is again under revision 
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  Section 4.5 of IBS 2005. The recommendations contain a further list of measures to manage 
pests, diseases and weeds. 
457
  IFOAM policy 60: Policy and procedure for revision of the lists of inputs in the IFOAM ba-
sic standards. 
458
  In this context, the precautionary principle has been defined as follows: “When an activity 
raises threats of harm to human health or the environment, precautionary measures should be 
taken even if some cause and effect relationships are not fully established scientifically. In 
this context the proponent of an activity, rather than the public, should bear the burden of 
proof.’ Furthermore: ‘The process of applying the precautionary principle must be open, in-
formed and democratic and must include potentially affected parties. It must also involve an 
examination of the full range of alternatives, including no action.’   
459
  According to IBS 2000, organic agriculture was defined as follows: organic agriculture in-
cludes all agricultural systems that promote the environmentally, socially and economically 
sound production of food and fibres. These systems take local soil fertility as a key to suc-
cessful production. By respecting the natural capacity of plants, animals and the landscape, it 
aims to optimise quality in all aspects of agriculture and the environment. Organic agriculture 
dramatically reduces external inputs by refraining from the use of chemo-synthetic fertilisers, 
pesticides and pharmaceuticals. Instead it allows the powerful laws of nature to increase both 
agricultural yields and disease resistance. 
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through stakeholder consultation and participation and will be put forward for approval 
by the members in the General Assembly in 2008. 
Section 8.3.3 wil place the definition process of organic agriculture in an EU context, 
and elaborates upon the roles of state and non-state actors and their mutual interaction. 
Institutional structure 
In the more than 30 years of its existence, IFOAM’s internal structure has been substan-
tially transformed as the organisation developed from basic to increasingly complex. Its 
present structure consists of a General Assembly, a World Board and an Executive 
Board.460 The General Assembly consists of representatives of all member organisations 
of IFOAM and meets every three years to decide about the general strategy of the or-
ganic movement. 
The General Assembly elects the World Board that consists of ten people from all conti-
nents. The World Board has decision-making power in all issues not yet determined by 
the General Assembly, and appoints members to official committees, working groups 
and task forces. Regional and sector specific interest groups are established by the mem-
ber organisations.461 The Executive Board is responsible for day-to-day management and 
represents the Federation. IFOAM is supported by a Head Office in Bonn, with a small 
annual budget. 
Rule-making 
The IFOAM basic standards for organic production and processing (IBS) form the core 
of the IFOAM organic guarantee system, as they define how organic products are grown, 
produced, processed and handled.462 The IFOAM basic standards document is arranged 
in chapters that each contain general principles, basic standards, and recommenda-
tions.463 In 2002, a category of derogations was added.464  
The common procedure for standard setting is that they are developed and revised by the 
IFOAM Standards Committee, and subsequently approved by the Norms Committee and 
ratified by the General Assembly. The Standards Committee is consists of up to 10 
members that represent diverse geographical areas and areas of technical expertise.465 It 
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  The internal structure is laid down in the IFOAM Statutes, approved by the General Assem-
bly in Victoria, Canada, August 2002. 
461
  The interest groups include: IFOAM Forum of Consultants, IFOAM Trade Forum, IFOAM 
Farmers Group and IFOAM Aquaculture Group. 
462
  The version currently in force is the IFOAM basic standards for organic production and 
processing, version 2005, ratified by the IFOAM General Assembly in Adelaide, 27th of Sep-
tember 2005 (IBS 2005). 
463
  IBS 2005 contains the following chapters: organic ecosystems; general requirements for crop 
production and animal husbandry; crop production; animal husbandry; processing and han-
dling; labelling, social justice, and aquaculture production standards.   
464
  With the category of derogations is meant that exceptions can be made to specific sections of 
the standards under clearly defined conditions. 
465
  IFOAM Policy 45 - IFOAM Standards Committee Terms of reference and general rules of 
procedure, as lastly amended by the EB in Kutztown, September 2006. 
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is accountable to the World Board through the Norms Management Committee that fo-
cuses on the process and management of the organic guarantee system as a whole.  
The system contains a special procedure for the revision of the standards that has been 
outlined in a separate document.466 Such revisions may address the content, structure and 
consistency of the standards. Moreover, the system provides for a procedure for urgent 
standards revision in case serious problems emerge that hamper the functioning of the 
organic guarantee system.467  
Rule-making takes place in an open consultation process with two public rounds for 
comments. In order to enhance transparency, the proposals for change are published at 
the IFOAM website. In case of a major revision, IFOAM may decide to organise a stan-
dards day to discuss specific controversial points. This has happened with the revision of 
2002, when the standards were thoroughly re-organised and various new procedural 
elements were added in order to make the process for norms development more expertly 
managed and the norms themselves more flexible and attractive to all kinds of interna-
tional stakeholders. 
IFOAM has recognised that the participation by developing countries in the rule-making 
process is insufficient and that the standards do not always reflect their particular needs 
or conditions.468 Hence, IFOAM has developed several activities to improve the position 
of Southern producers. It operates, for example, a programme called I-GO that promotes 
smallholder group certification, training and capacity building and development of local 
and regional markets in developing countries.469 This has resulted in the development of 
the concept of a participatory guarantee system, which can be defined as a farmer-own 
assessment scheme in which colleague agricultural producers perform the inspections 
and give advice on how to improve the production operation. This participatory approach 
especially meets the needs of small producers supplying to local markets.  
The IFOAM Accreditation Criteria (IAC), introduced in 1992, are based on the interna-
tional ISO norms for the operation of certification bodies and have been further elabo-
rated to reflect the particular circumstances of the certification process of organic pro-
duction and processing. In the accreditation process, the separate entity IOAS compares 
the standards used by the certifier against the IFOAM basic standards and the perform-
ance of the certifier against the IFOAM accreditation criteria.470 An advantage of the ac-
creditation system is that it provides an opportunity for determining equivalence between 
different certification schemes. In order to establish functional equivalence between 
                                                   
466
  IFOAM Policy 20 - Policy for the revision of the IFOAM Basic Standards, as lastly amended 
by the General Assembly in Adelaide, Australia, September 2005. 
467
  IFOAM Policy 21 – Policy for urgent standards revision, as lastly amended by the General 
Assembly in Basel, September 2000. 
468
  IFOAM (2002). IFOAM Annual Report 2001. Tholey-Theley: IFOAM, 11 p. 
469
  See for multiple documents about smallholder certification in developing countries at 
http://www.ifoam.org. 
470
  The Accreditation Criteria have been developed directly from ISO/IEC Guide 65 General re-
quirements for bodies operating product certification systems. 
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schemes, the IFOAM accredited certification bodies have built a multilateral agreement 
(MLA) for mutual recognition.471 
Rule-implementation  
The IFOAM standards cannot be used for certification on their own, but serve instead as 
a basis for regional or national entities to develop organic certification schemes that are 
tailor-made to regional or national circumstances. Besides this basic option that is open 
to anyone, there is also the possibility for standard setting organisations and certification 
bodies to engage in a stronger commitment to the IFOAM system through IFOAM 
membership and by participation in the IOAS accreditation programme. The option of 
membership implies that member organisations involved in standard setting and certifi-
cation are committed to implement the IFOAM basic standards in their own standards. 
Moreover, they are obliged to amend their standards within two years of each revision of 
the IFOAM basic standards. The second option of seeking accreditation implies a poten-
tially stronger level of commitment, requiring a formal recognition of equivalency con-
cerning the content of the standards and the performance of the certification body.  
Well-elaborated standards are considered a prerequisite to make the most of organic ag-
riculture in a specific climatic and geographical situation. However, this means that a 
balance has to be sought between the need for regional variations and international har-
monisation. In order to achieve this balance, IFOAM has established a policy on varia-
tions in standards.472 This policy permits regional standards to be developed and go 
through the procedure of becoming an IFOAM approved standard. The evaluation crite-
ria of this procedure describe under what conditions variations to the IBS are acceptable. 
Reasons for variation may be based on e.g. climate conditions, geographical conditions, 
legal requirements, religious and cultural factors, as well as situations where a specific 
requirement would prevent the further development of organic agriculture.  
The elaboration of the IFOAM basic standards demands an enormous input of research 
and knowledge at field level. For organic agriculture, there are specialised research insti-
tutes in many countries. In June 2003, the International Society of Organic Agriculture 
Research was founded to facilitate scientific exchange on a global level.473.  
Worldwide, there are at least 60 government regulations defining organic agriculture and 
probably more than 100 private standards.474 In several countries, public and private or-
ganic standards co-exist in parallel. The Member States of the EU have by far the most 
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  D. Bowen (2004). Current mechanisms that enable international trade in organic products. In: 
J. Michaud, E. Wynen & D. Bowen (eds.) (2004). Harmonization and equivalence in organic 
agriculture. Vol. 1: Background papers of the International Task Force on Harmonization and 
Equivalence in Organic Agriculture. UNCTAD, FAO & IFOAM, p. 32. 
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  IFOAM policy 42: IFOAM approval of certification standards based on the IBS, as approved 
by the World Board, March 2006. 
473
  Http://www.isofar.org. 
474
  K. Commins (2004). Overview of current status of standards and conformity assessment sys-
tems. In: J. Michaud, E. Wynen & D. Bowen (eds.) (2004). Harmonization and equivalence 
in organic agriculture. Vol. 1: Background papers of the International Task Force on Har-
monization and Equivalence in Organic Agriculture. UNCTAD, FAO & IFOAM. 
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organic schemes in operation. Africa and South-America are the least covered, whereas 
Asia is an in-between case with several fully implemented national regulations and pri-
vate schemes in countries, such as China, India and Japan.   
A consequence of the proliferation of schemes is that several certification bodies offer 
certification on the basis of a variety of organic certification programmes. Most certifica-
tion bodies involved in the certification of organic agricultural practices are small, spe-
cialised agencies with a national or regional focus. However, there are also organic certi-
fication bodies that are part of large multinational enterprises with a broad portfolio of 
certification operations.  
The first accreditations of organic certification bodies took place in 1994 when three cer-
tification bodies became IFOAM accredited. In 2007, 36 certification bodies, operating 
in all five continents, had acquired IFOAM accreditation, and 3 had applicant status.475 
IFOAM accreditation implies that the certification bodies involved have the obligation to 
incorporate all IFOAM basic standards in their own schemes and thus makes their com-
mitment to the IFOAM basic standards much stronger than is possible in a situation of 
membership. Notably, the fact that several retailers announced that in the future they 
would only buy produce for their own label lines that is certified by IFOAM accredited 
certification bodies can certainly be assumed to have contributed to the success of the 
accreditation programme. 476 This has in turn has strengthened the legitimacy of the basic 
standards. 
Hence, due to the status of accreditation, some private certification bodies and their 
labels have obtained a relatively stronger position in the international market than others. 
Such a position is, inter alia, reflected by the number of re-certifications that a 
certification body executes at the request of producers and importers in order to qualify 
for a specific label. Re-certification means taking over the certification of a product that 
was initially certified by some other certification body and using the data that have been 
obtained during on-site inspections on the basis of that other programme.  
Among these stronger certification programmes for organic agriculture are, for example, 
the systems operated by the founding organisations of IFOAM, such as the British Soil 
Association. However, new organisations may also turn out to be relatively influential, 
such as the Swedish KRAV.477 Due to their market success, the major certification 
bodies are often successful in influencing the standard setting in the international context 
by provided qualified people to occupy key positions in decision-making forums and by 
pushing their own priority issues on the agenda or veto-ing the ideas of others.  
Focusing on the implementation of organic production and consumption in practice, it is 
evident that organic agriculture has grown steadily since the 1940s and that in the mid-
1990s, growth figures started to accelerate. Organic farming is now practised in about 
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  Http://www.ioas.org. 
476
  Presentation of Robert Duxbury (Sainsbury’s) at IFOAM Conference on international har-
monisation and equivalence in organic agriculture, Nuremberg, 18-19 February 2002. 
477
  KRAV was founded on 21 February 1985. It is now one of the largest organic certification 
bodies in the world. It employs around 30 inspectors that carry out almost 8,000 inspection 
visits annually. More information is available at http://www.krav.se. 
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120 countries worldwide, and the share of agricultural land and farms is still growing.478 
In 2006, the total area managed organically was nearly 31 million hectares worldwide. 
Of this total, Oceania had the largest share in absolute terms (39%), followed by Europe 
(23%), Latin America (19%), Asia (9%), North America (7%), and Africa (3%).479 The 
relative proportion of organic agriculture in comparison with conventional production is 
the highest in Europe.  
The consumption market for certified organic products is still a niche in the total food 
sector, although sales have been steadily growing in the past decade. In 2005, the market 
value of organic products worldwide reached 25.5 billion euro, with the largest share of 
organic products being marketed in Europe and North America.480 However, the market 
for organic products is also developing in other countries, with Brazil and Middle East 
countries as the most significant examples.  
Rule-enforcement 
According to the IFOAM organic guarantee system, certification bodies are obliged to 
perform at least one inspection of production operations per farm per year. When they 
detect non-compliance with the standards, the sanctions available consist of a warning, 
and ultimately the cancellation of the certificate. 
This means that the actual decision-making about a producer’s compliance with specific 
standards is often in the hands of non-state actors that are performing inspection and cer-
tification services in the country involved. These actors can have a large influence on ac-
tual agricultural practices since they interpret the standards at the field or greenhouse 
level. The decisions taken during the inspection and certification process can have far 
reaching consequences for producers, as they may be confronted with the refusal, or the 
loss, of certification. In this respect, it is worthwhile to point to the rise of the certifica-
tion industry as a result of the present proliferation of auditing processes - a trend that is 
also visible in sectors other than food and agriculture.481 Some certification bodies in-
volved are small, specialised agencies, while others are large multinationals, auditing 
more or less anything.  
As a side-effect of the considerable growth of organic agriculture, the sector has become 
more susceptible to fraud. For example, there have been several cases of labelling fraud 
and incidents with contamination.482  
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  H. Willer & M. Yussefi (eds.) (2007). The world of organic agriculture. Statistics and emerg-
ing trends 2007 (completely revised edition). Bonn: IFOAM/ Frick: FiBL, 252 p. 
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  In absolute terms, Australia, China and Argentina had the largest acreage. However, Austria, 
Switzerland and Scandinavian countries led the way in relative terms.  
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  H. Willer & M. Yussefi (eds.) (2007).
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  M. Power (2003). Evaluating the audit explosion. In: Law and Policy, vol. 25, no. 3, pp. 185-
2002. 
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  B. Huber (2002). Would analyses prevent contamination scandals? In: The Organic Standard, 
issue 15 (July), p. 19. Contamination can take place through storage in polluted packhouses,  
pesticide use in neighbouring fields, and GMOs. 
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5.4.2 GlobalGAP programme for fruit and vegetables 
Structure of the programme 
The GlobalGAP programme is a retailer-led certification programme that defines good 
agricultural practice.483 After the introduction of the first protocol of standards in 2001, 
the programme has been thoroughly amended in 2004 and 2007. The core of the 
GlobalGAP system is formed by a modular programme consisting of normative and pro-
cedural documents, including general regulations, compliance criteria for different agri-
cultural sectors, and procedures for certification and benchmarking.484 In addition, 
GlobalGAP issues guidelines and supporting documents. 
The compliance criteria are the actual standards in the GlobalGAP programme. They 
have a varying status as a distinction is being made between major musts, minor musts 
and ‘shoulds’.485 For major musts 100% compliance is compulsory, whereas for minor 
musts this is 95%. ‘Shoulds’ have the status of recommendations that must be inspected 
by certification bodies, but are not a prerequisite for the granting of a GlobalGAP certifi-
cate. The status of the standards is especially relevant in relation to the sanctions that are 
available in case of non-compliance. 
The GlobalGAP programme provides a basic framework of standards that should be 
elaborated at the national or regional level by public authorities or private certification 
bodies. When the appropriate national standards are in place, individual agricultural pro-
ducers and producer groups can apply for GlobalGAP certification in the country con-
cerned.486 The certification of a producer can only be achieved through an independent 
verification by a national inspection or certification body that has received accreditation 
to perform such activities.487 Once a positive decision in such a procedure is made, the 
GlobalGAP certificate will be issued with a restricted validity.488  
Agricultural producers that have obtained GlobalGAP certification have the right to use 
the GlobalGAP logo which is a registered trademark only meant for communication in 
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  In the period between 1997 and 2007, GlobalGAP was called EurepGAP. The change of 
name indicates its ambitions of global expansion. Extensive information about the Global-
GAP programme for fruit and vegetables and also for other agricultural sectors is available at 
http://www.globalgap.org. 
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  The main documents presently in force include: GLOBALGAP (EUREPGAP). Control 
points and compliance criteria integrated farm assurance: 1) Introduction, 2) Crops Base, and 
3) Fruit and Vegetables; GLOBALGAP (EUREPGAP). General regulations integrated farm 
assurance. Part I – General information, Part II – Certification body rules, Part III – Producer 
group certification, Part IV – Benchmarking, and Part V - Training, V.3.0-2_SEP. All docu-
ments are available at http://www.globalgap.org. 
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  Article 4.9.3, GLOBALGAP (EUREPGAP). General regulations integrated farm assurance. 
Part I – General information.  
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  Articles 4.4, GLOBALGAP (EUREPGAP). General regulations integrated farm assurance. 
Part I – General information. 
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  Article 4.5, GLOBALGAP (EUREPGAP). General regulations integrated farm assurance. 
Part I – General information. 
488
  Article 9, GLOBALGAP (EUREPGAP). General regulations integrated farm assurance. Part 
I – General information. 
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the business-to-business area. The organisation has never had plans to communicate with 
the consumer. Its first aim has been to have the system in place and to work on its integ-
rity. Consequently, the majority of consumers will not be aware of its existence. 
GlobalGAP’s membership includes retailers and food service companies, suppliers, and 
associate members, and reflects a strong European dominance. The membership has 
grown from 20 in 1999 to more than 270 in 2008. Since its inception, the retailer and 
food service membership of GlobalGAP has been in constant flux, with members joining 
and leaving, but, overall, has quickly expanded. Currently, more than 30 retailers from 
several European countries, one from Japan and one from the USA are involved in the 
initiative.489 The UK and the Netherlands are relatively strongly represented. More re-
cently, the German influence has shown a sharp increase. Conspicuous by their absence 
are the large French retailers. 
Among the supplier members are agricultural producers and their organisations from all 
continents, with the majority of them being the major players in the field.490 The group of 
associate members is of a varied composition, representing certification bodies and other 
service companies, and significantly the crop protection and nutrients industry.491 Fur-
thermore, GlobalGAP has become affiliated with UNCTAD. 
Framing of the programme 
GlobalGAP calls itself the Global Partnership for Good Agricultural Practice, and claims 
to respond to consumer concerns on food safety, animal welfare, environmental protec-
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  In 2008, the retailer members included: Aeon Co., Ltd (Japan), Ahold (Netherland), Albert 
Heijn (Netherlands), Aldi (Germany), Asda Group Plc. (UK), CBL (Netherlands), Coop 
Switzerland (Switserland), Coop Norway (Norway), Delhaize (Belgium), Edeka Fruchtontor 
(Germany), Eroski (Spain), FEDIS (Belgium), Globus SB Warenhaus Holding (Germany), 
Grupo Carrefour (Spain), ICA (Sweden), Kaiser’s Tengelmann (Germany), Kesko (Finland), 
Laurus (Netherlands), Lidl Stiftung & Co KG (Germany), Marks & Spencers (UK), Mc Don-
ald’s Europe (Germany), Metro Group (Germany), Migros (Switzerland), Musgraves Super-
valu Centra (Ireland), NORMA (Germany), Otto (Germany), Plus Warenhandelsgesellschaft 
(Germany), Rewe (Germany), Sainsbury’s (UK), Schuitema (Netherlands), Somerfield (UK), 
Spar Austria (Austria), Super de Boer (Netherlands), Superunie (Netherlands), tegut … Gut-
berlet Stiftung & Co. (Germany), Tesco (UK), Waitrose (UK), Wegmans Food Market 
(USA), and Wm Morrison (UK).  
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  In 2008, the number of supplier members was around 140. Examples included: Agrexco (Is-
rael), Anecoop (Spain), Apofruit (Italy), Del Monte Fresh Produce Company (USA), Dris-
colls Strawberry Associates (USA), Fyffes Group Ltd. (UK), McCain Europe (Netherlands), 
The Greenery International (Netherlands), and Zespri International (New Zealand). 
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  In 2008, the number of associate members was around 100. Several of them belonged to the 
crop protection industry, including: BASF (Germany), Bayer CropScience AG (Germany), 
DuPont (France), ECPA (Belgium), Grodan Group (Netherlands), Intervet International 
(Netherlands), Janssen Pharmaceutica (Belgium),  Pokon Chrysal (UK), Syngenta Crop Pro-
tection AG (Switzerland), Valagro (Italy), and Yara International ASA (Norway). 
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tion and worker health, safety and welfare.492 In order to shape its response, GlobalGAP 
has introduced a certification programme for agricultural producers based on sector-
oriented protocols of standards for good agricultural practice (GAP).  
In contrast to the IFOAM organic guarantee system, GlobalGAP does not articulate its 
principles in a separate document. Instead, the introduction to the standardisation docu-
ment itself contains the principles of the GlobalGAP programme. A subtle change has 
taken place in the formulation of these principles over time, as agricultural producers are 
now directly addressed, suggesting that the responsibility for the proper execution of the 
programme has been shifted to the participating agricultural producers, instead of being 
shared with the retailers, as was previously the underlying idea. 
According to the present GlobalGAP principles, agricultural producers must be able to 
demonstrate their commitment to: 1) maintaining consumer confidence in food quality 
and safety; 2) minimising detrimental impact on the environment, whilst conserving na-
ture and wildlife; 3) reducing the use of agrochemicals; 4) improving the efficiency of 
natural resource use, and 5) ensuring a responsible attitude towards worker health and 
safety. Significantly, the reduction of agrochemicals use is mentioned as an explicit ob-
jective. Furthermore, the introduction states that:  
“GlobalGAP is a means of incorporating Integrated Pest Management (IPM) and Inte-
grated Crop Management (ICM) practices within the framework of commercial agricul-
tural production. Adoption of IPM/ICM is regarded by GlobalGAP members as essential 
for the long-term improvement and sustainability of agricultural production.” 
However, the status of this ‘principle’ is not further clarified. 
The 2001 version of the standardisation document included three basic elements related 
to pesticide risk reduction.493 First, the protocol prescribed the mandatory application of 
agricultural methods based on IPM or ICM, which were defined as follows:  
”Protection of crops against pests, diseases and weeds must be achieved with the appro-
priate minimum pesticide input and with minimum adverse environmental impact (vol-
ume/type of active ingredients) and with the appropriate employment of non-chemical 
methods (biological and cultural/mechanical).”  
Second, the protocol introduced the notion of traceability by obliging agricultural pro-
ducers to keep appropriate records “which help to trace the history of products from farm 
to final consumer.” Third, the standards obliged producers and suppliers of agricultural 
produce to perform pesticide residue analysis, as they “must be able to provide evidence 
of residue testing by laboratories accredited by a competent national authority to good 
laboratory practice (GLP).” These three requirements went beyond usual legal require-
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  In September 2007, EurepGAP was renamed GlobalGAP. The global ambitions of EUREP 
have become stronger over the years, as is perfectly reflected by the press release on the oc-
casion of the 2006 EurepGAP Conference in Prague, 21/9/2006: Conference maps out the 
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493
  EUREPGAP Protocol for Fresh Fruit and Vegetables, version September 2001. Cologne: 
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ments and meant that agricultural producers were made responsible for the risks and 
costs related to pesticide use. Most importantly, liability for failures was shifted from re-
tailers to producers. 
The basic elements have been reprioritised in the 2004 version of the standards for fruit 
and vegetables.494 Comparing the 2001 and 2004 versions, it is apparent that a thorough 
restructuring had taken place, related to form as well as content. In the 2004 version, 
IPM and ICM were no longer explicitly included as part of good agricultural practice. 
Whereas in the 2001 version, it was a minor must for agricultural producers to apply 
recognised IPM techniques, the status of this criterion had been reduced to a recommen-
dation, consequently losing nearly all its force. Instead, the 2004 version stated, in rather 
vague terms, that the negative impacts of agricultural production on the environment 
needed to be minimised but did not prescribe a specific agricultural production method 
to achieve this. Furthermore, the 2004 version declared that the standards were based on 
food safety criteria, derived from the application of the HACCP principles, which meant 
that HACCP had turned from a mere recommendation into a basic principle incorporated 
in the standards. 495 
In the 2004 protocol, the testing of pesticide residues, and hygiene during harvesting and 
produce handling gained importance. Moreover, the protocol was again amended in Oc-
tober 2004 in response to what was called “the challenges posed by fast changing crop 
protection product legislation” to include more detailed requirements about residue 
analysis of pesticides.  
In the 2007 version of the standards, there is again more emphasis on hygiene require-
ments and residue testing, and consequently the formulation of new compliance criteria 
and shifts of existing ones towards a higher level of obligation (from recommendations 
to minor musts, and from minor to major musts).496 Furthermore, a section has been 
added about IPM, which uses the definition from the FAO Code of Conduct as a base-
line.497 
The core of the new section on IPM standards form the triple requirements that an agri-
cultural producer must be able to show evidence of the implementation of at least one 
measure that falls in the respective categories of: 1) prevention, 2) observation and moni-
                                                   
494
  EUREPGAP Control Points & Compliance Criteria Fruit and Vegetables. Version 2.1-Jan04. 
Available at http://www.eurep.org. 
495
  More specifically, the 2001 version stated that: “EUREP supports the principles of and en-
courages the use of HACCP (Hazard Analysis Critical Control Points).” 
496
  GLOBALGAP (EUREPGAP). Control points and compliance criteria integrated farm assur-
ance: 1) Introduction, 2) Crops Base, and 3) Fruit and Vegetables; GLOBALGAP 
(EUREPGAP). General regulations integrated farm assurance. Part I – General information, 
Part II – Certification body rules, Part III – Producer group certification, Part IV – Bench-
marking, and Part V - Training, V.3.0-2_SEP. Köln: GlobalGAP c/o FoodPLUS GmbH. All 
documents are available at http://www.globalgap.org.  
497
  The definitions of terms used in the GlobalGAP system are included in the following docu-
ment: GLOBALGAP (EUREPGAP). General regulations integrated farm assurance. Part I – 
General information, Annex: I. V.3.0-2_SEP. Köln: GlobalGAP c/o FoodPLUS GmbH. 
Available at http://www.globalgap.org. 
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toring, and 3) intervention.498 An annex contains GlobalGAP IPM Guidelines for agri-
cultural producers and certification bodies, explaining that IPM is “an important strategic 
discipline contributing to food quality, food safety, farmers’ and workers’ health, and 
quality of the environment.”499 The guidelines are considered by GlobalGAP as a work 
in progress, leaving room for the future inclusion of additional measures that are com-
patible with IPM approaches. Furthermore, GlobalGAP allows certification bodies to 
make their own local interpretations. 
The shifts that have taken place between the different versions of the protocol are being 
reflected in the number and status of compliance criteria. Although the number of crite-
ria decreased from 254 to 210 between the 2001 and 2004 versions, the latter contained 
nine new major musts. The 2007 version showed again an increase of compliance crite-
ria to 273 criteria in total, including 11 new major musts. In order to receive certifica-
tion, a producer of fruit and vegetables must comply with 100% of all 74 major musts 
and 95% of the applicable 125 minor musts. In addition, there are 37 recommendations.  
Looking back at the evolution of the GlobalGAP programme from its inception until 
now, the conclusion is that the retailer-led initiative has turned from an initiative dealing 
with various sustainability issues into a programme that is primarily focused on food 
safety and hygiene. It urges for rationalisation of production through record keeping and 
obliges suppliers to have strict traceability systems in place. The obvious explanation for 
this shift in focus is the high priority for food safety issues at EU and national govern-
mental level and the need for retailers to cope with the new regulatory environment as 
established in the EU General Food Law.500 Strikingly, the GlobalGAP membership has 
increased since the food safety focus has been strengthened. This suggests that food 
safety has been a better vehicle for getting industry-wide support than environment and 
worker welfare. 
                                                   
498
  The full text of the triple requirements about IPM is as follows: 
 CC 7.2: The producer can show evidence of implementing at least one activity that includes 
the adoption of cultivation methods that could reduce the incidence and intensity of pest at-
tacks, thereby reducing the need for intervention. 
 CC 7.3: The producer can show evidence of implementing at least one activity that will de-
termine when, and to what extent, pests and their natural enemies are present, and using this 
information to plan what pest management techniques are required. 
 CC 7.4: The producer can show evidence that in situations where pest attack adversely af-
fects the economic value of a crop, intervention with specific pest control methods will take 
place. Where possible, non-chemical approaches must be considered. 
499
  According to the annex, the selective use of plant protection products in ways that reduce the 
risks of resistance includes: the use of approved selective plant protection products which 
have reduced adverse impact on non-target species (e.g. insect growth regulators, insecticidal 
soaps, mineral and vegetable oils, plant extracts); the use of plant protective products in a se-
lective manner (e.g. seed treatment; spot treatments in situations where the pest is located in 
‘hot spots’, rather than distributed throughout the crop); the use of bait treatment where ap-
propriate, and the systematic alternation of plant protection products from different chemical 
groups for effective resistance management. 
500
  EC Council Regulation 178/2002 laying down the general principles and requirements of 
food law, establishing the European Food Safety Authority and laying down procedures in 
matters of food safety, OJ L031, 28.01.2002. 
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Section 8.3.3 will place the definition process of integrated control in an EU context, and 
elaborates upon the roles of state and non-state actors and their mutual interaction. 
Institutional structure 
In the 10 years of its existence, GlobalGAP’s internal structure has evolved into a model 
of a Board, five Sector Committees, and a Secretariat.501 Early intentions of the initiators 
to set up a consultative body representing a broad range of stakeholders have been can-
celled.  
The Board is the decision-making body of GlobalGAP. Its members include representa-
tives from retailers and suppliers of agricultural products, the chairman of GlobalGAP, 
and the managing director of FoodPlus that performs the secretarial functions for 
GlobalGAP.502 The Sector Committees are constituted of retailer and supplier members. 
The role of these committees is to review, evaluate and approve normative and proce-
dural documents. Whenever necessary, they may draw on the expertise of external ex-
perts to provide advice on specific scientific and technical matters. 
GlobalGAP encourages stakeholders to establish national technical workgroups in order 
to assist in the implementation process of standards and give input to the Sector Commit-
tees. Several of such national working groups have been established focusing on the fruit 
and vegetables sector.503 Most of these groups have a multi-stakeholder composition and 
have at least a representation from farmer interest organisations and certification bodies. 
Formally, they do not belong to the GlobalGAP structure, but their position has become 
stronger as is, for example, demonstrated by the emphasis that has been put on them in 
the Global Report 2005. Increasingly, these technical workgroups have become involved 
in the translation and interpretation of the official GlobalGAP documents, and also en-
gaged in the harmonisation of inspection and certification practices and compliance with 
national law. Thus, they have become a vital link between GlobalGAP and agricultural 
producers and certification bodies in a certain country.   
The GlobalGAP organisation cooperates with certification bodies on the basis of con-
tracts. Increasingly, GlobalGAP has recognised the need for stricter quality control of 
certification body performance in order to strengthen the integrity of the GlobalGAP sys-
tem as a whole.504 The new measures include an approval process of certification bodies, 
a certification body reporting system, and most importantly the establishment of a certi-
fication body surveillance system. 
The GlobalGAP system is largely financed from membership fees and certification body 
license fees. Due to budget constraints, GlobalGAP proposed in 2006 to introduce a reg-
istration fee for agricultural producers to generate additional revenue.505 However, the 
                                                   
501
  Previously, the institutional structure of EUREP consisted of a Steering Committee (now 
Board), a Technical Standards Committee (now 5 Sector Committees), and a Secretariat.  
502
  FoodPlus is a not for profit limited company based in Cologne, Germany. 
503
  See at http://www.globalgap.org. 
504
  Nearly half of the budget for 2007 has been reserved for activities enhancing integrity of cer-
tification bodies. 
505
  Significantly, the revenue from the proposed fees nearly equalled the expenditure reserved 
for the new measures aimed at enhancing the integrity of certification bodies. 
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proposal about fees met with resistance from the producers concerned and led to a reduc-
tion of the proposed fees, but not their abolishment.506 This can be seen as a clear illus-
tration of the underlying assumption of the GlobalGAP system that agricultural produc-
ers must carry the costs. 
Rule-making 
The GlobalGAP documents with control points and compliance criteria form the core of 
the programme, as they elaborate how the produce needs to be grown, processed and 
handled from the field to the farm gate. The documents are arranged in sections that 
mention for every item control points, compliance criteria and their status (major musts, 
minor musts and recommendations). The total of standards for a producer of fruit and 
vegetables increased between 2001 and 2007 from around 200 to more than 300.  
Rule-making takes place in an open consultation process. However, stakeholder partici-
pation does not appear to be very well balanced. Significantly, the governing structure of 
GlobalGAP is such that retailers and large suppliers have the strongest positions in stan-
dard setting. Agricultural producers and environmental and social non-governmental or-
ganisations (NGOs) have no voice in the core procedures, although they have the right to 
comment to draft versions of normative and procedural documents. It is, however, un-
clear to what extent their comments are taken into account. A complicating factor is the 
limited transparency of the standard setting process, because the actual decision-making 
takes place behind closed doors and is difficult to reconstruct.507  
Rule-implementation 
The implementation of the GlobalGAP standards is a multi-tier process in which retail-
ers, regulators, and agricultural producers each perform distinct roles. At the retailer 
level, management decisions must be made about the implementation of the standards in 
the supply chains concerned, including targets and timetables. At the regulator level, ac-
tion has to be taken to elaborate and adapt the GlobalGAP standards at the national or 
regional level. At the agricultural producer level, individual producers and producer 
groups need to decide whether they apply for GlobalGAP certification.  
The practice of the implementation of GlobalGAP shows that the time schedule differs 
for each retailer and that some are explicit about their deadlines and others are not, but 
overall implementation has been taken seriously.508 For regulators aiming to bring the 
appropriate standards in place, there is a choice of options available, diverging from the 
creation of new rules by state or non-state actors to a formal GlobalGAP recognition of 
equivalency of an existing scheme. Obvious considerations in such a weighing of options 
                                                   
506
  EurepGAP press release, 30.08.2006: Deferral of EurepGAP fee increase – Introduction of 
new EurepGAP fee structure postponed to 1st January 2007. 
507
  For example, my request for a copy of the draft standards for fruit and vegetables for 2007, as 
discussed during the EurepGAP conference in Prague in September 2006, was turned down 
with the argument that my name was not on the list of participants attending the Prague Con-
ference. I was politely suggested to wait for the release of the standards in their final form.  
508
  Statement of Nigel Garbutt, chairman of EUREP, EUREPGAP Protocol Review Workshop 
Madrid, 9-10 September 2002.  
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are related to the existing regulatory situation in the country concerned, the positioning 
of the national agriculture and food industry, and the commercial prospects for the certi-
fication industry.  
In practice, the most common implementation method has been the application and in-
terpretation of the GlobalGAP standards by private certification bodies. In some coun-
tries, however, producer and exporter associations have developed national private 
schemes that are compatible with GlobalGAP. Examples include the SwissGAP, Chile-
GAP, and KenyaGAP systems.509 Significantly, the major agricultural producing coun-
tries of Brazil, China, Japan, and Mexico have developed legislation incorporating 
GlobalGAP standards.510 This means that the private standards of GlobalGAP have been 
implemented through national legislation, providing state approval and hence an excep-
tional legitimacy to a non-state actor scheme.  
In addition, the GlobalGAP system provides for a benchmark procedure whereby, in 
case of full compatibility, a national or regional scheme may additionally request a for-
mal recognition of equivalency that strengthens the ties between GlobalGAP and the na-
tional organisation and at the same time guarantees the ownership of the scheme. Of 
these benchmarked schemes, a relatively high proportion has a public or semi-public 
status and has been developed in response to the market success of GlobalGAP. An ex-
ample of a country that has followed the benchmark model is New Zealand with its 
EurepGAP Equivalent New Zealand Fresh Produce Approved Supplier Program.511  
Stricter ties between GlobalGAP and producers also exist in countries that have the 
comparative edge of a national technical workgroup that forms a linkage with the 
GlobalGAP organisational structure. This advantage can be even stronger for agricultural 
                                                   
509
  See the following press releases of EurepGAP: Progress in benchmarking: Chile, France and 
Switzerland, 23.06.2004; ChileGAP receives EurepGAP recognition as benchmarked 
scheme, 06.08.2004; KenyaGAP started the process to benchmark with EurepGAP, 
15.03.2005; SwissGAP Fruit and Vegetables successfully benchmarked against EurepGAP, 
20.11.2006.
 
510
  These are called: ChinaGAP, JGAP, and MSQ-GAP, respectively. See the following press 
releases of EurepGAP: Mexico: commitment to implement EurepGAP certification via its na-
tional scheme México Calidad Suprema, 19.07.2004; MexicoGAP to join EurepGAP family, 
14.02.2005; Chinese government signed MoU to develop ChinaGAP, 23.05.2005; ChinaGAP 
ready to start EurepGAP benchmarking procedure, 12.04.2006; Japan publishes JGAP and 
sign agreement to benchmark, 27.04.2006; Mexico Supreme Quality achieves EurepGAP 
equivalence, 25.05.2006. 
511
  The scheme was launched by the New Zealand Vegetables and Potato Growers Federation in 
1999, and was joined by the NZ Fruitgrowers Federation in 2000. The system is supported by 
the New Zealand Food Safety Authority. More information available at: 
http://www.approvedsupplier.co.nz.    
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producers in those countries that have developed approved national interpretations of the 
GlobalGAP standards.512  
At the end of 2006, there were around 90 certification bodies, active in 60 countries, ap-
proved to carry out GlobalGAP certification, and another dozen were in the process of 
getting accredited.513 Similarly as is the case for certification bodies involved in certify-
ing organic production operations, the GlobalGAP approved certification bodies differ in 
size and scope of their operations, but most of them are commercial undertakings, oper-
ating in several countries.514 Some standard owners and certification bodies have a rela-
tively stronger position in the GlobalGAP system. Among the most influential are the 
British Retailer Consortium (BRC) as a founding organisation of GlobalGAP and the in-
spirational force behind the system. More recently, the German QS organisation acceded 
to GlobalGAP after years of competition.515  
Concerning the implementation of the standards for fruit and vegetables in agricultural 
practice, the number of certified producers has increased from nearly 4000 producers in 
19 countries in 2002 to more than 80,000 producers in more than 75 countries in 2008.516 
Most certified producers are European.517 
Rule-enforcement 
The GlobalGAP certification programme uses the incentive of market access to convince 
agricultural producers to meet certification standards and to become certified. More spe-
cifically, the crucial incentive for producers is to obtain, and maintain, their license-to-
supply to the European supermarkets. Premium prices are generally not paid for Global-
                                                   
512
  Countries with interpretation guidelines are France, Italy, and the Netherlands. See the fol-
lowing press releases of EurepGAP: French technical interpretation guide for fruit and vege-
tables now available, 12.08.2004; French and Italian national interpretation guidelines for 
fruit and vegetables published, 20.05.2005, and Dutch national interpretation guidelines for 
fruit and vegetables published, 27.07.2005. 
513
  See for a list of approved certification bodies at: http://www.globalgap.org. 
514
  For example, SGS SA (Switzerland), Control Union (Netherlands), BCS Öko-Garantie 
GmbH (Germany), Integra BVBA (Belgium), and Moody Certification (France), and CMI 
(UK) and CERES (Germany). 
515
  EurepGAP press release, 13.09.2006: EurepGAP takes a further step in the harmonisation of 
requirements for producers: QS Germany completes benchmark with EurepGAP. 
516
  More precisely, 3,889 producers in 19 countries had obtained EurepGAP certification, corre-
sponding with 61,425 hectares in December 2002. One year later, the number of certified 
producers had increased to 13,040 in 41 countries, corresponding with more than 445,000 
hectares. At the end of 2005, the number of certified producers had reached the 30,000, cov-
ering more than 830,000 ha in more than 60 countries. Based on information in: EUREPGAP 
Press Release, 12/12/2002: Press release EUREP, 4/1/2004: Latest EUREPGAP certification 
numbers – end of 2003 statistics; EurepGAP Global Report 2005, presentation of Kristian 
Möller at the 2006 EurepGAP Conference in Prague, and GlobalGAP Newsletter, February 
2008. 
517
  By 2007, Italy had the highest number of certified agricultural producers followed by Ger-
many and Spain. From the developing countries, South Africa and Chile were doing well. 
From the non-EU members in the Mediterranean basin, Israel, Turkey, Morocco and Egypt 
had the highest numbers of certified agricultural producers. 
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GAP certified products, although the producers concerned have to make additional costs 
to adapt their production operation to the GlobalGAP requirements and must pay for the 
certification process. 
Participating agricultural producers have rights and obligations. The key obligation in-
cludes the producer’s responsibility for compliance of the certified products to the 
GlobalGAP protocol. In addition, producers must also take responsibility for any sub-
contractors employed. When a certification body detects non-compliance with the stan-
dards or other contractual obligations, it can give a warning, suspend the certificate or 
cancel it.518 This means that the ultimate consequence of non-compliance is exclusion 
from the supply chain.  
In response to accusations of non-compliance to GlobalGAP standards, agricultural pro-
ducers may appeal to the certification body involved, and in case this body does not re-
spond satisfactorily, the complaint can be addressed to the GlobalGAP secretariat. As 
may be expected in such sensitive matters, information about actual non-compliance by 
producers is not publicly available, and it is therefore difficult to assess how strictly the 
system is being operated in practice.  
5.5 Assessment 
This chapter has focused on non-state actor initiatives, especially at the transnational 
level, that aim to regulate pesticides in the different stages of their life-cycle, including 
production, marketing, use and residues. Based on this description, the current section 
makes an assessment of the transnational approach in terms of effectiveness, inclusive-
ness and fairness.  
Effectiveness 
Non-state actor regulation has been for many agricultural producers a convincing impe-
tus to change their agricultural production methods and to work actively on pesticide risk 
reduction. In this context, it is important to note that the IFOAM organic guarantee sys-
tem and the GlobalGAP programme for fruit and vegetables are based on diverging in-
terpretations of what safe and sustainable agriculture actually means in practice and 
more specifically what sustainable crop protection entails.  
IFOAM makes a case for the worldwide adoption of organic agriculture. With respect to 
crop protection, the IFOAM standards suggest a number of cultural and biological meas-
ures. Where these measures are insufficient, non-chemical inputs may be used that are 
listed in an appendix on crop protectants and growth regulators. The use of inputs in or-
ganic agriculture is a controversial issue and has been the subject of fierce debate during 
IFOAM meetings. Discussions focused on the issue of inputs in a general sense as well 
as the use of specific substances.519 The issue of inputs is one of the main reasons that 
                                                   
518
  Article 6, GLOBALGAP (EUREPGAP). General regulations integrated farm assurance. Part 
I – General information. 
519
  For example, presentations by Eckhard Reiners and Brian Baker at the IFOAM standards 
day, 17 February 2002. 
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IFOAM aims to keep the definition of organic agriculture within the organic movement, 
because its integrity is at stake. 
GlobalGAP’s ambitions are more modest as it requires that agricultural producers dem-
onstrate commitment to the application of good agricultural practice. Thus far, the inter-
pretation of good agricultural practice has been ambivalent, certainly with respect to crop 
protection. Although the adoption of IPM is regarded as essential since the programme’s 
inception, the standards concerned have only been incorporated in the 2007 version and 
have the status of minor musts. This means that producers are not obliged to convert to 
such techniques. Consequently, compliance to the GlobalGAP standards can mean more 
or less anything in relation to the use of pesticides as long as maximum residue limits for 
produce are not exceeded. However, the mere fact that IPM standards have been formu-
lated may indicate that they will obtain a higher status in the longer term 
Overall, it seems not to be a too far-fetched assumption that the GlobalGAP initiative has 
indeed a certain effect on the behaviour of producers with regard to pesticides. It may 
also be instrumental in reducing producers’ dependency on pesticide products. The first 
research results concerning the implementation of the GlobalGAP programme have 
shown indeed that producers participating in it have an inclination to reduce pesticide 
use and experiment with alternative practices.520 In this respect, the food safety focus of 
the GlobalGAP programme can be considered a catalyst for environmental improvement, 
as it raises awareness about pesticide issues and promotes rationalisation of production. 
Comparing the programmes of IFOAM and GlobalGAP with the paradigms that Lang 
and Heasman (2004) have developed in their book Food Wars, it seems obvious that the 
IFOAM programme represents the so-called ecologically integrated paradigm, that has 
as core assumption the recognition of mutual dependencies in agricultural production, 
symbiotic relationships and more subtle forms of manipulation, and that furthermore 
aims to preserve ecological diversity.521 It is, however, more difficult to classify the 
GlobalGAP initiative. In its present state, it belongs to the life sciences integrated para-
digm because it is driven by science-led integration of food supply chains dominated by 
retailers and relies on intensive agriculture. However, GlobalGAP may also have the po-
tential to develop in the direction of the ecologically integrated paradigm, under the con-
dition that the environmental content of the programme will be strengthened and a 
choice will be made for more rigorous pesticide risk reduction strategies. 
                                                   
520
  N.M. van der Grijp, T. Marsden & J.S. Barbosa Cavalcanti (2005). European retailers as 
agents of change towards sustainability: the case of fruit production in Brazil. In: Environ-
mental Sciences, vol. 2, no. 4, pp. 445-460. 
521
  T. Lang & M. Heasman (2004). Food Wars: The global battle for mouths, minds and mar-
kets. London and Sterling: Earthscan, 365 p. In the first chapter of their book, Lang & Heas-
man explain the Food Wars thesis and three food system paradigms. They argue that two 
possible science-informed visions for the future are emerging, that are competing paradigms 
for the future of food both seeking to transform the productionist paradigm that became 
dominant after World War II. One is what they call the life sciences integrated paradigm and 
the other the ecologically integrated paradigm. In fact, the life sciences integrated paradigm 
resembles the older productionist paradigm but claims to remedy a number of its limitations 
by a more scientifically sound approach. 
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Inclusiveness 
The IFOAM and GlobalGAP certification programmes both claim to be based on de-
mocratic principles, arguing that rule-making takes place in a participatory process. 
IFOAM is based on a federation model, in which all members have in principle an equal 
vote through the General Assembly or a delegated vote through the World Board. Fur-
thermore, it has pledged to comply with the Code of Good Practice for Setting Social 
and Environmental Standards that has been published by the ISEAL Alliance. This Code 
is a specification of the work on standardisation done by ISO and the WTO, and, inter 
alia, contains criteria for participation in the standard development process.  
GlobalGAP considers itself a partnership between retailers and suppliers, but although 
many of the suppliers concerned belong to the largest in a global perspective, there is a 
certain power asymmetry in favour of the retailers. The governing structure of Global-
GAP is such that retailers and large suppliers have the strongest positions in standard set-
ting, and other stakeholders have no vote in the core procedures. Furthermore, Global-
GAP does not participate in the ISEAL Alliance. 
Fairness 
Non-state actor regulation can have positive as well as negative impacts on market ac-
cess, which partly relates to the distribution of costs. In the IFOAM system, agricultural 
producers carry a large part of the operational and adaptational costs. However, these 
costs are compensated by the premium prices that are being paid for organic produce. 
Furthermore, IFOAM has introduced new forms of certification, such as smallholder 
group certification and participatory guarantee systems, in order to reduce the financial 
burden for small producers.  
According to the GlobalGAP programme, agricultural producers carry nearly all costs of 
the regulatory system without the compensation of price premiums. More precisely, 
farmers are responsible for the costs of adapting their production operation to the stan-
dards, for the costs of the certification process, and increasingly for the costs of the op-
eration and maintenance of the GlobalGAP system as such. Besides these direct costs, 
the system is organized in such a way that liability for product failure is shifted to farm-
ers.  
In addition to costs, it is a crucial question whether producers have the capabilities and 
the resources to comply with the standards for safe and sustainable agricultural produc-
tion imposed by the large retailers. This counts the most strongly for small producers in 
developing countries. A first problem is that many developing countries do not have the 
institutional infrastructure that is necessary for participation in certification programmes. 
Certification bodies, for example, play an important role in the implementation and 
elaboration of standards at the regional and local level, but many developing countries 
do not have such bodies. Increasingly, however, international certification bodies are es-
tablishing local branches in developing countries or are using local inspectors, and in 
some developing countries local certification bodies are being established. Another in-
frastructure problem may be related to the lack of laboratory facilities that are equipped 
to conduct the testing of pesticide residues.  
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These unequal market opportunities may result in tensions between developed and de-
veloping countries, and also between larger and smaller agricultural producers. Signifi-
cantly, the GlobalGAP programme is currently being scrutinized by the WTO, more pre-
cisely the SPS Committee, on the basis of trade concerns formulated by St Vincent and 
the Grenadines, and supported by Jamaica, Peru, Ecuador, and Argentina.522 The com-
plainants have argued that the GlobalGAP standards for bananas are stricter than gov-
ernmental requirements in the EU, and therefore not in line with the SPS Agreement. 
The complainants have called for a clarification of Article 13 of the SPS Agreement. 
This Article puts the responsibility for the observation of the Agreement upon the WTO 
members, and this responsibility does not only cover the behaviour of governmental ac-
tors but also of non-governmental entities. With regard to the latter category, the Article 
specifies that “[…] Members shall take such reasonable measures as may be available to 
them to ensure that non-governmental entities within their territories, as well as regional 
bodies in which relevant entities within their territories are members, comply with the 
relevant provisions of this Agreement […]”.523 The interpretation of this Article has 
raised several questions, including how far state responsibility goes and under what con-
ditions a non-governmental entity can be considered as not complying with the provi-
sions of the agreement. 
In a first reaction to the complaint, the EU insisted on a narrow interpretation of Article 
13 by arguing that it is not in a position to intervene in the GlobalGAP initiative because 
the private sector organisation concerned claims that its standards reflect consumer de-
mand. According to the EU, concerns should therefore be raised with the organization it-
self. In response, however, Mexico cautioned that this is a complex “systemic issue”, and 
members should not reach hasty conclusions.  
The issue was brought back as a separate agenda item during the meeting of the SPS 
Committee in 2007.524 The debate focused again on the question whether private sector 
standards fall under the SPS Agreement. In addition, the economic implications of such 
standards have been discussed. Some members argued that private standards can create 
trade because exporters meeting the standards can sell their products more easily.525 
Other members observed that (a) the proliferation of standards that are set without any 
consultation poses a challenge for small economies, (b) meeting the standards raises 
costs, and (c) private standards often conflict with those set by governments or interna-
tional organisations.526 It was also argued that in practice these voluntary private stan-
dards can have certain effects as if they were compulsory: if a supplier does not comply, 
this may lead to exclusion from the market.527 Other members, instead, put forward that 
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  G/SPS/R/37/Rev.1, paras 16-20. 
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  The Article goes even further by stating that: “In addition, Members shall not take measures 
which have the effect of, directly or indirectly, requiring or encouraging such regional or 
non-governmental entities, or local governmental bodies, to act in a manner inconsistent with 
the provisions of this Agreement […].” 
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  G/SPS/R/43, paras 40-42.  
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  E.g. Chile and the EU. 
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  E.g. St Vincent and the Grenadines, Bahamas, Egypt, Cuba, and Brazil. 
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  E.g. Argentina. 
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the focus should not be too much on private norms but that the priority should be to help 
developing countries comply with official standards. Subsequently, the SPS Committee 
decided to organise an informal information session and to invite a number of the private 
sector organizations concerned. 
At this joint UNCTAD/WTO information session on private standards, representatives 
from the GFSI, GlobalGAP, ISO and the British retailer Tesco were present, as well as 
representatives from Uganda, Malysia, and Brazil.528 The session focused on the impli-
cation of private standards in terms of relevance for market access, development issues, 
and WTO trade rules. The SPS Committee is expected to table this issue again in a next 
meeting. For several developing countries, the issue has raised in importance since 
EurepGAP turned into GlobalGAP and the first retailer from the USA became member. 
However, producers in developing countries do not only experience problems when con-
fronted with private standards from developed countries. Research in Ghana, for exam-
ple, has shown that producers experienced fundamental benefits of GlobalGAP certifica-
tion.529 First, the training in applying good agricultural practice, provided by an NGO in 
the context of development assistance, has improved the quality and safety of Ghanean 
produce in a cost-effective manner. Second, traceability systems have helped producers 
to trace back agricultural problems to their origin, making it easier to find solutions. 
Third, certification has offered a defence against wrongful claims about poor quality by 
exporters and importers. Fourth, certification has provided considerable prestige and per-
sonal pride to the producers involved. This example of Ghana shows that there can be 
important advantages for developing country producers linked to the participation in pri-
vate certification programmes.  
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  The joint UNCTAD/WTO informal information session on private standards, Geneva, 25 
June 2007. 
529
  M. Hatanaka, C. Bain & L. Busch (2005). Third-party certification in the global agrifood sys-
tem. In: Food Policy, vol. 30, issue 3, pp. 362-363. 
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Part III The practice of legal pluralism 
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6. The perspective of national government: the case of 
the Netherlands 
6.1 Introduction 
National governments are increasingly operating within frameworks of rules that have 
been formulated by state and non-state actors in the context of international law, regional 
agreements, and non-state actor regulation. This chapter uses the example of the Nether-
lands to explain how legal pluralism affects a national government and the national con-
ditions for effective law and policy making.  
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.2 describes the elaboration of the Dutch 
governmental law and policy on pesticides in the decades prior to 2000. Section 6.3 fo-
cuses on its erosion in the period from 2000 until 2005. Section 6.4 discusses the contes-
tation of several Dutch regulatory measures before the European Court of Justice (ECJ). 
Section 6.5 focuses on the reformulation of the Dutch law and policy on pesticides. Sec-
tion 6.6 gives an indication about the level of pesticide risk reduction. Section 6.7 pre-
sents conclusions.  
6.2 The elaboration of governmental law and policy 
In the Netherlands, the governmental responsibilities for the pesticide-related issues are 
divided among: the ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality (Landbouw, 
Natuurbeheer en Voedselkwaliteit, or LNV) for agricultural and food safety aspects; the 
ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and Environment (Volksgezondheid, Ruimtelijke 
Ordening en Milieu, or VROM) for environmental aspects; the ministry of Transport and 
Water Management (Verkeer en Waterstaat, V&W) for water quality; the ministry of 
Social Affairs (Sociale Zaken, or SZ) for working conditions; the ministry of Economic 
Affairs (Economische Zaken) for energy aspects, and the ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(Buitenlandse Zaken) for miscellaneous international aspects.530  
Pesticides Act 
The Pesticides Act 1962 (Bestrijdingsmiddelenwet 1962) forms the pivot of the Dutch 
law and policy on pesticides. 531 Its main objective is to regulate the marketing and use of 
pesticides as well as the protection against possible harmful side-effects. Initially, these 
side-effects included the protection of workers and consumers, but since 1975 the Act 
also incorporates the objective of environmental protection.532 
                                                   
530
  The names and portfolios of several ministries have changed over the years. 
531
  Parts of this section have been inspired by my work for a manual about the implementation 
of EU environmental law and policy in the Netherlands. See: F.H. Oosterhuis, H. van Asselt, 
N.M. van der Grijp, M. van Munster, L.A.J. Spaans, I. van Dun-van den Bosch, M. Jacobs & 
M.E.D. Matthee (2004). Handboek implementatie EG-milieubeleid in Nederland. Amster-
dam. Available at: http:://www.vrom.nl/eu-milieubeleid. 
532
  Amendment of the Pesticides Act, Stb. 1975, 381. 
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The most important instrument of the Dutch Pesticides Act is the authorisation procedure 
of pesticide products prior to their marketing and use.533 The instrument is not only being 
regulated in the Pesticides Act, but also in a series of regulations stemming from this Act 
(see Annex 4). The Board for the Authorisation of Pesticides (College voor de toelating 
van bestrijdingsmiddelen, or CTB) has been designated to decide on the authorisation of 
individual pesticide products.534  
The first Dutch governmental policy document with respect to the environmental aspects 
of pest control was published in 1983.535 The immediate reasons for action were the pol-
lution of drinking water by the widespread use of methyl bromide as soil disinfectant, 
and the negative impacts of various pesticides on bird populations. The main objective of 
the policy document was to reduce the volume of pesticides used. However, the policy 
did not have the intended impact, mainly because the sector did not consider it in its own 
interest to support its implementation.536 
The next policy document, issued in 1987, had a more distinct impact and introduced the 
objective of a reduction of pesticide dependency in addition to the volume reduction ob-
jective.537 Most importantly, it formed the foundation of the major policy plan on crop 
protection that became a landmark in the development of pesticide policy in the Nether-
lands. 
Multi-Year Crop Protection Plan 
This landmark policy plan was called the Multi-Year Crop Protection Plan (Meerjaren-
plan Gewasbescherming, or MJP-G), and was published in 1991 for a validity period of 
10 years.538 The basic idea underlying the plan was to develop a more integral policy ap-
proach to crop protection.539 It aimed at: (1) a reduction of the total pesticide volume, (2) 
a diminishing of pesticide dependency, and (3) a reduction of the environmental impact 
of pesticide use.540  
In order to ensure a proper implementation of the MJP-G, and as requested by Parlia-
ment, the relevant ministers and the representatives of the agricultural business commu-
nity signed a covenant (Bestuursovereenkomst) in 1993, which elaborated the objectives 
                                                   
533
  Pesticides Act, Articles 2-7.  
534
  The status of the CTB has changed in the course of its existence. Initially, the CTB was a 
body of the ministry of LNV. In a later stage, it became an independent public authority con-
sisting of experts designated by the ministers involved (Stb. 1998, 689). Extensive informa-
tion about the CTB is available at http://www.ctb-wageningen.nl. 
535
  Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (1983). Nota Gewasbescherming in Nederland. Den 
Haag: L&V.  
536
  A.M.C. Loeber (2003). Practical wisdom in the risk society. Methods and practice of inter-
pretive analysis on questions of sustainable development. Academic dissertation. Amster-
dam: University of Amsterdam, p. 214. 
537
  Ministry of Agriculture, Nature Conservation and Fisheries (LNV) (1987). Naar een taakstel-
lend meerjarenplan voor de gewasbescherming. Den Haag: LNV. 
538
  Parliament, TK 1990-1991, 21 677, nrs. 3-4. 
539
  A.M.C. Loeber (2003), p. 215. 
540
  Parliament, TK 1990-1991, 21 677, no. 5. 
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of the MJP-G in detail.541 Furthermore, the parties agreed to organize a mid-term review 
of the policy plan. According to this review in 1995, progress had been made in the areas 
of reduced volume and impacts but not in relation to the dependency objective, as most 
improvements were the result of technical adaptations and did not result from a funda-
mental change in agricultural production methods.542 Consequently, the government 
suggested shifting the policy emphasis towards the objective of dependency reduction. 
EU Directive 91/414  
In 1991, after long and strenuous deliberations, the EU had finally established Directive 
91/414 concerning the placing of plant protection products on the market (see Section 
4.3.1).543 In order to implement this Authorisation Directive, the Pesticides Act 1962 was 
amended in 1994, exceeding the deadline for transposition by more than one year.544 A 
complicating factor in the transposition process was the existing legislation on the au-
thorisation of pesticide products. Consequently, the implementation could not take place 
in a ‘one-to-one’ manner, but was carried out in a similar spirit as propagated by the Di-
rective. A comparison of the Directive and the relevant Dutch legislation shows that the 
terminology differs at certain points and that the procedures are not totally equivalent in 
form and substance. In her extensive study of the Dutch pesticides legislation, Vogelez-
ang points, for example, at the broadly defined competences of the minister of LNV and 
the CTB, especially in relation to the transitional provisions.545 
Overall, Directive 91/414 has given an impetus to major changes in the authorisation 
practice of pesticide products in the Netherlands, mainly because it defined stricter crite-
ria for the protection of human health and environment than were incorporated in the 
Pesticides Act 1962. Moreover, the Dutch government decided in 1995 that in the light 
of the urgent need to address the extremely high use of pesticides in Dutch agriculture 
and the correspondingly high environmental burden, to anticipate to the future EU re-
gime by immediately applying the European authorisation criteria in all procedures, even 
when the review of the substances concerned had not been finalised by the European 
Commission.546  
Besides its positive environmental impacts, the Directive also had a negative impact on 
the authorisation practices in the Netherlands. On the occasion of the transposition of Di-
rective 91/414 into national law, the government decided to delete the substitution prin-
                                                   
541
  Parliament, TK 1991-1992, 21 677, no. 10; A.M.C. Loeber (2003), pp. 217-218. 
542
  Parliament, TK 1995-1996, 21 677, no. 24. See e.g.: P.J.M. van den Heuvel, P. Leroy, 
R.S.E.W. Leuven & P.H. Nienhuis (1997). Chemische gewasbescherming dertig jaar na 
‘Zilveren sluiers en verborgen gevaren’. In: Milieu, vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 50-57. 
543
  OJ L230, 19.08.1991, pp. 1-32.   
544
  Wet van 15 december 1994 tot wijziging van de Bestrijdingsmiddelenwet en de op deze wet 
gebaseerde regels (Stb. 1995, 4).  The final date for transposition had been set at 26.07.1993. 
545
  E.M. Vogelezang-Stoute ( 2004). Bestrijdingsmiddelenrecht: een rechtsvergelijking. Aca-
demic dissertation. Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam, 824 p. See especially: pp. 751-
758. 
546
  Parliament, TK 1995-1996, 21 677, no. 24. See e.g.: H. de Heer & A. van Straten (2001). 
Ontwikkelingen in the Europese en nationale toelatingsbeleid voor gewasbeschermingsmid-
delen. In: Gewasbescherming, vol. 32, nrs. 4/5, p. 98. 
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ciple (alternatieventoets), which had been adopted one year earlier. This principle 
obliged the CTB to consider in its authorisation decisions whether a suitable alternative 
pesticide product with significantly less harmful side-effects was available in the market 
that could replace the product in question.547 According to the government, the Directive 
did not allow to perform such assessments, and the deletion of the provision seemed 
therefore the obvious solution. 
6.3 The erosion of governmental law and policy 
Exception of essential use 
In the late 1990s, the implementation of Directive 91/414, and especially the stringent 
policy that the Dutch government pursued with regard to the authorisation of pesticide 
products, began to show its first impacts on the number of pesticide products available in 
the Dutch market. The authorisation of several pesticide products had been terminated 
because they did not comply with the environmental criteria of the new Article 3 of the 
Pesticides Act. However, several of the products involved were considered essential by 
the agricultural sector for the continued production of certain crops. Under increasing 
pressure from the sector, the government finally decided to pull back by allowing certain 
exceptions and amended the Pesticides Act accordingly.548  
With the amendment of 2001, the exception of essential use became an explicit element 
of the Pesticides Act. In order to give guidance to the interpretation of the exception, an 
annex contained 11 substances that were considered to be potentially essential in combi-
nation with certain crops. However, the authorisations for more than half of these sub-
stances expired soon afterwards, because the manufacturers did not submit the necessary 
dossiers in time, indicating that the communication between the actors involved was less 
than optimal.549 As the issue of the so-called essential pesticide products turned out 
highly contentious and several court cases were started by environmental organisations, 
                                                   
547
  E.M. Vogelezang-Stoute (2001). De EG-richtlijnen inzake de toelating van bestrijdingsmid-
delen. In: Bestrijdingsmiddelen, Verslag van de 68ste ledenvergadering van de Vereniging 
voor Milieurecht op 27 juni 2000. Den Haag: Boom Juridische Uitgevers, p. 21. Many years 
later, the Parliament proposed to re-introduce the substitution principle, but the minister of 
LNV decided again that such an approach was not in accordance with Directive 91/414. 
548
  With the amendment of 25 January 2001, Article 25c (exception of essential use) was added 
to the Pesticides Act (Stb. 2001, 68). This exception did not apply for substances not allowed 
according on the basis of Community law. Vogelezang (2001) calls the exception of essential 
use a mirror image of the substitution principle. 
549
  The expirations may leave doubt about the essential nature of the pesticide products con-
cerned. However, another explanation may be that the manufacturers involved did not con-
sider these applications feasible from a commercial point of view. In this respect, De Heer & 
Van Straten (2001) have argued that the present expansion of the pesticide industry and its 
decreasing profit margins would have an impact on the availability of crop protection prod-
ucts, which could especially hamper the so-called ‘minor applications’.  
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the minister decided to issue a separate decree containing criteria for the definition of es-
sential use.550  
In reaction to the Dutch notification of this latter decree to the European Commission, 
Germany objected about its content, arguing that the loosening up of environmental cri-
teria was not consistent with the objective of Directive 91/414.551 Furthermore, the Ger-
man government feared distortion of competition because the Netherlands allowed the 
use of pesticide products that were already banned in anticipation in other Member 
States. However, the minister of LNV claimed that the Directive allowed the use of less 
stringent criteria as long as the substances in question had not been reviewed in the 
European context.  
Subsequently, the position of the “essential” as well as of non-reviewed pesticide prod-
ucts became stronger with amendments of the Pesticides Act.552 This legal facilitation of 
practices that were unlawful in a strict sense was effectuated by a combination of two 
measures.553 First, the CTB was given the authority to set its own priorities in its review 
programme of pesticide products. Second, the prohibition to use non-reviewed pesticide 
products was made less absolute.  
These amendments met with resistance from the environmental organisations. For exam-
ple, Rutteman of the Zuidhollandse Milieufederatie (or ZHM) questioned whether the 
new provisions were in line with the precautionary principle and Directive 91/414.554 He 
argued that it is difficult to maintain that the amendments of the Pesticides Act were in 
accordance with the high level of environmental protection that the Directive aspired, 
and the precedence of the protection of health and environment over the aim of improved 
plant production. In Rutteman’s view, the legal situation for the majority of pesticide 
products was back to the situation before 1975, when environmental objectives were first 
introduced in the Pesticides Act. 
Strategic plan on integrated management 
As the Multi-Year Crop Protection Plan (MJP-G) was going to expire in 2000, the gov-
ernment started preparing a follow-up strategic plan that was called ‘Integrated manage-
ment, the way ahead, crop protection policy up to 2010’ (Zicht op gezonde teelt, or 
ZOGZ).555 It marked a drastic change in approach, aiming at integrated management on 
certified farms by 2005, and addressing individual agricultural producers, instead of the 
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  Regeling toelatingseisen landbouwkundig onmisbare gewasbeschermingsmiddelen (Stcrt. 
2001, 41). 
551
  Spain also objected about the Dutch decree, but according to the minister of VROM, the 
Spanish had possibly misunderstood the legal basis of the measures concerned. 
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  CTB Besluit prioritering werkzame stoffen 2002, Stcrt. 2002, 178. 
553
  This legal facilitation of unlawful practices is called in Dutch: formeel gedogen. 
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  J. Rutteman (2002). De toelating van bestrijdingsmiddelen: terug naar 1975? In: Milieu & 
Recht, no. 12, pp. 316-317. 
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  Parliament, TK 2000-2001, 27 858, no. 2. Integrated management is used here as a collective 
term for integrated approaches to crop protection, and is as such comparable with the term in-
tegrated control. 
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sector as a whole. Although the plan had been carefully prepared with ample room for 
consultation and participation of the stakeholders involved, it failed dramatically.  
To deal with the pesticide dependency problem, the plan introduced the instrument of a 
public certification scheme as a means to define standards for integrated management, 
and to implement and enforce them. In order to specify the appropriate ambition level of 
standards, a distinction was made between average farms and around 20% of more inno-
vative farms. The standards matching with both levels were to be established as ‘pro-
gressive norms’ that would be formulated more strictly, step-by-step, in the years to 
come.556 This new policy focusing on certification was to be supported by a combination 
of ‘carrots and sticks’, ranging from financial incentives for cooperative producers to 
strict enforcement for those lagging behind.557 Furthermore, the government expressed 
the hope that the key market players would assist in managing the introduction of inte-
grated management, but remained vague about the ways in which this could take place. 
Notably, it did not refer to existing private certification schemes at all, turning a blind 
eye to market practices that had become increasingly common. 
With a view to the emission objectives in ZOGZ, the government expected that they 
could be largely achieved by the full implementation of the existing policies for the au-
thorisation of pesticide products and emission reduction.558 The objective concerning 
maximum acceptable risk (Maximaal Toelaatbaar Risico) could be expectedly realised 
with a minor effort, and an extra reduction of the environmental burden in the direction 
of negligible risk (Verwaarloosbaar Risico) was possibly feasible in the longer term. 
However, as mentioned above, the implementation of ZOGZ stagnated soon, as the plan 
was boycotted by the agricultural sector. As a matter of fact, the government officially 
abandoned ZOGZ in its second year of existence. This failure was caused by the dead-
lock position that was reached in the simultaneous discussion between the government 
and the sector about the future availability of the so-called essential pesticide products. 
Subsequently, preparations were started to replace ZOGZ by a less ambitious policy 
document. To this end, the government took the initiative to start negotiations about the 
                                                   
556
  In preparation of the implementation of the ZOGZ policy document, the ministry of LNV 
commissioned field trials in order to elaborate the concept of integrated management in un-
ambiguous, practicable and verifiable standards for specific crops. The trials demonstrated 
that such an elaboration was certainly feasible but that the possible level of detail strongly 
differed for each crop. In addition, the study concluded that a further transition towards inte-
grated control would only be feasible in combination with the availability of an appropriate 
set of crop protection products. Moreover, the government was advised to seek alliance with 
existing market-based initiatives such as EurepGAP. But above all, according to the study, 
the ministry of LNV should give priority to a restoration of confidence of the sector in the 
government. See for the report on the field trials: L. den Boer, H. Balkhoven, E. van der Wal 
& P. Lentjes (2002). Kijk op de praktijk. Eindrapportage praktijkproef 2001 Zicht op ge-
zonde teelt. CLM536-2002. Utrecht: CLM Onderzoek en Advies. 
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  It was the intention of the government to evaluate the new policy in 2004. In case of a lower 
percentage of certified farms than 90%, the government announced that it would consider the 
option of incorporating a legal obligation in the Pesticides Act that only certified farmers 
were allowed to use chemical pesticides. 
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  Parliament, TK 2000-2001, 27 858, nr. 2. 
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outlines of a future policy concerning sustainable crop protection with the parties in-
volved. Consensus was reached fairly quickly and led, as a first step, to the conclusion of 
a covenant in 2003 (Afsprakenkader gewasbescherming).  
With the covenant, the government aimed to overcome the policy deadlock and reach a 
formal agreement with the sector about the results to be achieved. Participants in the 
covenant included: the national farmers’ organisation LTO, the ministries of LNV, 
VROM, SZW and VWS, the environmental NGO Stichting Natuur en Milieu, the asso-
ciation of drinking water companies Vewin and the association of pesticide distributors 
(Agrodis). In a later stage, Stichting Natuur en Milieu withdrew from the covenant, and 
the Union of Water Boards (Unie van Waterschapppen) and the association of pesticide 
manufacturers Nefyto became new parties to it.  
According to the covenant, the national farmers’ organisation LTO adopted responsibil-
ity for the formulation of sectoral plans concerning sustainable crop protection that 
should be reported upon on an annual basis. Furthermore, the LTO committed itself to 
stimulate the adoption of integrated management through participation in certification 
schemes operated by market parties. Hence, the establishment of the covenant indicated 
that the government had dropped the idea of developing a public certification scheme. 
Strategic plan on sustainable crop protection 
In his letter of 4 April 2003, the minister of LNV officially abandoned the previously 
formulated policy plan and announced the publication of a new policy document to re-
place ZOGZ.559 One year later, in May 2004, the new policy document, called Strategic 
plan on sustainable crop protection (Nota Duurzame Gewasbescherming), was presented 
by the government to Parliament.560 Hence, in comparison with the previous plan, the 
term ‘integrated management’ was replaced by ‘sustainable crop protection’.  
In the introduction, the minister of LNV explained that the government had reconsidered 
the policy in ZOGZ, because the support from the agricultural sector as well as Parlia-
ment was disappointing. The major criticism from the sector was that the pesticide au-
thorisation policy pursued by the Dutch government impeded the implementation of in-
tegrated control. More precisely, the sector claimed that the implementation of such ap-
proaches required the availability of an appropriately broad spectrum of pesticide prod-
ucts. Moreover, the sector alleged that the government did not fully appreciate the nega-
tive impacts of the current authorisation policy on the competitive position of Dutch ag-
ricultural producers, and it even declared that there existed a crisis of confidence. 
The Strategic plan on sustainable crop protection provided the building blocks for the 
implementation of the covenant. Hence, the proposed measures related to the issues of 
the authorisation of pesticide products, the development of sectoral crop protection plans 
by the farmers’ organisation LTO, and the encouragement of the estimated 10% of pro-
ducers that were lagging behind. Furthermore, the minister stipulated to maintain the re-
duction targets from ZOGZ, including a reduction of emissions by 95% in 2005, in com-
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parison to 1998. Most remarkably, and in full contrast to ZOGZ, the new policy consid-
ered certification as a responsibility of business.  
In order to solve the issue of the essential pesticide products, the governmental Plant 
Protection Service of the Netherlands (Plantenziektenkundige Dienst) was asked to make 
an inventory of the so-called bottlenecks in current agricultural practice. To this end, the 
Service focused on the crops for which the sector claimed that appropriate pesticide 
products were not available in the market, and identified 110 of such ‘bottlenecks’. Sub-
sequently, the authorisation authority CTB assessed the risks involved of granting ex-
emptions for the crop/pesticide combinations concerned. Based on the advice of the 
CTB, the responsible authorities decided to grant 59 exemptions.561 For the remaining 51 
bottlenecks, however, exemptions were not considered an appropriate solution, with as 
main reasons: 1) incompatibility with norms concerning consumer and worker health, 2) 
incapability of estimating the risks involved, and 3) loss of interest of the manufacturer 
of the product involved in its further marketing. Subsequently, the exemptions approved 
by the CTB have been backed up by a series of legal provisions that have been issued on 
an annual basis since 2003.562  
Principles of integrated control 
In order to support the new policy on pesticides as established in the Strategic plan on 
sustainable crop protection, the minister of LNV articulated the principles of integrated 
control in a separate decree in 2004 (Besluit beginselen geïntegreerde gewasbescher-
ming).563 In the explanatory memorandum, the Minister stated that the Decree was meant 
to implement Article 3(3) of Directive 91/414 that obliges producers to apply the princi-
ples of good plant protection practice, and whenever possible, the principles of inte-
grated control. In the previous years, the government had interpreted this provision as an 
obligation for the agricultural sector to perform a demonstrable effort (inspanningsver-
plichting) that did not need to be explicitly transposed in Dutch law. However, with the 
establishment of the Decree in 2004, the government obviously changed its opinion after 
more than 10 years.  
The Decree inter alia aimed at the reduction of environmental pollution caused by pesti-
cides through the prevention and limitation of their use.564 It addressed in principle all 
producers but especially targeted those that are lagging behind in the conversion to inte-
grated crontrol. In order to achieve its objective, the Decree required that producers us-
ing pesticides comply with the general principles of integrated control. More specifi-
cally, they should account for their agricultural practices by drawing up individual crop 
protection plans as well as a monitoring reports, both on an annual basis.565 Whereas the 
crop protection plan should contain an elaboration of the methods and measures that a 
producer had in mind to implement the principles of integrated control, the monitoring 
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  Letter d.d. 9 May 2003 of the minister of LNV to Parliament concerning a total overview of 
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  See the ministerial decrees in Annex 4 that are called ‘Vrijstellingen …’. 
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  Stb. 2004, 485. 
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  Decree on the principles of integrated crop protection, Article 1. 
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  Decree on the principles of integrated crop protection, Article 2. 
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report should give account of its actual implementation and the ways in which a pro-
ducer had eventually departed from it. 
An annex to the Decree prescribed a number of measures to guide producers in elaborat-
ing a crop protection plan. These measures were based on the ‘no, unless principle’, 
which considered chemical crop protection as a measure of last resort. The principle im-
plied a preferential order in crop protection strategies, ranging from prevention of pests, 
technical measures, warning systems, non-chemical crop protection techniques to the 
application of pesticide products, and reduction of emissions.566 In order to further elabo-
rate the concept of integrated control in ‘progressive’ norms, the Decree delegated legis-
lative power to the minister of LNV.567 However, the minister later cancelled the idea of 
elaborating measures of integrated control after members of the Parliament had tabled a 
resolution to repeal the Decree in its entirety.568 In response to this resolution, the minis-
ter decided to partly meet the Parliamentary criticism by abolishing the obligation to 
keep a ‘logbook’ for self-monitoring but maintaining the crop protection plan.  
Organic agriculture 
A similar toning down of ambitions can be observed in the Dutch governmental policy 
vis-à-vis the development of organic agriculture. Since the early 1990s, the EU has 
stimulated the conversion to this production method, adopting a Regulation defining or-
ganic agriculture as well as a Regulation facilitating the payment of subsidies to agricul-
tural producers converting to less environmentally harmful practices under the scope of 
agri-environment schemes.569 In order to implement the EU legislation and to stimulate 
conversion to organic agriculture, the Dutch government issued a specific regulation that 
designated the private organisation SKAL to inspect and certify organic food production 
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in the Netherlands.570 It furthermore issued a compensation scheme in 1994, which pro-
vided financial support to producers in conversion (Regeling Stimulering Biologische 
Productiemethode).571 However, the scheme did not have the expected effect on the 
growth rate of organic agriculture because the premiums were generally considered too 
low.  
Subsequently, the ministry of LNV launched an action plan for organic agriculture (Plan 
van Aanpak Biologische Landbouw) in November 1996.572 A major reason to come up 
with the action plan was the observation that the developments in the Netherlands were 
lagging behind in comparison to neighbouring countries.573 The action plan did not con-
tain any targets and timetables. Unlike neighbouring European countries, the Dutch gov-
ernment held the opinion that market forces would determine which share of organic 
production was feasible in the Netherlands.574  
Together with the publication of the action plan, the minister of LNV proposed to raise 
the conversion premiums, which resulted in a new scheme that entered into force in 
1999.575 Moreover, the ministry developed several activities to engage the conventional 
food and retailing industry in organic production, such as a quality programme for or-
ganic products (Kwaliteitsprogramma Biologische Producten). As a consequence, the 
prospects for organic production and consumption looked favourable, but did not have 
the chance to fully materialise.  
With a change of government in 2000, the commitment of the ministry of LNV to or-
ganic agriculture diminished. This is reflected in the policy document on organic agricul-
ture that was published by the minister of LNV in 2000 (Beleidsnota biologische land-
bouw 2001-2004: Een biologische markt te winnen).576 This document further strength-
ened the previously chosen market-based approach and announced the abolishment of 
conversion subsidies after 2002. This meant that the Netherlands was the first country in 
the EU that decided not to use the European funds made available for the conversion to 
organic agriculture. Notwithstandly this lack of commitment, the minister observed in 
the policy document that it would credit the Netherlands to achieve the following in 
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2010: 1) a 10% share of agricultural area under organic production; 2) Dutch consumers 
as top users of organic products in Europe, and 3) the realisation of several successful 
organic brands by the food industry. However, the Minister did not provide any re-
sources to help the organic sector achieve these goals, except funding for communication 
and consultation. 
The pro-active role of retailer Albert Heijn 
Focusing on the role of non-state actors, the retailer Albert Heijn was one of the first 
conventional non-state actors that became actively involved in initiatives that were 
aimed at a reduction of pesticide use in fruit and vegetables production.577 The company, 
owned by Ahold, is the largest food retailer in the Netherlands with a market share of 
27.5% in 2006.578 The company has always positioned itself as a high-quality supermar-
ket, attracting a relatively large share of the better educated, middle and higher income 
groups of the Dutch population. Part of its quality policy has been the early embrace of 
strategies to reduce pesticide use.  
In the early 1990s, Albert Heijn introduced a programme to reduce pesticide use in fruit 
and vegetable production that was based on integrated control (Aarde & Waarde). The 
publication of the governmental Multi-Year Crop Protection Plan (Meerjarenplan Ge-
wasbescherming) in 1991 formed the immediate reason to launch the programme. Albert 
Heijn was in the position to consider such an effort, because it had traditionally exercised 
a tight control over its supply chains which was supported by its policy of favouring 
long-term relationships with suppliers. In the context of the programme, and with the as-
sistance of a research institute (Centrum voor Landbouw en Milieu, or CLM), criteria 
were developed for each different crop and subsequently implemented in agricultural 
practice. In the late 1990s, an estimated 95% of crops from Dutch origin were produced 
under standards of integrated control. 
Apart from its commitment to integrated control, Albert Heijn has also dedicated atten-
tion to the development of an organic product line, reportedly after a consumer petition 
including such a request.579 More specifically, Albert Heijn launched a specific home 
brand for organic products (AH Biologisch), and asked its suppliers if they were able to 
supply organic products besides the conventional lines. Many of its suppliers reacted 
positively to the request and became involved in the organic market. By creating a home 
brand, Albert Heijn aimed to demonstrate to its customers as well as suppliers that its 
commitment to the marketing of organic products was a serious business. 
In the past years, the interest in the issue of pesticide residues has increased at various 
levels. For example, environmental and consumer organizations have pointed at the un-
certainty surrounding the safety of current MRLs, especially with a view to young chil-
dren, the unknown risks of combinations of substances, and the exceedances of MRLs.580 
In response to these growing concerns, Albert Heijn announced in 1999 to aim at offer-
ing residue-free fresh produce, produced under either protocols of either integrated con-
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trol or organic production, by 2005. However, it has not succeeded as yet in achieving 
this goal. 
6.4 The contestation of specific legal measures 
Since the introduction of the environmental objective in the Pesticides Act in 1975, 
many decisions by the Dutch government concerning the authorisation of pesticide prod-
ucts have been contested in national courts. It goes beyond the scope of this study to ex-
amine these cases in detail. Moreover, Vogelezang (2004) provides an extensive over-
view of them in her book about pesticide law in the Netherlands.581 However, three re-
cent cases require attention here, since they concerned the legality of the Dutch law and 
policy on pesticides in the light of Directive 91/414 concerning the placing of plant pro-
tection products on the market.582 These cases have all been referred under Article 234 
EC Treaty for a preliminary ruling to the European Court of Justice (ECJ), requesting an 
interpretation of the transitional provisions of the Directive. 
In the first of these cases, the South Holland Environmental Association Foundation 
(Stichting Zuidhollandse Milieufederatie, or ZMF) lodged a complaint against the deci-
sion of the Pesticides Authorisation Board (College voor de Toelating van Bestrijding-
smiddelen, or CTB) to designate a number of active substances under the newly estab-
lished Article 25d of the Pesticides Act 1962.583 This designation amounted in practice to 
an automatic re-authorisation by operation of law for substances whose authorisation had 
just expired or was on the brink of doing so, without the full assessment that would be 
otherwise required under the Pesticides Act.584 The validity of that decision was con-
tested by the ZMF, inter alia on the basis that Article 25d was not compatible with Di-
rective 91/414, because it did not provide for a full procedure as required by the Direc-
tive. 
After the CTB declared the objections of the ZMF unfounded, the latter appealed to the 
Administrative Court for Trade and Industry (College van Beroep voor het Bedrijfsleven, 
or CBB), which decided to stay the proceedings and refer several questions about the in-
terpretation of the transitional provisions of Directive 91/414 to the ECJ for a prelimi-
nary ruling.585 In response, the ECJ ruled, in line with the opinion of Advocate-General 
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  CTB decision on prioritisation of active substances 12 June 2002 (CTB-besluit prioritering 
werkzame stoffen, C-122). 
584
  Article 25d of the Pesticides Act 1962 is worded as follows in the English translation used by 
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Jacobs, that the Directive did not require a full procedure for the substances concerned 
and that the national court should assess whether the evaluation provided for in Article 
25d corresponded to the review procedure within the meaning of the Article 8(3) of the 
Directive.586 Subsequently, the national court decided that the procedure of Article 25d 
was not equivalent to the review procedure of the Directive, and annulled the 2002 Deci-
sion from the CTB, which made dozens of re-authorisations legally not valid.587 
The second case questioned the compatibility of Article 16aa of the Pesticides Act with 
the transitional provisions of Directive 91/414. This Article had been included in the 
Pesticides Act in 2002, and allowed certain exemptions of specific pesticide products 
from the obligation to obtain an authorisation according to Article 8(2), based on sidera-
tions of essential use.588 After having lodged in vain an objection at the minister of LNV 
about a specific decision adopted under Article 16aa, the ZMF appealed at the CBB, 
contesting the validity of that decision on the basis that Article 16aa was not in confor-
mity with Directive 91/414.589 Subsequently, the CBB decided to bring the case before 
the ECJ by requesting a preliminary ruling.590 The questions posed were similar to those 
of the first case, except for the specific wording in relation to Article 16aa.  
Advocate General Sharpston of the ECJ delivered her opinion on 4 May 2006, being 
very critical about the course of action taken by the Dutch government.591 She noted that 
during the transitional period of Directive 91/414 the Netherlands had successively 
amended its national legislation for the regulation of plant protection products three 
times: first, by anticipating upon the stricter criteria used for Community assessment; 
second, by loosening up the assessment regime through the introduction of a specific au-
thorisation procedure for ‘agriculturally essential products’, and third, by loosening up 
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the regime even more rigorously, through the introduction of a series of exemptions for 
agriculturally essential pesticide products.592  
Sharpston went on to argue that Community law requires that during the transitional pe-
riod prescribed in Article 8(2) the Member States must refrain from adopting any meas-
ures liable seriously to compromise the result prescribed by Directive 91/414, and that it 
is for the national court to determine whether that is the case.593 She observed that ac-
cording to the recitals to the Directive the whole system of authorisations is based on a 
high level of protection of health, groundwater, and environment and that it is to be as-
sumed that the Community legislator did not intend the leeway afforded to Member 
States under the various provisions contained in Article 8 to undermine that objective.594 
She subsequently concluded that “measures establishing a system that does not require a 
dossier to be submitted, and that not contain a binding requirement for the competent au-
thority to take into account the effect of the product on health, groundwater and the envi-
ronment, are to be regarded as measures that are likely seriously to compromise the re-
sult prescribed by the Directive.”595 
In addition, Advocate General Sharpston observed that “during a transitional period a 
Member State may not replace its measures for implementation with new measures that 
provide for a lesser degree of implementation of the directive, and that would come 
down to a change of legislation in a ‘retrograde’ way, i.e. to introduce new provisions 
that are further from, rather than closer to, what the directive ultimately requires.”596 In 
this respect, the Advocate General concluded that the new exemption in the Dutch Pesti-
cides Act reflected the aims and objectives of the Directive less adequately than its 
predecessors and that such a measure is liable seriously to compromise the result pre-
scribed by the Directive.597 Finally, and in anticipation of the judgment to be made by 
the national court, Sharpston argued that the examination provided for in Article 16aa of 
the Pesticides Act is not a ‘review’ within the meaning of Article 8(3).598  
Subsequently, the case was referred to the CBB for a final judgment. In May 2007, the 
CBB decided that the procedure of Article 16aa was not equivalent to the review proce-
dure of the Directive, and repealed the 2004 decision of the minister of LNV.599 
The third case brought before the ECJ for a preliminary ruling was about the scope of the 
exception of essential use in relation to decisions of non-inclusion of active substances 
according to Directive 91/414. Such decisions generally imply that the Member States 
are obliged to withdraw pesticide products containing such a substance from the market. 
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In this particular case, Decision 2003/199 included the non-inclusion of the substance 
‘aldicarb’ and the withdrawal of authorisations concerning this active substance.600  
In order to implement the decision concerning aldicarb, the CTB decided to withdraw all 
authorisations for placing pesticide products containing the substance concerned on the 
market, however, with the exception of authorisations issued for essential use of those 
products.601 In response, the ZMF and the Foundation for Nature and Environment 
(Stichting Natuur en Milieu, or SNM) lodged a complaint against the CTB for making 
this exception. After the complaint was declared unfounded by the CTB, the two envi-
ronmental organisations appealed to the CBB.602 Subsequently, the CBB requested a pre-
liminary ruling from the ECJ whether an exception to immediate market withdrawal for 
specific applications was valid in the context of the Directive.603 In the wording of the 
ECJ, the national court was essentially asking “whether Article 2(3) of Decision 
2003/199 is consistent with Article 8 of Directive 91/414.”604   
Subsequently, the ECJ ruled that: “Article 2(3) of Decision 2003/199 must … be inter-
preted as allowing, under certain conditions, the Member States specified in column A of 
the annex to that decision to maintain in force until 30 June 2007 authorisations to place 
plant protection products containing the active substance ‘aldicarb’ on the market for es-
sential uses.” 605 It went on to argue that “the principle of establishing different time-
limits for the withdrawal of authorisations … cannot be considered to be inconsistent 
with the provisions of that directive”, and that “within the context of … the principle of 
proportionality, having regard to the broad discretion enjoyed by the Council in adopting 
Decision 2003/199, the legality of that measure can be affected only if the measure is 
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manifestly inappropriate having regard to the objective which the Council seeks to pur-
sue.”606 
The Court concluded that “all factors showed that the Council carried out a global as-
sessment of the advantages and drawbacks of the system to be established and that that 
system was not on any view manifestly inappropriate in the light of the objectives pur-
sued”, and thus that Article 2(3) of Decision 2003/199 was valid. The case was then re-
ferred back to the CBB to decide whether the Dutch provisions of the exception were in 
line with the one incorporated in the Decision.  
In sum, the three above-mentioned cases demonstrate that the Netherlands government 
has explored the boundaries of what is acceptable and lawfull in the context of the EU 
legislation on pesticides, and has occasionally exceeded these boundaries in the opinion 
of the ECJ.  
6.5 The formulation of a new act 
In response to the ongoing legal conflicts and the resulting legal uncertainty, the minister 
of LNV and the state secretary of VROM announced the preparation of a new law on 
pesticides in 2004.607 Shortly afterwards, they proposed a framework act aiming to serve 
three purposes.608 First, the structure of the new act would be more simple and accessible 
than its predecessor. Second, the act would be in full conformity with the EU directives 
concerned, and make use of dynamic references to ensure future compatibility. Third, the 
new framework act would create a ‘level playing field’ for Dutch agricultural producers 
in the European context.  
The act itself is meant as a framework, concentrating on the key issues, and will be fur-
ther elaborated in executive decrees. Although the minister had stipulated that the legis-
lative proposal could be published in the first half of 2005, the drafting process was de-
layed, and the proposal was sent to Parliament in March 2006.609 The new act was pub-
lished in February 2007 and will enter into force stage-wise (Wet gewasbescherming-
smiddelen en biociden).610 
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6.6 The level of pesticide risk reduction 
The Dutch government has chosen the option of integrated control as the most realistic 
form of sustainable agriculture for the Netherlands, considering each producer farming 
organically as a bonus. However, the ministry of LNV has thus far not defined what in-
tegrated control entails. Since governmental guidance did not exist in this field, compa-
nies in the food and retailing industry have chosen their own interpretation of the con-
cept. Several of them established their own norms, whereas other companies imple-
mented the standards formulated in the context of national or international certification 
programmes introduced by non-state actors.611 With the policy document on public certi-
fication (ZOGZ), the government attempted to define bottom line standards itself, but, 
due to the failure of the plan, the definition of integrated control is back into private 
hands. 
The current state-of-affairs is that many Dutch growers have a GlobalGAP certification, 
which has become a bottom line requirement for supplying the major European retailers. 
A major reason for the successful implementation of GlobalGAP in the Netherlands is 
that the growers’ marketing cooperative The Greenery anticipated the system in an early 
stage by making its member growers accustomed to keeping an input administration.  
With regard to pesticide residues, the newly established Food and Consumer Product 
Safety Authority (Voedsel- en Warenautoriteit, or VWA) is responsible for the enforce-
ment of the legislation concerned and also carries out the annual monitoring programme 
of the European Commission.612 The data submitted by the Member States show that ag-
ricultural products available in the Dutch market contain residues more often than the 
European average and score extremely high in the category of multiple residues.613 
Moreover, the EU MRLs are more often exceeded in the Netherlands than in other 
Member States. 
According to the VWA, there may be several reasons for a higher percentage of deviance 
in the Netherlands than in other countries.614 First, the VWA argued that the Dutch 
monitoring effort is one of the more comprehensive in Europe as regards the numbers of 
samples and monitored substances. Second, the VWA claimed that its sampling strategy 
is very efficient. Third, the VWA stressed that the highest level of exceedances is found 
in agricultural products imported from non-EU countries. Fourth, the VWA suggested 
that a high level of exceedances could be an indication of problems in agricultural prac-
tice. 
However, the data from the EU monitoring exercise do not fully confirm the first two ar-
guments of comprehensiveness and efficiency. Although it is a general rule that the more 
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substances are monitored, the more residues are found, this does not necessarily mean 
that countries with a higher number of monitored substances have a higher level of ex-
ceedances. For example, Germany monitors more substances than the Netherlands but 
has relatively less samples with residues above EU limits. 
6.7 Conclusions 
The Dutch government has experienced considerable difficulties in pursuing a consistent 
law and policy on pesticides. In the period from 1962 until 1990, the government pre-
pared the groundwork for a law and policy on pesticides with a dual objective, including 
the promotion of agricultural production as well as the protection of the environment and 
human health. From 1990 until 2001, the government further raised its ambitions in the 
environmental field with a strategic policy plan and the decision to anticipate on EU pol-
icy. However, it had to pull back as the pressure from the agricultural sector increased. 
In the years between 2001 until 2005, the government reversed several of its earlier deci-
sions, loosening up the regulatory regime for pesticide authorisations. In addition, the 
government was forced by the horticultural sector to replace a carefully prepared strate-
gic policy plan introducing a public certification scheme based on integrated manage-
ment by a less ambitious plan that considered certification a responsibility of business. In 
this period, the effort of the Dutch government can be characterised as ‘zigzagging’ be-
tween the wish to diminish environmental risks on the one hand, and the interests of the 
horticultural sector to continue current production practices on the other hand. This diffi-
culty to balance diverging interests has also become apparent in occasional frictions be-
tween the responsible ministries. Furthermore, it has had as a consequence that time and 
again the government has been ‘corrected’ by legal rulings in court cases. 
A new period began around 2005 when in response to increased legal uncertainty about 
the previous amendments of the Pesticide Act, the minister of LNV decided to start a 
legislative procedure for a new act on pesticides aiming to simplify the complex web of 
rules that had been established over the years and implement the EU legislation in a con-
sistent manner. As a consequence, pressure will be taken from the national government. 
Moreover, with the strong emergence of private certification schemes, national and for-
eign market parties have started formulating their own rules for food quality and safety, 
which means that the regulatory ‘battlefield’ has been largely relocated.  
In sum, increased legal pluralism has meant for the Dutch national government that it has 
become increasingly ‘overruled’ by EU legislation and non-state actor regulation, urging 
the government to redefine its responsibilities and to adapt to the new circumstances. 
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7. The perspective of agricultural producers: the case of 
tomato production 
7.1 Introduction 
Agricultural producers are increasingly confronted with requirements to upgrade their 
production in terms of food quality and safety. These requirements are formulated by a 
broad range of state and non-state actors and take many different forms. This chapter 
uses the example of tomato production to explain how legal pluralism affects agricultural 
producers by influencing the conditions for production and trading. It especially high-
lights aspects of competition, and market access. Its geographical focus is mainly on 
Europe and the Mediterranean basin, although seen in the larger context of global devel-
opments and impacts.  
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 7.2 examines the concept of governance in 
relation to supply chain management. Section 7.3 describes the market for tomatoes and 
identifies the key players. Section 7.4 explains the major production regimes and the 
main sustainability issues associated with them. Section 7.5 considers the tomato as ob-
ject of regulation in the different stages of its life-cycle. Section 7.6 deals with the com-
petitive position of tomato producers. Section 7.7 presents conclusions. 
7.2 Supply chain governance 
The international trade in agricultural and food products has become increasingly com-
petitive and globalised under the influence of trade liberalisation.615 This observation ac-
counts relatively stronger for the fruit and vegetables sector. One of the decisive factors 
in the globalisation process of this sector has been the ever-growing market share of 
large food producers and retailers in combination with their increased global sourcing 
practices. On top of that, the food and retailing sector is subjected to ongoing processes 
of horizontal and vertical concentration.616 This implies that a relatively small number of 
economic actors exercises a major influence over the other stakeholders in the supply 
chain, and is able to influence production circumstances and product choice. 
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This chapter uses insights from political economy, and more precisely from global com-
modity chain analysis and global value chain analysis in order to explain these changes 
in supply chain governance.617 These analytical tools help to understand the way in 
which economic actors participate in the global economy. They are useful when explain-
ing restructuring and transition processes in specific economic sectors. In comparison 
with traditional sectoral analysis, which tends to be static, they apply a more dynamic 
approach focusing on interlinkages within the productive sector.  
Commodity chain analysis and value chain analysis put the emphasis on power relations 
in product and service chains, and the dynamics of rent distribution along these chains. 
These approaches stress the importance of global buyers, particularly retailers and brand-
name companies, as shapers of production, distribution and marketing systems, and pay 
attention to the factors that determine global sourcing relationships with producers, espe-
cially in developing countries. Gereffi has observed the emergence of two distinct types 
of international economic networks: ‘producer-driven’ and ‘buyer-driven’ commodity 
chains.618 His thesis is that most industrial sectors belong to either one of these types, but 
that overall a transition towards buyer-driven chains has taken place. Along similar lines, 
Kaplinsky and Morris have argued that value chains have shifted from a “supplier-push” 
to a “market-pulled” nature in the past decades.619 They stress that markets have become 
much more demanding as competitive pressures increased, making it increasingly impor-
tant for economic actors to upgrade their products and production processes. 
The concept of governance is central to the two approaches of global commodity chain 
analysis and global value chain analysis, as it is considered one of the determinants of 
competitive advantage.620 Governance encompasses internal as well as external rules. 
The first set of rules is set, implemented and enforced by the stakeholders in value chains 
themselves. This form of governance ensures that interactions between firms along a 
value chain exhibit some reflection of organisation rather than being simply random. 
In concrete terms, this means that stakeholders in value chains are determining product 
and production criteria that have consequences up or down the value chain. These rules 
are primarily sector-oriented.  
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  See e.g: G. Gereffi (1999). International trade and industrial upgrading in the apparel com-
modity chain, in Journal of International Economics vol. 48, pp. 37-70, and R. Kaplinsky 
(2000), Globalisation and unequalisation: What can be learned from value chain analysis? In 
The Journal of Development Studies, vol. 37, no. 2, pp. 117-146. 
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  According to Gereffi (1999), producer-driven commodity chains are those in which large, 
usually transnational, manufacturers play the central roles in coordinating production net-
works (including their backward and forward linkages). Buyer-driven commodity chains re-
fer to those industries in which large retailers, branded marketers, and branded manufacturers 
play the pivotal roles in setting up decentralized production networks in a variety of export-
ing countries, typically located in the Third World. 
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  R. Kaplinsky & M. Morris (2001). A handbook for value chain research. Ottawa: IDRC, p. 
55. 
620
  See e.g.: R. Kaplinsky & M. Morris (2001), and G. Gereffi, J. Humphrey & T. Sturgeon 
(2005). The governance of global value chains. In: Review of International Political Econ-
omy, vol. 12, no. 1, pp. 78-104. 
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The second set of rules is being established by actors outside value chains that do not 
have a direct stake in the value chain involved. These rules have a more generic charac-
ter, and can create all kinds of institutional mechanisms that influence the power rela-
tionships within value chains and the distribution of costs and benefits. They determine 
the general legal setting. Most of these rules are set by governments and public interna-
tional organisations, but they can also have a non-state origin.   
This contemporary reality of a multiplicity of internal and external rules makes govern-
ance a multi-faceted phenomenon for the participants in many supply chains.621 At any 
one point in time, a number of different actors may be setting rules, auditing perform-
ance, and assisting producers to achieve the required standards. As a consequence of this 
multiplicity, there are interactions between different sets of rules, which is essentially a 
similar idea as promoted by the concept of legal pluralism. 
Dolan and Humphrey have been looking at the changing governance patterns in the trade 
in fresh vegetables between Africa and the UK.622 They concluded that these changes are 
mainly caused by the behaviour of large retailers that have adopted competitive strate-
gies based on quality, year-round-supply, and product differentiation, and have imple-
mented risk control approaches. Interestingly, their research shows that the regulatory 
environment created during the 1990s by the UK government and the EU played a cru-
cial role in the creation of the new governance structures in the supply chains for fruit 
and vegetables, but that this issue has not got proper attention in global commodity chain 
and global value chain analyses hitherto. Furthermore, they point the attention to the in-
creased influence of standard setting bodies, both public and private, on value chain gov-
ernance.   
García Martinez and Poole have come to similar conclusions on the basis of research 
they have done about the increasing demands for food safety and quality by European 
food retailers and their implications for Southern Mediterranean producers. In their arti-
cle, they speak of “a new paradigm for stakeholder relationships characterised by com-
plex interactions between public and private modes of regulation.”623 They observe that 
the increasing globalisation of food production and consumption makes it difficult for 
national governments to exert comprehensive controls over the entire supply chain and 
that this has led to the resulting shift of responsibility towards the private sector. They go 
on to suggest that the interaction between self-regulation and public regulation could 
even provide a superior outcome, as industry and firms are more knowledgeable regard-
ing product quality, and public regulation can generate reputation-based incentives to 
monitor quality, in the form of public exposure.624  
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  Ibidem, p. 33. 
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  C. Dolan & J. Humphrey (2004). Changing governance patterns in the trade in fresh vegeta-
bles between Africa and the United Kingdom. In: Environment and Planning A, vol. 36 issue 
3, pp. 491-509. 
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  M. García Martinez & N. Poole (2004). The development of private fresh produce safety 
standards: implications for developing Mediterranean exporting countries. In: Food Policy 
29, issue 3, pp. 229-255. 
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Buller and Morris have also recognised shifting regulatory influences between the mar-
ket and the state in their article about market-oriented initiatives for environmentally sus-
tainable food production.625 More precisely, they notice a critical interplay and interrela-
tionship of public policy and market forces in achieving environmentally sustainable 
forms of agriculture. They argue that market-oriented approaches do not constitute a 
regulation-free alternative to public policy and that the traditional division of responsi-
bilities is being reversed to a new situation in which public policy increasingly plays the 
role of facilitator and the market that of regulator. Their final conclusion is that a new 
regulatory regime is being established and that this raises a number of questions concern-
ing the attainment of public policy objectives, their effects on competition in the food in-
dustry, and the division of power and the distribution of benefits in food supply 
chains.626 
The next sections will explore the rules governing the supply chains of fresh-market to-
matoes, and the way these rules influence the competitive position of tomato producers. 
7.3 The market for tomatoes 
The tomato belongs to the family of Solanaceae, also known as the nightshade family, 
and the genus of Lycopersicon.627 The only edible part of the tomato plant is the fruit. It 
is therefore classified as a fruiting vegetable, together with, for example, peppers and 
aubergines.628  
The tomato as we know it today has come a long way from a plant growing in the wild to 
a species subject to intense domestication, hybridisation, and lately genetic modification. 
The origin and early history of the cultivated tomato are not definitive. Several authors 
claim that the tomato, or xitomatl, was originally a wild growing plant in the Andes in 
South America that became cultivated by the people living in the area.629 What is certain 
is that the tomato was first domesticated on a larger scale in Mexico and brought to 
Europe by Spanish conquistadores in the 16th century. Its first use was as an ornamental 
plant in gardens because as a member of the nightshade family it was believed to be poi-
sonous. However, starting in Southern Europe, the tomato was increasingly appreciated 
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  H. Buller & C. Morris (2004). Growing goods: the market, the state and sustainable food 
production, in: Environment and Planning A, vol. 36, issue 6, pp. 1065-1084. 
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  Ibidem, pp. 1079-1080. 
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  J.M. Costa & E. Heuvelink (2005). Introduction: the tomato crop and industry. In: E. Heu-
velink (ed.), Tomatoes, Oxfordshire/Cambridge: CABI Publishing, p. 1-19. 
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  C.A. Wright (2001). Mediterranean vegetables: a cook’s ABC of vegetables and their prepa-
ration in Spain, France, Italy, Greece, Turkey, the Middle East, and North Africa, with more 
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  See e.g.: C.A. Wright (2001); M. Harvey, S. Quilly & H. Beynon (2002). Exploring the to-
mato. Transformations of nature, society and economy. Cheltenham/Northampton: Edgar El-
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bible’ published in 1986: J.G. Atherton and J. Rudich (eds.) (1986). The tomato crop: a sci-
entific basis for improvement. London: Chapman & Hall, 661 p.   
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for consumption.630 It was only in the late 19th century that the tomato was recognised as 
a common ingredient in the cuisine of European countries. Subsequently, Europeans in-
troduced the tomato to other parts of the world, such as China and the USA, where it 
soon became accepted as part of the national diet.631 
A next landmark in the triumphal progress of the tomato was the development of can-
ning technology in the USA, which was the impetus for the marketing of pre-processed 
tomato products, such as soups and sauces.632 These products are pre-eminently symbol-
ised by the two icons of tomato mass consumption that emerged in the 20th century, in-
cluding Heinz tomato ketchup and Campbell’s condensed tomato soup. As Harvey et al. 
observe, canning was a critical step towards mass cultivation, and made it possible for 
the tomato to become available throughout the year, either in fresh or processed form.633 
Nowadays, there are many varieties of tomatoes, although basically five major types can 
be distinguished, including classic round tomatoes, cherry and cocktail tomatoes, plum 
and baby plum tomatoes, beefsteak tomatoes, and vine or truss tomatoes. In addition to 
these basic types, commercial tomato breeders have developed tomatoes with specific 
properties that are more easy to handle and harvest, or fulfil other criteria. In order to 
achieve this, specific traits from the wild Lycopersicon species have been extensively 
studied and used to alter the tomato, for example in terms of fruit size, disease resistance, 
taste, colour, shelf-life, but also nutritional value.634  
Regarding nutrition, tomatoes are thought to deliver particular benefits to human health, 
because of their high level of lycopene, a nutrient that may work as a powerful antioxi-
dant protecting against a number of diseases.635 Several experiments of the seed industry 
have subsequently sought to enhance the natural lycopene content of the tomato, includ-
ing genetic modification.  
The same technique has also been used to prolong the shelf-life of tomatoes and this has 
resulted in the creation of the FlavrSavr TM tomato by the British company Zeneca in 
1994.636 However, the marketing of this ‘Methusalem tomato’, as Petrini called it, has 
been stopped as supermarkets in Europe decided to withdraw all genetically modified 
products in 1997. 637 
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As concerns statistics, the annual worldwide production of tomatoes in 2003 has been es-
timated at 110 million tonnes with a total production area of about 4.2 million ha.638 In 
the same year, the global trade of tomatoes and tomato products reached US$ 4.2 bil-
lion.639 In 2003, the four leading producers were China, the USA, Turkey, and India, 
whereas the USA, Italy, Spain and Turkey dominated the world processing industry for 
tomatoes. However, China is catching up fast, investing heavily in processing technol-
ogy.  
In this respect, it should be noted that tomato production has increasingly become a 
globalised business under pressure of demand for year-round supply. Consequently, the 
tomato industry has started to cross national borders and become multinational. This 
multinationalisation can take several forms. First, tomato producers may conclude stra-
tegic alliances with producers in countries with favourable production circumstances, 
such as a mild climate, cheap labour, or less strict regulations. Second, tomato producers 
may start production operations themselves in those countries.   
Focusing on tomato consumption, it is evident that it has increased dramatically and 
nearly doubled since the 1970s, although patterns of consumption widely differ between 
countries.640 This increase has been stimulated by the fact that tomatoes are suitable for 
various uses. Nowadays, tomatoes are eaten fresh, in raw as well as prepared form. In 
addition, they are marketed in a multiple of processed forms, such as (i) tomato pre-
serves (e.g. peeled, juice, pulp, past, pulp, and pickled), (ii) dried tomatoes (e.g. powder, 
flakes, and fruits), and (iii) tomato-based foods (e.g. soups, sauces, and convenience 
foods). 
In sum, it can be concluded that the market for fresh as well as processed tomatoes is 
blossoming. It is, however, also in turmoil and far from stable, as there is a fierce compe-
tition between tomato producers and prices are under downward pressure. This has urged 
producers to look for a competitive edge in order to be able to ask for higher prices and 
has been a major impetus for a trend towards more differentiation in fresh tomatoes and 
processed tomato products on offer. 
7.4 Production systems and sustainability 
Many factors determine successful production of tomatoes, such as climate, soil, expo-
sure to sun, quality of seeds or seedlings, geography, exposure to wind, rainfall and so 
forth. The favourite climatic conditions for the tomato plant include temperate and sub-
tropical zones where it is not exposed to temperatures below 12ºC.641 However, these 
conditions are not favourable everywhere and this had led to the development of covered 
production spaces that make production circumstances more controllable. More specifi-
cally, glasshouses, a technology that had previously only been used in private gardens, 
was introduced on a commercial basis in the late 19th century, first in the UK and later 
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also in the Netherlands and Belgium.642 The production in glasshouses soon took off and 
its success was the impetus to the development of new technologies making production 
increasingly efficient and allowing the growing season to be extended. 
In the present-day tomato industry, processing tomatoes, as a rule, are grown in open 
field systems where they are harvested mechanically. Fresh-market varieties are grown 
in both the open field and greenhouses. These greenhouses may vary widely, from sim-
ple plastic structures and shade houses to high-tech glasshouses. Harvesting of these to-
matoes is mainly done by hand. On a global scale, the share of fresh-market tomatoes 
produced in greenhouses has shown a fast increase at the expense of field tomatoes 
grown for the fresh market.643 The relatively uniform appearance of greenhouse tomatoes 
and their stable production volumes are the major reasons for their appeal to especially 
the retail industry.  
The European production of greenhouse tomatoes can be divided into two major produc-
tion systems that diverge in region, season, production method, and type of tomato.644 
The Northern European system is capital and input intensive, and takes place in high-
tech glasshouses. The system is highly productive, and focused on fresh tomato produc-
tion. The season generally starts in Winter and ends in late Autumn, but there is a ten-
dency for year-round production with the help of artificial light. The Netherlands and 
Belgium are the leaders in this Northern system of tomato production. Most of their pro-
duce is exported, with Germany and the UK as major markets. 
The Southern system of the Mediterranean countries is focused on fresh tomatoes that 
are grown in plastic-covered structures that diverge from very simple to high-tech.645 
More precisely, the Southern system has been in transition over the past years from 
lower to higher technology, leading to ever higher yields, and increasingly resembles the 
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Northern system. Its season starts in late Summer and ends in late Spring, with the ma-
jority of the produce being exported to Northern European countries. The Southern sys-
tem is being practised along the coast of the Mediterranean, especially in Spain (prov-
inces of Almería and Murcia, and Canary Islands), Portugal (Algarve), Italy (Sicily), and 
Greece (Crete).646 Increasingly, this type of production is also taking place in other coun-
tries in the Mediterranean basin, such as Turkey (region of Antalya), and Morocco (re-
gions of Fez, El-Jadida, Safi and Atlas), and to a lesser extent in Syria, Israel, Jordan, 
Egypt, and Tunisia.  
A similar division of roles can be recognised in North America, where the main players 
include Canada, Mexico, and the USA, especially the states of California and Florida.647 
The main difference is that the position of field-grown tomatoes is still relatively 
stronger than in Europe, which is demonstrated by the fact that they have an important 
market share in the fresh tomato market and are also exported. However, this situation 
may change as Mexico is expanding its greenhouse area fast in order to supply the US 
and Canadian market. 
Overall, the different systems of covered tomato production have a number of environ-
mental problems in common, including the pollution of water, soil and air, soil degrada-
tion, and loss of biodiversity.648  These problems are to a large extent related to the use 
of pesticides and fertilisers. Furthermore, the appreciation of the landscape may drasti-
cally change in areas with a proliferation of greenhouses and production under plastic. 
Other problems are more specific to the climatic region where production takes place 
and the production system in use. The major specific impacts of Northern glasshouse 
production are caused by the high use of energy for heating purposes, and the use of arti-
ficial lighting at night-time. Southern greenhouse production has specific problematic ef-
fects because of the extensive use of scarce water resources for irrigation, the creation of 
large amounts of plastic waste, and the surpluses of tomatoes that must be withdrawn 
from the market.  
With regard to the social aspects of production, it should be noted that horticulture is a 
relatively labour intensive sector and that the income per work unit is often low. More-
over, this type of work has a highly seasonal character that makes it attractive to use ille-
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gal workers, often immigrants, who are a flexible workforce without any rights.649 An 
important economic issue is related to the distribution of income in food supply chains 
and the price that producers get for their produce. In the past decade, agrochemical com-
panies, food industry and retailers have been capturing much more of the financial bene-
fits in food supply chains than they used to do.650 As a result, producers are getting rela-
tively lower prices for their produce. Moreover, as competition further increases between 
the large retailers, it can be expected that prices at farm level may come under greater 
downward pressure. 
Concerning human health aspects, there is evidence that pesticide poisoning is not a 
problem of developing countries only. The example of California in the US, with its con-
siderable acreage of tomato production, shows that farmworkers in major developed 
countries can also experience major health problems as the result of pesticide use in to-
mato production.651 In addition, consumers may be exposed to pesticide residues in fresh 
and processed tomato products.652 
Focusing on pesticide use, it is important to note that the tomato plant and its fruits are 
vulnerable to diseases and pests.653 In order to achieve more stable yields, governments 
and industry started to promote the use of chemicals for soil sterilisation and pest control 
already in the 1950s and 1960s. This has had as a consequence that many agricultural 
producers followed their advice and the chemical regime became ubiquitous.654  As a re-
sult, tomato production became synonymous with high levels of chemical inputs. 
Since the late 1970s, new agricultural production methods have become increasingly 
available in reaction to the negative impacts of chemical-based agricultural practices. 
The development of techniques of integrated control and organic agriculture have both 
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benefitted from technological developments concerning biological control which has 
gained many proponents among producers in closed production systems (see Chapter 5). 
However, despite the availability of a range of alternative agricultural techniques, pesti-
cide use is still widespread in tomato production leading to risks for the environment and 
human health.655 The use of pesticides in tomato production is also reflected by the 
presence of pesticide residues in fresh tomatoes. Particularly relevant here is the EU co-
ordinated monitoring programme that enables the estimation of the actual dietary 
pesticide exposure throughout Europe.656 The programme is annually elaborated in detail 
through recommendations that select the fruits and vegetables to be investigated. 
Tomatoes have been part of the EU-coordinated programme in 1996, 2001 and 2004, 
respectively.657 
As shown in Table 7.1, the share of residue-free tomatoes in the EU market amounted to 
64% in 2004. However, the results widely diverged between countries.658 Several coun-
tries (8 out of 25) reported exceedances of EU MRLs, varying between 0.3 and 10.5%.659 
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Table 7.1 Results of the EU co-ordinated monitoring programme for tomatoes 
Samples 1996 
(314 samples, 
9 substances) 
(%) 
2001 
(2016 samples, 
37 substances) 
(%) 
2004 
(2665 samples, 
47 substances) 
(%) 
 
Without residues 
 
 
69 
 
65 
 
64 
With residues below or at the national and 
EU MRLs 
31 33 36 
With residues above national and/or EU 
MRLs 
0.3 1.5 0.9 
With residues above EU MRLs - 1.5 0.8 
    
In 2004, tomatoes contained residues of most of the substances sought for.660 Compared 
with the results of 2001, there had been a relative decrease of some problematic sub-
stances, but simultaneously an increase of other hazardous substances. It is therefore not 
possible to draw an unambiguous conclusion on the reduction of pesticide risks in to-
mato production. 
7.5 The tomato as object of regulation   
The tomato, like other fruit and vegetables, is the object of multiple rules as it passes 
through the different stages of its life-cycle, including: the manufacturing of seed; the 
cultivation of propagating and planting material; the production of agricultural produce; 
the marketing of fresh and processed products, and consumption.  
Focusing on the EU and its Member States, it is evident that in the past decade the num-
ber of applicable rules has significantly increased in practically all stages of the tomato 
life-cycle. For many years, rules were almost exclusively set by state actors, initially at 
national level and later increasingly at EU level. These rules especially focused on the 
production and marketing stages. Increasingly, however, state actors have extended their 
legislative activities towards the earlier stages in the tomato life-cycle, including the 
manufacturing of seed and the cultivation of propagating and planting material.  
Importantly, the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agricul-
ture was adopted in 2001, and entered into force on 29 June 2004.661 It provides a legally 
binding global framework for access to agricultural plant genetic resources and the shar-
ing of benefits from their use. At the EU level, relevant legislation on plant variety rights 
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exists since 1994.662 This legislation recognises intellectual property rights for plant va-
rieties developed by the seed industry, and provides at the same time an exemption for 
farmer saved seeds. By the end of 2005, 37 varieties of tomato plants had been granted 
protection by the Community Plant Variety Office (CPVO) pursuant to the Regula-
tion.663  
The plant variety legislation is complemented by rules on the marketing of vegetable 
seed stipulating that vegetable seed of registered varieties may only be marketed if it has 
been officially examined and certified.664 This legislation has significantly strengthened 
the position of the seed industry, which is for a considerable part located in the Nether-
lands and shows some overlap with the multinational corporations that are active in the 
production of pesticide products. Furthermore, additional rules exist for the marketing of 
vegetable propagating material in order to guarantee that some minimum conditions are 
met concerning quality, labelling, and packaging.665  
In addition to these new areas, state actors have also strengthened their legislative activi-
ties in the more traditional fields of production and marketing, as a series of new interna-
tional standards and EU legislation demonstrates. The Codex Alimentarius Commission, 
for example, set marketing standards for tomato concentrate in 1972 and for canned to-
matoes in 1981.666 Since 1999, the Codex Committee on Fresh Fruit and Vegetables 
(CCFFV) has also been preparing a Codex standard for fresh tomatoes, but due to differ-
                                                   
662
  EC Council Regulation No 2100/94 of 27 July 1994 on Community plant variety rights, OJ 
L227, 01.09.1994, pp. 1-30. See also: Commission Regulation (EC) No 1239/95 of 31 May 
1995 establishing implementing rules for the application of Council Regulation (EC) No 
2100/94 as regards proceedings before the Community Plant Variety Office; Commission 
Regulation (EC) No 1238/95 of 31 May 1995 establishing implementing rules for the appli-
cation of Council Regulation (EC) No 2100/94 as regards the fees payable to the Community 
Plant Variety Office, and Commission Regulation (EC) No 1768/95 of 24 July 1995 imple-
menting rules on the agricultural exemption provided for in Article 14(3) of Council Regula-
tion (EC) No 2100/94 on Community plant variety rights.  
663
  Community Plant Variety Office (2006). Annual report 2005. Office for Official Publications 
of the European Communities, Luxembourg. The total number of plant varieties protected 
under the Community system was 11,505 on 31 December of 2005, with more than one third 
in the hands of seed companies located in the Netherlands. 31 out of the 37 titles for tomato 
seed had been granted to Dutch seed companies, including Rijk Zwaan, Syngenta Seeds, SVS 
Holland, Marcel Bruins, and Enza Zaden. 
664
  Council Directive 2002/55/EC of 13 June 2002 on the marketing of vegetable seed, OJ 
L193/33, 20.07.2002. 
665
  Council Directive 92/33/EEC of 28 April 1992 on the marketing of vegetable propagating 
and planting material, other than seed, OJ L157, 10.06.1992.  
666
  Codex Standard for Canned Tomatoes, Codex Stan 13-1981; Codex Standard for Processed 
Tomato Concentrates, Codex Stan 57-1981, formerly CAC/RS-1972. 
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ences of opinion the finalisation of this standard has been postponed.667 More precisely, 
the Netherlands has proposed to remove the commercial type of cherry tomatoes from 
the standard, but has met with strong objections from Italy, the largest producer of this 
type of tomatoes. The consequence of considering cherry tomatoes as ordinary round 
tomatoes is that price premiums paid for the former will level off, because they will then 
compete in the market of round tomatoes which has many more suppliers.  
Quality standards for tomatoes have existed in the EU since 1983. As these standards 
were considered no longer in line with market and regulatory developments, the Com-
mission, introduced a Regulation containing a marketing standard for tomatoes in 
2000.668 According to the Commission, “applying these standards should result in prod-
ucts of unsatisfactory quality being removed from the market, bringing production into 
line with consumer requirements and facilitating trade relationships based on fair compe-
tition, thereby helping improve the profitability of production.” The standards in the EU 
regulation are largely similar to those in an earlier UN/ECE standard.669 
The EU standard contains a definition of tomato produce and provisions concerning 
quality, sizing, tolerances, presentation, and marking. The standard applies to tomatoes 
to be supplied fresh to the consumer.670 Tomatoes for industrial processing are excluded. 
The standard distinguishes four different commercial types, including round tomatoes, 
ribbed tomatoes, oblong or elongated tomatoes, and cherry tomatoes, including cocktail 
tomatoes. Each package of tomatoes should bear the following information: identifica-
tion of the packer and/or dispatcher; nature of produce (e.g. ‘tomatoes’ or ‘trusses of to-
matoes’), and their commercial type, origin of produce, commercial specifications, and 
official control mark (optionally). 
With regard to pesticide residues, tomato producers must comply with the MRLs based 
on good agricultural practice, that have been set by the Codex Alimentarius Commission 
(CAC), the EU, and its Member States. More precisely, the CAC has set residue levels 
for 65 different substances in relation to tomatoes, and the EU for 186 substances. 
                                                   
667
  The 8th Session of the CCFFV agreed that Mexico, assisted by the US, would elaborate a 
proposed draft Codex Standard for Tomatoes. The Codex Alimentarius Commission ap-
proved this decision, and encouraged the CCFFV to perform this task in close collaboration 
with the UN/ECE. Moreover, the 9th Session of the CCFFV suggested in order to avoid du-
plication of effort that UN/ECE standards should be used as a starting point for draft Codex 
standards where appropriate and that Brazil should also provide assistance in the work.    
668
  EC Commission Regulation No 790/2000 of 14 April 2000 laying down the marketing stan-
dard for tomatoes, OJ L095, 15.04.2000, p. 24. According to the earlier Council Regulation 
No 2200/96 of 28 October 1996 on the common organisation of the market in fruit and vege-
tables, OJ L297, 23.11.1996, marketing standards must be adopted for certain products, one 
of them being tomatoes. 
669
  UN/ECE Standard FFV-36 concerning the marketing and commercial quality control of to-
matoes moving in international trade between and to UN/ECE member countries. 
TRADE/WP.7/2000/11/Add.14, 13 December 2000. The standard was first published in 
1961 and has been revised in 1997 and 2000. 
670
  Of the varieties (cultivars) grown from Lycopersicon lycopersicum (L.) Karsten ex 
Farw./Lycopersicon esculentum Mill. 
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Comparing the 34 MRLs covering the same tomato/substance combinations, it is evident 
that EU levels are more stringent for half of them and equal in one third.671  
As a consequence of the limited harmonisation of MRLs at the EU and international 
level, the specific levels that are applicable largely depend on the country where a 
tomato is produced and the country where a tomato is marketed. As a result, complicated 
situations may occur as a tomato produced according to the regulations of country A 
may not be marketed in country B, when it has been treated with a substance that is not 
allowed in production in country B and contains residues of that treatment. This means 
that residue requirements imposed by one country may influence the choice of pesticide 
products in another country. 
In order to protect consumers, residues are monitored in relation to food imports from 
other EU Member States and third countries. According to the EU Rapid Alert System 
for Food and Feed (RASFF), exceedances of MRLs should be notified to other Member 
States. In contrast to previous years, there have been several alerts with regard to 
tomatoes in 2007.672 It should be noted though that, inherently to its design, the RASFF 
system does not show more than the tip of the iceberg.673    
In addition to this intensification of rule-making by state actors, non-state actors have 
developed regulatory approaches to specify safe and sustainable production practices for 
their own specific purposes. Most of these non-state actor initiatives are, in fact, supply 
chain arrangements that are proposed by participants in the supply chains concerned, in-
dividually or in partnerships, stipulating the use of certain agricultural production meth-
ods, thereby aiming to realise specific quality and safety attributes of food products. 
Such arrangements may vary from simple contractual requirements to comprehensive 
programmes defining and implementing production practices. Several of these initiatives 
are supported by a specific marketing approach that is targeted towards specific groups 
of buyers and/or consumers.  
The regulatory approaches of the private sector are often framed as quality assurance 
programmes. The most significant and long-standing examples are the programmes of 
British retailers such as Coop UK, Marks and Spencer, Sainsbury’s, and Tesco, that 
work with specific standards about the types of pesticides allowed in production, and the 
                                                   
671
  More precisely, for 12 out of 34 tomato/pesticide combinations CAC and EU MRLs are iden-
tical, for 18 of them the EU MRLS are more stringent, and for 4 of them the CAC MRLs are 
stricter.  
672
  See the annual reports about the Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed at 
http://ec.europa.eu/food/food/rapidalert.
 
673
  This statement has been confirmed by the 2004 EU co-ordinated programme which points 
out that of the 28 samples for which an exceedance of the ARfD was estimated only 4 cases 
had been notified through the RASFF system and that the reason for non-notification of the 
remaining 24 samples could not be explained. See for a similar observation the VWA report 
covering monitoring of pesticide residues in the Netherlands in 2004.  
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residue levels permitted in produce.674 More recently, and under the pressure of a Green-
peace study, the German retailers Aldi and Lidl have formulated their own rules for ag-
gregate MRLs that are stricter than those required by law.675 Participation in these initia-
tives is in principle voluntary, although market circumstances may provide a strong im-
petus for producers to comply with the rules concerned. 
In addition, retailers have begun to develop initiatives that promote healthy eating habits 
in the struggle against obesity and food related diseases. Many of these initiatives have a 
communicative form and consist of logos and labels that indicate the nutritional value of 
the food products involved.676 In general, fresh fruit and vegetables, including tomatoes, 
benefit from such initiatives because they have a relatively high nutritional value in 
comparison to most processed food products.  
Hence, the conclusion is the number of rules applicable in each stage of the tomato life-
cycle has sharply increased in the past decade. Traditionally, state actors focused on the 
production and marketing stages, but have started to increasingly regulate the stages of 
seed manufacturing and the cultivation of propagating and planting material. Non-state 
actors, for their part, initially focused primarily on the production stage, but have shifted 
their regulatory activity more recently to other stages.  
7.6 The competitive position of tomato producers 
As explained in the previous section, agricultural producers are increasingly confronted 
with rules and regulations governing the different stages of the tomato life-cycle. This 
section investigates the response of agricultural producers to the increased ‘rulification’ 
of the tomato life-cycle. This response should be seen in the light of the fierce 
competition that fresh tomatoes experience as the market is often on the brink of 
oversupply. Such competition does not go without tensions, as the so-called tomato wars 
between the US, Canada, and Mexico have shown in recent years.677  
                                                   
674
  See e.g.: M. Harvey, S. Quilly & H. Beynon (2002), especially chapters 9 “Growing new 
routes”, pp. 201-227, and 10 “Supermarket tomato”, pp. 228-252. See for details about the 
specific retailer initiatives at their websites: http://www.co-op.co.uk, 
www.marksandspencer.com, www.sainsburys.co.uk, and www.tesco.co.uk. 
675
  See for information about the successful lobbying by Greenpeace at 
http://www.greenpeace.de. 
676
  For example, English retailers have developed a ‘traffic light’ system and the Dutch retailer 
Albert Heijn uses the logo of a cloverleaf to indicate food products delivering benefits to 
health.  
677
  See e.g.: A.B. Peschard (1996). The U.S.-Mexico fresh winter tomato trade dispute. The 
broader implications. Washington: The Center for Strategic and International Studies; B. 
Simon (2001). U.S.-Canada tomato war heats up. In: The New York Times, 7 December 
2001. See for the role of tomatoes as a means of post-war reconstruction effort: USAID 
(2006). Agriculture: program works to improve Iraq’s tomato production, 3 March 2006, 
available at http://www.portaliraq.com. The article explains that the U.S. Agency for Interna-
tional Development (USAID) is executing an Agriculture Reconstruction and Development 
Program for Iraq (ARDI), supplying highly productive hybrid tomato seeds and teaching 
Iraqi farmers modern methods of tomato cultivation. 
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In general terms, the patterns of trade for tomatoes are still strongly regional for both 
fresh and processed tomatoes.678 This means that Europe and the other continents have 
their own distinctive configurations. The regional trade patterns, however, are far from 
stable and there are degrees of complementarity and conflict, interpenetration and sharp-
ening differentiation.  
In Europe, the market for fresh tomatoes is dominated by the greenhouse tomato. Until 
1995, the Netherlands was the leading exporting country of fresh greenhouse toma-
toes.679 Spain took then over as the dominant exporter and has kept this position until to-
day. However, in the next few years, more competition is expected from Turkey, Eastern 
Europe, and the Southern Mediterranean countries. As labour costs are lower in those 
countries, the prices for ‘ordinary’ tomatoes are increasingly coming under downward 
pressure. In reaction to these developments, producers in traditional tomato growing 
countries in the EU-15 try to strengthen their competitive position by aiming at higher 
quality segments of the market.  
Tomato producers in the Netherlands, for example, have chosen in the mid-1990s to di-
versify on the basis of tomato variety. This choice was closely connected to the deterio-
rating reputation that the Dutch tomato experienced in the German market in the early 
1990s. Around that time, it was being nicknamed “Wasserbombe”, because of its taste-
lessness, which threatened to negatively affect its market position in a major export mar-
ket and was the impetus for several changes in the industry. 
In response to the reputation problems, a number of producer associations were estab-
lished that each specialised in one specific tomato variety, enabling the introduction of 
tomato varieties such as the vine tomato, the cherry tomato and the roma tomato.680 This 
focus on particular varieties was a reason for closer linkages between producer associa-
tions and seed manufacturers than before. Several of these producer organisations started 
to use the newly established cooperative The Greenery International as a marketing or-
ganisation. 
Ten years after the establishment of The Greenery in 2006, the Netherlands counted 21 
producer associations for tomatoes, with seven of them, especially the larger ones, being 
a member of The Greenery.681 Overall, most Dutch tomato producers had one or more 
certifications.682 More specifically, one third of Dutch tomato producers had a Global-
GAP certification, which has become a bottom line requirement for supplying the major 
European retailers. A major reason for the successful implementation of GlobalGAP in 
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  M. Harvey, S. Quilly & H. Beynon (2002), p. 68. 
679
  Ibidem, p. 72. 
680
  Ibidem, pp. 82-92. 
681
  Groenten en Fruit, no. 11, 17 March 2006. Tomato producers cover at least 1200 hectares. 
682
  See Annex to the Dutch weekly Groente en Fruit about tomato production in the Nether-
lands. 
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the Netherlands is that The Greenery anticipated the system at an early stage by making 
its members accustomed to keeping an input administration.683  
Besides taking part in quality assurance programmes, several Dutch producer associa-
tions for tomatoes have started growing special tomato varieties for niche markets, often 
supplying them under a brand name. These special tomatoes have several features, either 
visible or invisible, that should give them an extra value in comparison with an ordinary 
tomato. Such features usually include flavour and taste, colouring, model, type of flesh, 
but may also relate to the content of nutrients or the level of pesticide residues in the 
produce. 
With respect to product differentiation, Dutch producers are in an advantageous position 
because several of the major players of the global seed industry are located in the Neth-
erlands, offering the opportunity of close cooperation in the development of new hybrid 
seeds. For example, the Dutch seed company De Ruiter Seeds has recently developed a 
tomato variety with a higher lycopene content that distinguishes itself visually by carry-
ing a zebra-style striped design.684 Appropriately, it is being called the Safari tomato. 
Other successful examples of this new trend of tomato branding include: the Red Star 
Cupido, the Delitom, the Tasty Tom, the Roma Vine, the Bonchita, the Pick-a-Tommy 
(Pluktomaatje), the Marzanino, and the Sweet Vine. 
The new hybrid seeds are often marketed with the help of marketing specialists that 
work for the seed companies trying to interest potential customers for the newly devel-
oped varieties. Interestingly, the seed industry not only approaches agricultural produc-
ers, but also retailers in order to create partnerships covering all stages of the tomato’s 
life-cycle. By organising the support of the main stakeholders involved, the seed industry 
ensures that its products will enter the market under the best circumstances for market 
success. Significantly, these partnership initiatives aimed at marketing brandname toma-
toes are being widely promoted in the Netherlands for their innovative potential and con-
tribution to improved competitiveness. In the past few years, many of the awards in the 
agricultural sector that aim to encourage innovative and excellent entrepreneurship have 
been given to tomato producers that have developed brandname products.685 
The launching of the Marzanino tomato is especially an interesting phenomenon because 
it is a variety of the traditional Italian San Marzano Pomodoro, a tomato with a special 
status in the EU as it carries the mark of Protected Designation of Origin (PDO).686 The 
PDO status is meant to protect against unfair competition and the misleading of consum-
ers. The traditional San Marzano tomato has furthermore been given a special status by 
the Slow Food movement, as it has been included in the Ark of Taste that aims to protect 
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  See for more information about The Greenery: N.M. van der Grijp, J. de Boer & F. den Hond 
(2001). Initiatieven vanuit de Nederlandse voedingssector ter beperking van het bestrijding-
smiddelengebruik (Initiatives of the Dutch food industry to reduce pesticide use). R-01/03. 
Amsterdam: Instituut voor Milieuvraagstukken, Vrije Universiteit, 149 p. 
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  Groenten & Fruit, no. 43, 2005. More information available at http://www.deruiterseeds.com. 
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  Examples include: Hillenraad top 100 and the Grower of the Year award. 
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  EC Council Regulation (EC) No 2081/92 of 14 July 1992 on the protection of geographical 
indications and designations of origin for agricultural products and foodstuffs. 
  
174
traditional products.687 At this stage, it cannot be predicted if the new tomato variety 
Marzanino, developed by De Ruiter Seeds and grown by Dutch producers, will triumph 
in the market at the expense of the traditional San Marzano tomato from Italy. In any 
case, the British retailer Tesco has decided to give the Dutch Marzanino a chance by of-
fering it in its UK shops. 
As mentioned in Section 7.4, Spain took over from the Netherlands as the leading ex-
porting country of fresh greenhouse tomatoes around 1995 and has kept this position un-
til today. A major factor has been the so-called miracle of Almería that started to take 
place in the 1980s when groundwater resources were found in one of the driest and poor-
est provinces of Spain. This miracle has turned the province in a ‘sea of plastic’, with 
thousands of hectares of tomato production under plastic, the so-called plasticultura.  
Over the years, this intensive type of production caused enormous environmental pres-
sure in the area because of heavy pollution from several problematic pesticides and of 
the limited water resources. In addition, social stress in the area increased because of bad 
working conditions and the influx of immigrants from Africa.688 Increasingly, however, 
agricultural producers have started to implement more sustainable agricultural produc-
tion techniques, such as integrated control and organic production. This happened under 
the influence of stricter rules at EU level and especially the demand from the large retail-
ers in the UK and Germany. The spectacular growth of Spanish organic acreage has been 
supported by targeted legislation of the autonomous regions. Considerable residue prob-
lems in the production of peppers in the 2006/2007 growing season have formed an addi-
tional impetus to accelerate the transition towards integrated control and organic produc-
tion, which is now being supported by financial injections from the government.  
The area of Koundoura in Southern Crete in Greece provides an example of a relatively 
small group of Mediterranean producers seeking marketing opportunities under a situa-
tion of increased competition from neighbouring Meditterranean countries.689 In order to 
improve their market position, producers of vegetables, mainly tomatoes, founded a co-
operative called Selino. The cooperative set up a programme to enhance the quality of 
production and produce, and focused on the reduction of pesticide use. It chose to work 
with the certification body AgroCert that is operating a certification scheme based on 
ISO 9000 as well as criteria of integrated control. Interestingly, the cooperative consid-
ered the GlobalGAP programme too weak from an environmental perspective. Produc-
tion under the AgroCert protocol started in 2001 and the first certifications were granted 
                                                   
687
  See for the Ark of Taste at: http://www.slowfoodfoundation.com. The other five Italian to-
mato varieties included in the Ark of Taste are the Belmonte tomato, the Corbara Plum to-
mato, the Piennolo small tomato, the Rotonda tomato, and the Sorrentino tomato. Petrini, 
2001. In order to strengthen the position of the products in the Ark of Taste, several regional 
‘Presidia’ have been set up to protect and encourage specific local products inter alia by the 
creation of market opportunities for them. Such a presidium also exists for the San Marzano 
tomato. 
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  See e.g.: F. Lawrence (2004). Not on the label: What really goes into the food on your plate. 
London: Penguin Books, 272 p. 
689
  These paragraphs are based on information collected during a visit to the area, including a 
conversation with a Cretan tomato producer who has been one of the initiators of the quality 
programme (11 September 2004). 
  
175
in 2002. More recently, producers in the area have also started to convert to organic pro-
duction.  
A major reason for the cooperative to start with the quality programme was the competi-
tion experienced from agricultural producers in countries such as Turkey, Morocco and 
Syria, who work for much lower prices but are assumed to have lower quality standards. 
Hence, a quality assurance programme is seen as an effective means to improve the re-
gion’s competitive position and to receive a certain minimum price for the produce. 
Moreover, the cooperative considers it essential to develop a longer-term vision that en-
tails a broad-scale conversion to organic production. However, the financial position of 
poor producers from the mountains is a barrier for the full implementation of the quality 
programme in the region. The short-term priority of these producers is to earn a decent 
income and they are less interested in upgrading production in the longer-term.   
Morocco provides an example of a Southern Mediterranean country that is increasingly 
seeking opportunities to export greenhouse tomatoes to the EU market. However, trade 
in tomatoes (and some other agricultural products) between the EU and Morocco is sub-
ject to certain rules that form a restriction on the principle of free trade, but are allowed 
according to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture. These rules have been established as 
part of the Association Agreement that the EU and Morocco have concluded in 2000.690 
One of the main aims of the Agreement is to establish the conditions for the gradual lib-
eralisation of trade in goods, services and capital, stating that the EU and Morocco “shall 
gradually implement greater liberalisation of their reciprocal trade in agricultural and 
fishery products”.691 
For certain products, one of which is tomatoes, specific provisions have been estab-
lished. According to Protocol 1 on the arrangements applying to imports into the EU of 
agricultural products originating in Morocco, the country is allowed to export a maxi-
mum quotum of tomatoes between 1 October to 31 March of each year, divided in 
monthly portions, against an agreed entry price. It is further obliged to notify the Com-
mission of weekly exports of tomatoes. 
A comparison of the trade figures for tomatoes of the EU and the maximum Moroccan 
export quota of recent years shows that, although these quota are relatively small, Mo-
rocco is one of the more important non-EU suppliers of tomatoes. Moreover, the produc-
tion of tomatoes for export delivers a substantial contribution to Moroccan national in-
come. Interestingly, Moroccan producers have started to convert to more sustainable ag-
ricultural practices in recent years. In the process, they have experienced several barriers, 
such as the lack of national certification bodies and fully equipped laboratories.  
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  OJ L070/2, 18.03.2000. In the period previously to the Association Agreement, when a Co-
operation Agreement was in force, the regime for imports of tomatoes originating in and im-
ported from Morocco was established by way of an agreement in the form of an exchange of 
letters, OJ L048, 03.03.1995, pp. 21-25. The maximum quantity was set at 130 000 tonnes 
between 1 October to 31 March, against an agreed entry price.  
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  Association Agreement, Articles 1(1) and 16. 
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7.7 Conclusions 
This chapter has investigated the plethora of rules that producers of fruit and vegetables 
have to deal with to be able to participate in national and international supply chains. At 
a more general level, the chapter has described the emergence of a regulatory pattern that 
increasingly favours the economic interests of multinational companies in the pesticide 
industry, seed industry, and food and retailing industry, as it facilitates a consolidation of 
market share and power through the establishment of additional governance structures. 
This bias has led to an increased standardisation and commoditisation of agricultural 
produce resulting in increasingly homogeneous products and, at the same time, to the 
development of specialty products based on high-technology. Both developments have 
taken place at the expense of traditional agricultural biodiversity.  
At a more specific level, and in order to make the argument more concrete, the example 
of the fresh tomato has been used to illustrate how pluralism of rules works out in prac-
tice and how it affects the conditions for production and trading. By means of the to-
mato, it has been shown why a tomato is no longer just a tomato, but can have many dif-
ferent appearances.  
Drawing all the strands together of regulatory approaches that are relevant for tomato 
production, trade and consumption, a pattern of regulation emerges in which both state 
and non-state actors play important roles and are engaged in complex interactions. It 
seems that legal pluralism is a reality in the field of tomato production and that tomato 
producers are highly affected by this reality. However, most EU tomato producers do not 
object against the high priority that is given to food safety in Europe, because it provides 
them, for the time being, with an opportunity to protect their competitive position against 
producers in the Southern Mediterranean, Turkey, and China that do not comply with 
strict MRLs. 
For several EU tomato producers, the profusion of rules has provided an opportunity for 
product differentiation securing market access and under some circumstances higher 
prices. This differentiation focuses on a broad variety of quality, safety and sustainability 
aspects. However, despite this new trend of tomato differentiation and branding, the cer-
tified tomato fulfilling all criteria of being tasteful, as well as nutritious, residue-free, 
produced under decent labour conditions, and paid a fair price, has not entered the mar-
ket as yet. 
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Part IV The dynamics of legal pluralism 
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8. Regulatory interaction in the issue-area of pesticide risk 
reduction 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter investigates the interaction between state and non-state actor approaches in 
order to determine the mutual influences and whether these are beneficial, adverse or 
neutral from the point of view of pesticide risk reduction. At the international level, the 
emphasis is on the FAO International Code of Conduct on the Distribution and Use of 
Pesticides, the Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Cer-
tain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade, and the Stockholm 
Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants. At the level of the EU, the main instru-
ments include Directive 91/414/EEC concerning the placing on the market of plant pro-
tection products; Regulation (EC) No 396/2005 on maximum residue levels of pesticides 
in or on food and feed of plant and animal origin, and the proposed framework directive 
on the sustainable use of pesticides. At the transnational level, the focus is on the 
IFOAM organic guarantee system, and the GlobalGAP program for fruit and vegetables.  
Using these instruments as a starting point, this chapter makes an analysis of regulatory 
interaction based on two distinctive approaches. Section 8.2 provides a multilevel ap-
proach of regulatory interaction in vertical, horizontal and diagonal directions. Section 
8.3 uses a more dynamic approach, focusing on the stages of the pesticide life-cycle. 
Section 8.4 presents conclusions. 
8.2 A multi-level perspective upon regulatory interaction  
As explained in Section 2.4.4, the multi-level perspective distinguishes between regula-
tory interaction in vertical, horizontal, and diagonal directions. Vertical interaction takes 
place between regulatory approaches at different levels and is based upon a formalised 
hierarchical relationship. Horizontal interaction, in contrast, refers to interaction between 
regulatory approaches at the same level that are in principle independent from each 
other. Diagonal interaction follows a different logic, taking place between state and non-
state actor approaches at multiple levels without any formal relation. 
8.2.1 Vertical interaction 
Interaction between instruments of international and EU law 
Focusing on the instruments of international and EU law, several cases of vertical inter-
action can be identified, with some of them providing synergy and others conflict. In the 
international context, the EU has a specific position as a supranational organisation unit-
ing 27 Member States. The legal basis for the EU to conclude international agreements 
in the environmental field is provided by Article 174(4) of the EC Treaty. The general 
policy adopted by the Commission is to seek EU participation wherever it can establish 
EU ‘competence’. However, determining competence can be a complex matter. Accord-
ing to several rulings of the ECJ, the major criterion for competence is whether the EU 
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has adopted measures, which cover the same aspects as those in the Convention con-
cerned.692   
As a member organisation of FAO, the EU is formally committed to comply with the re-
quirements of the FAO Code of Conduct. The same accounts for the Member States. The 
clearest evidence of EU adherence to the Code is the fact that the European Commission 
has adopted the FAO definition of IPM in the proposal for a framework directive on the 
sustainable use of pesticides, and previously had implemented the PIC procedure. Over-
all, however, the commitment of the EU to the Code seems not well developed, as is ap-
parent from the fact that the implementation and observance of the Code are not regulary 
discussed by the EU institutional bodies. Moreover, the EU is not represented in the 
FAO Panel of Experts bearing responsibility for the implementation of the Code. How-
ever, the Member States Germany, Italy and Sweden have each representatives in the 
Panel. 
With regard to the Rotterdam Convention, the EU was the first, and is still the only, re-
gional economic organisation that became a Party to the Rotterdam Convention. Accord-
ing to Article 25(2), the EU is as such bound by all obligations under the Convention.693 
To formalise its participation, the Council deposited the instrument of ratification, to-
gether with a declaration of competence, with the Secretary-General of the United Na-
tions on 20 December 2002.694 The Member States also ratified the Convention, with the 
exception of Malta.  
Concerning the implementation of the substantive provisions of the Rotterdam Conven-
tion, it should be noted that the PIC procedure was already implemented in the EU under 
Regulation No 2455/92 on the export and import of certain dangerous chemicals.695 The 
main revisions that were needed with a view to a proper implementation of the Rotter-
dam Convention related to timing and frequency of prior export notification, the level of 
information required, and the introduction of provisions relating to technical assistance 
for developing countries. In order to take account of these additional requirements of the 
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Convention, Regulation No 304/2003 concerning the export and import of dangerous 
chemicals was adopted in January 2003, repealing the previous Regulation.696 
Interestingly, Regulation No 304/2004 went beyond the scope of the Convention in cer-
tain respects, as it extended the scope of export notification to all those chemicals that 
are banned or severely regulated in the Community, which, inter alia, refers to non-
authorised pesticide substances, and it prescribed appropriate labelling of all chemicals 
exported from the Community.697 
However, the Regulation has been annulled in 2006, because its legal basis was judged 
inadequate by the ECJ. During the preparation of the decision for approval of the Con-
vention and the substantive regulation to implement it, there had already been discussion 
about the proper legal basis in the EC Treaty: whether it should be common commercial 
policy (Art. 133) or environmental policy (Art. 175(1)).698 The choice of legal basis is 
important, not only because it determines the dominant subject-area concerned, but also 
since it has consequences for the voting procedure and the extent of the competence of 
the European Parliament in the decision-making process. Or in the words of Advocate 
General Kokott: 
 “The choice of the correct legal basis is of considerable practical and institutional, in-
deed constitutional importance. It determines not only the legislative procedure applica-
ble (rights of Parliament to participate, unanimity or qualified majority in the Council) 
but also whether the Community’s competence to legislate and conclude an international 
agreement is exclusive or is to be shared with the Member States.”699 
After consultation with the Parliament, the Council decided, in opposition to the Com-
mission, to give both measures an environmental policy basis. 
                                                   
696
  Regulation (EC) No 304/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 
January 2003 concerning the export and import of dangerous chemicals, OJ L063/1, 
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Subsequently, the Commission took action against the Council, contesting the legal basis 
of both the Decision and the Regulation before the ECJ. On 10 January 2006, the Court 
delivered two separate judgments providing a compromise between the two viewpoints. 
First, the Court annulled the Council Decision, ruling that there should have been a dual 
legal base including both articles, and not a single one.700 Second, the Court also chose 
to annul the Regulation, using a largely similar argumentation.701 Both rulings were con-
trary to the opinion of the Advocate General Kokott who had proposed that the Court 
should dismiss both applications of the Commission, while considering Article 175(1) 
the correct basis for the Decision as well as the Regulation in the light of the objectives 
and content of the Convention and the context in which it was concluded.702 
These annulments did not have many practical effects. In the first case, the Court de-
cided that the annulment of the Decision did not affect the original Community ratifica-
tion of the Convention and the EU remained a Party in accordance with the Vienna Con-
vention.703 In the second case, the Court ruled that Regulation No 304/2003 maintained 
its effects until the adoption, within a reasonable period, of a new regulation founded on 
appropriate legal bases.704 This so-called ex tunc nullity of both the Regulation and the 
Decision can be considered as a means to limit the potential consequences for the legal 
relationships that were built upon the Regulation since its entry into force in 2003.705 
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announced to come up with a separate proposal containing amendments to Regulation No 
304/2003. 
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  D. Schaffrin (2006). Dual legal bases in EC environmental law revisited: note on the judg-
ments of the European Court of Justice in the cases C-94/03 (Commission of the European 
Communities v. Council of the European Union) and C-178/03 (Commission of the European 
Communities v Council of the European Union. In: RECIEL vol. 15, no. 3, pp. 339-343. 
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The importance of these rulings relates to the fundamental disagreement between the EU 
institutional bodies on the “centre of gravity” of the Rotterdam Convention and the 
sphere of policy it should be allotted to, having regard to its content, aims and context.706 
In particular, the discussion is about the essence of the PIC procedure, whether it is an 
instrument of commercial or environmental policy. Most notably, similar discussions 
about the correct legal basis have taken place concerning other EU policies and measures 
regarding pesticides. It seems that the legislative role of the Parliament in pesticide pol-
icy issues is at stake, because Article 133 (commercial policy) and also Article 37 (agri-
culture) only allow for a consultative role of Parliament, whereas Article 175(1) (envi-
ronment) requires co-decision. The argument of the Court that the two legislative proce-
dures are compatible with each other, taking the specific circumstances of these two 
cases into account, seems an artificial construction supporting a different purpose rather 
than solving the issue at stake. 
Subsequently, the Commission published a proposal for a new Regulation implementing 
the Rotterdam Convention that introduced a dual legal base, and also included a number 
of so-called technical amendments.707 The Commission explained these amendments by 
referring to a report on the implementation experiences of the Member States.708  
More specifically, the Commission proposed to amend the provisions of explicit consent 
for the substances that are banned or severely restricted under EU law but which are not 
yet covered by the Rotterdam Convention. The proposed amendment included a re-
placement by a less strict regime allowing the export of the substances concerned in case 
a request for explicit authorisation to import a substance does not receive a sufficiently 
prompt response.709 Hence, this less strict regime would allow tacit consent. The latter 
amendment has been contested by the rapporteur of the European Parliament, arguing 
that it was not in line with the aim of the Regulation, i.e. the protection of states which 
are less able or even unable to assess the hazardous chemicals concerned.710 However, 
the draft legislative resolution seems to have been submitted to no avail due to a low 
MEP turnout for the vote.711 This means that with the change of the legal basis of the 
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Regulation, the Commission also chose to change its content in favour of commercial 
considerations. 
In order to coordinate export and import notifications, the EU has created a database 
called EDEXIM in which data are collected about exporting and importing countries and 
the substances concerned.712 From the database, it can be concluded that the number of 
export notifications has significantly increased since the Regulation entered into force.713 
From the EU Member States, Germany has submitted the highest number of notifications 
for pesticide substances, to dozens of different countries.714 
Similarly as regards the Rotterdam Convention, the EU was the first, and is still the only, 
regional economic organisation that became a Party to the Stockholm Convention.715 By 
its Decision of 14 October 2004, the Council approved the Convention on behalf of the 
European Community.716 Most of the Member States have also ratified the Convention, 
with the exception of Estonia, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Malta and Poland.717  
At the first Conference of the Parties (COP-1) in 2005, the European Parliament submit-
ted a resolution on the EU strategy for the Punta del Este Conference on Persistent Or-
ganic Pollutants.718 The Parliament urged the EU to take an active role in the negotia-
tions by means of effective cooperation between the Commission, the Council and Par-
liament. 
Subsequently, the EU has implemented the Stockholm Convention by establishing Regu-
lation No 850/2004 on persistent organic pollutants, with Article 175(1) (environment) 
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as legal basis.719 The Regulation entered into force on 20 May 2004 and is directly appli-
cable in all Member States, including those which are not a Party. A second instrument 
implementing the Convention is Regulation No 304/2003 concerning the export and im-
port of dangerous chemicals, which includes the prohibition of export of the persistent 
organic pollutants (POPs) currently listed in the Stockholm Convention, in accordance 
with the provisions therein.  
As regards the obligation to prevent marketing and use of new POP-like pesticides in ag-
riculture, Directive 91/414 is of particular importance. However, production of new sub-
stances with POP characteristics cannot be prevented by this Directive. The stage of pro-
duction will be covered by the REACH Regulation and will be included in the revised 
EU legislation on pesticides.720  
Furthermore, the Convention obliged the EU to submit its implementation plan before 14 
February 2007. The EU experienced a minor delay and issued its plan on 19 March 
2007.721 It is based on an integration of the national implementation plans (NIPs) of the 
Member States, as far as finalised before that date.722 It is important to note that the non-
ratifying Member States were not obliged to submit a NIP. 
According to the Persistent Organic Pollutants Community Implementation Plan 
(POPCIP), the EU has achieved substantial progress in limiting the use of POPs and in 
reducing their emissions to the environment.723 However, it recognised that there are on-
going releases to the environment as well as a constant cycling of substances released in 
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former times. Most pesticides listed in the Stockholm Convention have been phased out 
in the EU several years ago. Exceptions include lindane that was allowed for use until 
the end of 2007 as public health and veterinary topical insecticide, and the use of DDT as 
an intermediate for the production of dicofol which is being manufactured in Spain.724 
Concerning stockpiles of obsolete pesticides containing POPs, the estimations amounted 
to a surplus of 5,370 t, mainly located in Poland (4,500 t). However, the Commission 
suspects that the total amount is largely underestimated and that the historical contami-
nation of the soil by especially lindane is on a much larger scale than estimated in the 
POPCIP context.725 
In its POPCIP, the Commission stressed several times that the EU and the Member 
States aim to have additional POP substances included under the Stockholm Convention 
in order to achieve the 2020 chemicals target adopted at the Johannesburg Summit in 
2002. To this end, the EU has officially nominated chlordecone to the POPRC and is 
considering nominations of endosulfan, dicofol, trifluralin, and pentachlorophenol. 
Concerning the provision of new and additional financial resources to assist developing 
countries with the implementation of the Convention, the Commission stated in the 
POPCIP that the Community is not a country Party and thus not directly obliged by Arti-
cle 13.2 to provide financial resources to developing countries and countries with 
economies in transition. It furthermore argued that: “So far, development partners have 
not requested funding for POPs relevant investments or technical assistance at the coun-
try level and this is unlikely to change in the near future since few developing country 
governments see a strong link between the Stockholm Convention and meeting the Mil-
lennium Development Goals that are the major determinant of aid priorities.”726 How-
ever, this argument seems a less appropriate excuse because the provision about new and 
additional funds requires that financial and technical assistance for the implementation of 
the Stockholm Convention should be paid out of other funds than those reserved for de-
velopment assistance. 
Conclusion 
As this section has shown, the vertical interaction between the international and EU level 
has stimulated the progressive development of the international law governing pesticides 
to some extent. Without the Stockholm Convention a production ban of specific hazard-
ous substances would probably not have been feasible in the EU. However, progress is 
less evident where it concerns issues of financial and technical assistance to developing 
countries. Furthermore, there is a certain friction between the objectives set at the multi-
lateral and the EU level. For example, the EU Regulation implementing the Rotterdam 
Convention has the additional objective of supporting commercial policy, which may 
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prove difficult to combine with the objectives of environmental and human health pro-
tection.  
8.2.2 Horizontal interaction 
Interaction between instruments of international law 
At the international level, several cases of synergetic horizontal interaction can be identi-
fied between the FAO Code of Conduct, the Rotterdam Convention and the Stockholm 
Convention. First, learning experiences in the context of the Rotterdam Convention con-
cerning representation and distributive issues have inspired similar solutions with regard 
to the Stockholm Convention. An example includes the composition of the Chemical 
Review Committee (CRC) under the Rotterdam Convention that has been a model for 
the Persistent Organic Pollutants Review Committee (POPRC) under the Stockholm 
Convention. Second, the secretariats of the conventions dealing with hazardous chemi-
cals are increasingly exploring options for the mutual use of information in relation to 
substances with global effects.727 This so-called bridging of information relates, for ex-
ample, to risk evaluations made under global multilateral environmental agreements such 
as the Montreal Protocol and the Stockholm Convention and their applicability under the 
Rotterdam Convention.  
Third, priority setting can be influenced by decision-making under other regimes. For 
example, the Rotterdam Convention will assign lower priority in future work of the CRC 
to chemicals that are already covered under the Stockholm Convention and for which 
ongoing trade cannot be confirmed.728 Fourth, and more in general, FAO, UNEP, and 
WHO intend to increasingly look for opportunities for collaboration and work sharing to 
provide unified guidance to countries, instead of working in isolation from each other.729 
Interaction between instruments of EU law 
At the EU level, a limited number of cases of horizontal interaction can be identified be-
tween the instruments of pesticide law. More precisely, the potential for synergetic inter-
action at the EU level has not been fully recognised and utilized thus far, but is likely to 
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be increasingly exploited in the near future as a result of the revision of the EU legisla-
tion on pesticides, in combination with the reform of the CAP, and the implementation 
of the Water Framework Directive. Most significantly, the EU institutional bodies in-
creasingly aim for policy integration and coherence by linking of the mechanisms for 
monitoring. 
Concerning the specific instruments of EU pesticide legislation, there has been some in-
teraction between the Directive on authorisation of pesticide substances and products and 
the legislation on pesticide residues. This interaction has mainly focused on the coordi-
nation of procedures for authorisation of pesticide substances and products and the set-
ting of MRLs. However, for many years the coordination of procedures did not deliver 
the expected results because of the major delays in the assessment of existing substances 
and the establishment of MRLs. 
Since the early 2000s, however, the EU efforts for a coherent and integrated regulatory 
framework covering pesticides have been strengthened and will ultimately lead to a 
completely renewed legislative regime for pesticides. In 2005, a new Regulation on 
maximum residue levels was introduced, streamlining procedures and, inter alia, intro-
ducing temporary MRLs for substances that have not yet been reviewed. Furthermore, 
the European Commission has proposed a Thematic Strategy on the sustainable use of 
pesticides based upon a strengthening of existing policies and legislation through inte-
grative measures, and a draft Directive establishing a framework for Community action 
to achieve a sustainable use of pesticides and a new Regulation concerning the placing of 
plant protection products on the market. Both proposals are expecting finalisation in 
2008.730  
The measures proposed in the Thematic Strategy and the draft legislation aim to contrib-
ute to the CAP reform and especially target an improvement of systems for monitoring 
compliance. First, the Commission aims to amend the current Article 17 of Directive 
91/414 in order to be able to monitor compliance with good agriculture practice (GAP). 
Second, Member States will be required to report on pesticide poisoning incidents in-
volving operators, bystanders, residents, consumers, and wildlife. Third, integration will 
be sought with the Water Framework Directive that provides instruments for monitoring 
environmental emissions on the basis of water quality standards that need to be complied 
with by the Member States. Four, the new Regulation No 396/2005 on maximum residue 
levels of pesticides in food and feed provides for a reinforcement of annual monitoring 
programmes which provide indications of compliance with good agricultural practice, as 
prescribed in the Authorisation Directive. 
Interaction between regulatory approaches of non-state actors 
Focusing on the transnational level, several cases of interaction can be identified be-
tween regulatory initiatives by non-state actors. A major driving force for this interaction 
is the consolidation of economic power and competitive advantage. Some actors are us-
ing such initiatives to create favourable alliances, whereas other actors are using them to 
distinguish themselves in the market. Significantly, the emergence of a regulatory initia-
                                                   
730
  COM(2006) 372 final, 12.07.2006; COM(2006) 373 final, 12.07.2006, and COM(2006) 388 
final, 12.08.2006, respectively. 
  
189
tive may provoke the establishment of a competing initiative, as standard setting is one 
of the means to get control in the industry. This mechanism can be illustrated by the 
power struggle that is presently going on between the large retailers and the multina-
tional food corporations, which focuses on the dominance of the corporate brand over 
the retailer own brand, and vice versa.731 The introduction of the GlobalGAP protocol for 
fruit and vegetables by the European retailers, and the subsequent launching of the SAI 
Platform by the multinational food companies, can be seen in this light. An additional 
example is the current competition between food safety schemes for market dominance. 
An example of alliance seeking is provided by ECPA that has asked assistance from dif-
ferent stakeholders at both the governmental and non-governmental level in order to 
combat the problem of counterfeiting and illegal trade in pesticides.732 Most notably, 
ECPA has asked for the help of the food industry in its fight against illegal pesticides by 
calling on production and distribution chains to report incidents of illegal products and 
trade to authorities and the crop protection industry and by requesting that the ‘food 
chain’ actively promotes the use of registered and approved products in their farmer sup-
plier contracts. 
Conclusion 
As this section has shown, horizontal interaction at the international, EU and transna-
tional level is still in an early stage but increasingly aspired by state and non-state actors. 
Most of this interaction may stimulate synergy, but in other cases, especially at the non-
state actor level it may lead to conflict and arguably over-regulation.  
8.2.3 Diagonal interaction 
Interaction between instruments of international law and non-state actor 
regulatory approaches 
Focusing on the instruments at the international and transnational level, several cases of 
diagonal interaction can be observed, with most of them providing synergy. On the one 
hand, international agreements have been used as input for the private standard setting 
process. Examples include the ILO conventions on labour conditions, and the UN 
Agenda 21 recommendations on sustainable agriculture and responsible management of 
chemicals. On the other hand, private standards have provided inspiration for public pol-
icy makers, such as the IFOAM organic guarantee system that has been used as input for 
the guidelines developed by the Codex Alimentarius Commission. 
Most notable is the interaction between the FAO Code of Conduct and the initiatives of 
the pesticide industry, and, more recently, the food industry. To stimulate compliance 
with the Code, CropLife has developed a guide for its member companies, which high-
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lights the most important responsibilities and actions for industry.733 Furthermore, the 
Code invites the pesticide industry to provide reports on its product stewardship activi-
ties related to observance of the Code, and other interested parties are invited to monitor 
activities related to the implementation of the Code and report these to the Director-
General of FAO.734
 
Furthermore, the Code explicitly calls on the food industry to help implement its rec-
ommendations and to play a proactive role in the development and promotion of IPM.735 
Interestingly, the FAO Expert Panel has referred to food industry initiatives such as the 
Sustainable Agriculture Initiative (SAI Platform) and GlobalGAP, as well as activities 
initiated by individual companies. 736 The Panel noted in this respect that the food indus-
try’s need for long-term supply of safe raw materials, and consumer requirements with 
respect to food safety and quality, are in clear agreement with the general objectives of 
the Code of Conduct. Consequently, the Panel concluded that the food industry and FAO 
member countries have a common interest in enhancing implementation of the Code of 
Conduct. In concrete terms, the Panel has requested the SAI Platform to consider possi-
bilities to explicitly refer to the Code of Conduct in its principles for sustainable agricul-
ture.737 This means that the Panel is actively seeking interaction with multinational food 
corporations, applying a rather restricted interpretation of the term food industry. 
Interaction between instruments of EU law and non-state actor regulatory 
approaches 
Focusing on the interaction between the EU and the transnational level, it is apparent that 
the EU institutions increasingly consider non-state actor initiatives as full-fledged alter-
natives for rule-making by state actors. However, in some areas private regulatory efforts 
may be competitive with EU law and policy and leading to over-regulation of the norm 
adressees. In this respect, it is interesting to notice how carefully retailers express them-
selves about the nature of their initiatives. One British retailer remarked that its “pro-
gramme does not supersede the regulatory approach but provides a parallel model for 
development”, and another said that “it does not want to be a quasi-regulator … but that 
there is maybe not one system that suits all users today”.738 
In other areas, non-state actor initiatives may go against EU law and policy, as the ex-
ample of the struggle of the Slow Food movement with the EU food hygiene rules illus-
                                                   
733
  CropLife International (2004). Guide for industry on the implementation of the FAO Code of 
Conduct on the distribution and use of pesticides (revised version). Available at: 
http://www.croplife.org. 
734
  FAO Code of Conduct, Articles 12.8 and 12.9. 
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  FAO Code of Conduct, Article 3.8. 
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  FAO Panel of Experts on Pesticide Management, Report of the 2nd session, 7-10 November 
2006, Rome: FAO, 2007. 
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  According to the list of attendees, mr. Eduard Bruckner of Nestlé, representing the SAI Plat-
form, participated in the 2nd session of the FAO Panel of Experts. 
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  See: D. Croft (2002). Removing pesticides from the food chain. In: Pesticides News, no. 58, 
pp. 9-10, and D. Buffin (2001). Food retailer aims to restrict pesticide use. In: Pesticides 
News, no. 54, p. 3. 
  
191
trates.739 Slow Food argues that these EU rules are written for larger corporations operat-
ing internationally, and that it is not fair to demand compliance from small producers. 
More in general, Slow Food observes problems for small producers caused by the way in 
which subsidy systems, regulations, and supply chains are organised.  
Conclusion 
As this section has shown, diagonal interaction has significantly increased in the past 
decade, providing synergy as well as conflict. The synergetic forms of interaction are 
based on mutual learning as well as imitation. The more conflictuous ones are especially 
grounded in power struggles, focused on regulatory initiative and ownership. Overall, 
diagonal interaction tends to favour the interests of multinational corporations, as rules 
are a more common form of market communication for them than for smaller compa-
nies.  
8.3 A life-cycle perspective upon regulatory interaction 
This section provides a more dynamic perspective on regulatory interaction by clarifying 
the mutual influences between state and non-state actors and highlighting the evolution-
ary nature of many interaction processes. For each of the different stages in the pesticide 
life-cycle, including production, marketing, use, and residues, this section explores the 
pattern of rules and regulations and pays attention to the distinctive roles of the state and 
non-state actors involved and the way in which they influence each other.  
8.3.1 Production stage 
The current pattern of regulation in the production stage of pesticide substances and 
products is straightforward with dominant roles for state actors. The production stage is 
hardly regulated at the international level, except for a phase out of the production of a 
few selected substances under the Montreal Protocol and the Stockholm Convention. In-
stead, the regulatory centre of gravity is located at the national government of the coun-
try where a production facility is located, or planned to be set up. Consequently, national 
public authorities decide about issues of protection of human health and the environ-
ment.  
In addition, non-state actors pursue their own policies to reduce the negative impacts of 
pesticide production. Companies producing pesticides have developed their own initia-
tives for risk management, inspired by notions of corporate social responsibility and sus-
tainable development. A well-known example is the Responsible Care programme pro-
moted by the chemical industry. Furthermore, social and environmental NGOs are scru-
tinizing corporate activity, especially in developing countries.740 
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  C. Honoré (2004). In praise of slow. How a worldwide movement is challenging the cult of 
speed. London: Orion Books Ltd. With backing from Slow Food, artisanal cheese-makers 
formed a Europe-wide alliance in 2003 to fight for the right to work with raw milk, pp. 54-
55. 
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  Examples include Bhopal Watch, Berne Declaration, and PAN. 
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8.3.2 Marketing stage 
Unlike the production stage, the regulatory pattern in the marketing stage of pesticide 
substances and products is complex and fragmented, with state and non-state actors at 
different levels performing regulatory roles. As a consequence, the regulatory pattern is 
different per country and per pesticide product. In some, mainly developed countries, the 
marketing of pesticides is densely regulated, whereas in others, especially developing 
countries, marketing is more or less unregulated.  
The regulatory pattern in the marketing stage can be investigated more thoroughly by 
comparing the status of specific pesticide substances under different evaluation and au-
thorisation systems. Such an analysis makes clear whether the regulatory systems in 
place have converging tendencies or instead deliver mixed messages about the risks for 
the environment and human health of the substances concerned.  
In order to perform this exercise, data from several sources have been combined in one 
comprehensive table that is included in Annex 5. More precisely, the table contains an 
overview of active ingredients used in pesticide products and their status under different 
regulatory regimes from state as well as non-state origin. As a starting point, active in-
gredients have been listed that have been assessed under the 1st and 2nd stages of the EU 
work programme for the gradual examination of active substances that were available on 
the market two years after the date of notification of Directive 91/414.741 In addition, the 
table also includes the substances that have been prohibited before 1991 on the basis of 
Directive 79/117.742 In total, the table contains 239 entries of pesticide substances, ar-
guably representing the most hazardous products.  
About the selection criteria of the substances for the different stages of the work pro-
gramme under Directive 91/414, the Commission has remarked the following in the pre-
amble of Regulation No 3600/92: 
“Whereas, given the very high number of active substances on the market on that 
date [23 July 1993], a selection has already been made, taking into account in a bal-
anced manner such aspects as health and/or environmental concern, the possibility of 
residues in treated products, the importance of the preparations containing these sub-
stances for agriculture, any manifest data gaps (or, conversely, the presence of a 
complete, updated data package), and any similarity of chemical or biological prop-
erties …” 
However, the exact criteria used by the Commission to distinguish between the different 
stages of the EU work programme remain unclear. It seems that other than risk-based 
criteria have also played a role. A first scan of the existing substances still awaiting re-
view revealed that several problematic ones among them, as the examples of chlorme-
quat, dicofol, and methyl bromide clearly demonstrate. 
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  OJ L170, 25.06.1992.  
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  OJ L033, 08.02.1979. 
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Initially, the deadline for the assessment of the work programme in its entirety had been 
set at 2003, but was extended due to the delay in the review of substances.743 In Septem-
ber 2007, the assessment of the substances from the 1st and 2nd stages of the work pro-
gramme was finalised.744 Concerning the 90 substances of the 1st stage of the work pro-
gramme, the Commission had received notifications from producers on 89 of the 90 ac-
tive substances in the preceding years. Such notifications are a prerequisite for starting 
the review process.745 Of these 89 substances, 59 were positively reviewed and received 
an authorisation to be marketed and used, whereas 30 were to be withdrawn from the 
market. Interestingly, there have been a number of cases before the ECJ in which deci-
sions of the EU concerning inclusion or non-inclusion of specific substances have been 
contested.746 
Concerning the 148 substances of the 2nd stage of the work programme, the Commission 
received 63 notifications that indicated the interest of producers to continue marketing 
pesticide products containing the active ingredients concerned.747 The review of these 
notified substances resulted in the authorisation of 31 substances and the non-inclusion 
of 27 substances. In addition, 5 substances will be withdrawn as soon as alternatives be-
come available but are for the time being allowed under conditions of restricted use. 
The information in the table in Annex 5 has been complemented by data based on re-
views of substances under other regulatory regimes. These other regimes include the 
WHO Classification of Pesticides by Hazard, international environmental conventions, 
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  Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. Evaluation of the 
active substances of plant protection products (submitted in accordance with Article 8(2) of 
Council Directive 91/414/EEC on the placing of plant protection products on the market), 
COM(2001) 444 final, 25.07.2001; Commission Regulation No 2076/2002 of 20 November 
2002 extending the time period referred to in Article 8(2) of the Directive and concerning the 
non-inclusion of certain active substances in Annex I to that Directive and the withdrawal of 
authorisations for plant protection products containing these substances, OJ L319, 
23.11.2002, and Commission Decision of 25 July 2003 extending the time period provided 
for in Article 8(2) of the Directive, OJ L192, 31.07.2003. 
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  SANCO DOC 3010 – Directive 91/414/EEC, rev. October 2007. 
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  See: Commission Regulation No 3600/92 of 11 December 1992 laying down the detailed 
rules for the implementation of the first stage of the programme of work referred to in Article 
8 (2) the Directive, OJ L366, 15.12.1992, and Commission Regulation No 933/94 of 27 April 
1994 laying down the active substances of plant protection products and designating the rap-
porteur Member States for the implementation of Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
3600/92, OJ L107, 28.04.1994. 
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  Examples include: case T-229/04 (inclusion of paraquat annulled), case T-475/07 (suspen-
sion of non-inclusion of trifluralin refused), and case C-326/05 (non-inclusion of metalaxyl 
annulled). 
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  See: Commission Regulation No 451/2000 of 28 February 2000 laying down the detailed 
rules for the implementation of the second and third stages of the work programme referred 
to in Article 8(2) of the Directive Commission, OJ L055, 29.02.2002, and Commission Regu-
lation No 703/2001 of 6 April 2001 laying down the active substances of plant protection 
products to be assessed in the second stage of the work programme referred to in Article 8(2) 
of the Directive and revising the list of Member States designated as rapporteurs for those 
substances, OJ L098, 07.04.2001. 
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EU legislation in the field of water policy, retailer schemes, and schemes established by 
environmental and social NGOs. The criteria in these regimes are, partly or totally, based 
on considerations of human health and environment protection but use different interpre-
tations of risk.  
The WHO Classification of Pesticides by Hazard system distinguishes several classes of 
pesticide substances based on acute toxicity, including extremely hazardous (IA), highly 
hazardous (IB), moderately hazardous (II) and slightly hazardous (III) substances, and a 
class of substances unlikely to present acute hazard in normal use.748 In addition, certain 
chemicals are designated by the WHO as obsolete or discontinued for use as pesticides. 
However, the WHO itself has stated, that it is sometimes difficult to establish whether all 
commercial activity in a substance has ceased. In fact, some of these ‘obsolete’ pesti-
cides are contained in pesticide products that are currently registered for legal use in the 
US.749 
Under the heading of international environmental conventions, the table summarises data 
based on the Rotterdam Convention and the Stockholm Convention. With regard to the 
Rotterdam Convention, the table contains information about the substances or pesticide 
formulations listed in Annex III, the notifications accepted by the CRC, and notifications 
of final regulatory action for banned or severely restricted chemicals verified to meet the 
requirements of Annex I. In respect to the Stockholm Convention, the table lists informa-
tion about the pesticide substances included in the Annexes A and B, and those that are 
nominated for inclusion.   
Concerning EU water policy, information has been added about priority substances in 
the context of the Water Framework Directive as has been decided on the basis of Deci-
sion No 2455/2001/EC.750 More precisely, this legislation distinguishes between priority 
substantives for which measures should be taken that are aimed at their progressive re-
duction and priority hazardous substances for which measures should be taken aimed at 
the cessation or phasing out of discharges, emissions and losses within 20 years after 
their adoption at Community level. 
Under the heading of retailer schemes, data from the GlobalGAP standards of the joint 
European retailers and the individual initiatives of Coop UK and Marks and Spencer 
have been collected. Concerning the choice of pesticide products, the GlobalGAP stan-
dards prescribe compliance with national legislation and do not elaborate substance-
specific rules. There are, however, a few important exceptions. First, GlobalGAP prohib-
its the use of the ozone depleting substance methyl bromide as a soil fumigant, which is 
                                                   
748
  WHO (2005). The WHO recommended classification of pesticides by hazard and guidelines 
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a requirement that goes beyond current European legislation. Second, the retailer initia-
tive is instrumental in extending the scope of prohibitions of the most hazardous sub-
stances partly outside the European territory. More precisely, GlobalGAP prohibits its 
suppliers worldwide from using substances that have been banned for marketing and use 
in the European context under Directive 79/119/EEC.
 
The Co-op UK initiative consists of two lists: one of substances that suppliers are not al-
lowed to use and the other contains those substances that can be used with permission 
only. Substances qualify for inclusion in the list of banned substances if their use has 
been shown to be harmful to humans or that they are toxic at very low levels and thus 
prevent a risk to vulnerable members of society, particularly babies, infants and young 
children.751 The substances on the other list can still be used but only after the producer 
has received written authorisation from the retailer. Permission is only granted for an in-
dividual crop grown by a particular producer and only after checking to make sure there 
is no suitable alternative. Each individual use has to be approved. Co-op considers these 
substances as candidates for an overall ban in the longer term.  
Marks & Spencer uses a highly similar approach as Co-op, making a distinction between 
banned substances and those that can be used with permission only, the so-called red and 
amber lists.752 Its criteria are based on whether substances are dangerous to aquatic life, 
have endocrine disrupting impacts or are linked to problems associated with the human 
nervous system.  
The last column with data about NGO schemes uses information based on the list of 
chemicals that WWF considers candidates for inclusion in the Annexes of the Stockholm 
Convention, the database of PAN that contains detailed information about hundreds of 
pesticide substances, and the black, grey and yellow lists of Greenpeace Germany.753 
PAN uses a classification based on environmental and human health considerations. 
PAN uses the term PAN Dirty Dozen for a small group of substances, that are highly 
persistent and toxic. Many more substances have received the status of PAN Bad Actor, 
which indicates that they are: 1) known or probable carcinogens, 2) reproductive or de-
velopmental toxicants, 3) neurotoxic cholinesterase inhibitors, 4) known groundwater 
contaminants, or 5) of high acute toxicity. Because there are no authoritative lists of en-
docrine disrupting chemicals as yet, PAN does not use this criterion in its classification 
but only indicates whether chemicals are suspected of having endocrine disrupting im-
pacts. Greenpeace uses fourteen toxicological and ecotoxicological criteria in its assess-
ment of approximately 1100 pesticide substances. It distinguishes between a blacklist of 
especially hazardous substances,  a grey list of hazardous substances without specific 
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dangerous properties, and a yellow list of substances about which hardly anything is 
known. 
This exercise of combining data from several sources makes clear that the world-wide 
progress in limiting the use of the most dangerous substances has been slow in the past 
decades. Although the EU prohibited the marketing and use of certain substances in its 
own territory in the late 1970s and 1980s, several of them have remained in use in other 
continents. More precisely, under Directive 79/114 the EU has prohibited the marketing 
and use of 20 substances in total. 15 out of these substances now fall under the scope of 
the Rotterdam Convention and 6 of them are being phased out under the Stockholm 
Convention, including aldrin, camphechlor (toxaphene), chlordane, dieldrin, endrin, and 
heptachlor. A seventh substance, DDT, is being phased out for agricultural use but will 
be allowed for continued use to combat vector diseases. Significantly, retailer initiatives 
have been instrumental in extending the scope of the prohibitions under Directive 79/114 
partly outside the European territory. 
Table 8.1 Substances reviewed by the EU under the Directives 79/117 and 91/414 and their clas-
sification in the WHO system 
WHO class of hazard Substances prohib-
ited to be marketed 
and used 
Substances allowed 
to be marketed and 
used 
Substances al-
lowed for re-
stricted use 
Total 
Extremely hazardous 
(1A) 
11   1 -   12 
Highly hazardous 
(1B) 
23   6 3   32 
Moderately hazard-
ous (II) 
29 20 1   50 
Slightly hazardous 
(III) 
  9 16 -   25 
Unlikely to be haz-
ardous in normal use 
(U)754 
17 33 1   51 
Obsolete755 43   - -   43 
Fumigants (FM)756   5   - -     5 
Unclassified 14   7 -   21 
Total 151 83 5 239 
 
Comparing the outcomes of the review process by the EU with the results from the haz-
ard classification by WHO, as shown in Table 8.1, it is evident that the European Com-
mission has succeeded in reducing the number of different substances available in the 
EU market and has especially achieved a strong reduction in the classes of the more haz-
ardous substances. However, it also shows that several hazardous substances from the 
classes IA, IB and II, which are considered by WHO as candidates for a total phase out, 
are continued to be allowed for marketing and use in the EU.  
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When the EU review results are compared with the status of the same substances accord-
ing to the PAN system, the analysis shows that half of the authorised substances are Bad 
Actors in PAN terms. Furthermore, a considerable overlap can be noticed between the 
WHO classification and the PAN Bad Actor system. This is reflected by the fact that 
most PAN Bad Actors are classified in the WHO system as hazardous. However, a num-
ber of PAN Bad Actors are classified by the WHO as unlikely to have hazardous im-
pacts, or are not listed at all. Conversely, looking at the data from the WHO perspective, 
it is a marked fact that several substances from the WHO classes II and III have been ex-
plicitly assessed by PAN as not being Bad Actors. The explanation for these differences 
lies in the criteria that have been used and the differences in the interpretation of evalua-
tion results. 
8.3.3 Use stage 
Similarly as in the marketing stage, the regulatory pattern in the use stage of pesticides is 
complex and fragmented. This section examines the interaction between state and non-
state actors through a description of the definition processes of innovative agricultural 
production methods. In order to get a better understanding of the issues at stake, this sec-
tion unravels the definition processes of organic agriculture as well as integrated control, 
emphasizing the distinctive roles of state and non-state actors and the way they influence 
each other, especially in the European context. In addition, the dilemmas and controver-
sies that underlie the definition processes of these innovative agricultural production 
methods are identified.  
The definition process of organic agriculture 
Over the past 50 years, the definition of organic agriculture has evolved in a continuous 
process of interaction between state and non-state actors. As explained in Chapter 5, the 
concept of organic agriculture was first developed by pioneering agricultural producers 
in the UK and US in the 1940s. In Europe, the concept was further institutionalised by 
organic producers’ organisations that created common standards for organic production 
that could provide assurance to consumers and prevent fraudulent claims and unfair 
competition.757  
Unlike Europe, the US followed a state-actor dominated model of rule-making for or-
ganic agriculture, with state actors taking the regulatory initiative and largely keeping it. 
In response to the growing interest in the organic agricultural production method from 
the 1960s onwards, several states adopted legislation defining organic agriculture. In 
1973, Oregon became the first state to pass a law regulating organic food as a response 
to reports of fraud and inconsistencies in terms of organic claims.758 In due course, sev-
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  K. Commins (2004). Overview of current status of standards and conformity assessment sys-
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eral other states followed the Oregon example, and increasingly non-state actors also 
chose the regulatory track.  
The initiative for the establishment of international organic standards was taken by the 
International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements (IFOAM), in response to the 
increase of private standards and public regulations worldwide. This non-state actor saw 
the need for harmonisation at the international level, inter alia, in order to facilitate trade 
in organic products. It consequently decided to develop the IFOAM basic standards for 
organic production and processing, which were published in 1980, and contained the 
first ever international definition of organic agriculture:  
“Organic agriculture includes all agricultural systems that promote the environmentally, 
socially and economically sound production of food and fibres. These systems take local 
soil fertility as a key to successful production. By respecting the natural capacity of 
plants, animals and the landscape, it aims to optimise quality in all aspects of agriculture 
and the environment. Organic agriculture reduces external inputs by refraining from the 
use of chemical-synthetic fertilisers, pesticides and pharmaceuticals. The use of geneti-
cally modified organisms is excluded.”759  
As the area under organic production further increased, the EU started to regulate or-
ganic agriculture and its products. In 1991, the EU established Regulation No 2092/91 
that aimed to provide the basis for the regulation of organic agriculture in the Member 
States.760 Key considerations of the EU to come up with legislation were to ensure fair 
competition between organic producers, to enhance transparency at all stages of produc-
tion and processing, and to improve credibility in the eyes of consumers. The first ver-
sion of the legislation only applied to unprocessed agricultural products of vegetable ori-
gin as well as processed food products composed of one or several ingredients. In a later 
stage, the scope of the legislation was extended towards agricultural products from ani-
mal origin as well.761 
The EU Regulation required Member States to set up an inspection system operated by 
one or more designated inspection authorities and/or approved private bodies.762 Hence, 
the EU system explicitly allowed non-state actors to be involved in inspection and certi-
fication activities. Following the implementation requirements of the regulation, all EU 
Member States have designated certification bodies, which work with their own organic 
standards, inspection schemes and symbols (consumer labels) under the condition that 
they comply with the bottom line set by the EU.  
In the US, the great variety of legislative schemes across states, in combination with the 
fact that organic agriculture remained unregulated in several other states, urged the fed-
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eral government to move toward a nationally standardized system.763 An additional mo-
tive for regulation at the federal level were the interests of US agricultural actors who 
wished to move closer to EU organic standards for economic and trade reasons.764 As a 
result of its legislative effort, the federal government incorporated the Organic Food Pro-
tection Act (OFPA) into the 1990 Farm Bill. With this Act, the government shifted most 
authority to itself, and more precisely to the US Department of Agriculture (USDA).765 
This means that from that moment on a state was no longer allowed to require higher or-
ganic standards than the USDA did federally, unless specific environmental conditions 
necessitated stricter state standards.766 Moreover, the US system left no space for 
autonomous standardisation by non-state entities.767 
The initial Organic Food Protection Act (OFPA) followed the IFOAM and EU models 
closely. In 1997, however, it seemed that the US government was on a collision course 
with the organic movement, as the USDA proposed a thorough amendment of the Act 
aiming to allow the use of genetically modified organisms and sewage sludge in organic 
production, and irradiation of organic food products.768 The proposal about the so-called 
Big Three created considerable controversy among the stakeholders concerned. Under 
considerable opposition of the public, USDA finally abandoned it. Moreover, this gov-
ernmental U-turn may be inspired by the guidelines on organic agriculture that were in 
the process of being developed by the Codex Alimentarius Commission in that same pe-
riod. These Codex guidelines did not allow for the use of the Big Three.   
The Codex Alimentarius Commission had started to develop its guidelines in the course 
of the 1990s, when the market share of organic food products began to increase world-
wide. In order to provide clear information to consumers, the Commission decided to ask 
the Codex Committee on Food Labelling to develop guidance on claims about organic 
agriculture and food products. In a process that took several years, the Committee devel-
oped the Guidelines for the Production, Processing, Marketing and Labelling of Organi-
cally Produced Foods. They were first adopted in 1999, and subsequently amended in 
2001.769 The Guidelines were intended to facilitate the harmonisation of requirements for 
organic products at the international level, and to provide assistance to governments 
wishing to establish national regulations in this area. 
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Returning to the situation in Europe, it can be concluded that Regulation No 2092/91 on 
organic production has had two distinct impacts on the organic movement. On the one 
hand, and in combination with the funding provided by the European Commission on the 
basis of the agri-environment scheme, the Regulation has given an important impetus to 
the growth of organic agriculture in the Member States, and has provided an increased 
legitimacy to the regulatory activities of non-state actors. On the other hand, the in-
volvement of the EU in the definition process of organic agriculture has made the or-
ganic movement more vulnerable to outside influences as there is a threat that the EU 
will gradually remove the power to define what is organic from the organic move-
ment.770 This tension has become apparent in the revision process of Regulation No 
2092/91.  
The revision process started with the publication of the European Action Plan on Or-
ganic Food and Farming by the European Commission in June 2004, in which it an-
nounced a major overhaul of the regulatory framework defining organic agriculture.771 
After a short consultation round, the Commission published a proposal for a Council 
Regulation on organic production and labelling of organic products in December 
2005.772 This proposal had the character of framework legislation that needed to be fur-
ther elaborated by so-called implementing measures. According to the Commission, the 
revised Regulation especially aimed to improve clarity for both consumers and agricul-
tural producers. 
One of the issues debated in the revision process concerned the proposed restriction on 
ownership of standards and use of logos by non-state actors. However, IFOAM has lob-
bied successfully in order to safeguard its position and that of its member organisations. 
From the start, IFOAM has chosen an active position in the decision-making process 
about the EU legislation. Through its IFOAM EU group, it first formulated its comments 
in a paper on ‘grave concerns’, asking for a less tight timeline for the finalisation of the 
regulation. Subsequently, IFOAM pursued a constructive approach by actively helping 
to find solutions for several of the contested issues.773  
Importantly, the Austrian and Finnish Presidencies of the EU have played a major role in 
bringing the diverging viewpoints together by tabling several compromise proposals. On 
19 December 2006, the Agricultural Council reached agreement on the so-called general 
approach of the new regulation on organic production. This meant that the legislative 
process was close to finalisation and that in the last stage the Commission was only al-
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  According to IFOAM, several issues remained contested, such as the fact that the objectives 
and principles of the Regulation were not in line with those of the organic sector, the cen-
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private inspection and certification bodies with regard to advertising use of private logos 
(marks of conformity). 
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lowed to make minor technical changes in the text of the proposal. The new regulation 
was published in early 2007 and will come into force on the 1st of January 2009.774 
The preparatory process of the revised EU Regulation demonstrates the fragile position 
of rules made by non-state actors as they may be overruled at any time through interven-
tion by the state. Moreover, state actors may choose different priorities and solutions for 
the issues at stake. With regard to the EU Regulation, for example, a number of issues 
have not been solved to the satisfaction of IFOAM, including the rules about stakeholder 
involvement in procedures, GMOs, the mandatory use of the EU logo, the link to the 
food and feed control regulation and the exclusion of catering and non-food products 
from the scope of the egulation.775  
In a parallel development, the EU introduced an amendment of the old scheme for im-
ports of organic products from non-EU Member States in late 2006.776 The old scheme, 
which was incorporated in Article 11 of Regulation No 2092/91, had been in force for 
more than 15 years and has been criticized for the cumbersome procedures that it created 
and its negative effects on international trade. The new import scheme constitutes a revi-
sion of Article 11 of Regulation No 2092/91 by extending the marketing possibilities for 
non-EC exporters as it introduces a list of recognized inspection bodies and authorities 
that carry out inspection in countries that are not on the list of recognized third countries. 
Thus, the new provisions explicitly place state and non-state actors at an equal level. 
Reviewing the definition process of organic agriculture, the conclusion is that the or-
ganic agriculture movement has managed to create a united front worldwide over the 
past 35 years and keep the definition of organic agriculture essentially within the move-
ment. Moreover, IFOAM has succeeded in creating a system of standards that has influ-
enced the development of organic agriculture worldwide and has influenced rule-making 
by state as well as non-state actors to a large extent. 
One of the greatest dilemmas for the organic agriculture movement nowadays is the in-
creased involvement of the conventional food industry and the emergence of large play-
ers in the organic market. This involvement has been termed the ‘conventionalisation’ of 
organic production, as it has become increasingly dependent on, and integrated into, 
conventional agribusiness structures and processes.777 On the one hand, the involvement 
of the conventional industry is one of the major reasons for the growth of organic agri-
culture worldwide. On the other hand, the pressure from the food industry could, over 
time, lead to a watering down of ambitions and a weakening of standards, and eventually 
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culture. In: NJAS Wageningen Journal of Life Sciences, Special issue Values in organic agri-
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regulatory capture by non-adherents of organic principles.778 With regard to pesticides, 
such conventionalisation could mean that non-synthetic pesticides are increasingly used 
as substitutes for chemicals. As a consequence, the quality of organic products could suf-
fer and the original aims of the organic movement gradually undermined. Therefore, the 
challenge for the organic movement is the reconciliation of the principles of organic pro-
duction with the practice of intensive and industrial forms of agriculture. At the practical 
level, this means that a number of issues need to be addressed such as the compatibility 
of large scale farming operations with the principles of organic agriculture, the compati-
bility of long distance transport of produce, the minimum percentage of organic ingredi-
ents in processed products, and the use of non-synthetic inputs.   
In contrast to this threat of a possible erosion of standards, it has also become apparent 
that a number of large market players, from conventional as well as non-conventional 
origin, has sought to raise the ambition level of organic standards and enhance the qual-
ity of products.779 In order to achieve their aims, these market players usually follow one 
of the following routes, or a combination of them. First, they can choose to stipulate that 
suppliers deliver products certified on the basis of accredited schemes. Second, they can 
demand certification on the basis of schemes that contain more stringent requirements 
than the average. Third, they can create own organic-plus systems that articulate specific 
requirements on top of the regular organic standards. 
As a side-effect, this sharpening up of rules by individual or groups of actors has lead to 
an increased diversity of standards and, hence, an undermining of harmonisation. The 
EU has tried, with its revision proposal of Regulation No 2092/91, to limit diversity by 
prohibiting the creation of more demanding certification schemes. In its first legislative 
proposal, the option of establishing more stringent standards was explicitly excluded, but 
in the face of fierce criticism from the organic movement the EU revoked this proposal 
in a later stage.  
Besides the challenge of keeping up an autonomous and distinct identity in the face of 
increased globalisation and market growth, the organic movement is also challenged by 
issues that are raised from within, such as the needs of small producers supplying local 
markets. In response to their needs, IFOAM has recently developed the participatory 
guarantee system, which is an informal verification system. This system can be consid-
ered as a softer variant of a conformity assessment procedure as the verification is per-
formed by the farmer community to which the agricultural producer belongs and not by a 
third party. 
In order to face the above mentioned challenges, scholars have started to explore the phi-
losophical underpinning of organic agriculture, identifying the core values that constitute 
the essence of organic agriculture. One of these contributions specifically focused on the 
value of ‘naturalness’ distinghuishing three aspirational levels, including the no-
chemicals, agro-ecological and integrity approaches.780 IFOAM itself has developed sev-
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eral activities to strengthen its profile and keep the regulatory initiative, which is in line 
with Boström and Klintman who argue that “an independent cognitive platform with 
well-developed framings and a firm collective identity implies systematic and reflexive 
awareness of one’s own (rather than another’s) priorities.”781 Besides the recent reformu-
lation of its mission and principles, and partly related to it, IFOAM has decided to articu-
late a new definition of organic agriculture which will be put forward for approval by the 
membership in 2008. 
The definition process of integrated control 
Compared with organic production, the definition process of agricultural production ap-
proaches based on integrated control is of a more recent date and relatively less well 
crystallized. As explained in Chapter 5, the concept of integrated control was first intro-
duced in the 1970s when scientists interested in biological control of pests developed 
several multifaceted strategies that consider synthetic pesticides as one, but not the only 
method, to combat pests and diseases. These strategies aim at minimising the use of fer-
tilisers and pesticide products by using additional measures, such as natural predators, 
crop rotation and mechanical weeding, and strive for a certain level of integration of dif-
ferent agricultural practices.  
Integrated control should be seen as an umbrella concept that accommodates a range of 
different production methods aimed at different ambition levels of integration. In accor-
dance with these levels, a basic distinction can be made between IPM, ICM, and inte-
grated production. Whereas integrated production aims for the relatively highest grade of 
integration, taking all aspects of farm management into account, ICM and IPM have a 
relatively more narrow focus, targeting the integrated management of crops and pests, 
respectively. It is important to note that the scope of these concepts has implications for 
the role of synthetic pesticides in the agricultural production process, and more specifi-
cally for the hierarchy of crop protection measures.  
The first guidelines for integrated control were developed by non-state actors in the 
1970s. Towards the end of the 1980s, these definition processes had reached the stage 
that the first labelling and certification schemes were established. In the early 1990s, the 
International Organisation for Biological Control of Noxious Animals and Plants (IOBC) 
developed guidelines for integrated control, and suggested that the EU should develop a 
minimum regulation for integrated control similar to that for organic agriculture.782 The 
EU, however, did not pick up the issue. 
The pioneering schemes for integrated control were mostly initiated by non-state actors 
in a single- or two-party context. Most of them can be characterised as self-regulation. 
However, as these schemes developed further, taking additional stakeholders on board 
and establishing third-party verification, it can be argued that somewhere along this tra-
jectory, some of them transformed from self-regulation into multi-actor regulation. The 
level of integration promoted by these schemes diverged from bottom-line to highly in-
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tegrated, using different terms to indicate the specificity of a certain agricultural produc-
tion method.  
In contrast, state actors seemed to pursue a more uniform model of integration, favouring 
the conversion to IPM. Importantly, the promotion of IPM has been given a strong impe-
tus in the international context by the FAO International Code of Conduct on the Distri-
bution and Use of Pesticides since 1989, and the Rio Conference on Environment and 
Development in 1992. According to the 1989 version of the Code of Conduct, IPM was 
recommended as the agricultural production method appropriate for a proper manage-
ment of pesticides, using the following definition: 
“A pest management system that, in the context of the associated environment and 
the population dynamics of the pest species, utilizes all suitable techniques and 
methods in as compatible a manner as possible and maintains the pest populations at 
levels below those causing economically unacceptable damage or loss.”  
This preference for IPM has been further emphasized by Agenda 21 that was adopted at 
the Rio Conference in 1992. However, the Agenda 21 definition went much further by 
explicitly articulating the objective of a minimisation of pesticide use: 
“Integrated pest management, which combines biological control, host plant resis-
tance and appropriate farming practices and minimizes the use of pesticides, is the 
best option for the future, as it guarantees yields, reduces costs, is environmentally 
friendly and contributes to the sustainability of agriculture.”783  
10 years after the Rio Conference, in 2002, FAO gave a new impetus to the worldwide 
implementation of IPM, with its drastic revision of the FAO Code of Conduct. In com-
parison with its predecessor, the revised Code puts much more emphasis on IPM as the 
agricultural production method of preference.784 In comparison with the 1989 version, 
the definition of the concept includes the objective of risk reduction in relation to both 
human health and environment, and the encouragement of natural pest control mecha-
nisms. However, it does not contain the objective of use minimisation as included in 
Agenda 21. The revised FAO definition is as follows: 
 “Integrated Pest Management (IPM) means the careful consideration of all available 
pest control techniques and subsequent integration of appropriate measures that dis-
courage the development of pest populations and keep pesticides and other interven-
tions to levels that are economically justified and reduce or minimize risks to human 
health and the environment. IPM emphasizes the growth of a healthy crop with the 
least possible disruption to agro-ecosystems and encourages natural pest control 
mechanisms.”785  
As this definition only gives an indication about what IPM entails, it needs further elabo-
ration in technical guidelines in order to give practical guidance to agricultural produc-
ers. As yet, the formulation of these guidelines has not been given priority by FAO due 
to political will and a lack of finances. 
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In comparision, it is interesting to see how the debate in the EU institutional bodies has 
developed, or arguably, how it has failed to develop. The definition of integrated control 
is an issue, which the EU has been postponing to tackle for several years and still seems 
unlikely to solve. The discussion started with the establishment of Directive 91/414 and 
got a new impetus in the early 2000s with the preparation of the Thematic Strategy on 
the Sustainable Use of Pesticides and the proposals for new legislation.786 
To start with, Directive 91/414 introduced the triple concepts of the proper use of plant 
protection products, the principles of good plant protection practice, and the principles of 
integrated control. According to Directive 91/414, the proper use of plant protection 
products inter alia includes the application of the principles of good plant protection 
practice as well as, whenever possible, the principles of integrated control. In this re-
spect, integrated control is defined as:  
“The rational application of a combination of biological, biotechnological, chemical, cul-
tural or plant-breeding measures whereby the use of chemical plant protection products is 
limited to the strict minimum necessary to maintain the pest population at levels below 
those causing economically unacceptable damage or loss.”787  
With the proposed regulation for an authorisation scheme, the EU has maintained the 
concept of proper use but framed it differently. In its new formulation, proper use in-
cludes the application of the principles of good plant protection practice as well as, 
whenever possible, the principles of IPM and good environmental practice. Hence, what 
is new about the proposal is that the EU now uses the term IPM instead of integrated 
control. Notably, the EU definition of IPM is similar to the definition used in the FAO 
Code of Conduct, which implies a shift from use limitation as an objective to risk reduc-
tion. 
In its proposal for a framework Directive on the sustainable use of pesticides, the Com-
mission goes a small step further by proposing that general standards for IPM shall be 
developed in a ‘comitology’ procedure and shall become mandatory as of 2014.788 Addi-
tionally, the Commission proposes that Community-wide specific IPM standards shall be 
developed for particular crops. However, the Commission does not specify for which 
crops and based on what criteria. Moreover, the Commission has taken the sting out of 
this requirement by stating, without giving any arguments, that the implementation of 
specific IPM standards will remain voluntary.  
During the preparatory process of the framework Directive and also of other pesticide-
related legislation, members of the European Parliament have drafted several resolutions 
giving evidence of their widely diverging points of view about the definition of IPM and 
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other integrated approaches.789 A member for the Committee on Agriculture and Rural 
Development, for example, suggested a softer two-level approach consisting of uniform 
binding criteria for good professional practice in pest management and voluntary guide-
lines for IPM.790 These uniform criteria and guidelines were subsequently spelt out in 
two proposed annexes that put the emphasis on the correct and responsible use of pesti-
cides, instead of pesticide use reduction and awareness campaigns.  
From a totally different perspective, PAN Europe had already earlier extensively elabo-
rated on the definition of IPM/ICM in an annex to the draft SLIM report, distinguishing 
ten key criteria:  
1) A soil structure serving as an adequate buffering system for agriculture; 2) A crop ro-
tation frequency enhancing a balanced population of soil organisms preventing outbreak 
of soil-bound pests; 3) The use of the best available pest-resistant crop varieties; 4) Use 
of optimal crop distance and crop management to prevent growth of fungi; 5) Availabil-
ity of refugia for natural enemies of pests and for the prevention of pesticide-resistant 
pests; 6) Economical nutrient management on the basis of information of already present 
nutrients in the soil and of the soil structure, and dosage only on the crop; 7) In principle 
only use of mechanical weeding (or other non-chemical methods like the use of heat); 
only exception in case of bad weather conditions; 8) Use of pesticides based on informa-
tion of presence of pests (scouting, sensors, on-line services) and only the use of selec-
tive pesticides (non harming beneficial organisms); 9) Priority is given to the use of 
’green’ pesticides and pest-preventive substances, and 10) Minimal material resources 
input.791 
Subsequently, PAN Europe, together with the European Environment Bureau (EEB) 
drafted a ‘directive’ on Pesticides Use Reduction in Europe, the so-called PURE direc-
tive, which prescribed the mandatory application of IPM/ICM standards.792 
Significantly, GlobalGAP has added a section about IPM with the 2007 revision of the 
standards.793 Interestingly, the GlobalGAP definition of IPM uses the FAO definition as 
incorporated in the FAO Code of Conduct as a starting point for the development of IPM 
guidelines, whilst recognising the need for local interpretation of the guidelines by the 
certification bodies in charge. Hence, the formulation of these IPM guidelines means that 
a non-state actor has claimed the regulatory initiative to define the concept of IPM in 
concrete measures.  
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The core of the new section on IPM standards form the triple requirements that an agri-
cultural producer must be able to show evidence of implementation of at least one activ-
ity that falls in the categories of a) prevention, b) observation and monitoring, and c) in-
tervention.794 For an explanation of the requirements about IPM, the protocol refers to an 
annex containing GlobalGAP IPM Guidelines that is meant for agricultural producers 
and certification bodies alike. This annex explains that GlobalGAP sees IPM as “an im-
portant strategic discipline contributing to food quality, food safety, farmers’ and work-
ers’ health, and quality of the environment.” It elaborates that: 
1) Prevention includes measures of crop rotation, pest exclusion and soil management, 
selection of appropriate plant varieties and planting material, and good crop hygiene.  
2) Observation and monitoring are about crop monitoring and using decision-support 
systems as a means to identify the need for, and/or timing, of intervention strategies.  
3) Intervention includes, where possible, the consideration of non-chemical approaches. 
In concrete terms, it encourages the selective use of plant protection production in 
ways that reduce the risk of pesticide resistance, the use of natural enemies and other 
commercially-available biological methods of control, and the use of other methods, 
such as mechanical weeding and use of traps for insect pest control.795  
In sum, the last word has not been said about the interpretation of IPM and other ap-
proaches of integrated control. The regulatory vacuum in relation to precise definitions 
already exists for many years and is likely to persist in the years to come. As the situa-
tion is now, the retailer working group GlobalGAP has taken the first steps in the further 
definition process of IPM by formulating guidelines, thereby possibly capturing the 
regulatory initiative. 
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The lack of generally agreed and well-elaborated definitions has as a consequence that 
claims based upon integrated control can mean more or less anything in terms of pesti-
cide risk reduction. As long as the definition of the concept does not contain a priority 
ladder of crop protection measures, it can be even argued that there is not a significant 
difference with the concept of good agricultural practice. Moreover, the diversity of ap-
proaches that are practiced under the heading of integrated control has lead to a confu-
sion of terminology, which has obscured the discussion for many years and is possibly a 
reason for the lack of actual progress at the farm level. 
8.3.4 Residue stage 
The reduction of pesticide residues in agricultural products can be achieved either by 
limiting the application of pesticides during production or by ensuring that pesticides 
have broken down sufficiently before food products are sold in the market. In order to 
give guidance to agricultural producers about acceptable risks, pesticide residues have 
been traditionally regulated by state actors, mostly on a national basis. The necessary 
guidance has been provided through the establishment of maximum residue levels 
(MRLs) based on good agricultural practice, and values indicating acceptable daily in-
takes (ADIs) and acute reference doses (ARfDs).  
In recent years, the Codex Alimentarius Commission and the EU have started to aim for 
a harmonisation of national MRLs. This trend of harmonisation has been strengthened 
with the entry into force of the SPS Agreement. A comparison of matching Codex and 
EU MRLs in 2001 revealed that the EU MRLs were stricter or equal, and seldom less 
stringent than the Codex MRLs.796  
Hence, most of the state actor approaches to pesticide residues focus on the determina-
tion of limit values for individual substances. However, non-state actors, and especially 
the large retailers, have increasingly chosen other lines of approach. First, GlobalGAP 
has made producers responsible for pesticide residue analysis, resulting in increased pro-
ducer awareness and a shift of costs and liability. Second, Aldi and Lidl have chosen to 
limit the accumulation of pesticide residues on a single product by providing an aggre-
gated limit value. Significantly, several retailers consider setting the limit value at zero, 
indicating a preference for residue-free produce. 
8.4 Conclusions 
As this chapter has shown, regulatory interaction in the issue-area of pesticide risk re-
duction in agriculture has increased in the past decades in vertical, horizontal and diago-
nal directions. Vertically, there has been an increased use of mechanisms to stimulate 
implementation such as obligations for monitoring, reporting and development of im-
plementation plans. Between the international and EU level, there is a certain amount of 
synergy as the EU complies with its international obligations and is active in the prepara-
tion of proposals for the inclusion of new substances under the Rotterdam and Stock-
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holm Conventions. However, the EU seems less inclined to provide assistance to devel-
oping countries to enable them to implement the necessary measures.  
Horizontally, there has been a stronger emphasis on integration and coherence. At the in-
ternational level, there is an increased aim for the ‘bridging’ of information, institutional 
learning, and work sharing between the convention secretariats. The same is true for the 
EU level, where environmental policy integration has become an objective with a legal 
status and has been codified in the EU Treaty.   
Diagonally, there has been an increased emphasis on cooperation between state and non-
state actors. It is evident that food industry initiatives are increasingly formally recog-
nised by international organisations such as the Codex Alimentarius Commission, FAO, 
UNCTAD, and WTO and, hence, have become part of the global framework of rules. 
Significantly, state actors explicitly require assistance from non-state actors in processes 
of rule-implementation and rule-enforcement, and are providing legitimacy to non-state 
actor initiatives by giving private standards a legal status through codification.  
From the analysis of the definition processes of organic production and integrated con-
trol, it is evident that the definitions concerned are being established in complicated 
processes of interaction between state and non-state actors, which may result in weaker 
or stronger versions dependent on the position of the dominant stakeholders in the final 
decision-making. Thus far, the definition process of organic agriculture has been primar-
ily farmer-driven and can be characterised by a clear leadership role performed by 
IFOAM and a relatively strong definition of organic agriculture. However, the risk of 
regulatory capture has increased for IFOAM by the conventionalisation of organic agri-
culture, thus urging the movement to formulate and reformulate its basic principles and 
aims. 
With regard to the definition process of integrated control, the distribution of roles and 
responsibilities has been less clear-cut. The development of the concept of integrated 
control was initially scientist-driven, but increasingly other actors started to give their 
own interpretations to the concept which has led to much confusion and lack of clarity. 
Since 1992, FAO has taken a leadership role by adopting a formal definition of IPM. 
This definition has been amended in 2002, still lacking concrete criteria. More recently, 
GlobalGAP has taken the definition process a step further by developing IPM guidelines. 
However, compared with organic agriculture, the definition process of IPM, and even 
more so of the other forms of integrated control, is still in its infancy. 
In sum, the relationships between actors at different sites of governance have become in-
creasingly dynamic, mutually influencing the emergence of each other’s substantive and 
procedural rules. Moreover, it is apparent that most of this regulatory interaction has 
strengthened the integration of environmental and human health dimensions in pesticide 
risk regulation.  
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9. Towards a global law on pesticide risk reduction in 
agriculture  
9.1 Introduction 
This study has addressed the way in which pesticide risk reduction in agriculture is regu-
lated, using the perspectives of legal pluralism and sustainable development. In concrete 
terms, this means that the different elements of the regulatory regime governing pesticide 
risk reduction have been described at the international, EU, and transnational level, and 
subsequently assessed against the criteria of effectiveness, inclusiveness and fairness. In 
addition, two non-comparative case studies have been presented, focusing on the posi-
tions of national government and agricultural producers, respectively. Furthermore, an 
analysis has been made of the interaction between the different elements of the regula-
tory regime, using a multi-level as well as a life-cycle approach.  
As a last stage of the research, this chapter pulls the different threads together in order to 
determine the pattern of pesticide risk regulation and its current reconfiguration. It fur-
thermore aims to identify future options, taking into account the possible roles of state 
and non-state actors. In addition, conclusions are drawn about the application of the con-
cept of legal pluralism in research. Section 9.2 examines the pattern of regulation and its 
reconfiguration from the point of view of legal pluralism. Section 9.3 elaborates upon the 
pattern of regulation from the perspective of sustainable development. Section 9.4 ex-
plores the way forward by outlining a normative and procedural framework to achieve a 
progressive reduction of pesticide risks. Section 9.5 considers in retrospect the concept 
of legal pluralism and its application in research. Section 9.6 presents final observations.  
9.2 The pattern of pesticide risk regulation and legal pluralism 
In the past decades, the pattern of pesticide risk regulation has become increasingly di-
verse and complex. This section examines this pattern and its reconfiguration from the 
point of view of legal pluralism. First, it discusses the division of regulatory roles be-
tween state and non-state actors. Second, it looks at the dominant sources of authority, 
and the identity of regulator and regulated. Third, it elaborates on the dominant steering 
modes in the different stages of regulation. Fourth, it examines the concept of binding-
ness in relation to the regulatory approaches concerned. 
Division of regulatory roles 
Focusing on the division of regulatory roles, the pattern of pesticide risk regulation and 
its reconfiguration can be characterised by shifting roles of state and non-state actors in 
processes of rule-making, rule-implementation and rule-enforcement. More specifically, 
an increased regulatory involvement of non-state actors can be identified in the public as 
well as private domain. With regard to rule-making, it is evident that non-state actors are 
increasingly participating in legislative processes by state actors and that, in addition, 
they are increasingly taking over the regulatory initiative by developing their own forms 
of regulation, be it self-regulation, single-actor regulation or multi-actor regulation. 
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In relation to rule-implementation, a similar dual shift has taken place. Public regulation 
increasingly addresses non-state actors to assist with the implementation of rules and 
regulations, as the examples of the FAO International Code of Conduct on the Distribu-
tion and Use of Pesticides, the Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent 
Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade and the 
Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants demonstrate. In addition, na-
tional non-state actors are increasingly implementing transnational standards, such as the 
IFOAM organic guarantee system and the GlobalGAP programme for fruit and vegeta-
bles. This is reflected in the rise of the private certification industry that can be consid-
ered to fulfill the function of the executive power in relation to private regulation. How-
ever, compared with public administrations, these private administrative bodies are less 
independent, as they may find themselves in an ambivalent position because they assess 
the performance of their customers and, at the same time, have an interest in securing 
customer loyalty. Moreover, they can be tied to the standard setting entity through ac-
creditation, which makes their split responsibilities even more difficult to combine.  
With regard to rule-enforcement, there is a similar trend of enhanced non-state actor in-
volvement. Whereas state actors increasingly request non-state actors to assist in the 
monitoring of the implementation of public regulation, non-state actors increasingly de-
velop provisions for monitoring, control and sanctioning as a component of their own 
rule systems. Significantly, private regulation based on own authority may strengthen the 
enforcement of public regulation by emphasizing its content and backing it up with mar-
ket-based sanctions. The GlobalGAP system, for example, requires compliance with the 
national legislation concerning authorised substances and MRLs in the country of pro-
duction and, if relevant, the country of destination. It thus gives a stronger backing to 
state regulation by adding its own monitoring and control mechanisms to the state actor 
repertoire, plus the powerful sanction of withdrawing a producer’s license-to-supply. 
Source of authority 
Focusing on source of authority, the pattern of pesticide risk regulation and its reconfigu-
ration can be characterised by a relatively stronger emphasis on the development of pri-
vate own-authority regulation in accordance with the typology introduced in Section 2.2. 
This typology, based on source of authority and identity of regulator and regulated, dis-
tinguishes primary and secondary legislation at the state level, and private own-authority 
regulation and co-regulation at the non-state level. With regard to private own-authority 
regulation, the typology has been refined into self-regulation, single-actor regulation, and 
multi-actor regulation.  
Applying this typology to the IFOAM organic guarantee system, it is evident that the 
regulating entity is formally constituted by the member organisations, mostly consisting 
of organic farmers’ associations and companies that deliver services to organic produc-
ers, whereas the regulated party are the same producers and organisations. A further in-
spection of the functioning of the system makes clear that organic producers determine 
its actual core in all stages of the regulatory process, as rule-making is ultimately in the 
hands of the IFOAM World Board consisting of organic producers’ associations, and 
rule-implementation is mostly the responsibility of dedicated organic certification bod-
ies, with the quality of the performance of certification bodies controlled by a voluntary 
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accreditation programme operated by a subsidiairy of IFOAM. Furthermore, rule-
enforcement is performed by the same certification bodies, which carry responsibility for 
rule-implementation. In sum, it is therefore argued that the IFOAM system is a form of 
self-regulation, as the structure of the system is such that regulator and regulated are es-
sentially identical.  
Taking a closer look at the GlobalGAP programme, it is clear that the regulating entity is 
formally constituted by a combination of retailers and agricultural producers, whereas 
the regulated party are the producers. However, there is a certain power asymmetry in 
favour of the retailers, which reveals itself in the different stages of the regulatory proc-
ess. With regard to rule-making, the governing structure of GlobalGAP is such that re-
tailers and the world’s largest suppliers have the strongest positions in standard setting. 
Concerning rule-implementation, certification bodies are in charge of elaborating and 
applying the standards. However, they have to operate within the strict boundaries set by 
GlobalGAP, as exemplified by the requirement of mandatory GlobalGAP accreditation 
and the strict GlobalGAP quality programme for certification bodies. Most importantly, 
certification bodies are dependent on the retailers for their license-to-operate. In relation 
to rule-enforcement, the retailers of GlobalGAP dispose of the most effective sanction to 
stimulate the adherence to rules and regulations, namely the threat of withdrawing a pro-
ducer’s license-to-supply. In sum, it is therefore argued that the GlobalGAP system is a 
form of single-actor regulation, as the structure of the system is largely influenced by the 
apparent power asymmetry. 
The application of this typology based on source of authority can thus provide clarity 
about issues of power distribution in private regulation. Notably, the rise of private regu-
lation based on own authority evokes questions about the procedural safeguards for those 
regulatory variations and the dispute settlement mechanisms in place. Procedural safe-
guards for public regulation consist of constitutional provisions and principles and rules 
of administrative law. In contrast, procedural safeguards for private regulation cannot be 
found in legislation specifically established to serve this goal, but are scattered over 
various sources, as is summarised in Table 9.1. 
Table 9.1 Procedural safeguards for private regulation of pesticide risks 
Type of private regulation State actor safeguards Non-state actor safeguards 
Self-regulation TBT Agreement 
SPS Agreement 
Civil law 
ISO 
ISEAL Code of Conduct 
Single-actor regulation TBT Agreement 
SPS Agreement 
Civil law 
ISO 
 
Multi-actor regulation TBT Agreement 
SPS Agreement 
Civil law 
ISO 
ISEAL Code of Conduct 
Co-regulation TBT Agreement 
SPS Agreement 
State and administrative law 
- 
 
The TBT and SPS Agreements of the WTO provide several procedural safeguards that 
are also applicable to forms of private regulation. It is however unclear how far this ap-
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plicability goes, as is demonstrated by the current investigation of the GlobalGAP initia-
tive by the SPS Committee. Furthermore, forms of private regulation fall under the um-
brella of general provisions of civil law, providing a safety net based on, for example, 
tort law, contract law, liability law, and competition law. Although it is true that civil law 
does not provide the procedural safeguards comparable to those embedded in administra-
tive law, this is to some extent compensated by the corrective mechanisms provided by 
corporate assets such as shareholder value, credibility and reputation. Interestingly, sev-
eral scholars of international law and international relations argue that a global adminis-
trative law is emerging, consisting of principles that aim to do justice to the interests of 
all the actors concerned. 797 So far, these principles have been quite implicit and it is un-
certain whether they can be invoked before a court. They are, for example, incorporated 
in the procedural requirements in ISO standardisation documents and the ISEAL Code of 
Conduct for Setting Social and Environmental Standards.  
Steering modes of regulation 
Focusing on steering modes, the pattern of pesticide risk regulation and its reconfigura-
tion can be characterised by a shift from hierarchy-based towards non-hierarchical steer-
ing modes based on market mechanisms and consensus-seeking. This shift is strongly re-
lated to the fact that non-state actors from the private sector and civil society are increas-
ingly performing regulatory roles. In order to provide insights into the regulatory conse-
quences of this shift, Table 9.2 combines the steering modes of hierarchy, market, and 
consensus-seeking with the different stages in regulatory processes.  
Table 9.2 Basic regulatory mechanisms in the issue-area of pesticide risk reduction in agriculture 
Steering mode/stage Rule-making Rule-implementation Rule-enforcement 
 
Hierarchy-based Imposition Public law rights and 
obligations  
Public sanctions 
Market-based Negotiation Civil law rights and 
obligations 
Private sanctions 
Consensus-based Deliberation Voluntary commit-
ment 
Social sanctions 
 
In the hierarchy-based steering mode, rules are imposed from above based on the princi-
ple of democratic representation, implemented through rights and obligations based on 
public law, and enforced through public law mechanisms that are linked to the privilege 
of citizenship. In the market-based steering mode, rules are made through negotiation 
based on market power, implemented through rights and obligations based on civil law, 
                                                   
797
  See e.g.: H. Schepel (2005); C. Harlow (2006). Global administrative law: the quest for prin-
ciples and values. In: The European Journal of International Law, vol. 17, no. 1, pp. 187-214; 
N. Krisch & B. Kingsbury (2006). Introduction: Global governance and global administrative 
law in the international legal order. In: The European Journal of International Law (EJIL), 
vol. 17, no. 1, pp. 1-13. The articles of Harlow and Krisch & Kingsbury are part of a special 
issue of the European Journal of International Law that is devoted to issues of good govern-
ance, rule of law, pluralism etc. Essentially, these articles focus on the development of an 
overarching framework of principles and values for private regulation. 
  
215
and enforced through private mechanisms that are linked to the privilege of market ac-
cess. In the consensus-based mode of regulation, rules are made through deliberation 
based on common interests, implemented through commitment, and enforced through 
social mechanisms that are linked to the privilege of participation.  
The sanctions available in case of non-compliance are linked to the deprivation of the 
privileges and rights that are specific for each steering mode. This means that: non-
compliance with hierarchical rules may ultimately lead through public sanctions to a 
limitation of citizenship, that non-compliance with market-based rules may lead through 
private sanctions to a limitation of market access, and that non-compliance with consen-
sus-based rules may lead through social sanctions to a limitation of participation. This 
distinction between different types of sanctions is related to the so-called license model 
according to which corporate behaviour can be explained by interactions between regula-
tory, economic and social licenses-to-operate resulting in the overarching idea of the 
multi-faceted license.798 
Importantly, there can be in practice a less clear dividing line between the steering 
modes of public and private regulation than may appear at first sight. As this study has 
shown, private regulation based on own-authority increasingly takes place within a tri-
angle of hierarchy, market, and consensus-seeking steering modes. This is certainly rele-
vant in a situation of asymmetrical relationships where a private regulator dominates a 
regulated party through market power, and consequently a situation has arisen of actual 
hierarchy. The same blurring of dividing lines can be recognised in certain forms of pub-
lic regulation that use market-based instruments to achieve public policy goals.  
Bindingness 
Focusing on bindingness, the pattern of pesticide risk regulation and its reconfiguration 
can be characterised by an increased emphasis on voluntary and, hence, non-binding 
forms of regulation. In principle, primary and secondary legislation and co-regulation are 
mandatory and, hence, binding forms of regulation, whereas private regulation has a vol-
untary and thus non-binding nature. However, this distinction between mandatory and 
voluntary regulation is in practice more ambiguous. Figure 9.1 aims to illustrate these 
nuances in bindingness. Whereas the horizontal axis refers to the distinction between 
public and private regulation, the vertical axis provides a distinction between de facto 
binding and de facto non-binding. As a result, the figure proposes the following categori-
sation: public regulation that is legally binding (hard regulation), public regulation that is 
binding in theory but non-binding in practice (‘soft’ hard regulation), private regulation 
that is non-binding in theory and practice (soft regulation), and private regulation that is 
non-binding in theory but binding in practice (‘hard’ soft regulation). Looking back at 
several decades of pesticide risk regulation, it is apparent that most regulatory develop-
ments have taken place in the private domain and hence can be characterised as soft or 
‘hard’ soft regulation.  
                                                   
798
  N. Gunningham (2007). Regulatory reform beyond command and control. Paper presented at 
the Amsterdam Conference on the Human Dimensions of Global Environmental Change, 
Earth System Governance: Theories and Strategies for Sustainability, 24-26 May 2007, 17 p. 
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                                                               De facto binding  
‘Hard’ soft regulation 
Single-actor regulation  
 
 
 
Private regulation 
                                                Hard regulation 
International conventions 
EU legislation 
National legislation 
 
                                                Public regulation 
 
Self-regulation 
Multi-actor regulation 
Regulation by international organisations 
 
Soft regulation 
 
Mandatory rules that are not being monitored 
and/or enforced 
 
 
                                      ‘Soft’ hard regulation 
                                                              De facto non-binding 
Figure 9.1 Variations in de facto bindingness of pesticide risk regulation 
 
9.3 The pattern of pesticide risk regulation and sustainable 
development 
This section draws conclusions about the pattern of pesticide risk regulation and its re-
configuration from the point of view of sustainable development. First, it focuses on 
regulatory objectives. Second, it examines regulatory activity in relation to the different 
stages in the pesticide life-cycle. Third, it investigates the effectiveness, inclusiveness, 
and fairness of state and non-state actor regulation. 
Regulatory objectives 
Focusing on regulatory objectives, the pattern of pesticide risk regulation and its recon-
figuration can be characterised by an increased variety of interests and objectives. 
Whereas the initial focus of pesticide risk regulation was almost exclusively on the pro-
tection of national agriculture against pests from other countries and thus an increase of 
national agricultural production, the emphasis has subsequently shifted in the direction 
of international economic interests, such as the harmonisation of the market for pesticide 
products, the facilitation of trade in agricultural products, and the stimulation of em-
ployment in the chemical industry. Simultaneously, objectives of environmental and 
human health protection have also come to the fore. 
Thus far, the argument of consumer health protection has been the main point of lever-
age for non-state actors to establish regulation aimed at pesticide risk reduction. Worker 
health and environment have had a secondary priority. Looking at the near future, it can 
be expected that consumer health protection will remain a high priority as new scientific 
evidence is continuously emerging, for example about hormone disruptive substances 
and substances potentially triggering Parkinson’s disease. In some respects, consumer 
health can be instrumental in reducing pesticide risks for the environment as well as 
worker health, but this is not necessarily the case. 
A recurrent theme in the debates on the regulation of pesticides concerns the determina-
tion of risk and the interpretation of scientific evidence. The interpretation of the actual 
risks involved and potential hazards differs widely between actors across levels and there 
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are also differences of opinion about the safety margins to be taken into account in deci-
sion-making and the level of precaution to be considered. This divergence of interpreta-
tions and opinions is, for example, illustrated by the different status of pesticide sub-
stances under different regulatory regimes.  
In addition, actors may differ in their ideas about risk management options. A major is-
sue concerns the question whether the ultimate objective of pesticide law and policy 
should be risk reduction as such, or combined with dependency and/or use reduction. As 
can be concluded from this study, the present pattern of regulation reflects a broad con-
sensus about the objective of risk reduction but less agreement about the reduction of 
dependency and use. At the national level, however, regulatory patterns can be radically 
different, as the examples of the Scandinavian countries demonstrate, putting consider-
able emphasis on dependency and use reduction.   
The consequence of multiple, and often opposing, interests and objectives is that they 
have to be weighed against each other in decision-making processes. As this study has 
shown, state actors at governmental level have experienced difficulties to find a balance 
between the diverging interests at play in the past decades. At different levels, state ac-
tors have been muddling through in establishing a coherent and effective law and policy 
on pesticides. This is, for example, demonstrated by the fact that the decisions concern-
ing the objectives of legislation and their interpretation are often controversial and the 
definition process of crucial concepts postponed, as is evident from the case study of the 
Netherlands, but also from the EU legislation on pesticides, the FAO Code of Conduct 
and the Rotterdam Convention. In response to this paralysis of state actors, non-state ac-
tors have increasingly taken over the regulatory initiative in pesticide risk reduction mat-
ters, arguably better equipped to reconcile diverging objectives. In their new role, they 
increasingly claim to function as ‘agents of change’ in the process towards food safety 
and sustainability.  
A side-effect of the current regulatory pattern, as pointed out in the case study on tomato 
production, is that it favours the economic interests of multinational companies in the 
pesticide industry, seed industry, and food and retailing industry, because it facilitates a 
consolidation of market share and power through the establishment of additional govern-
ance structures. The increased influence of multinational companies has led to two op-
posing trends. On the one hand, it has resulted in an increased standardisation and com-
modification of the bulk of agricultural produce by creating increasingly homogeneous 
products. On the other hand, it has led to de-commodification through the development 
of specialty products based on high-technology for niche markets. Both developments 
have taken place at the expense of traditional agricultural biodiversity.  
Life-cycle of pesticides 
Focusing on the pesticide life-cycle, the pattern of pesticide risk regulation and its recon-
figuration can be characterised by a shift towards greater involvement of non-state actors 
in the stages of production, marketing, use and residues. The pattern in the production 
stage has relatively changed the least and is still primarily being determined by state ac-
tors. Concerning the marketing stage, the pattern has become more diverse over the 
years, with state and non-state actors both regulating the status of pesticide substances, 
but with state actors still in the dominant position. In the use stage, the pattern has be-
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come equally diverse but with an arguably increased dominance of non-state actors. The 
regulatory pattern has also changed considerably in the residue stage, and is now being 
determined by state as well as non-state actors.  
Looking at the regulatory activity in the different stages of the pesticide life-cycle, it is 
apparent that state actors have concentrated so far on the marketing and residue stages, 
whereas non-state actors have focused especially on the use and residue stages. Notably, 
the group of non-state actors is far from homogeneous and consequently the focus of 
their activities diverges. From the examination of non-state actor initiatives, it is evident 
that civil society initiatives primarily focus on the use stage of pesticides whereas corpo-
rate initiatives put the emphasis on food safety aspects, such as pesticide residues in food 
products.  
As a result of the regulatory activity of state and non-state actors, the density of rules is 
relatively high in relation to residues which from the point of view of regulatory effi-
ciency can be seen as counterproductive because the more advanced the stage in the life-
cycle, the higher the costs of monitoring and enforcement. However, as long as con-
sumer health is a higher priority on the agenda of politicians and broader society than the 
protection of the environment and worker health, the incidence of residues will remain 
the main point of leverage for enacting new rules and regulations by state and non-state 
actors.  
In contrast to the high regulatory activity in the residue stage, the level of activity is rela-
tively low in the production stage. As the experience with persistent organic pollutants 
has demonstrated, it takes many years before even the most hazardous substances can be 
eliminated. In this respect, it is important to note that as long as a substance is being pro-
duced, it can always make a re-entry in agricultural production. In the end, a production 
ban at the international level is the most effective instrument to reduce pesticide risks. In 
this respect, the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants has finally pro-
vided the means for the demise of several of the most hazardous substances by phasing 
out their production, marketing and use.  
Significantly, the current distribution of regulatory activity and rule density may indicate 
that a lack of production regulation at the international level leads to compensation 
through the regulation of the marketing, use and residues stages at other levels. Hence, 
the regulation of these stages may function in fact as a substitute for a global production 
ban, but leads at the same time to uneven levels of protection of the environment and 
human health worldwide. 
Effectiveness, inclusiveness and fairness 
As defined in Section 2.4.3, the criterion of effectiveness refers to the contribution that a 
regulatory approach delivers towards the objective of reducing environmental and hu-
man health risks associated with pesticide use. At the international level, the conclusion 
is that although the instruments of international law have a complementary character 
from a life cycle perspective, this does not mean that pesticide risks are adequately cov-
ered. First, these instruments focus on a selection of the more hazardous substances, 
many of which are no longer significant in agriculture, and have barely any influence on 
the production, marketing and use of the majority of ‘regular’ harmful pesticides. Sec-
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ond, the instruments do not provide an impetus for agricultural producers to change their 
behaviour and become less pesticide dependent, as they do not provide an alternative 
perspective on how to deal with pest related problems. Third, the design of these instru-
ments is such that their implementation may induce negative side-effects, such as the in-
creased use of other hazardous pesticides and increased illegal trade in banned pesti-
cides. 
At the EU level, the conclusion is that despite a range of legislative measures that affect 
the different stages of the pesticide life-cycle, progress towards pesticide risk reduction 
has been slow. There are even indications that pesticide use in fruit and vegetables pro-
duction is on the increase and the EU residue monitoring exercises suggest that agricul-
tural producers are using a growing number of different pesticide products on each crop. 
The inadequacy of the EU pesticide legislation has several reasons. First, the EU instru-
ments do not provide a sufficient incentive for agricultural producers to change their pes-
ticide use patterns and become less pesticide dependent. Second, the residues legislation 
does not provide aggregate MRLs for multiple residues and does not take into account 
the possibility of synergistic health effects. Third, the compliance and enforcement 
mechanisms of the legislation have been insufficient, which is signalled by the increased 
use of illegal substances.  
At the transnational level, the conclusion is that the emergence of private regulation has 
certainly been a positive step forward to reduce pesticide risks and has helped to create a 
favourable climate for a transition towards more sustainable forms of agriculture. As is 
evident from the examples of the IFOAM organic guarantee system and the GlobalGAP 
programme for fruit and vegetables, such regulation has been an impetus for agricultural 
producers to change their agricultural production methods in various positive ways.  
In sum, the combined regulatory approaches by state and non-state actors have provided 
a certain impetus to reduce environmental and human health risks in the different stages 
of the pesticide life-cycle. In addition, the effectiveness of these regulatory approaches 
has been further strengthened by synergetic interaction in vertical, horizontal and diago-
nal directions. However, on a global scale the progress achieved can be considered mar-
ginal. The experiences of the past 50 years have shown that the environmental and hu-
man health risks of pesticides are difficult to control and that an adequate level of protec-
tion is not evenly shared between all countries and citizens. More precisely, the current 
regulatory pattern mostly benefits the protection of the environment and human health in 
developed countries, but is lesser effective for developing countries with emerging 
economies and those with economies lagging behind. For example, despite the introduc-
tion of less harmful pesticides through technological innovation, the use of older sub-
stances from the highest WHO hazard classes is still commonplace in poorer countries 
that often have less strict authorisation rules and enforcement. In order to improve the ef-
fectiveness of the complex of rules, their adequacy needs additional attention. 
As defined in Section 2.4.3, the criterion of inclusiveness refers to the involvement of the 
stakeholders concerned in processes of rule-making, rule-implementation and rule-
enforcement. At the international level, the conclusion is that the participation of non-
state actors in processes of rule-making and -implementation has expanded enormously 
in the last decade, but is not evenly shared. First, the procedures for inclusion of new 
substances under the Rotterdam and Stockholm Conventions provide a number of barri-
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ers for developing countries. Second, a higher level of participation may conceal the fact 
that not all stakeholders are organised in such a way that they are able to voice their in-
terests sufficiently. Concerning pesticide risk regulation, farmers and farmers’ organisa-
tions in both developed and developing countries are most often absent.  
At the EU level, the conclusion is that the EU has clearly invested in increased stake-
holder involvement and participation in decision-making. It remains, however, unclear 
how far this commitment goes and if the EU’s efforts deliver a meaningful contribution 
to the end result. First, the experiences so far reveal that there are stakeholders with a 
voice, and those without. Second, it is not transparent to what extent the outcomes of 
stakeholder consultations and participatory processes affect the actual decision-making. 
At the transnational level, the conclusion is that although the programmes of IFOAM 
and GlobalGAP both claim to adhere to democratic principles, their level of stakeholder 
involvement and participation is widely divergent in practice. Importantly, IFOAM has 
pledged to comply with the ISEAL Code of Good Practice for Setting Social and Envi-
ronmental Standards that contains criteria for participation in standard development 
processes. It furthermore has a fully transparent procedure for the revision of standards. 
GlobalGAP, in contrast, is not a member of the ISEAL Alliance. Although the stake-
holders concerned have in principle the right to comment on draft versions of normative 
and procedural documents, it is not transparent to what extent their comments are taken 
into account. 
In sum, it is evident that both state and non-state actors are increasingly aiming at higher 
levels of inclusiveness in regulatory processes. However, increased inclusiveness does 
not automatically lead to better decisions and better compliance. In order to enhance the 
inclusiveness of the complex of rules, the quality of participatory processes needs addi-
tional attention. 
As defined in Section 2.4.3, the criterion of fairness refers to the impacts of a regulatory 
approach on the distribution of costs and benefits in the supply chains of agricultural 
products, and ultimately on the marketing opportunities for agricultural producers. At the 
international level, the conclusion is that the harmonising effects of the Rotterdam and 
Stockholm Conventions outweigh potential distorting impacts on trade. It should be 
noted that MEAs are the preferred approach by the WTO, as they have in principle har-
monising effects, although these can be hampered by non-ratifications and national ex-
ceptions.  
At the EU level, the conclusion is that the regulatory situation in the EU with all kinds of 
different types of rules and regulations at EU and Member State levels is confusing and 
not transparent. With the new regulation on pesticide residues, the system has become 
simpler and more transparent, because all MRLs are set at the EU level. At the same 
time, the norms have become stricter as the default value for pesticide substances with-
drawn from the Community market has been established at the lowest level of determi-
nation. Moreover, with its focus on a high level of consumer protection, the legislation 
asks in fact for a revision of all existing MRLs, which could eventually lead to the crea-
tion of extra non-tariff trade barriers for agricultural producers located outside the EU. 
Notably, it has not been clarified as yet to what extent the new EU Residues Regulation 
is compatible with the WTO provisions. 
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At the transnational level, the conclusion is that private regulation may have positive as 
well as negative impacts on market access. Such initiatives may open up market oppor-
tunities for some groups of producers and may provide barriers for others. This depends 
on a broad variety of factors, such as institutional infrastructure, qualified laboratories, 
skilled personnel, competitive structures, and costs of labour and capital. Interestingly, 
development assistance organisations increasingly refer to specific forms of private regu-
lation in their cooperation projects with developing countries. In general, however, the 
positive impacts of such regulation is more strongly felt by large producers and the nega-
tive impacts more strongly by small producers. 
Focusing on financial aspects, it is one of the main characteristics of non-state actor 
regulation that the costs of regulation and compliance are shifted to the regulated. With 
regard to the IFOAM system, agricultural producers carry a large part of the operational 
and adaptation costs, but these costs are compensated by the premium prices that are be-
ing paid for organic produce. In addition, IFOAM has introduced new forms of certifica-
tion, such as smallholder group certification and participatory guarantee systems, in or-
der to reduce the financial burden for small producers, 
In relation to GlobalGAP, agricultural producers carry nearly all costs of the regulatory 
system without the compensation of price premiums. More precisely, producers are re-
sponsible for the costs of adapting their production operation to the applicable standards, 
for the costs of the certification process, and increasingly for the costs of the operation 
and maintenance of the GlobalGAP system as such. Besides these direct costs, the sys-
tem is organized in such a way that liability for product failure is shifted to producers. 
Significantly, GlobalGAP is currently being scrutinized by the WTO, more precisely the 
SPS Committee, about what has been called by Mexico a ‘systemic issue’. Notably, it 
seems that the WTO agreements are not tailored to deal with global certification pro-
grammes because the trade rules address national governments, which are powerless in 
the face of transnational regulation by non-state actors. Hence, these programmes oper-
ate more or less in a legal vacuum. In order to enhance the fairness of the complex of 
rules, the position of small producers needs additional attention. 
9.4 The outlines of a normative and procedural framework 
The previous sections have discussed several characteristics of the pattern of pesticide 
risk regulation and its current reconfiguration. Among the main shifts in governance 
have been a shift towards increased regulation at the international and transnational 
level, a shift towards increased involvement of non-state actors in regulatory processes, a 
shift towards an emphasis on non-binding forms of regulation, and a shift towards the in-
creased regulation of further advanced stages of the pesticide life-cycle. 
In order to achieve the objective of responsibly dealing with pesticides by 2020, as 
agreed during the Johannesburg Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002, it is nec-
essary to strengthen the normative and procedural framework for pesticide risk reduc-
tion. In particular, the emphasis should be on how to improve the balance of regulatory 
power, the adequacy of rules, the quality of participation, and the position of small agri-
cultural producers.  
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Balance of regulatory power 
In order to restore the balance of regulatory power, the current division of authority and 
responsibility between state and non-state actors needs reconsideration. From the public 
policy perspective, private regulation can be assumed to have certain advantages in com-
parison with public regulation, such as greater flexibility and adaptability of rules and 
the availability of expert knowledge. An additional argument in favour of private regula-
tion is that the costs of rule-making, rule-implementation and rule-enforcement are 
shifted to the regulated concerned. Under certain conditions, this can be considered as a 
form of internalisation of costs and, hence, an application of the polluter-pays principle. 
Furthermore, private regulation can fulfil several functions in the ‘shadow of the law’, 
such as providing a testing ground for regulation, preparing a suitable environment for 
regulation, and offering adequate mechanisms for compliance and control.799  
However, there are also important limitations to the potential of private regulation to 
help solve public policy problems, First, the scope of private regulation is limited, as the 
norm addressees are often a selected group. The addressees of the GlobalGAP pro-
gramme, for example, are the agricultural producers that already have a relationship with 
the European retailers, or are in the race to capture such a position. Thus, the programme 
will not reach those suppliers who use other distribution channels to sell their produce. 
Second, it is important to recognise that some functions can only be performed by the 
state, such as ensuring the balance of regulatory power and the coordination of regula-
tory efforts.800 The example of pesticide risk regulation has shown that state actors ex-
perience difficulties with the execution of these functions and have increasingly trans-
ferred the regulatory initiative into the hands of the private sector, arguably loosing con-
trol.  
The limitations of private regulation have as a consequence that non-state actors can at 
best perform a transitional or complementary function in achieving public policy objec-
tives. Thus, private regulation can be considered part of the solution but not the solution 
in itself. In order to respond to these limitations of private regulation, it is argued that 
state actors should take back their primary responsibility for regulation, and develop a 
longer-term vision on pesticide risk reduction strategies to be established in appropriate 
frameworks of normative and procedural rules. In addition, state actors should adapt to 
the present regulatory reconfiguration by strengthening their steering and coordination 
capacities and applying the possibilities that competition and anti-trust legislation offer 
more rigorously.  
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  See e.g.: G. Salmon (2002). Voluntary sustainability standards and labels (VSSLs): the case 
for fostering them. Background paper for the Round Table on Sustainable Development. 
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Hence, state actors should aim to resume their responsibility as main regulators. At the 
same time, they should take advantage of the initiatives developed by non-state actors. 
Most importantly, the co-existence of state and non-state actor approaches could be the 
ideal starting point for developing a ‘smart’ mix of instruments to help agricultural pro-
ducers make a transition towards sustainable agriculture. Accordingly, Gunningham 
(2007) has argued that “there is not one solution, but it is essentially about seeking the 
right combination of partial solutions at different levels.”801 
As part of this smart mix, non-state actors can contribute to a further reduction of pesti-
cide risks by developing competing initiatives using self-regulatory or multi-stakeholder 
approaches. The latter approaches could be based on existing models, such as a steward-
ship council, a commodity roundtable, or a community-based initiative.802  
Adequacy of rules 
In order to enhance the adequacy of rules, it is necessary to further develop the norma-
tive framework for pesticide risk reduction and make it more ambitious, encompassing 
and coherent. The main argument to regulate pesticide issues as much as possible at the 
international level is to achieve harmonisation not only in terms of trade opportunities 
but also in relation to the protection of the environment and human health.803 Impor-
tantly, regulatory activity at other levels should take place within certain boundaries im-
posed by international law and in accordance with the principles of sovereignty and sub-
sidiarity. 
For a framework of normative rules, the FAO Code of Conduct on the Distribution and 
Use of Pesticides could serve as a point of departure, since it covers in principle all 
stages of the pesticide life-cycle and targets all pesticide substances. In addition, such a 
global law on pesticide risk reduction should consist of the following basic elements at 
least: 
• Production stage: To phase out the hazardous substances from the WHO hazard 
classes of extremely hazardous (IA), highly hazardous (IB), moderately hazardous 
(II), and, as far as feasible, slightly hazardous (III) substances.  
• Marketing stage: To apply the precautionary and substitution principles more strictly 
during authorisation of pesticide substances and products. 
• Use stage:  
• To give an increased priority to the elaboration of internationally harmonised 
guidelines for IPM and their implementation in practice; 
• To start developing internationally harmonised definitions and guidelines for 
agricultural production methods aiming at higher levels of integration; 
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  N. Gunningham (2007). 
802
  Examples of multistakeholder approaches include: the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), the 
Marine Stewardship Council (MSC), the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO), the 
Sustainable Commodity Initiative (SCI), and Community Supported Agriculture (CSA). 
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  S. Karlsson (2000). Multlayered governance. Pesticides in the South – environmental con-
cerns in a globalised world. Academic dissertation. Linköping: Linköping University, 397 p. 
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• To apply the polluter pays principle more widely, for example by taxing the 
production, marketing and/or use of hazardous, patent-free pesticide products 
and to deposit the revenues in the Global IPM Facility. 
• To stimulate non-state actors to develop programmes using self-regulatory 
and multi-stakeholder approaches. 
• Residue stage: To formulate aggregate MRLs and a final goal of residue-free pro-
duce.  
With a view to the use stage of pesticides, it is important for the longer-term that state 
actors develop a vision on the transition towards sustainable agricultural production 
methods. Such a transition can only happen step by step and will take many years. 
Therefore, this vision should be accompanied with concrete targets and timetables. Con-
sidering the conversion to IPM as a first step in a process towards further risk reduction, 
it is important, with a view to the progressive development of norms in the longer term, 
to examine the content of concepts with a higher level of integration. 
   
Conventional agriculture     -     IPM    -     ICM     -     IP         
                                                                                        Organic agriculture 
 
 
Increased level of integration 
Decreased level of pesticide risks 
 
Figure 9.2  
 
As a general rule, and as pointed out in Figure 9.2, it is argued that the higher the level of 
integration, the lower the level of pesticide risks. However, this statement needs some 
nuance as the extent of risk reduction largely depends on the definitions of the concepts 
concerned and their application in agricultural practice. There are strong and weak defi-
nitions in place for innovative agricultural production methods, such as organic agricul-
ture and integrated control. Such weak definitions may have counterproductive effects. 
For example, a weak definition of organic agriculture, that does not restrict the use of 
off-farm inputs, could increase the risk that non-synthetic pesticides are increasingly 
used as substitutes for synthetic pesticide products. A weak definition of integrated con-
trol that does not include a priority ladder of measures could have the effect that agricul-
tural producers will go on with business-as-usual.  
Quality of participation 
In order to improve the quality of participation, it is important to develop minimum crite-
ria for participatory processes, covering aspects of representation, due process, and de-
liberation.804 More precisely, these criteria should include that: a) the relevant stake-
                                                   
804
  See e.g.: J.S. Dryzek (2002). Deliberative democracy and beyond: liberals, critics, contesta-
tions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 306 p, and S. Courville (2003). Social accountability 
audits: challenging or defending democratic governance. In: Law and Policy, vol. 25, no. 3, 
pp. 269-297,  
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holders are represented in the decision-making process in a balanced manner, b) the ap-
propriate procedural arrangements are in place, and c) the exchange of arguments pre-
ceding decision-making represents a certain deliberative quality.  
Currently, there is no principle of international law covering all these different aspects of 
inclusiveness in a broad and encompassing manner. However, several principles and 
procedural rules have some common features and could offer a first point of departure. 
The principle of participation in the Rio Declaration, for example, covers the involve-
ment of the citizens concerned.805 In addition, the principle of good governance in the 
ILA New Delhi Declaration emphasizes the adoption of democratic and transparent deci-
sion-making procedures and respect for the rule of law and human rights.806 Further-
more, aspects of inclusive decision-making are partly incorporated in the procedural 
rules that have been defined by the TBT Committee, ISO and the ISEAL Alliance. 
Linking up with these existing rules, there are several options for improving the proce-
dural framework. These options are not mutually exclusive but could be complementary. 
The first option includes the adaptation of the principles of the international law on sus-
tainable development and specifically aims at the further evolution of the principle of 
participation as incorporated in the Rio Declaration and ILA New Delhi Declaration. The 
second option relates to the formulation of criteria of good regulation, which is essen-
tially a further elaboration of the TBT Agreement, and more specifically the Code of 
Good Practice. The third option implies a code of conduct for participatory processes 
aimed at the procedural upgrading and harmonisation of standard setting processes by 
non-state actors. Significantly, the International Social and Environmental Accreditation 
and Labelling Alliance (ISEAL Alliance) published a Code of Good Practice for Setting 
Social and Environmental Standards in 2004, that is a further specification of the work 
done by ISO and the WTO in relation to standardisation.807 The ISEAL Code contains 
procedural requirements for the development of standards, elaborates on their effective-
ness, relevance and international harmonisation, and gives criteria for participation in the 
standard development process. The development of this code means that non-state actors 
themselves are making an effort to exercise control over the quality of standard setting 
by private entities. 
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Position of small producers 
In order to improve the position of small producers, it is necessary to emphasize the im-
plementation of the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, as formu-
lated in the Rio Declaration and the ILA New Delhi Declaration.808 In the context of de-
veloped and developing countries, such implementation should include at least: a) a 
more even sharing of knowledge and information, b) a more generous provision of tech-
nical and financial assistance, and c) a more strict legislation on global competition.809 
Most importantly, however, it is argued that the relevance of the dividing line between 
developed and developing countries is shifting, as multinational companies are increas-
ingly taking over agricultural export production in developed as well as developing 
countries. In terms of human and financial resources, they are generally better equipped 
for dealing with additional regulatory requirements. This means that the critical distinc-
tive criterion has increasingly become the ownership structure of agricultural undertak-
ings instead of geographical location, which again provides an argument for stricter 
competition and anti-trust legislation on a global scale.  
9.5 The concept of legal pluralism in retrospect 
The theoretical concept of legal pluralism has been used in this study to analyse patterns 
and processes of regulation. By offering a pluralist perspective, the concept emphasizes 
the dynamics of regulatory processes and thus aims to cope with the globalisation of law 
and transnationalisation of regulation. Focusing on the issue-area of pesticide risk reduc-
tion, it is evident that the approaches developed by non-state actors are indeed sophisti-
cated rule systems. Moreover, they perform similar functions as those established by 
state actors and are perceived by the addressees as having at least a similar binding force. 
A merit of the concept of legal pluralism is that it stimulates to take these forms of pri-
vate regulation seriously in a legal context and to understand that they are lasting phe-
nomena. It thus draws the attention to issues related to the distribution of power and re-
sponsibility for steering. Moreover, the concept provides a bridge between law and so-
cial sciences, in particular political sciences, and can open up new opportunities for mu-
tual understanding and exchange between the disciplines.  
Returning to the observation of Santos that in fact two types of transnationalisation are 
emerging in the legal field, one organized by “world capitalism” and the other by the 
“dominated, exploited and oppressed social groups and interests”, this study concludes 
that the transnational rules in the issue-area of pesticide risk reduction are indeed being 
determined by two different groups of non-state actors. However, the actual contrast be-
tween the two groups is arguably less dramatic than phrased by Santos. Notably, the rise 
of organic agriculture certification has shown that a bottom-up regulatory system created 
by small farmer and consumer movements can serve as a catalyst in launching a viable 
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alternative for conventional agriculture, as has been increasingly recognised by state ac-
tors and international organisations.810   
Teubner has argued that contemporary law will grow mainly from the social peripheries, 
not from the political centres of nation-states and international institutions. Although 
there may be some truth in this statement, it deserves at the same time to be put in per-
spective and to be carefully scrutinized, as this study has shown. More specifically, it 
should be realised that regulation by non-state actors is not merely a spontaneous form of 
rule-making but that the legal order created by state actors has facilitated, or even stimu-
lated, the emergence of non-state actor regulation. The reason that non-state actor ap-
proaches have started to proliferate can indeed be found in the hesitance of state actors to 
develop normative frameworks for the protection of the environment and human health 
at the international level, as has been the case in the issue-area of pesticide risk reduc-
tion. Moreover, regulatory initiatives of the private sector have been fuelled by the lack 
of mechanisms to restrain economic power. Thus, the argument is that state actors have 
at least been accomplice to the rise of private governance. 
The question remains whether private regulation can be called law, as this term has hith-
erto been reserved for legislative activity originating in the state. Asking this question 
means returning to earlier debates about what law essentially is and refers to the standard 
work by Hart about the concept of law.811 More precisely, the discussion is about the 
crucial criterion for determining what constitutes law: form or function. In this context, it 
is without doubt that legal pluralists put function above form, and that legal positivists 
prefer the reverse. Consequently, private regulation based on own authority is law in the 
perception of legal pluralists and non-law for positivists. This difference of opinion is of 
such a fundamental nature that it seems nearly impossible to provide a definitive answer. 
It is therefore argued to formulate a compromise and stay on the safe side, preferably us-
ing the term regulatory pluralism instead of legal pluralism. At the same time, the in-
sights developed by the proponents of legal pluralism should be recognised as extremely 
valuable for developing solutions to contemporary problems of unsustainable economic 
globalisation.  
Focusing on the five-step research approach applied in this study, the conclusion is that it 
has provided a useful tool for understanding regulatory processes in which state and non-
state actors fulfil important, and often complementary, roles. During the research, several 
adaptations have been made to the approach based on the following lessons learned. 
With regard to step 1, the identification of sites of governance, it is important to limit the 
issue-area under consideration as strictly as possible in order to make it possible to do 
more in-depth research. In order to get an overview of the area under research, it can be 
helpful to describe the evolution of law and policy in the specific area. With regard to 
step 2, the description of rule systems, it is important to focus not only on content but 
especially on the institutional structure and the division of power in the different stages 
of the regulatory process in order to be able to place the initiative in a larger context. 
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With regard to step 3, the evaluation of rule-systems, it is important to develop clearly 
defined subcriteria in an early stage of the research. With regard to step 4, the analysis of 
interaction, it is important to focus on specific themes, and analyse processes of mutual 
interaction emphasizing the roles of state and non-state actors. With regard to step 5, the 
construction of the regulatory pattern, it is important to choose various points of view in 
order to highlight the main shifts in governance. 
9.6 Final observations 
This study has given an example of the regulatory reconfiguration that is currently taking 
place in the relationships between state and non-state actors in a broader context. Com-
parable phenomena as have been found in the issue-area of pesticide risk reduction can 
be found in other issue-areas. More precisely, this reconfiguration can be considered an 
expression of increased tendencies at deregulation and privatisation, which can be aptly 
summarised as the globalisation of law. In the new configuration, rules have increasingly 
become an arena of competition, an important means of obtaining and maintaining eco-
nomic power.  
From the perspective of law, the challenge is to find new answers to deal with “creeping 
globalisation, seemingly unstoppable and impossible to fully comprehend.”812 However, 
one of the pitfalls in responding to the current explosion of rules is the creation of addi-
tional layers of rules in a haphazard way.813 The option for the longer term should pref-
erably be a move towards comprehensive frameworks at the international level that are 
based more strongly on values of equity, sustainability, and stewardship. 
Saving a last remark for pesticide risk reduction: this study has argued that considera-
tions of consumer health have thus far been the main vehicle for regulatory approaches 
targeting pesticides. Due to new scientific findings about linkages between pesticides 
and major diseases, and fuelled by increasing concerns of the public, it can be expected 
that these considerations will gain additional strength in the next couple of years. How-
ever, it is not unthinkable that a fresh impetus for an accelerated conversion to more sus-
tainable forms of agriculture will also come from different angles, as the evidence of the 
nutritional differences between conventional and organically produced agricultural prod-
ucts is mounting in favour of organic produce.814 In addition, the current debate about 
the limitation of food miles is pushing local agricultural production. Such a shift could 
have as side-effect that patterns of agricultural production and pesticide use will change. 
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Summary  
Regulating pesticide risk reduction: the practice and dynamics of legal plural-
ism  
 
The challenge of pesticide risk reduction 
Synthetic pesticides have become widely used in the past century to combat agricultural 
pests and diseases, and hence to achieve higher yields. However, their inherently toxic 
properties are also the reason that pesticides may cause harm to the environment and 
human health during the different stages of their life-cycle, that in its simplest form con-
sists of the stages of production, marketing, use, and residues. In the production stage, 
site-specific emissions to the environment may occur as the result of production proc-
esses of pesticide substances and products, and workers in pesticide plants and people 
living in the neighbourhood of such production facilities may be at risk of exposure to 
hazardous emissions and industrial accidents. 
In the marketing stage, emissions may take place during transport and by leaching from 
storage depots. Such depots may form a considerable risk for the local population, espe-
cially in developing countries and countries with economies in transition. In the use 
stage, emissions are related to the fact that pesticides are never used entirely efficiently 
by the receiving crops. Small but significant quantities of pesticides are lost directly to 
the environment, and may also result in negative impacts on biodiversity, climate condi-
tions and the ozone layer. People working at farms and those living next to fields and 
greenhouses may experience damage to their health due to pesticide impacts.  
In the residue stage, consumers may be exposed to critical levels of pesticide residues in 
food that could cause chronic or acute health effects. Despite scientific effort in this area, 
the debate on the health implications of pesticide residues is still surrounded with many 
scientific uncertainties. Such uncertainties inter alia include the potential of pesticides to 
cause cancer, to disrupt the hormone and reproductive system, and to bring damage to 
the nervous system. In general, there is a lack of reliable data on the long-term conse-
quences of exposure to pesticide residues and on the ‘cocktail’ effects of multiple resi-
dues. Children are considered to be most vulnerable to pesticide residues, because their 
bodies are still developing and they are exposed to relatively higher doses than grown-up 
people. 
The research objectives and question 
In order to contribute to the discussion about the management of pesticide risks, this 
study aims to investigate the regulatory efforts of state and non-state actors to reduce 
those risks and make a transition towards the production of safe and sustainable food 
products. The study has the following objectives: 
• To identify, analyse, and assess current regulatory approaches by state and non-state 
actors aimed at pesticide risk reduction; 
• To analyse the interaction between the different regulatory approaches, and  
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• To construct the resulting pattern of regulation and identify options for improvement. 
 
 
Based on these research objectives, the study has the following overarching research 
question: 
How is pesticide risk reduction regulated considered from the perspectives of le-
gal pluralism and sustainable development and what are the options for im-
provement? 
The concept of legal pluralism and its application 
The theoretical approach of this study is based on the concept of legal pluralism that 
stretches the boundaries of law in response to the emergence of new sites and forms of 
governance, in which non-state actors are performing prominent regulatory roles. Impor-
tantly, it recognises different types of normative activity without discriminating between 
them on the basis of their origin and source. This means that all normative activities are 
considered to operate on an equal level, which makes it possible to focus the attention to 
the interaction between different normative orders, thus providing a dynamic perspective 
and more depth to the analysis of contemporary societal reality.  
In order to apply the theoretical concept of legal pluralism to the concrete issue-area of 
pesticide risk reduction, the study has elaborated a structured approach, consisting of 
five steps: 1) the delineation of the issue-area under consideration and the identification 
of the regulating actors, 2) the description of rule systems created and operated by the 
sites of governance concerned, 3) the evaluation of rule systems on the basis of criteria 
derived from an interpretation of the concept of sustainable development, including ef-
fectiveness, inclusiveness, and fairness, 4) the analysis of interaction between rule sys-
tems, and 5) the construction of the resulting pattern of regulation and the identification 
of options for improvement. 
In addition, the study has explored the practice of legal pluralism by elaborating two 
non-comparative case studies. The first case study described the development of pesti-
cide law and policy in the Netherlands from the perspective of a national government 
that is increasingly confronted with European and also private regulation. The second 
case study used the example of tomato production to explain how legal pluralism affects 
agricultural producers by influencing the conditions for production and trading.  
The components of legal pluralism 
The study has focused on a selection of rule systems that have been identified as the 
main components of the complex of rules aimed at pesticide risk reduction. The legal 
tenets of the multilateral approach include the FAO International Code of Conduct on the 
Distribution and Use of Pesticides (1985), the Rotterdam Convention on the Prior In-
formed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in Interna-
tional Trade (1998), and the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants 
(2001). The legal tenets of the EU approach include Directive 91/414 concerning the 
placing on the market of plant protection products, Regulation No 396/2005 on maxi-
mum residue levels of pesticides in or on food and feed of plant and animal origin, and 
the proposed Directive establishing a framework for Community action to achieve a sus-
tainable use of pesticides. The most important components of the transnational approach 
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include the IFOAM organic guarantee system and the EurepGAP programme for fruit 
and vegetables.  
The pattern of pesticide risk regulation and legal pluralism 
Drawing the different threads of the analysis together, it is evident that the pattern of 
pesticide risk regulation has become increasingly diverse and complex in the past dec-
ades. Focusing on the division of regulatory roles, an increased regulatory involvement 
of non-state actors is evident in the public as well as private domain. Furthermore, the 
analysis shows that the relationships between actors at different sites of governance have 
become increasingly dynamic, mutually influencing the emergence of each other’s sub-
stantive and procedural rules.  
The greater involvement of non-state actors is reflected in a stronger emphasis on the 
development of private regulation. Notably, the rise of private regulation at the transna-
tional level evokes questions about the procedural safeguards for those regulatory varia-
tions and the dispute settlement mechanisms in place. Such safeguards cannot be found 
in legislation specifically established to serve this goal, but are scattered over various 
sources. Interestingly, several scholars of international law and international relations ar-
gue that a global administrative law is emerging, consisting of principles that aim to do 
justice to the interests of all the actors concerned. So far, these principles have been quite 
implicit and it is uncertain whether they can be invoked before a court. 
Strongly related to the fact that non-state actors from the private sector and civil society 
are increasingly performing regulatory roles, it is apparent that there has been a shift 
from hierarchy-based towards non-hierarchical steering modes based on market mecha-
nisms and consensus-seeking. Importantly, the dividing line between the different steer-
ing modes is in practice less clear-cut than the distinction suggests. As this study has 
shown, private regulation increasingly takes place within a triangle of hierarchy, market, 
and consensus-seeking steering modes. This is certainly relevant in a situation of asym-
metrical relationships where a private regulator dominates a regulated party through 
market power, and consequently a situation has arisen of actual hierarchy. Therefore, this 
type of regulation can be considered ‘hard’ soft regulation which is legally non-binding 
but binding in practice.  
The pattern of pesticide risk regulation and sustainable development 
Focusing on sustainability content, it is apparent that the pattern of pesticide risk regula-
tion and its reconfiguration can be characterised by an increased variety of interests and 
objectives. Whereas the initial focus of pesticide risk regulation was almost exclusively 
on the protection of national agriculture against pests from other countries and thus an 
increase of national agricultural production, the emphasis has subsequently shifted in the 
direction of serving international economic interests, such as the harmonisation of the 
market for pesticide products, the facilitation of trade in agricultural products, and the 
stimulation of employment in the chemical industry. Simultaneously, objectives of envi-
ronmental and human health protection have come to the fore. 
The consequence of multiple, and often opposing, interests and objectives is that they 
have to be weighed against each other in decision-making processes. As this study has 
shown, state actors at governmental level have experienced difficulties in the past dec-
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ades to find a balance between those diverging interests and objectives at play. This is, 
for example, demonstrated by the fact that the decisions concerning the objectives of leg-
islation and their interpretation are often controversial and the definition process of cru-
cial concepts postponed, as is evident from the case study of the Netherlands, but also 
from the EU legislation on pesticides, the FAO Code of Conduct, and the Rotterdam 
Convention. In response to this paralysis of state actors, non-state actors have increas-
ingly taken over the regulatory initiative in pesticide risk reduction matters, arguably bet-
ter equipped to reconcile diverging objectives. In their new role, they increasingly claim 
to function as ‘agents of change’ in the process towards food safety and sustainability.  
Thus far, the argument of consumer health protection has been the main point of lever-
age for non-state actors to establish regulation aimed at pesticide risk reduction. Worker 
health and environment have had a secondary priority. Looking at the near future, it can 
be expected that consumer health protection will remain a high priority as new scientific 
evidence is continuously emerging, for example about hormone disruptive substances 
and substances potentially triggering Parkinson’s disease. In some respects, consumer 
health can be instrumental in reducing pesticide risks for the environment as well as 
worker health, but this is not necessarily the case. 
The shift towards greater involvement of non-state actors is evident in nearly all stages 
of production, marketing, use and residues. However, state actors have concentrated so 
far on the marketing and residue stages, whereas non-state actors have focused especially 
on the use and residue stages. As a result, the density of rules about residues is relatively 
high which from the point of view of regulatory efficiency can be seen as counterproduc-
tive because the more advanced the intervention takes place in the pesticide life-cycle, 
the higher the costs of monitoring and enforcement.  
In contrast to the residue stage, the level of regulatory activity and density has relatively 
changed the least in the production stage and is primarily determined by state actors. As 
the experience with persistent organic pollutants demonstrates, it takes many years be-
fore even the most hazardous substances are eliminated. In this respect, it is important to 
note that as long as a substance is produced, it can always make a re-entry in the market. 
Importantly, the Stockholm Convention has finally provided the means for the demise of 
several of the most hazardous substances by phasing out their production, marketing and 
use.  
Significantly, the current distribution of regulatory activity may indicate that a lack of 
regulation of the production stage at the international level leads to compensation 
through the regulation of the marketing, use and residues stages at regional and national 
levels. Hence, the regulation of these stages may function in fact as a substitute for a 
global production ban, leading at the same time to uneven levels of protection of the en-
vironment and human health worldwide. 
With a view to the effectiveness of the complex of rules, the conclusion is that the com-
bined regulatory approaches by state and non-state actors have provided an impetus to 
reduce environmental and human health risks in the different stages of the pesticide life-
cycle. Moreover, it is apparent that the regulatory interaction has strengthened the inte-
gration of environmental and human health dimensions in pesticide risk regulation. In 
particular, the emergence of private regulation has been a positive step forward to reduce 
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pesticide risks and has helped to create a favourable climate for a transition towards 
more sustainable forms of agriculture. As is evident from the examples of the IFOAM 
organic guarantee system and the GlobalGAP programme for fruit and vegetables, such 
regulation has been an impetus for agricultural producers to change their agricultural 
production methods in various positive ways.  
However, on a global scale the progress achieved can be considered marginal. The ex-
periences of the past decades have shown that the environmental and human health risks 
of pesticides are difficult to control and that an adequate level of protection is not evenly 
shared between all countries and citizens. More precisely, the current regulatory pattern 
mostly benefits the protection of the environment and human health in developed coun-
tries, but is lesser effective for developing countries with emerging economies and those 
with economies lagging behind. For example, despite the introduction of less harmful 
pesticides through technological innovation, the use of older substances from the highest 
WHO hazard classes is still commonplace in poorer countries that often have a less strict 
authorisation and enforcement regime. Hence, in order to improve the effectiveness of 
the complex of rules, their adequacy needs additional attention. 
With a view to the inclusiveness of the complex of rules, the conclusion is that the par-
ticipation of non-state actors in processes of rule-making and -implementation has ex-
panded enormously, but is not evenly shared. In addition, increased inclusiveness does 
not automatically lead to better decisions and better compliance. Hence, in order to en-
hance the inclusiveness of the complex of rules, the quality of participatory processes 
needs additional attention. 
With a view to the fairness of the complex of rules, the conclusion is that transnational 
certification programmes may open up market opportunities for some groups of produc-
ers and may provide barriers for others. This depends on a broad variety of factors, such 
as institutional infrastructure, qualified laboratories, skilled personnel, competitive struc-
tures, and costs of labour and capital. Interestingly, development assistance organisations 
increasingly refer to specific private certification programmes in their cooperation pro-
jects with developing countries. In general, however, the positive impacts of such certifi-
cation programmes are more strongly felt by large producers and the negative impacts 
more strongly by small producers. Notably, it seems that the WTO agreements are not 
tailored to deal with transnational certification programmes because the trade rules ad-
dress national governments, which are relatively powerless in the face of transnational 
regulation by non-state actors. This means that these programmes operate more or less in 
a legal vacuum. Hence, in order to enhance the fairness of the complex of rules, the posi-
tion of small producers needs additional attention. 
The outlines of a normative and procedural framework 
In order to achieve the objective of responsibly dealing with pesticides by 2020, as 
agreed during the Johannesburg Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002, it is nec-
essary to strengthen the normative and procedural framework for pesticide risk reduc-
tion. In particular, the emphasis should be on the improvement of the balance of regula-
tory power, the adequacy of rules, the quality of participation, and the position of small 
agricultural producers.  
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In order to restore the balance of regulatory power, the current division of authority and 
responsibility between state and non-state actors needs reconsideration. Because of the 
limitations of private regulation, it is argued that state actors should take back their pri-
mary responsibility for regulation, and develop a longer-term vision on pesticide risk re-
duction strategies. In addition, state actors should adapt to the present regulatory recon-
figuration by strengthening their steering and coordination capacities and applying the 
possibilities that competition and anti-trust legislation offer more rigorously.  
At the same time, state actors should take advantage of the initiatives developed by non-
state actors. Most importantly, the co-existence of state and non-state actor approaches 
could be the ideal starting point for developing a ‘smart’ mix of instruments to help agri-
cultural producers make a transition towards sustainable agriculture. As part of this smart 
mix, non-state actors can contribute to a further reduction of pesticide risks by develop-
ing competing initiatives using self-regulatory or multi-stakeholder approaches. The lat-
ter approaches could be based on existing models, such as a stewardship council, a 
commodity roundtable, or a community-based initiative. 
In order to enhance the adequacy of rules, the normative framework for pesticide risk re-
duction needs further development by making it more ambitious, encompassing and co-
herent. The main argument to regulate pesticide issues as much as possible at the interna-
tional level is to achieve harmonisation not only in terms of trade opportunities but also 
in relation to the protection of the environment and human health. For a framework of 
normative rules, the FAO Code of Conduct on the Distribution and Use of Pesticides 
could serve as a point of departure, since it covers in principle all stages of the pesticide 
life-cycle and targets all pesticide substances. In addition, such a global law on pesticide 
risk reduction should consist of the following basic elements at least: 
• Production stage: To phase out the hazardous substances from the WHO hazard 
classes of extremely hazardous (IA), highly hazardous (IB), moderately hazardous 
(II), and, as far as feasible, slightly hazardous (III) substances.  
• Marketing stage: To apply the precautionary and substitution principles more strictly 
during authorisation of pesticide substances and products. 
• Use stage:  
• To give an increased priority to the elaboration of internationally harmonised 
guidelines for IPM and their implementation in practice; 
• To start developing internationally harmonised definitions and guidelines for 
agricultural production methods aiming at higher levels of integration; 
• To apply the polluter pays principle more widely, for example by taxing the 
production, marketing and/or use of hazardous, patent-free pesticide products 
and to deposit the revenues in the Global IPM Facility. 
• To stimulate non-state actors to develop programmes using self-regulatory 
and multi-stakeholder approaches. 
• Residue stage: To formulate aggregate MRLs and a final goal of residue-free pro-
duce.  
In order to improve the quality of participation, minimum criteria for participatory proc-
esses need to be developed. Such criteria could inter alia include the following: a) the 
relevant stakeholders are represented in the decision-making process in a balanced man-
ner, b) the appropriate procedural arrangements are in place, and c) the exchange of ar-
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guments preceding decision-making represents a certain deliberative quality. Linking up 
with existing rules, there are several options for establishing such criteria: 1) the adapta-
tion of the principles of the international law on sustainable development, specifically 
the principle of participation as incorporated in the Rio Declaration and the ILA New 
Delhi Declaration, 2) the formulation of criteria of good regulation, which is essentially a 
further elaboration of the TBT Agreement, and more specifically its Code of Good Prac-
tice, and 3) a code of conduct for participatory processes aimed at the procedural upgrad-
ing and harmonisation of standard setting processes by non-state actors. These options 
are not mutually exclusive but could be complementary. 
In order to improve the position of small producers, the implementation of the principle 
of common but differentiated responsibilities needs further emphasis. In the context of 
developed and developing countries, such implementation should include at least: a) a 
more even sharing of knowledge and information, b) a more generous provision of tech-
nical and financial assistance, and c) a more strict legislation on global competition. 
Most importantly, however, it should be noted that the relevance of the dividing line be-
tween developed and developing countries is shifting, as multinational companies are in-
creasingly taking over agricultural export production in developed as well as developing 
countries. This means that the critical distinctive criterion has become the ownership 
structure of agricultural undertakings instead of geographical location, which again pro-
vides an argument for stricter competition and anti-trust legislation on a global scale.  
Final remarks 
This study has given an example of the regulatory reconfiguration that is currently taking 
place in the relationships between state and non-state actors in a broader context. Com-
parable phenomena as have been found in the issue-area of pesticide risk reduction can 
be found in other issue-areas. More precisely, this reconfiguration can be considered an 
expression of the globalisation of law. In the new configuration, rules have increasingly 
become an arena of competition, an important means of obtaining and maintaining eco-
nomic power. However, one of the pitfalls in responding to the current explosion of rules 
is the creation of additional layers of rules in a haphazard way. The option for the longer 
term should preferably be a move towards comprehensive frameworks at the interna-
tional level that are based more strongly on values of equity, sustainability and steward-
ship. 
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Samenvatting 
Reguleren van risico’s van bestrijdingsmiddelen: de praktijk en dynamiek van 
pluralisme van regelgeving 
 
De noodzaak tot beperking van risico’s van bestrijdingsmiddelen 
Vanwege hun toxische eigenschappen zijn synthetische bestrijdingsmiddelen in de afge-
lopen eeuw op steeds ruimere schaal toegepast in de landbouw om ziekten en plagen te 
bestrijden en daardoor grotere oogsten te bewerkstelligen. Diezelfde eigenschappen kun-
nen echter ook de reden zijn dat bestrijdingsmiddelen in de diverse stadia van hun le-
venscyclus schade veroorzaken aan mens en milieu. Zo treden tijdens de productie van 
bestrijdingsmiddelen locatie-specifieke emissies op naar het milieu en kunnen werkne-
mers in chemische bedrijven en de bevolking in de nabijheid van deze locaties hieraan 
worden blootgesteld. Bovendien bestaat het risico van industriële ongevallen. 
Tijdens de fase van het op de markt brengen van bestrijdingsmiddelen vinden emissies 
plaats bij transport en door uitloging vanuit opslagplaatsen. Dergelijke opslagplaatsen 
kunnen een aanzienlijk risico vormen voor de lokale bevolking, zeker in ontwikkelings-
landen en de voormalige Oostbloklanden. Tijdens het gebruik van bestrijdingsmiddelen 
treden evenzeer emissies op doordat deze middelen nooit volledig efficiënt worden op-
genomen door landbouwgewassen. Kleine, maar significante, hoeveelheden bestrij-
dingsmiddelen komen in het milieu terecht en veroorzaken, behalve vervuiling van bo-
dem, water en lucht, ook indirecte negatieve effecten op biodiversiteit, klimaatomstan-
digheden en de ozonlaag. Daarnaast kunnen mensen die op landbouwbedrijven werken 
of daar dichtbij wonen gezondheidsschade oplopen als gevolg van blootstelling aan 
emissies van bestrijdingsmiddelen. 
Tijdens de consumptie van voedingsmiddelen en drinkwater worden consumenten bloot-
gesteld aan bestrijdingsmiddelenresiduen, die mogelijk chronische of acute gezonds-
heidseffecten oorzaken. Ondanks de wetenschappelijke inspanningen op dit gebied 
wordt het debat over de mogelijke gezondheidseffecten van blootstelling nog steeds ge-
kenmerkt door vele onzekerheden. Dergelijke onzekerheden betreffen onder meer het ri-
sico dat bestrijdingsmiddelen kanker veroorzaken, het hormoon- en voortplantingssys-
teem verstoren en schade veroorzaken aan het zenuwstelsel. In het algemeen is er een te-
kort aan betrouwbare gegevens over de lange-termijn consequenties van de blootstelling 
aan bestrijdingsmiddelenresiduen en de mogelijke ‘cocktail’ effecten van combinaties 
van meerdere stoffen. Kinderen worden in dit verband gezien als het meest kwetsbaar, 
omdat zij nog in de groei zijn en aan relatief grotere doses worden blootgesteld dan vol-
wassenen.  
De onderzoeksdoelen en vraagstelling 
Met deze studie is beoogd om een bijdrage te leveren aan de discussie over het beperken 
van risico’s van bestrijdingsmiddelen. Daartoe zijn verschillende vormen van regulering 
van statelijke en niet-statelijke actoren onderzocht die erop zijn gericht om deze risico’s 
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te verminderen en een transitie te stimuleren naar de productie van veilige en duurzame 
voedingsmiddelen. Meer specifiek heeft deze studie de volgende doelen: 
• Het identificeren, analyseren, en beoordelen van vormen van regulering door statelij-
ke en niet-statelijke actoren gericht op het beperken van de risico’s van bestrijdings-
middelen; 
• Het analyseren van de wisselwerking tussen de verschillende vormen van regelge-
ving, en 
• Het construeren van het resulterende patroon van regelgeving en het identificeren 
van opties ter verbetering. 
 
Op basis van deze doelen is de volgende overkoepelende onderzoeksvraag geformuleerd: 
Hoe wordt de beperking van bestrijdingsmiddelen gereguleerd, bezien vanuit het per-
spectief van pluralisme van regelgeving en duurzame ontwikkeling, en wat zijn de opties 
ter verbetering? 
Het concept van pluralisme van regelgeving en de toepassing 
De theoretische benadering van deze studie is gebaseerd op het concept van pluralisme 
van regelgeving dat de grenzen van het recht oprekt in reactie op de nieuwe vormen van 
maatschappelijke sturing waarin niet-statelijke actoren een prominente regulerende rol 
vervullen. Dit concept erkent verschillende soorten van normatieve activiteit zonder een 
verschil te maken naar bron en betrokken actoren. De consequentie daarvan is dat ver-
schillende normatieve benaderingen op een zelfde niveau worden geacht te opereren, 
waardoor het meer voor de hand liggend is om aandacht te besteden aan de onderlinge 
wisselwerking. Hierdoor biedt het concept van pluralisme van regelgeving een dyna-
misch perspectief en diepgang aan de analyse van processen van regulering. 
Om het concept toe te kunnen passen op het concrete onderwerp van de beperking van 
risico’s van bestrijdingsmiddelen is in de studie een onderzoeksbenadering uitgewerkt, 
bestaande uit vijf stappen: 1) afbakening van het onderwerp en identificering van de re-
gulerende actoren, 2) beschrijving van de systemen van regels die door de betreffende 
actoren zijn gecreëerd en in stand worden gehouden, 3) beoordeling van systemen van 
regels op basis van criteria ontleend aan het concept van duurzame ontwikkeling, te we-
ten effectiviteit, inclusiviteit en rechtvaardigheid, 4) analyse van de wisselwerking tussen 
systemen van regels, en 5) constructie van het resulterende patroon van regelgeving en 
identificeren van opties ter verbetering. 
Daarnaast is in de studie de praktijk van pluralisme van regelgeving verkend door het 
uitwerken van twee verschillende case studies. De eerste case studie beschrijft de ont-
wikkeling van het recht en beleid inzake bestrijdingsmiddelen in Nederland vanuit het 
perspectief van een nationale overheid die in toenemende mate met Europese en private 
regulering wordt geconfronteerd. De tweede case studie legt aan de hand van de tomaat 
uit welk effect pluralisme van regelgeving heeft op agrarische producenten doordat de 
condities voor productie en handel worden beïnvloed. 
De componenten van pluralisme van regelgeving 
De studie is gericht op een selectie van systemen van regels die zijn geïdentificeerd als 
de belangrijkste componenten van het complex van regels voor het beperken van de risi-
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co’s van bestrijdingsmiddelen. De belangrijkste componenten van de multilaterale bena-
dering zijn: de FAO Internationale gedragscode voor de distributie en het gebruik van 
gewasbeschermingsmiddelen (1985), het Verdrag van Rotterdam inzake de toepassing 
van de procedure met betrekking tot voorafgaande geïnformeerde toestemming ten aan-
zien van bepaalde gevaarlijke chemische stoffen en pesticiden in de internationale handel 
(1998), en het Verdrag van Stockholm inzake persistente organische verontreinigende 
stoffen (2001). De belangrijkste componenten van de Europese benadering zijn: Richtlijn 
91/414 betreffende het op de markt brengen van gewasbeschermingsmiddelen, Verorde-
ning No 396/2005 tot vaststelling van maximumgehalten aan bestrijdingsmiddelenresi-
duen in of op levensmiddelen en diervoeders van plantaardige en dierlijke oorsprong, en 
het voorstel voor een richtlijn tot vaststelling van een kader voor communautaire actie ter 
verwezenlijking van een duurzaam gebruik van pesticiden. De belangrijkste componen-
ten van de transnationale benadering zijn: het IFOAM biologische garantiesysteem en 
het GlobalGAP programma voor groente en fruit.  
Het patroon van regelgeving en de rolverdeling tussen statelijke en niet-statelijke 
actoren 
De integratie van de verschillende onderdelen van de analyse maakt duidelijk dat het pa-
troon van regelgeving inzake het beperken van risico’s van bestrijdingsmiddelen in de 
afgelopen jaren steeds gevarieerder en ingewikkelder is geworden. Wat betreft de 
rolverdeling in reguleringsprocessen blijkt dat er een toenemende betrokkenheid van 
niet-statelijke actoren is in zowel het publieke als het private domein. Verder laat de ana-
lyse zien dat de relaties tussen de verschillende actoren steeds dynamischer zijn ge-
worden en dat zij elkaars normatieve en procedurele regels in toenemende mate 
beïnvloeden. 
De grotere betrokkenheid van niet-statelijke actoren vindt zijn weerslag in een sterkere 
nadruk op de ontwikkeling van private regulering, met inbegrip van zelfregulering, één-
actor regulering en multi-actor regulering. De opkomst van private regulering, en met 
name van de transnationale vormen waarin één actor een dominante rol heeft, roept 
vragen op over de procedurele waarborgen en de beschikbare mechanismen voor conflic-
toplossing. Dergelijke waarborgen kunnen niet worden aangetroffen in specifieke wet-
geving die voor dit doel is vastgesteld, maar zijn verspreid over verschillende bronnen. 
Verscheidene wetenschappers van internationaal recht en internationale betrekkingen 
hebben er echter op gewezen dat zich momenteel een mondiaal administratief recht ont-
wikkelt, gestoeld op principes die beogen recht te doen aan de belangen van de bij pri-
vate regulering betrokken actoren. Tot dusverre zijn deze principes vrij impliciet en het 
is onduidelijk of zij kunnen worden ingeroepen voor een rechterlijke instantie. 
In samenhang met het feit dat niet-statelijke actoren in toenemende mate een regulerende 
rol zijn gaan spelen kan worden geconcludeerd dat er een verschuiving heeft plaats-
gevonden van hiërarchische naar niet-hiërarchische sturingsvormen die zijn gebaseerd op 
marktmechanismen en het zoeken naar consensus. De scheidingslijn tussen de verschil-
lende sturingsvormen is echter in de praktijk minder scherp dan het onderscheid sug-
gereert. Zoals deze studie heeft laten zien vindt private regulering in toenemende mate 
plaats binnen de driehoek van hiërarchie, markt en consensus. Deze constatering is zeker 
relevant in een situatie van asymmetrische verhoudingen waarin de regulerende partij de 
gereguleerde overheerst op basis van economische macht, en als gevolg daarvan een 
  
256 
situatie is ontstaan van feitelijke hiërarchie. Deze laatste vorm van regulering kan 
daarom als ‘harde’ zachte regulering worden gekenschetst aangezien de regels in ju-
ridische zin niet bindend zijn maar wel een hoge mate van feitelijke binding blijken te 
hebben. 
Het patroon van regelgeving en duurzaamheid  
Vanuit de optiek van duurzaamheid is uit de analyse gebleken dat de regelgeving inzake 
het beperken van risico’s van bestrijdingsmiddelen in de afgelopen jaren steeds meer uit-
eenlopende belangen en doelen is gaan dienen. Terwijl de aanvankelijke focus vrijwel 
uitsluitend was gericht op de bescherming van de eigen nationale landbouw tegen ziek-
ten en plagen uit andere landen en daarmee op een vergroting van de nationale agrari-
sche productie is de nadruk vervolgens verschoven in de richting van internationale eco-
nomische belangen, zoals de harmonisering van de markt voor bestrijdingsmiddelen, de 
bevordering van de handel in landbouwproducten, en het stimuleren van de werkgele-
genheid in de chemische industrie. Tegelijkertijd zijn doelstellingen van bescherming 
van mens en milieu meer op de voorgrond getreden. 
De consequentie van meerdere, vaak tegenstrijdige, belangen en doelen is dat zij tegen 
elkaar moeten worden afgewogen in besluitvormingsprocessen. Deze studie heeft laten 
zien dat statelijke actoren in de afgelopen jaren moeilijkheden hebben ondervonden bij 
het vinden van een balans tussen die belangen en doelen. Dit blijkt bijvoorbeeld uit het 
feit dat beslissingen betreffende de doelen van wetgeving en hun interpretatie vaak con-
troversieel zijn en de definiëring van cruciale concepten wordt uitgesteld, zoals de case 
studie over Nederland laat zien, maar ook naar voren komt uit de gang van zaken rond de 
Europese regelgeving inzake bestrijdingsmiddelen, de FAO Gedragscode en het Verdrag 
van Rotterdam. In reactie op deze verlamming van statelijke actoren hebben niet-
statelijke actoren in toenemende mate het initiatief tot regulering overgenomen met het 
argument dat zij beter in staat zouden zijn om uiteenlopende belangen met elkaar te ver-
zoenen. In hun nieuwe rol maken zij er aanspraak op te functioneren als ‘aanjagers van 
verandering’ in het transitieproces naar veilige en duurzame voedingsmiddelen. 
Tot dusverre is de bescherming van de gezondheid van consumenten de belangrijkste 
aanleiding geweest voor niet-statelijke actoren om regels tot stand te brengen die zijn ge-
richt op het beperken van risico’s van bestrijdingsmiddelen. Overwegingen over het mi-
lieu en de gezondheid van werknemers hebben een secundaire prioriteit gehad. Voor de 
nabije toekomst kan worden verwacht dat de gezondheid van consumenten een hoge pri-
oriteit zal houden, aangezien regelmatig nieuwe wetenschappelijke inzichten worden ge-
publiceerd, bijvoorbeeld over hormoonverstorende stoffen en stoffen die de ziekte van 
Parkinson zouden kunnen teweegbrengen. In dit verband is het van belang dat de doel-
stelling van bescherming van de gezondheid van consumenten in sommige opzichten in-
strumenteel kan zijn bij het beperken van risico’s van bestrijdingsmiddelen voor het mi-
lieu en de gezondheid van werknemers, maar dat dit niet noodzakelijkerwijs het geval 
hoeft te zijn. 
In vrijwel alle stadia van de levenscyclus van bestrijdingsmiddelen heeft een verschui-
ving plaatsgevonden naar een grotere betrokkenheid van niet-statelijke actoren. Statelij-
ke actoren hebben zich tot dusverre geconcentreerd op de stadia van het op de markt 
brengen en de residuen, terwijl niet-statelijke actoren zich vooral hebben gericht op het 
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gebruik en de residuen. Als gevolg daarvan is de dichtheid aan regels inzake residuen re-
latief hoog, hetgeen vanuit het gezichtspunt van efficiëntie averechts werkt, omdat in het 
algemeen kan worden gesteld dat hoe verder de ingreep plaats vindt in de levenscyclus 
van bestrijdingsmiddelen, des te hoger de kosten zijn van controle en handhaving.  
Vergelijkenderwijs is het patroon van regelgeving en de dichtheid van regels in het sta-
dium van productie het minst veranderd en wordt dan ook nog steeds voornamelijk be-
paald door statelijke actoren. De ervaringen met persistente organische verontreinigde 
stoffen hebben laten zien dat het vele jaren kan duren voordat zelfs de meest gevaarlijke 
stoffen zijn geëlimineerd. In dit verband is het belangrijk te realiseren dat zolang een stof 
wordt geproduceerd, deze altijd opnieuw een herintrede in de markt kan doen. Het is 
daarom een belangrijke mijlpaal dat het Verdrag van Stockholm eindelijk de mogelijk-
heid heeft verschaft om de meest gevaarlijke stoffen uit te bannen door de productie, het 
op de markt brengen en het gebruik ervan  te verbieden. 
Het huidige patroon van regelgeving wijst erop dat een gebrek aan regulering van de 
productie van bestrijdingsmiddelen op internationaal niveau leidt tot compensatie op re-
gionaal en nationaal niveau door het reguleren van het op de markt brengen, het gebruik 
en de residuen van bestrijdingsmiddelen. Dit betekent dat de regulering van deze stadia 
in de levenscyclus in feite functioneert als een substituut voor een mondiaal productie-
verbod en leidt tot ongelijke niveaus van bescherming van mens en milieu wereldwijd. 
Met het oog op de effectiviteit van het complex aan regels kan worden geconcludeerd 
dat de gecombineerde benaderingen van statelijke en niet-statelijke actoren een impuls 
hebben gegeven tot een beperking van de risico’s voor mens en milieu in de verschillen-
de stadia van de levenscyclus van bestrijdingsmiddelen. Bovendien komt uit de studie 
naar voren dat de wisselwerking tussen verschillende vormen van regulering de integra-
tie van de bescherming van mens en milieu heeft versterkt. Het valt met name op dat de 
opkomst van private regulering heeft geholpen om een gunstig klimaat te creëren voor 
een transitie naar meer duurzame vormen van landbouw. De voorbeelden van het 
IFOAM biologische garantiesysteem en het GlobalGAP programma voor groente en 
fruit hebben laten zien, dat dergelijke regulering zeker een impuls kan geven aan agrari-
sche producenten om hun productiemethoden op een positieve manier te veranderen. 
Ondanks de genoemde ontwikkelingen is de vooruitgang mondiaal gezien echter be-
perkt. De ervaringen van de afgelopen jaren laten zien dat de risico’s van bestrijdings-
middelen voor mens en milieu moeilijk zijn te controleren en dat een adequaat niveau 
van bescherming niet gelijkelijk wordt gedeeld in alle landen en door alle burgers. Het 
huidige patroon van regelgeving bevoorrecht met name de bescherming van mens en mi-
lieu in ontwikkelde landen, maar is minder effectief voor ontwikkelingslanden en voor-
malige Oostbloklanden. Ondanks de ontwikkeling van minder schadelijke bestrijdings-
middelen door technologische innovatie is bijvoorbeeld het gebruik van oudere stoffen 
uit de hoogste gevaarklassen volgens de WHO nog steeds gebruikelijk in armere landen 
met een minder strict toelatings- en handhavingsregime. Ter verbetering van de effectivi-
teit van het complex aan regels is er daarom extra aandacht nodig voor de adequaatheid 
van de regelgeving. 
Met het oog op de inclusiviteit van het complex aan regels kan worden geconcludeerd 
dat de participatie van niet-statelijke actoren bij het maken, implementeren en handhaven 
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van regels enorm is uitgebreid, maar dat de mogelijkheden tot het geven van een zinvolle 
inbreng niet gelijkelijk zijn verdeeld tussen de verschillende actoren. Hierbij moet tevens 
de kanttekening worden gemaakt dat een toegenomen inclusiviteit niet automatisch leidt 
tot betere beslissingen en nakoming. Ter verbetering van de inclusiviteit van het complex 
aan regels is er daarom extra aandacht nodig voor de kwaliteit van participatieve proces-
sen. 
Met het oog op de rechtvaardigheid van het complex aan regels kan worden geconclu-
deerd dat de toename van private regulering ertoe heeft geleid dat zich voor sommige 
groepen van agrarische producenten nieuwe mogelijkheden tot vermarkten voordoen, 
terwijl er voor andere groepen handelsbarrières ontstaan. Dit hangt van een grote ver-
scheidenheid van, veelal nationale, factoren af, zoals de institutionele infrastructuur, ge-
kwalificeerde laboratoria, geschoold personeel, concurrentieverhoudingen, en de kosten 
van arbeid en kapitaal. In het algemeen kan echter worden gesteld dat de positieve effec-
ten van private regulering vooral worden ondervonden door grotere producenten en de 
negatieve door de kleinere. Gezien het risico van een toenemende marginalisering van 
deze laatste groep is het in dit verband verontrustend dat de WTO verdragen niet zijn 
toegesneden op transnationale regulering omdat de handelsregels zijn geadresseerd aan 
nationale regeringen die relatief machteloos zijn ten opzichte van grensoverstijgende re-
gulering door niet-statelijke actoren. Daarom opereren dergelijke programma’s in meer 
of mindere mate in een juridisch vacuüm. Ter verbetering van de rechtvaardigheid van 
het complex van regels is er daarom extra aandacht nodig voor de concurrentieverhou-
dingen en met name de positie van kleine agrarische producenten. 
De contouren van een normatief en procedureel kader 
Tijdens de Wereldtop voor Duurzame Ontwikkeling in Johannesburg in 2002 is afge-
sproken om uiterlijk in 2020 verantwoord om te gaan met chemische stoffen waaronder 
bestrijdingsmiddelen. Om deze doelstelling tijdig te bereiken, is het nodig om het norma-
tieve en procedurele kader voor de beperking van risico’s van bestrijdingsmiddelen te 
versterken. In het bijzonder zou de nadruk moeten liggen op de regie in reguleringspro-
cessen, de adequaatheid van regels, de kwaliteit van participatie, en de positie van kleine 
agrarische producenten. 
Ter verduidelijking van de regie in reguleringsprocessen zou de huidige rolverdeling tus-
sen statelijke en niet-statelijke actoren moeten worden heroverwogen. Vanwege de be-
perkingen van private regulering is het nodig dat statelijke actoren de eerste verantwoor-
delijkheid voor regulering terugnemen en een langere termijn visie ontwikkelen over 
strategieën voor het beperken van risico’s van bestrijdingsmiddelen. Daarnaast verdient 
het aanbeveling dat statelijke actoren hun sturende en coördinerende bevoegdheden ver-
sterken en de wetgeving inzake mededinging en concurrentieverhoudingen strikter toe-
passen. 
Tegelijkertijd kunnen statelijke actoren profijt hebben van de initiatieven die door niet-
statelijke actoren zijn ontwikkeld. Het naast elkaar bestaan van statelijke en niet-
statelijke benaderingen zou het ideale uitgangspunt kunnen zijn voor het ontwikkelen 
van een ‘slimme’ mix van instrumenten die agrarische producenten kunnen helpen bij 
het maken van een transitie naar een veilige en duurzame landbouw. Als onderdeel van 
die slimme mix zouden niet-statelijke actoren kunnen bijdragen aan een beperking van 
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risico’s van bestrijdingsmiddelen door het ontwikkelen van concurrerende initiatieven 
die bij voorkeur zijn gebaseerd op een multi-actor benadering. 
Ter verbetering van de adequaatheid van regels is het nodig dat het normatieve kader 
voor de het beperken van risico’s van bestrijdingsmiddelen verder wordt ontwikkeld om 
het meer ambitieus, omvattend en samenhangend te maken. Het belangrijkste argument 
om dit onderwerp zoveel mogelijk op internationaal niveau aan te pakken is dat daarmee 
de harmonisering is gebaat, niet alleen in de zin van handelskansen maar ook in relatie 
tot de bescherming van mens en milieu gezondheid. De FAO Gedragscode kan bij het 
ontwikkelen van dit kader als uitgangspunt dienen, aangezien deze in principe alle stadia 
in de levenscyclus van bestrijdingsmiddelen omvat en op alle bestrijdingsmiddelen is ge-
richt. Een dergelijk kader zou op zijn minst de volgende elementen moeten bevatten: 
• Productie: Het uitbannen van stoffen die behoren tot de WHO gevaarklassen van ui-
terst gevaarlijk (IA), hoogst gevaarlijk (IB), matig gevaarlijk (II) en, voorzover mo-
gelijk, beperkt gevaarlijk (III). 
• Op de markt brengen: Het strikt toepassen van de beginselen van voorzorg en substi-
tutie tijdens de toelatingsprocedure van bestrijdingsmiddelen. 
• Gebruik:  
- Het geven van een hoge prioriteit aan de uitwerking van internationale richtlijnen 
voor geïntegreerde ziektebestrijding en de implementatie ervan. 
- Het ontwikkelen van internationale definities en richtlijnen voor agrarische pro-
ductiemethoden die zijn gericht op een hoger niveau van integratie. 
- Het toepassen van het beginsel van de vervuiler betaalt, bijvoorbeeld door een 
heffing in te stellen op de productie, het op de markt brengen en/of gebruik van 
patentloze bestrijdingsmiddelen en de opbrengsten te gebruiken voor het stimule-
ren van geïntegreerde productiemethoden. 
- Het stimuleren van niet-statelijke actoren om programma’s te ontwikkelen die bij 
voorkeur zijn gebaseerd op multi-actor benaderingen. 
• Residuen: Het formuleren van geaggregeerde maximumgehalten van residuen van 
bestrijdingsmiddelen en het uiteindelijke doel van residu-vrije voedingsmiddelen. 
 
Ter verbetering van de kwaliteit van participatie is het nodig om minimum criteria voor 
participatieve processen te ontwikkelen die onder meer het volgende inhouden: a) de be-
trokken actoren moeten op een evenwichtige manier in het besluitvormingsproces zijn 
vertegenwoordigd, b) de benodigde procedurele voorschriften moeten tot stand zijn ge-
bracht, c) de wijze van uitwisseling van argumenten moet voldoen aan een bepaalde 
kwaliteitsnorm voor beraadslaging. Aanhakend bij bestaande initiatieven zijn er verschil-
lende opties om dergelijke criteria vast te leggen: 1) de aanpassing van de beginselen van 
het internationale recht van duurzame ontwikkeling en in het bijzonder van het beginsel 
van participatie, zoals deze zijn opgenomen in de Rio Verklaring en de ILA New Delhi 
Verklaring, 2) de formulering van criteria van goede reguleringspraktijken, hetgeen 
neerkomt op een verdere uitwerking van het TBT Verdrag en met name de bijbehorende 
Code van Goede Praktijken, en 3) de opstelling van een gedragscode voor participatieve 
processen die is gericht op het verbeteren en harmoniseren van reguleringsprocessen van 
niet-statelijke actoren. 
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Ter verbetering van de positie van kleine agrarische producenten is het nodig om de im-
plementatie van het beginsel van gemeenschappelijke doch gedifferentieerde verant-
woordelijkheden uit het internationale recht meer nadruk te geven. Die versterkte im-
plementatie zou in de context van ontwikkelde en ontwikkelingslanden op zijn minst het 
volgende moeten inhouden: a) het meer gelijkelijk delen van kennis en informatie; b) het 
meer rijkelijk verschaffen van technische en financiële assistentie, en c) het tot stand 
brengen van strengere regels over mondiale concurrentieverhoudingen. Het is echter be-
langrijk om te realiseren dat het onderscheid tussen ontwikkelde en ontwikkelingslanden 
wellicht aan relevantie verliest op dit terrein, aangezien multinationale bedrijven in toe-
nemende mate zich richten op agrarische productie voor exportdoeleinden, in zowel 
ontwikkelde als ontwikkelingslanden. Dit betekent dat het belangrijkste onderscheidende 
criterium de eigendomsstructuur is van agrarische bedrijven in plaats van geografische 
locatie, hetgeen opnieuw een argument is voor striktere regulering van concurrentiever-
houdingen op internationaal niveau. 
Slotopmerkingen 
In deze studie is naar de veranderingen gekeken die plaats vinden in de verhoudingen 
tussen statelijke en niet-statelijke actoren op het gebied van regulering van risico’s van 
bestrijdingsmiddelen. Vergelijkbare verschijnselen kunnen worden waargenomen op an-
dere terreinen. In het algemeen kan worden gesteld dat het toenemende pluralisme van 
regelgeving kan worden beschouwd als een uitdrukking van de globalisering van het 
recht. In de nieuwe situatie zijn de regels afkomstig van niet-statelijke actoren in toene-
mende mate een middel om economische macht te verkrijgen en te behouden. Mede 
daarom is het contraproductief om in reactie op de huidige explosie van regels lukraak 
nieuwe lagen van regels te creëren. De voorkeur voor de langere termijn is een omvat-
tend raamwerk op internationaal niveau dat sterker is gebaseerd op waarden van recht-
vaardigheid, duurzaamheid en rentmeesterschap.      
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Annex 1 Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed 
Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and 
Pesticides in International Trade: listings and notifications 
Pesticide substances listed under the Rotterdam Convention in Annex III (april 
2008) 
• 2,4,5-T 
• Aldrin 
• Binacapryl 
• Captafol 
• Chlordane 
• Chlorobenzilate 
• DDT 
• Dieldrin 
• Dinoseb and its salts 
• DNOC and its salts 
• EDB 
• Ethylene dichloride 
• Ethylene oxide 
• Fluoroacetamide 
• HCH 
• Heptachlor 
• Hexachlorobenzene 
• Lindane 
• Mercury compounds 
• Monocrotophos 
• Parathion 
• Pentachlorophenol 
• Toxaphene  
Hazardous pesticide formulations listed under the Rotterdam Convention in Annex 
III 
• Dustable powder formulations containing a combination of: benomyl at or above 7 
per cent, carbofuran at above 10 per cent, thiram at or above 15 per cent 
• Methamidophos (soluble liquid formulations of the substance that exceed 600 g ac-
tive ingredient/l) 
• Phosphamidon (soluble liquid formulations of the substance that exceed 1000 g ac-
tive ingredient/l) 
• Methyl-parathion (emulsifiable concentrates at or above 19.5% active ingredient and 
dusts at or above 1.5% active ingredient). 
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Notifying countries under the Rotterdam Convention 
 CRC-1 CRC-2 CRC-3 CRC-4 Total Accepted no-
tifications 
Brazil 3 - - - 3 - 
Bulgaria - 2 2 - 4 - 
Canada - 5 1 - 6 4 
Cote d’Ivoire 4 1 - - 5 - 
Dominican 
Republic 
- - - 1 1 - 
El Salvador 2 - - - 2 - 
EU 2 - 1 3 6 6 
Gambia 1 - -  1 - 
Guyana - - - 2 2 - 
Korea 3 - - - 3 - 
Japan 4 4 - - 8 - 
Jamaica - - - 1 1 1 
Jordan 2 - - 1 3 - 
Netherlands 2 2 - - 4 3 
Nigeria - 1 1 - 2 - 
Norway 1 - - - 1 - 
Panama 3 - - - 3 - 
Romania 1 1 - - 2 - 
Switzerland 3 - 1 - 4 - 
Peru 1 - - - 1 - 
Thailand 3 2 1 - 6 1 
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Notifications of pesticides reviewed by the CRC under the Rotterdam Convention  
Pesticide substances Old notifications New notifications Accepted Reason for 
non accep-
tance 
CRC-1     
Chlordecone  Switzerland No (b) (iii) 
  Thailand No (b) (iii) 
Endosulfan Jordan  No (b) (iii) 
 Netherlands  Yes  
 Norway  No (b) (iii) 
  Cote d’Ivoire No (b) (iii), (c) 
(i) (ii) 
Endrin Jordan  No (b) (iii) 
 Peru  No (b) (i) (ii) 
(iii) 
  Japan No (b) (iii), (c) 
(iv) 
  Korea No (b) (iii), (c) 
(iv) 
  Romania No (b) (iii), (c) 
(iv) 
  Switzerland No (b) (iii), (c) 
(iv) 
Methamidophos  Brazil No (b) (iii), (c) 
(i), (iii) 
  Cote d’Ivoire No (b) (i) (ii) 
(iii) 
  El Salvador No (b) (iii), (c) 
(i) (iii) 
  Panama No (b) (iii), (c) 
(i) (iii) 
  Thailand No (b) (iii) 
Methyl bromide  Korea No (b) (iii) 
  Netherlands Yes  
  Switzerland No (b) (iii) 
Methyl parathion  Brazil No (b) (iii) 
  Cote d’Ivoire No (b) (i) (ii) 
(iii), (c) (i) 
(ii) (iii) 
  El Salvador No (b) (iii), (c) 
(i) (ii) 
  EU Yes  
  Gambia No (b) (iii) 
  Japan No (b) (iii) 
  Panama No (b) (iii), (c) 
(i) (ii) 
Phosphamidon  Brazil No  
  Cote d’Ivoire No  
  Japan No  
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  Panama No  
  Thailand No  
Tributyltin EU   (b) (iii) 
  Japan No  
  Korea No (b) (iii) 
CRC-2     
Alachlor  Canada Yes  
  Netherlands No (b) (iii) 
Cyhexatin  Canada  Yes  
  Japan No (b) (iii) 
DBCP  Canada No (b) (iii), (c) 
(iv) 
  Japan No (b) (iii), (c) 
(iv) 
Dicofol  Japan No (b) (iii) 
  Netherlands Yes  
  Romania No (b) (iii) 
Endosulfan Jordan  No (b) (iii) 
 Netherlands  Yes  
 Norway  No (b) (iii) 
 Cote d’Ivoire  No (b) (iii), (c) 
(i) (ii) 
 Netherlands  Yes  
  Thailand Yes  
Methyl parathion EU  Yes  
  Bulgaria No (b) (i) (ii) 
(iii) 
  Cote de Ivoire No (b) (i) (ii) 
(iii) 
  Nigeria No (b) (iii) 
  Thailand No (b) (iii) 
Mirex  Bulgaria No (b) (iii) 
  Canada Yes  
  Japan No (b) (iii) 
Tributyltin EU  Yes  
 Japan  No (b) (iii) 
 Korea  No (b) (iii) 
  Canada Yes  
CRC-3     
Endosulfan Cote d’Ivoire  No (b) (iii), (c) 
(i) (ii) 
 Jordan  No (b) (iii) 
 Netherlands  Yes  
 Norway  No (b) (iii) 
 Thailand  Yes  
  EU Yes  
Endrin Jordan  No (b) (iii) 
 Japan  No (b) (iii), (c) 
(iv) 
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 Korea  No (b) (iii), (c) 
(iv) 
 Peru  No (b) (i) (ii) 
(iii) 
 Romania  No (b) (iii), (c) 
(iv) 
 Switzerland  No (b) (iii), (c) 
(iv) 
  Canada No (b) (i) (ii) 
(iii), c (iii) 
(iv) 
  Bulgaria No (b) (i) (ii) 
(iii), c (i) 
(ii) (iii) (iv) 
Methamidophos Brazil  No (b) (iii), (c) 
(i), (iii) 
 Cote d’Ivoire  No (b) (i) (ii) 
(iii) 
 El Salvador  No (b) (iii), (c) 
(i) (iii) 
 Panama  No (b) (iii), (c) 
(i) (iii) 
 Thailand  No (b) (iii) 
  Bulgaria No (b) (i) (ii) 
(iii) 
  Nigeria No (b) (iii) 
Mirex Bulgaria  No (b) (iii) 
 Canada  Yes  
 Japan  No (b) (iii) 
  Switzerland No (b) (iii) 
  Thailand No  (b) (iii) 
CRC-4     
Alachlor Canada  Yes  
 Netherlands  No (b) (iii) 
  EU Yes  
Aldicarb  EU Yes  
  Jamaica Yes  
Carbaryl  EU Yes  
  Jordan No (b) (i) (ii) 
(iii), (c) (iii) 
Methyl parathion Bulgaria  No (b) (i) (ii) 
(iii) 
 Cote d’Ivoire  No (b) (i) (ii) 
(iii) 
 El Salvador  No (b) (iii), (c) 
(i) (ii) 
 EU  Yes  
 Gambia  No (b) (iii) 
 Japan  No (b) (iii) 
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 Nigeria  No (b) (iii) 
 Panama  No (b) (iii), (c) 
(i) (ii) 
 Thailand  No (b) (iii) 
  Dominican Repub-
lic 
No (b) (i) (ii) 
(iii) 
  Guyana No (b) (i) (ii) 
(iii) 
Mirex Bulgaria  No (b) (iii) 
 Canada  Yes  
 Japan  No (b) (iii) 
 Switzerland  No (b) (iii) 
 Thailand  No  (b) (iii) 
  Guyana No (b) (iii) (c) 
(iv) 
 
  
267 
Annex 2 Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic 
Pollutants: listings and nominations 
Pesticide substances listed under the Stockholm Convention: 
• Aldrin 
• Chlordane 
• DDT 
• Dieldrin 
• Endrin 
• Heptachlor 
• Mirex 
• Toxaphene 
 
Nominations of pesticides reviewed by the POPRC under the Stockholm Convention:  
• Hexachlorocyclohexane (HCH), i.e.lindane 
• Chlordecone 
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Annex 3 EU Authorisation Directive (91/414) and related 
legislative measures 
Legislation concerning the programme of work referred to in Article 8(2) of Directive 91/414  
3600/92 (OJ L366, 15.12.1992) Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3600/92 of 
11 December 1992 laying down the detailed 
rules for the implementation of the first stage of 
the programme of work referred to in Article 8 
(2) the Directive  
933/94 (OJ L107, 28.04.1994) Commission Regulation (EC) No 933/94 of 27 
April 1994 laying down the active substances of 
plant protection products and designating the 
rapporteur Member States for the implementa-
tion of Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
3600/92 
491/95 (OJ L049, 04.03.1995) Amendment of Regulation (EEC) No 3600/92 
and Regulation (EC) No 933/94, in particular 
with regard to the integration of the designated 
public authorities and the producers in Austria, 
Finland and Sweden  
2230/95 (OJ L225, 22.09.1995) Amendment of Regulation (EC) No 933/94 
1199/97 (OJ L170, 28.06.1997) Amendment of Regulation (EEC) No 3600/92 
1972/1999 (OJ L244, 16.09.1999) Amendment of Regulation (EEC) No 3600/92 
451/2000 (OJ L055, 29.02.2000) Commission Regulation (EC) No 451/2000 of 28 
February 2000 laying down the detailed rules for 
the implementation of the second and third 
stages of the work programme referred to in Ar-
ticle 8(2) of the Directive  
2266/2000 (OJ L259, 13.10.2000) Amendment of Regulation (EEC) No 3600/92 
703/2001 (OJ L098, 07.04.2001) Commission Regulation (EC) No 703/2001 of 6 
April 2001 laying down the active substances of 
plant protection products to be assessed in the 
second stage of the work programme referred to 
in Article 8(2) of the Directive and revising the 
list of Member States designated as rapporteurs 
for those substances 
1112/2002 (OJ L168, 27.06.2002) Commission Regulation (EC) No 1112/2002 of 
20 June 2002 laying down the detailed rules for 
the implementation of the fourth stage of the 
programme of work referred to in Article 8(2) of 
the Directive 
1490/2002 (OJ L224, 21.08.2002) Commission Regulation (EC) No 1490/2002 of 
14 August 2002 laying down further detailed 
rules for the implementation of the third stage of 
the programme of work referred to in Article 
8(2) of the Directive and amending Regulation 
(EC) No 451/2000 
2076/2002 (OJ L319, 23.11.2002) Commission Regulation (EC) No 2076/2002 of 
  
270
20 November 2002 extending the time period re-
ferred to in Article 8(2) of the Directive and 
concerning the non-inclusion of certain active 
substances in Annex I to that Directive and the 
withdrawal of authorisations for plant protection 
products containing these substances 
1044/2003 (OJ L151, 19.06.2003) Commission Regulation (EC) No 1044/2003 of 
18 June 2003 amending Regulations (EC) No 
451/2000 and (EC) No 1490/2002 
1336/2003 (OJ L187, 26.07.2003) Commission Regulation (EC) No 1336/2003 of 
25 July 2003 amending Regulation (EC) No 
2076/2002 as regards the continued use of the 
substances listed in Annex II 
2003/565 (OJ L192, 31.07.2003) Commission Decision 2003/565/EC of 25 July 
2003 extending the time period provided for in 
Article 8(2) of the Directive 
2004/129 (OJ L037, 10.02.2004) Commission Decision 2004/129/EC of 30 Janu-
ary 2004 concerning the non-inclusion of certain 
active substances in Annex I to the Directive 
91/414/EEC and the withdrawal of authorisa-
tions for plant protection  
771/2004 (OJ L123, 27.04.2007) Commission Regulation (EC) No 771/2004 of 23 
April 2004 laying down transitional measures 
with regard to continued use of plant protection 
products containing certain active substances 
following the accession of new Member States 
to the European Union 
1765/2004 (OJ L315, 14.10.2004) Commission Regulation (EC) No 1765/2004 of 
13 October 2004 amending Regulation (EC) No 
2076/2002 as regards the continued use of the 
substances listed in Annex II 
2229/2004 (OJ L379, 24.12.2004)  Commission Regulation (EC) No 2229/2004 of 3 
December 2004 laying down further detailed 
rules for the implementation of the fourth stage 
of the programme of work referred to in Article 
8(2) of the Directive 
835/2004 (OJ L127, 29.4.2004) Commission Regulation (EC) No 835/2004 of 28 
April 2004 adapting Regulation (EC) No 
2076/2002 and Decisions 2002/928/EC, 
2004/129/EC, 2004/247/EC and 2004/248 as re-
gards the continued use of certain active sub-
stances not included in Annex I to Directive 
91/414/EEC, by reason of the accession of the 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and 
Slovakia 
1335/2005 (OJ L211, 13.08.2005) Commission Regulation (EC) of 12 August 2005 
amending Regulation (EC) No 2076/2002 and 
Decisions 2002/928/EC, 2004/129/EC, 
2004/140/EC, 2004/247/EC and 2005/303/EC as 
regards the time period referred to in Article 8(2) 
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of Council Directive 91/414/EEC and the con-
tinued use of certain substances not included in 
its Annex I 
1980/2006 (OJ L368, 23.12.2006) Commission Regulation (EC) No 1980/2006 of 
20 December 2006 laying down transitional 
measures amending Regulation (EC)  
2076/2002 and Decisions 2001/245/EC, 
2002/928/EC and 2006/797/EC as regards the 
continued use of certain active substances not 
included in Annex I to Directive 91/414/EEC by 
reason of the accession of Bulgaria 
2024/2006 (OJ L384, 29.12.2006) Commission Regulation (EC) No 2024/2006 of 
22 December 2006 laying down transitional 
measures derogating from Regulation (EC) No 
2076/2002 and Decisions 98/270/EC, 
2002/928/EC, 2003/308/EC, 2004/129/EC, 
2004/141/EC, 2004/247/EC, 2004/248/EC, 
2005/303/EC and 2005/864/EC as regards the 
continued use of plant protection products con-
taining certain active substances not included in 
Annex I to Directive 91/414/EEC by reason of 
the accession of Romania 
 
  
272
Commission Decisions withdrawing authorisation for plant protection products with certain ac-
tive ingredients 
94/643/EC (OJ L249, 24.09.1994) Cyhalothrin 
95/276/EC (OJ L170, 20.07.1995) Ferbam and azinphos-ethyl 
96/586/EC (OJ L257, 10.10.1996) Propham 
98/269/EC (OJ L117, 21.04.1998) Dinoterb 
98/270/EC (OJ L117, 21.04.1998) Fenvalerate 
99/164/EC (OJ L054, 02.03.1999) DNOC 
2000/233/EC (OJ L073, 22.03.2000) Pyrazophos 
2000/234/EC (OJ L073, 22.03.2000) Monolinuron 
2000/626/EC (OJ L263, 18.10.2000) Chlozolinate 
2000/725/EC (OJ L292, 21.11.2000) Tecnazene 
2000/801/EC (OJ L324, 21.12.2000) Lindane 
2000/816/EC (OJ L332, 28.12.2000) Quintozene 
2000/817/EC (OJ L332, 28.12.2000) Permethrin 
2001/245/EC (OJ L088, 28.03.2001) Zineb 
2001/520/EC (OJ L187, 10.07.2001) Parathion 
2001/697/EC (OJ L249, 19.09.2001) Chlorfenapyr* 
2002/478/EC (OJ L164, 22.06.2002) Fentin acetate 
2002/479/EC (OJ L164, 22.06.2002) Fentin hydroxide 
2002/928/EC (OJ L322, 27.11.2002) Benomyl 
2002/949/EC (OJ L328, 05.12.2002) Azafenidin* 
2003/166/EC (OJ L067, 12.03.2003) Parathion-methyl 
2003/199/EC (OJ L076, 22.03.2003) Aldicarb 
2003/219/EC (OJ L082, 29.03.2003) Acephate 
2003/308/EC (OJ L113, 07.05.2003) Metalaxyl  
2004/140/EC (OJ L046, 17.02.2004) Fenthion 
2004/141/EC (OJ L046, 17.02.2004) Amitraz 
2004/247/EC (OJ L078, 16.03.2004) Simazin 
2004/248/EC (OJ L078, 16.03.2004) Atrazine 
2004/401/EC (OJ L123, 27.04.2004) Mefluidide 
2005/864/EC (OJ L317, 03.12.2005) Endosulfan 
2006/797/EC (OJ L324, 23.11.2006) 8-hydroxyquinoline, ammonium sulphamate, 
hexaconazole, and sodium tetrathiocarbonate 
2006/966/EC (OJ L397, 30.12.2006) Alachlor 
2006/1009/EC (OJ L379, 28.12.2006) Dimethenamid 
2006/1010/EC (OJ L379, 28.12.2006) Phosalone 
2007/355/EC (OJ L133, 25.05.2007) Carbaryl 
2007/356/EC (OJ L133, 25.05.2007) Trichlorfon 
2007/366/EC (OJ L139, 31.05.2007) Thiodicarb 
2007/379/EC (OJ L141, 02.06.2007) Fenitrothion 
2007/387/EC (OJ L145, 07.06.2007) Dichlorvos 
2007/389/EC (OJ L146, 08.06.2007) Malathion 
2007/392/EC (OJ L148, 09.06.2007) Oxydemeton-methyl 
2007/393/EC (OJ L148, 09.06.2007) Diazinon 
2007/415/EC (OJ L156, 16.06.2007) Carbosulfan 
2007/416/EC (OJ L156, 16.06.2007) Carbofuran 
2007/417/EC (OJ L156, 16.06.2007) Diuron 
2007/428/EC (OJ L160, 21.06.2007) Cadusafos 
2007/437/EC (OJ L163, 23.06.2007) Haloxyfop-R 
2007/615/EC (OJ L246, 21.09.2007) Benfuracarb 
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2007/619/EC (OJ L249, 25.09.2007) 1,3-dichloropropene 
2007/628/EC (OJ L255, 29.09.2007) Methomyl 
2007/629/EC (OJ L255, 29.09.2007) Trifluralin 
 
Commission Directives including certain active substances in Annex I (the positive list of author-
ised active ingredients) 
97/73/EC (OJ L353, 24.12.1997) Imazalil 
98/47/EC (OJ L191, 07.07.1998) Azoxystrobine* 
1999/1/EC (OJ L021, 28.01.1999, corrigendum 
OJ L145, 10.06.1999) 
Kresoxim-methyl* 
1999/73/EC (OJ L206, 05.08.1999, corrigendum 
OJ L221, 21.08.1999) 
Spiroxamine* 
1999/80/EC (OJ L210, 10.08.1999) Azimsulfuron* 
2000/10/EC (OJ L057, 02.03.2000) Fluroxypyr 
2000/49/EC (OJ L197, 03.08.2000) Metsulfuron-methyl 
2000/50/EC (OJ L198, 04.08.2000) Prohexadione-calcium* 
2000/66/EC (OJ L276, 28.10.2000) Triasulfuron 
2000/67/EC (OJ L276, 28.10.2000) Esfenvalerate 
2000/68/EC (OJ L276, 28.10.2000) Bentazone 
2000/80/EC  (OJ L309, 09.12.2000) Lambda-cyhalothrin 
2001/21/EC (OJ L069, 10.03.2001) Amitrole, diquat, pyridate, thiabendazole 
2001/28/EC (OJ L113, 24.04.2001) Fenhexamid* 
2001/47/EC (OJ L175, 28.06.2001) Paecilomyces fumosoroseus* 
2001/49/EC (OJ L176, 29.06.2001) Flupyrsulfuron-methyl* 
2001/87/EC (OJ L276, 19.10.2001)  Acibenzolar-s-methyl, cyclanilide, ferric phos-
phate, pymetrozine, pyraflufen-ethyl* 
2001/99/EC (OJ L304, 21.11.2001) Glyphosate, thifensulfuron-methyl  
2001/103/EC (OJ L313, 30.11.2001) 2,4-dichlorophenoxy acetic acid (2,4-D) 
2002/18/EC (OJ L055, 26.02.2002) Isoproturon 
2002/37/EC (OJ L117, 04.05.2002) Ethofumesate 
2002//48/EC (OJ L148, 06.06.2002) Iprovalicarb, prosulfuron and sulfosulfuron* 
2002/64/EC (OJ L189, 18.07.2002)  Cinidon-ethyl, cyhalofop butyl, famoxadone, 
florasulam, metalaxyl-M and picolinafen* 
2002/81/EC (OJ L276, 12.10.2002) Flumioxazine* 
2003/5/EC (OJ L008, 14.01.2003) Deltamethrin 
2003/23/EC (OJ L081, 28.03.2003) Imazamox, oxasulfuron, ethoxysulfuron, foram-
sulfuron, oxadiargyl and cyazofamid* 
2003/31/EC (OJ L101, 23.04.2003) 2,4-DB, beta-cyfluthrin, cyfluthrin, iprodione, 
linuron, maleic hydrazide and pendimethalin 
2003/39/EC (OJ L124, 20.05.2003) Propineb and propyzamide 
2003/68/EC (OJ L177, 16.07.2003) Tryfloxystrobin, carfentrazone-ethyl, meso-
trione, fenamidone and isoxaflutole* 
2003/70/EC (OJ L184, 23.07.2003) Mecoprop, mecoprop-P and propiconazole 
2003/79/EC (OJ L205, 14.08.2003)  Coniothyrium minitans* 
2003/81/EC (OJ L224, 06.09.2003) Molinate, thiram and ziram 
2003/84/EC (OJ L247, 30.09.2003) Flurtamone, flufenacet, iodosulfuron, di-
methenamid-p, picoxystrobin, fosthiazate and 
silthiofam* 
2003/112/EC (OJ L321, 06.12.2003) Paraquat 
2003/119/EC (OJ L325, 12.12.2003) Mesosulfuron, propoxycarbazone and zox-
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amide* 
2004/20/EC (OJ L070, 09.03.2004) Chlorpropham 
2004/30/EC (OJ L077, 13.03.2004) Benzoic acid, flazasulfuron and pyraclostrobin* 
2004/58/EC (OJ L120, 24.04.2004) Alpha-cypermethrin, benalaxyl, bromoxynil, 
desmedipham, ioxynil and phenmedipham 
2004/60/EC (OJ L120, 24.04.2004) Quinoxyfen* 
2004/62/EC (OJ L125, 28.04.2004) Mepanipyrim* 
2004/71/EC (OJ L127, 29.04.2004) Pseudomonas chlororaphis* 
2004/99/EC (OJ L309, 06.10.2004) Acetamiprid and thiacloprid* 
2005/2/EC (OJ L020, 22.01.2005) Ampelomyces quisqualis and Gliocladium 
catenulatum* 
2005/3/EC (OJ L020, 22.01.2005) Imazosulfuron, laminarin, methoxyfenozide and 
s-Metolachlor* 
2005/34/EC (OJ L125, 18.05.2005) Etoxazol and tepraloxydim* 
2005/53/EC (OJ L241, 17.09.2005) Chlorotalonil, chlorotoluron, cypermethrin, da-
minozide and thiophanate-methyl 
2005/54/EC (OJ L244, 20.09.2005) Tribenuron 
2005/57/EC (OJ L246, 22.09.2005) MCPA and MCPB 
2005/58/EC (OJ L246, 22.09.2005) Bifenazate and milbemectin* 
2005/72/EC (OJ L279, 22.10.2005) Chlorpyrifos, chlorpyrifos-methyl, mancozeb, 
maneb, metiram 
2006/5/EC (OJ L012, 18.01.2006) Warfarin 
2006/6/EC (OJ L012, 18.01.2006) Tolylfluanid 
2006/10/EC (OJ L025, 28.01.2006) Forchlofenuron and indoxacarb* 
2006/16/EC (OJ L036, 08.02.2006) Oxamyl 
2006/19/EC (OJ L044, 15.02.2006) 1-methylcyclopropene* 
2006/39/EC (OJ L104, 13.04.2006) Clodinafop, pirimicarb, rimsulfuron, tolclofos-
methyl and triticonazole 
2006/41/EC (OJ L187, 08.07.2006) Clothianidin and pethoxamid* 
2006/45/EC (OJ L130, 18.05.2006) Propoxycarbazone* (change of specification) 
2006/64/EC (OJ L206, 27.07.2006) Clopyralid, cyprodinil, fosetyl and trinexapac 
2006/74/EC (OJ L235, 30.08.2006) Dichlorprop-P, metconazole, pyrimethanil and 
triclopyr 
2006/75/EC (OJ L248, 12.09.2006) Dimoxystrobin* 
2006/85/EC (OJ L293, 24.10.2006) Ethephon and fenamiphos 
2006/131/EC (OJ L349, 12.12.2006) Methamidophos 
2006/132/EC (OJ L349, 12.12.2006) Procymidone 
2006/133/EC (OJ L349, 12.12.2006) Flusilazole 
2006/134/EC (OJ L349, 12.12.2006) Fenarimol 
2006/135/EC (OJ L349, 12.12.2006) Carbendazim 
2006/136/EC (OJ L349, 12.12.2006) Dinocap 
2007/5/EC (OJ L035, 08.02.2007) Captan, folpet, formetanate and methiocarb 
2007/6/EC (OJ L043, 15.02.2007) Metrafenone, bacillus subtilis, spinosad and 
thiamethoxam* 
2007/25/EC (OJ L106, 24.04.2007) Dimethoate, dimethomorph, glufosinate, 
metribuzin, phosmet and propamocarb 
2007/52/EC (OJ L214, 17.08.2007) Ethoprophos, pirimiphos-methyl and fipronil  
(*) new substances that have been introduced after 26 July 1993 
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In addition to the legislation listed above, Directive 91/414 distinguishes the following 
types of decisions: 
• Commission Decisions recognizing in principle the completeness of dossiers submit-
ted for detailed examination relating to the inclusion of various active substances in 
Annex I of Directive 91/414 
• Commission Decisions recognizing the potential inclusion of certain active sub-
stances in Annex I (the positive list of authorized active ingredients) 
• Commission Decisions allowing Member States to extend provisional authorizations 
granted for new active substances 
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Annex 4 National legislation on pesticides issued in the 
Netherlands  
Bestrijdingsmiddelenwet 1962 Stb. 1962, 288 
  
Besluit milieutoelatingseisen bestrijdingsmid-
delen 
Stb. 1995, 37 
Besluit uitvoer bestrijdingsmiddelen Stb. 1995, 101 
Besluit wijziging toelatingsvoorschriften bestri-
jdingsmiddelen 
Stb. 1995, 103 
Besluit uniforme beginselen gewasbescher-
mingsmiddelen 
Stb. 1995, 241 
Besluit andere taken College voor de toelating 
van bestrijdingsmiddelen 
Stb. 1999, 503 
Regeling samenstelling bestrijdingsmiddelen 
(voorheen: Beschikking/Regeling indeling, ver-
pakking en etikettering bestrijdingsmiddelen) 
Stb. 1980, 43 
Wijzigingsbesluit Besluit milieutoelatingeisen 
bestrijdingsmiddelen (aanvullende milieucrite-
ria) 
Stb. 2000, 136 
Besluit regels verlenging communautaire over-
gangstermijn gewasbeschermingsmiddelen 
Stb. 2003, 274 
Besluit beginselen geïntegreerde gewasbesch-
erming 
Stb. 2004, 485 
Wijziging Besluit uniforme beginselen gewas-
bescherming 
Stb. 2005, 413 
  
Uitvoeringsregeling bestrijdingsmiddelen Stcrt. 1976, 157 
Regeling uitzondering bestrijdingsmiddelen Stcrt. 1978, 98 
Regeling uitvoering milieutoelatingseisen be-
strijdingsmiddelen 
Stcrt. 1995, 29 
Regeling toelating bestrijdingsmiddelen 1995 Stcrt. 1995, 41 
Regeling toelatingseisen landbouwkundige on-
misbare gewasbeschermingsmiddelen  
Stcrt. 2001, 41 
Regeling tijdelijke vrijstelling gewasbescher-
mingsmiddelen ter bestrijding van valse 
meeldauw bij uien 
Stcrt. 2002, 142 
Regeling tijdelijke vrijstelling gewasbescher-
mingsmiddelen met cis-dichloorpropeen 
Stcrt. 2002, 151 
Regeling vrijstelling I gewasbeschermingsmid-
delen teeltseizoen 2003 
Stcrt. 2003, 54 
Regeling vrijstelling II gewasbeschermingsmid-
delen teeltseizoen 2003 
Stcrt. 2003, 74 
Regeling vrijstelling III gewasbescherming-
smiddelen teeltseizoen 2003 
Stcrt. 2003, 80 
Regeling tijdelijke vrijstelling gewasbescher-
mingsmiddelen ter bestrijding van valse meel-
dauw bij uien 2003 
Stcrt. 2003, 124 
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Regeling tijdelijke vrijstelling gewasbescher-
mingsmiddelen met cis-dichloorpropeen 2003 
Stcrt. 2003, 126 
Regeling tijdelijke vrijstelling gewasbescher-
mingsmiddelen ter bestrijding van trips in prei 
2003 
Stcrt. 2003, 155 
Regeling tijdelijke vrijstelling gewasbescher-
mingsmiddelen ter bestrijding van de maïswor-
telkever 2003 
Stcrt. 2003, 157 
Regeling vrijstelling chloorthalonil teeltseizoen 
2003 
Stcrt. 2003, 234; ingetrokken Stcrt. 2003, 250 
Regeling tijdelijke vrijstelling gewasbescher-
mingsmiddelen eerste kwartaal 2004 
Stcrt. 2003, 246 
Regeling vrijstelling zilverthiosulfaat 2004 Stcrt. 2003, 249 
Intrekking Regeling vrijstelling chloorthalonil 
teeltseizoen 2003 
Stcrt. 2003, 250 
Vrijstellingen gewasbeschermingsmiddelen eer-
ste kwartaal 2004 
Stcrt. 2004, 71 
Vrijstellingen gewasbeschermingsmiddelen 
2004 
Stcrt. 2004, 77 
Wijziging Vrijstellingen gewasbescherming-
smiddelen 2004 
Stcrt. 2004, 82 
Besluit tijdelijke vrijstelling gewasbescherming-
smiddelen met cis-dichloorpropeen 
Stcrt. 2004, 126 
Wijziging Vrijstellingen gewasbescherming-
smiddelen 2004 
Stcrt. 2004, 139 
Wijziging Vrijstellingen gewasbescherming-
smiddelen 2004 
Stcrt. 2004, 149 
Wijziging Vrijstellingen gewasbescherming-
smiddelen 2004 
Stcrt. 2004, 168 
Tarievenbesluit CTB 2005 Stcrt. 2004, 245 
Vrijstellingen gewasbeschermingsmiddelen 
2005 
Stcrt. 2005, 4 
Wijziging besluit vrijstellingen gewasbescher-
mingsmiddelen 2005 
Stcrt. 2005, 37 
Tarievenbesluit CTB 2006 Stcrt. 2005,42 
Wijziging besluit vrijstellingen gewasbescher-
mingsmiddelen 2005 
Stcrt. 2005, 73 
Besluit tijdelijke vrijstelling gewasbescherming-
smiddelen met deltamethrin 2005 
Stcrt. 2005, 159 
Regeling houdende CTB-besluit wijziging pri-
oritering werkzame stoffen 2004 
Stcrt. 2005, 237 
Vrijstellingen gewasbeschermingsmiddelen 
2006 
Stcrt. 2005, 246 
Regeling uitwerking uniforme beginselen ge-
wasbeschermingsmiddelen 
Stcrt. 2005, 248 
Wijziging besluit vrijstellingen gewasbescher-
mingsmiddelen 2006 
Stcrt. 2006, 40 
Wijziging besluit vrijstellingen gewasbescher-
mingsmiddelen 2006 
Stcrt. 2006, 67 
Derde wijziging van het besluit vrijstellingen 
gewasbeschermingsmiddelen 2006 
Stcrt. 2006, 82 
  
279
Vrijstelling verbod Bacillus Thuringiensis Is-
raeliensis 
Stcrt. 2006, 102 
Wijziging regeling uitzondering bestrijding-
smiddelen 
Stcrt. 2006, 118 
Vierde wijziging van het besluit vrijstellingen 
gewasbeschermingsmiddelen 2006 
Stcrt. 2006, 119 
Ontheffing verbod permethrin 2006 II Stcrt. 2006, 149 
Vrijstelling verbod deltamethrin ter bestrijding 
Culicoïdesmug 
Stcrt. 2006, 163 
Vrijstelling verbod deltamethrin en permethrin 
ter bestrijding Culicoïdes II 
Stcrt. 2006, 171 
Vrijstellingen gewasbeschermingsmiddelen 
2007 
Stcrt. 2006, 243 
Vrijstelling verbod deltamethrin en permethrin 
ter bestrijding Culicoïdes III 
Stcrt. 2006, 248 
Besluit bekendmaking Beleidsregels inzake de 
toelating van biociden en gewasbescherming-
smiddelen (Handleiding toelating bestrijding-
smiddelen versie 1.0) 
Stcrt. 2006, 248 
Wijziging vrijstellingen gewasbescherming-
smiddelen 2007 
Stcrt. 2006, 249 
Vrijstelling ter bestrijding van de aardappel-
spindelknolviroïde (PSTVd) 
Stcrt. 2006, 250 
Wijziging regeling tarieven Plantenziektenkun-
dige Dienst en Regeling toelating bestrijding-
smiddelen 1995 
Stcrt. 2006, 252 
Tarievenbesluit CTB 2007 Stcrt. 2006, 252 
Lijst van aangewezen stoffen als bedoeld in ar-
tikel 25d Bestrijdingsmiddelenwet 1962 
Stcrt. 2006, 253 
Ontheffing verbod permethrin 2007/I Stcrt. 2007, 25 
Wijziging vrijstellingen gewasbescherming-
smiddelen 2007 
Stcrt. 2007, 41 
Vrijstelling verbod deltamethrin en permethrin 
ter bestrijding Culicoïdes 4 
Stcrt. 2007, 69 
Ontheffing verbod permethrin 2007/II Stcrt. 2007, 76 
Wijziging regeling toelating bestrijdingsmid-
delen 1995 en Regeling risicobeoordeling 
nieuwe stiffen Wet milieugevaarlijke stoffen 
Stcrt. 2007, 93 
Ontheffing verbod permethrin 2007/III Stcrt. 2007, 148 
Beleidsnota Zicht op gezonde teelt TK 2001-2002, 27 858, no. 1  
Nota Duurzame gewasbescherming TK 2003-2004, 27 858, no. 47 
 
Regeling milieukwaliteitseisen gevaarlijke stoffen oppervlaktewateren, Stcrt. 2004, 237 
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Legislation concerning pesticide residues 
Bestrijdingsmiddelenwet 1962 Stb. 1962, 288 
  
Residubesluit Stb. 1964, 319 
  
Regeling residuen van bestrijdingsmiddelen Stcrt. 1984, 54 
Warenwetregeling zuigelingenvoeding Stcrt. 1993, 183 
Warenwetregeling babyvoeding Stcrt. 1997, 19 
Warenwetregeling verontreinigingen in  
levensmiddelen 
Stcrt. 1999, 30 
  
Beleidsnota Zicht op gezonde teelt TK 2001-2002, 27 858, no. 1 
Nota Duurzame gewasbescherming TK 2003-2004, 27 858, no. 47 
 
In addition, there are dozens of amendments of the Regeling residuen van bestrijdingsmiddelen 
covering changes of MRLs. 
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Annex 5 Status of active ingredients used in pesticide 
products under state and non-state actor regimes 
This table presents a compilation of data concerning the status of active ingredients used 
in pesticide products under different regulatory regimes from state as well as non-state 
origin. As a starting point, active ingredients have been listed that have been assessed 
under the 1st and 2nd stages of the EU work programme for existing substances under Di-
rective 91/414/EEC. In addition, the table also includes the substances that have been 
prohibited before 1991 on the basis of Directive 79/117/EEC. In total, the table contains 
239 entries of pesticide substances, arguably representing the most hazardous products.  
The EU data have been complemented by data based on reviews of substances under 
other regulatory regimes. These other regimes include the WHO Classification of Pesti-
cides by Hazard, international environmental conventions, EU legislation in the field of 
water policy, retailer schemes, and schemes established by environmental and social 
NGOs. The criteria in these regimes are, partly or totally, based on considerations of 
human health and environment protection but use different interpretations of risk.  
 
Abbreviations used in the table: 
PS = priority substance WFD 
PHS = priority hazardous substance WFD under Decision No 2455/2001 
EQS = proposed environmental quality standards for priority substances and certain 
other pollutants in surface water according to COM(2006) 397 final 
GP = Greenpeace 
M&S = Marks and Spencer 
 
  
282
 
Active ingredient WHO 
class 
Status under 
international 
environmental 
conventions 
Status under 
EU legislation 
Status ac-
cording to 
retailer 
schemes 
Status ac-
cording to 
NGO 
schemes 
1,2-dichloropropane Obsolete 
as pesti-
cide, not 
listed 
- Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002 
- PAN Bad 
Actor 
1,3-dichloropropene Fumigant, 
not classi-
fied 
- Restricted use: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002; non-
inclusion Deci-
sion 
2007/619/EC 
- PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list  
1,3-dichloropropene 
(cis) 
- - Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002 
- - 
2-(dithiocyano me-
thylthio)-
benzothiazol 
- - Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002 
- - 
2,4-D  see 2,4-
dichlorophenoxy 
acetic acid 
     
2,4-dichlorophenoxy 
acetic acid (2,4-D) 
II - Inclusion: Direc-
tive 
2001/103/EC  
- PAN Bad 
Actor  
2,4-DB III Rotterdam 
Convention: 1 
notification 
Inclusion: Direc-
tive 2003/31/EC  
- PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
2,4,5-T  see 2,4,5-
trichlorophenoxy 
     
2,4,5-
trichlorophenoxy 
(2,4,5-T) 
Obsolete 
as pesti-
cide, not 
classified 
Rotterdam 
Convention: 
Annex III 
Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002 
M&S 
banned 
PAN Dirty 
Dozen; 
PAN Bad 
Actor 
4-t-pentylphenol - - Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002 
- - 
Acephate III Rotterdam 
Convention: 1 
notification 
Non-inclusion: 
Decision 
2003/219/EC  
- PAN Bad 
Actor 
Alachlor III Rotterdam 
Convention: 3 
notifications, 2 
accepted 
Non-inclusion: 
Decision 
2006/966/EC; 
PS under Deci-
sion No 
2455/2001 
M&S 
banned 
PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
Aldicarb IA Rotterdam 
Convention: 2 
notification2, 2 
accepted 
Non-inclusion: 
Decision 
2003/199/EC  
Co-op per-
mission 
PAN Dirty 
Dozen; 
PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
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black list 
Aldrin Obsolete, 
not classi-
fied 
Rotterdam 
Convention: 
Annex III; 
Stockholm 
Convention: 
Annex A 
Prohibition: Di-
rective 
79/117/EEC; 
Regulation No 
850/2004; EQS 
part B 
M&S 
banned; Co-
op banned; 
GlobalGAP 
banned 
PAN Dirty 
Dozen; 
PAN Bad 
Actor 
Alpha-cypermethrin - - Inclusion: Direc-
tive 2004/58/EC  
- Not listed 
as PAN 
Bad Actor; 
GP black 
list 
Amitraz III Rotterdam 
Convention: 1 
notification 
Non-inclusion: 
Decision 
2004/141/EC  
- PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
Amitrole U Rotterdam 
Convention: 1 
notification 
Inclusion: Direc-
tive 2001/21/EC  
- PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
Ampropylofos - - Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002 
- Not listed 
as PAN 
Bad Actor; 
GP yellow 
list 
Atrazine U Rotterdam 
Convention: 1 
notification 
Non-inclusion: 
Decision 
2004/248/EC; 
PHS under Deci-
sion No 
2455/2001 
M&S 
banned 
PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
Azamethiphos III - Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002 
- PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list  
Azinphos-ethyl IB Rotterdam 
Convention: 1 
notification 
Non-inclusion: 
Decision 
95/643/EC  
- PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
Azinphos-methyl IB Rotterdam 
Convention: 1 
notification 
Non-inclusion: 
Regulation 
1355/2005 
M&S per-
mission 
PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
Barban Obsolete 
as pesti-
cide, not 
classified 
- Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002 
- Not listed 
as PAN 
Bad Actor 
Benalaxyl U - Inclusion: Direc-
tive 2004/58/EC 
- Not listed 
as PAN 
Bad Actor: 
GP grey 
list 
Bendiocarb II - Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002 
- PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
Benfuracarb II - Non-inclusion: 
Decision 
- PAN Bad 
Actor 
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2007/615/EC 
Benomyl U Rotterdam 
Convention: 
listed as haz-
ardous pesti-
cide formula-
tion 
Non-inclusion: 
Decision 
2002/928/EC, 
essential use 
835/2004  
Co-op per-
mission 
PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
Bentazone III Rotterdam 
Convention: 1 
notification 
Inclusion: Direc-
tive 2000/68/EC  
- Not listed 
as PAN 
Bad Actor; 
GP grey 
list 
Beta-cyfluthrin - - Inclusion: Direc-
tive 2003/31/EC  
- Not listed 
as PAN 
Bad Actor; 
GP black 
list 
Binapacryl Obsolete 
as pesti-
cide, not 
classified 
Rotterdam 
Convention: 
Annex III 
Prohibition: Di-
rective 
90/533/EEC  
M&S 
banned; 
GlobalGAP 
banned 
PAN Bad 
Actor 
Bromocyclen Obsolete 
as pesti-
cide, not 
classified 
- Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002 
- Not listed 
as PAN 
Bad Actor 
Bromophos Obsolete 
as pesti-
cide, not 
classified 
- Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002 
- PAN Bad 
Actor 
Bromophos-ethyl Obsolete 
as pesti-
cide, not 
classified 
- Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002 
- PAN Bad 
Actor 
Bromoxynil II Rotterdam 
Convention: 1 
notification 
Inclusion: Direc-
tive 2004/58/EC 
M&S 
banned 
PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
Bronopol II - Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002 
- PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
grey list 
Butocarboxim IB - Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002 
- PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
Butoxycarbozim IB - Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002 
- PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
yellow list 
Cadusaphos IB - Non-inclusion: 
Decision 
2007/428/EC 
Co-op 
banned 
PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
Camphechlor  
Toxaphene 
     
Captafol IA Rotterdam 
Convention: 
Prohibition: Di-
rective 
M&S 
banned; Co-
PAN Bad 
Actor 
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Annex III 90/533/EEC  op banned; 
GlobalGAP 
banned 
Captan U - Inclusion: Direc-
tive 2007/5/EC  
Co-op per-
mission 
PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
grey list 
Carbaryl II Rotterdam 
Convention: 2 
notifications, 1 
accepted 
Non-inclusion: 
Decision 
2007/355/EC 
M&S per-
mission 
PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
Carbendazim U - Inclusion: Direc-
tive 
2006/135/EC 
Co-op per-
mission 
Not listed 
as PAN 
Bad Actor; 
GP black 
list 
Carbophenothion Obsolete 
as pesti-
cide, not 
classified 
- Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002 
- PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
grey list 
Carbofuran IB Rotterdam 
Convention: 
listed as haz-
ardous pesti-
cide formula-
tion 
Non-inclusion: 
Decision 
2007/416/EC 
M&S per-
mission 
PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
Carbosulfan II - Non-inclusion: 
Decision 
2007/415/EC 
- PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
Chloral-bis-acylal - - Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002 
- Not listed 
as PAN 
Bad Actor 
Chloral-semi-acetal - - Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002 
- Not listed 
as PAN 
Bad Actor 
Chlordane II Rotterdam 
Convention: 
Annex III; 
Stockholm 
Convention: 
Annex A 
Prohibition: Di-
rective 
79/117/EEC and 
Regulation No 
850/2004  
M&S 
banned; Co-
op banned; 
GlobalGAP 
banned 
PAN Dirty 
Dozen; 
PAN Bad 
Actor 
Chlordecone Obsolete 
as pesti-
cide, not 
classified 
Rotterdam 
Convention: 2 
notifications, 
none accepted; 
Stockholm 
Convention: 
nomination by 
the EU 
Not regulated M&S 
banned; Co-
op banned  
PAN Bad 
Actor; 
WWF 
candidate 
POPs list 
Chlordimeform Obsolete 
as pesti-
cide, not 
classified 
Rotterdam 
Convention: 
Annex III 
Regulation No 
304/2003 
M&S 
banned; Co-
op permis-
sion 
PAN Dirty 
Dozen; 
PAN Bad 
Actor 
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Chlorfenprop - Rotterdam 
Convention: 1 
notification 
Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002 
- Not listed 
as PAN 
Bad Actor 
Chlorfenvinphos IB - Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002; es-
sential use: 
Regulation No 
835/2004; PS 
under Decision 
No 2455/2001 
M&S 
banned; Co-
op banned 
PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
Chlormephos IA - Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002 
- PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
Chlorobenzilate Obsolete 
as pesti-
cide, not 
classified 
Rotterdam 
Convention: 
Annex III 
Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002 
M&S 
banned 
PAN Dirty 
Dozen; 
PAN Bad 
Actor 
Chlorotalonil U - Inclusion: Direc-
tive 2005/53/EC  
Co-op per-
mission 
GP black 
list 
Chlorotoluron U - Inclusion: Direc-
tive 2005/53/EC  
- Not listed 
as PAN 
Bad Actor 
Chloroxuron Obsolete 
as pesti-
cide, not 
classified 
- Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002 
- Not listed 
as PAN 
Bad Actor 
Chlorpropham U - Inclusion: Direc-
tive 2004/20/EC  
- Not listed 
as PAN 
Bad Actor; 
GP grey 
list 
Chlorpyrifos II - Inclusion: Direc-
tive 2005/72/EC; 
PHS under Deci-
sion No 
2455/2001 
- PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
Chlorpyrifos-methyl U - Inclusion: Direc-
tive 2005/72/EC  
- PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
Chlorthiophos Obsolete 
as pesti-
cide, not 
classified 
Rotterdam 
Convention: 1 
notification 
Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002 
- PAN Bad 
Actor 
Chlozolinate U Rotterdam 
Convention: 1 
notification 
Non-inclusion: 
Decision 
2000/626/EC  
- Not listed 
as PAN 
Bad Actor; 
GP grey 
list 
Clodinafop - - Inclusion: Direc-
tive 2006/39/EC  
- Not listed 
as PAN 
Bad Actor; 
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GP black 
list 
Clopyralid U - Inclusion: Direc-
tive 2006/64/EC 
(OJ L206, 
27.07.2006) 
- PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
grey list 
Cyanazine II - Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002 
- PAN Bad 
Actor 
Cyfluthrin II - Inclusion: Direc-
tive 2003/31/EC  
- Not listed 
as PAN 
Bad Actor; 
GP black 
list 
Cyhalothrin II - Non-inclusion: 
Decision 
94/643/EC  
- Not listed 
as PAN 
Bad Actor; 
GP black 
list 
Cypermethrin II - Inclusion: Direc-
tive 2005/53/EC  
- Not listed 
as PAN 
Bad Actor; 
GP grey 
list 
Cyprodinil - - Inclusion: Direc-
tive 2006/64/EC  
- Not listed 
as PAN 
Bad Actor; 
GP grey 
list 
DADZ  Zinc-
dimethyldithio-
carbamate 
     
Daminozide U - Inclusion: Direc-
tive 2005/53/EC 
Co-op per-
mission 
PAN Bad 
Actor 
DBCP  Dibromo-
chloro-propane 
     
DDT  Dichloro-
diphenyl-trichloro-
ethane 
     
Deltamethrin II - Inclusion: Direc-
tive 2003/5/EC  
- Not listed 
as PAN 
Bad Actor; 
GP black 
list 
Demeton-S-methyl IB Rotterdam 
Convention: 1 
notification 
Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002 
M&S 
banned; Co-
op banned 
PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
grey list 
Demeton-S-methyl 
sulphone 
Obsolete 
as pesti-
cide, not 
classified 
- Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002 
- PAN Bad 
Actor 
Desmedipham U - Inclusion: Direc- - Not listed 
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tive 2004/58/EC  as PAN 
Bad Actor; 
GP grey 
list 
Di-allate Obsolete 
as pesti-
cide, not 
classified 
- Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002 
- PAN Bad 
Actor 
Dialifos Obsolete 
as pesti-
cide, not 
classified 
- Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002 
- PAN Bad 
Actor 
Diazinon II - Non-inclusion: 
Decision 
2007/393/EC 
M&S per-
mission 
PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
Dibromochloro-
propane (DBCP) 
Obsolete 
as pesti-
cide, not 
classified 
Rotterdam 
Convention: 2 
notifications 
Not regulated - PAN Dirty 
Dozen; 
PAN Bad 
Actor 
Dichlofenthion Obsolete 
as pesti-
cide, not 
classified 
- Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002 
- PAN Bad 
Actor 
Dichloro-diphenyl-
trichloroethane 
(DDT)  
II Rotterdam 
Convention: 
Annex III; 
Stockholm 
Convention: 
Annex B – se-
verely re-
stricted 
Prohibition: Di-
rective 
79/117/EEC; 
Regulation No 
850/2004; EQS 
part B  
M&S 
banned; Co-
op banned; 
GlobalGAP 
banned 
PAN Dirty 
Dozen; 
PAN Bad 
Actor 
Dichlorprop III - Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
2002/2076 
- PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
Dichlorprop-P - - Inclusion: Direc-
tive 2006/74/EC  
- PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
grey list 
Dichlorvos (DDVP) IB - Non-inclusion: 
Decision 
2007/387/EC 
M&S per-
mission 
PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
Dicrotophos IB Rotterdam 
Convention: 1 
notification 
Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002 
- PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
Dieldrin Obsolete 
as pesti-
cide, not 
classified 
Rotterdam 
Convention: 
Annex III; 
Stockholm: 
Annex A 
Prohibition: Di-
rective 
79/117/EEC; 
Regulation No 
850/2004; EQS 
part B  
M&S 
banned; Co-
op banned; 
GlobalGAP 
banned 
PAN Dirty 
Dozen; 
PAN Bad 
Actor 
Difenoxuron Obsolete 
as pesti-
cide, not 
- Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002 
- Not listed 
as PAN 
Bad Actor 
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classified 
Dimefox Obsolete 
as pesti-
cide, not 
classified 
Rotterdam 
Convention: 2 
notifications 
Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002 
- Not listed 
as PAN 
Bad Actor 
Dimethenamid - - Non-inclusion: 
Decision 
2006/1009/EC  
- Not listed 
as PAN 
Bad Actor; 
GP grey 
list 
Dimethoate II - Inclusion: Direc-
tive 2007/25/EC  
M&S per-
mission 
PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
Dimethomorph U - Inclusion: Direc-
tive 2007/25/EC  
- Not listed 
as PAN 
Bad Actor; 
GP grey 
list 
Dinocap III - Inclusion: Direc-
tive 
2006/136/EC  
- PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
Dinoseb Obsolete 
as pesti-
cide, not 
classified 
Rotterdam 
Convention: 
Annex III 
Prohibition: Di-
rective 
90/533/EEC  
M&S 
banned; 
GlobalGAP 
banned 
PAN Bad 
Actor 
Dinoterb IB Rotterdam 
Convention: 3 
notifications 
Non-inclusion: 
Decision 
98/269/EC  
M&S 
banned 
PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
Dioxacarb Obsolete 
as pesti-
cide, not 
classified 
- Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002 
- PAN Bad 
Actor 
Dioxathion Obsolete 
as pesti-
cide, not 
classified 
- Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002 
- PAN Bad 
Actor 
Diquat II - Inclusion: Direc-
tive 2001/21/EC  
- Not listed 
as PAN 
Bad Actor 
Disulfoton IA Rotterdam 
Convention: 1 
notification 
Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002 
M&S 
banned; Co-
op permis-
sion 
PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
Ditalimfos Obsolete 
as pesti-
cide, not 
classified 
- Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002 
- PAN Bad 
Actor 
Diuron U - Non-inclusion: 
Decison 
2007/417/EC; 
PHS under Deci-
sion No 
 PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
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2455/2001 
DNOC IB Rotterdam 
Convention: 
Annex III 
Non-inclusion: 
Decision 
99/164/EC  
M&S 
banned 
PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
EDB  ethylene di-
bromide 
     
EDC ethylene di-
chloride 
     
Endosulfan  II Rotterdam 
Convention: 
CRC recom-
mendation for 
inclusion in 
Annex III 
 
Non-inclusion: 
Decision 
2005/864/EC; 
PHS under Deci-
sion No 
2455/2001  
M&S per-
mission; Co-
op permis-
sion 
PAN Bad 
Actor; 
WWF 
candidate 
POPs list; 
GP black 
list 
Endrin Obsolete 
as pesti-
cide, not 
classified 
Rotterdam 
Convention: 8 
notifications, 
none accepted; 
Stockholm 
Convention: 
Annex A 
Prohibition: Di-
rective 
79/117/EEC and 
Regulation No 
850/2004; Ex-
port ban: Regu-
lation No 
304/2003; EQS 
part B 
M&S 
banned; Co-
op banned; 
GlobalGAP 
banned 
PAN Dirty 
Dozen; 
PAN Bad 
Actor 
Esfenvalerate II - Inclusion: Direc-
tive 2000/67/EC  
- Not listed 
as PAN 
Bad Actor; 
GP black 
list 
Ethephon  U - Inclusion: Direc-
tive 2006/85/EC  
- PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
Ethiofencarb IB - Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002 
M&S 
banned 
PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
grey list 
Ethion II - Restricted use: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002; es-
sential use 
- PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
Ethoate-methyl Obsolete 
as pesti-
cide, not 
classified 
- Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002 
- PAN Bad 
Actor 
Ethofumesate U - Inclusion: Direc-
tive 2002/37/EC  
- Not listed 
as PAN 
Bad Actor; 
GP grey 
list 
Ethoprophos IA - Inclusion: Direc-
tive 2007/52/EC 
Co-op 
banned 
PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
Ethylene dibromide Fumigant, Rotterdam Prohibition: Di- M&S PAN Dirty 
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(EDB) not classi-
fied 
Convention: 
Annex III 
rective 
87/181/EEC 
banned; 
GlobalGAP 
banned 
Dozen; 
PAN Bad 
Actor 
Ethylene dichloride 
(EDC) 
Fumigant, 
not classi-
fied 
Rotterdam 
Convention: 
Annex III 
Prohibition: Di-
rective 
87/181/EEC 
M&S 
banned; 
GlobalGAP 
banned 
PAN Bad 
Actor 
Ethylene oxide Fumigant, 
not classi-
fied 
Rotterdam 
Convention: 
Annex III 
Prohibition: Di-
rective 
86/355/EEC 
M&S 
banned; 
GlobalGAP 
banned 
PAN Bad 
Actor 
Etrimfos Obsolete 
as pesti-
cide, not 
classified 
- Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002 
M&S 
banned 
PAN Bad 
Actor 
Fenamiphos IB - Inclusion: Direc-
tive 2006/85/EC  
Co-op 
banned 
PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
Fenarimol U - Inclusion: Direc-
tive 
2006/134/EC  
- Not listed 
as PAN 
Bad Actor; 
GP black 
list 
Fenitrothion II - Non-inclusion: 
Decision 
2007/379/EC 
M&S per-
mission 
PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
Fenthion II Rotterdam 
Convention: 1 
notification 
Non-inclusion: 
Decision 
2004/140/EC  
- PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
Fentin acetate II Rotterdam 
Convention: 1 
notification 
Non-inclusion: 
Decision 
2002/478/EC  
M&S 
banned; Co-
op permis-
sion 
Not listed 
as PAN 
Bad Actor 
Fentin hydroxide II Rotterdam 
Convention: 1 
notification 
Non-inclusion: 
Decision 
2002/479/EC  
Co-op per-
mission 
PAN Bad 
Actor 
Fenvalerate II - Non-inclusion: 
Decision 
98/270/EC  
- Not listed 
as PAN 
Bad Actor; 
GP black 
list 
Ferbam U - Non-inclusion: 
Decision 
95/276/EC  
Co-op per-
mission 
Not listed 
as PAN 
Bad Actor; 
GP grey 
list 
Fipronil II - Inclusion: Direc-
tive 2007/52/EC 
- Not listed 
as PAN 
Bad Actor; 
GP black 
list 
Fluorodifen Obsolete - Non-inclusion: - Not listed 
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as pesti-
cide, not 
classified 
Regulation No 
2076/2002 
as PAN 
Bad Actor 
Fluroxypyr U - Inclusion: Direc-
tive 2000/10/EC  
- Not listed 
as PAN 
Bad Actor; 
GP grey 
list 
Flusilazole III - Inclusion: Direc-
tive 
2006/133/EC; 
suspended ECJ  
- Not listed 
as PAN 
Bad Actor; 
GP black 
list 
Folpet U Rotterdam 
Convention: 1 
notification 
Inclusion: Direc-
tive 2007/5/EC  
- PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
Fonofos Obsolete 
as pesti-
cide, not 
classified 
Rotterdam 
Convention: 1 
notification 
Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002 
- PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
grey list 
Formetanate IB - Inclusion: Direc-
tive 2007/5/EC  
- PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
Formothion Obsolete 
as pesti-
cide, not 
classified 
- Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002 
- PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
grey list 
Fosetyl U - Inclusion: Direc-
tive 2006/64/EC  
- Not listed 
as PAN 
Bad Actor; 
GP grey 
list 
Furathiocarb IB - Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002 
- PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
Furfural - Rotterdam 
Convention: 1 
notification 
Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002 
- Not listed 
as PAN 
Bad Actor; 
GP grey 
list 
Glufosinate III - Inclusion: Direc-
tive 2007/25/EC  
- Not listed 
as PAN 
Bad Actor; 
GP black 
list 
Glyphosate U - Inclusion: Direc-
tive 2001/99/EC  
- Not listed 
as PAN 
Bad Actor; 
GP grey 
list 
Haloxyfop II - Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
- Not listed 
as PAN 
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2076/2002 Bad Actor; 
GP grey 
list 
Haloxyfop-R - - Non-inclusion: 
Decision 
2007/437/EC 
Co-op 
banned 
Not listed 
as PAN 
Bad Actor; 
GP yellow 
list 
HCB  see hexa-
chlorobenzene 
     
HCH  see hexa-
chlorocyclo-hexane 
     
Heptachlor Obsolete 
as pesti-
cide, not 
classified 
Rotterdam 
Convention: 
Annex III: 
Stockholm 
Convention: 
Annex A 
Prohibition: Di-
rective 
79/117/EEC and 
Regulation No 
850/2004 
M&S 
banned; Co-
op banned; 
GlobalGAP 
banned 
PAN Dirty 
Dozen; 
PAN Bad 
Actor 
Heptenophos IB - Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002 
M&S 
banned 
PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
grey list 
Hexachlorobenzene 
(HCB) 
1A Rotterdam 
Convention: 
Annex III 
Prohibition:   Di-
rective 
79/117/EEC and 
Regulation No 
850/2004; PHS 
under Decision 
No 2455/2001 
M&S 
banned; Co-
op banned; 
GlobalGAP 
banned 
PAN Bad 
Actor 
Hexachlorocyclo-
hexane (HCH) 
II Rotterdam 
Convention: 
Annex III; 
Stockholm 
Convention: 
nomination by 
Mexico 
Prohibition: Di-
rective 
79/117/EEC and 
Regulation No 
850/2004; PHS 
under Decision 
No 2455/2001 
M&S 
banned; 
GlobalGAP 
banned 
PAN Dirty 
Dozen; 
PAN Bad 
Actor; 
WWF 
candidate 
POPs 
Imazalil II Rotterdam 
Convention: 1 
notification 
Inclusion: Direc-
tive 97/73/EC 
- PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
Iodofenphos Obsolete 
as pesti-
cide, not 
classified 
- Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002 
- PAN Bad 
Actor 
Ioxynil II - Inclusion: Direc-
tive 2004/58/EC  
- Not listed 
as PAN 
Bad Actor; 
GP black 
list 
Iprodione U - Inclusion: Direc-
tive 2003/31/EC  
- PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
Isazofos Obsolete 
as pesti-
- Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
- PAN Bad 
Actor 
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cide, not 
classified 
2076/2002 
Isocarbamide Obsolete 
as pesti-
cide, not 
classified 
- Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002 
- Not listed 
as PAN 
Bad Actor; 
GP yellow 
list 
Isofenphos Obsolete 
as pesti-
cide, not 
classified 
- Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002 
- PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
yellow list 
Isoproturon III - Inclusion: Direc-
tive 2002/18/EC; 
PHS under Deci-
sion No 
2455/2001 
- Not listed 
as PAN 
Bad Actor; 
GP grey 
list 
Isoxathion IB - Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002 
- PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
Lambda-cyhalothrin II - Inclusion: Direc-
tive 2000/80/EC   
- Not listed 
as PAN 
Bad Actor; 
GP black 
list 
Lindane (gamma-
HCH) 
II Rotterdam 
Convention: 
Annex III; 
Stockholm 
Convention: 
nominated by 
Mexico 
Non-inclusion: 
Decision 
2000/801/EC; 
PHS under Deci-
sion No 
2455/2001  
M&S 
banned; Co-
op banned 
PAN Dirty 
Dozen; 
PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
Linuron U Rotterdam 
Convention: 1 
notification 
Inclusion: Direc-
tive 2003/31/EC  
Co-op per-
mission 
PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
Malathion III - Non-inclusion: 
Decision 
2007/389/EC 
M&S per-
mission 
PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
Maleic hydrazide U Rotterdam 
Convention: 1 
notification 
Inclusion: Direc-
tive 2003/31/EC  
- Not listed 
as PAN 
Bad Actor 
Mancozeb U - Inclusion: Direc-
tive 2005/72/EC  
Co-op per-
mission 
PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
Maneb U - Inclusion: Direc-
tive 2005/72/EC  
M&S per-
mission; 
Coop per-
mission 
PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
MCP  see 1-
methylcyclopropene 
(MCP) 
     
MCPA III Rotterdam 
Convention: 1 
Inclusion: Direc-
tive 2005/57/EC  
- PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
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notification grey list 
MCPB III Rotterdam 
Convention: 1 
notification 
Inclusion: Direc-
tive 2005/57/EC  
- Not listed 
as PAN 
Bad Actor; 
GP black 
list 
Mecarbam IB - Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002 
- PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
grey list 
Mecoprop III - Inclusion: Direc-
tive 2003/70/EC  
- Not listed 
as PAN 
Bad Actor; 
GP grey 
list 
Mecoprop-P  III Rotterdam 
Convention: 1 
notification 
Inclusion: Direc-
tive 2003/70/EC  
- PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
yellow list 
Mephospholan Obsolete 
as pesti-
cide, not 
classified 
Rotterdam 
Convention: 1 
notification 
Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002 
M&S 
banned 
PAN Bad 
Actor 
Mercury and its 
compounds 
IA, IB & 
II 
Rotterdam 
Convention: 
Annex III 
Prohibition: Di-
rective 
79/117/EEC; 
PHS under Deci-
sion No 
2455/2001 
M&S 
banned; Co-
op permis-
sion; 
GlobalGAP 
banned 
PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
Metalaxyl  III - Non-inclusion: 
Decision 
2003/308/EC; 
annulled by ECJ  
Co-op per-
mission 
Not listed 
as PAN 
Bad Actor; 
GP black 
list 
Metconazole III - Inclusion: Direc-
tive 2006/74/EC  
- Not listed 
as PAN 
Bad Actor; 
GP black 
list 
Methamidophos IB Rotterdam 
Convention: 
listed as haz-
ardous pesti-
cide formula-
tion; 7 notifica-
tions of sub-
stance, none 
accepted 
Inclusion: Direc-
tive 
2006/131/EC 
M&S 
banned 
PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
Methidathion IB - Non-inclusion: 
Decision 
2004/129/EC; 
essential use: 
Regulation 
835/2004 
- PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
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Methiocarb IB - Inclusion: Direc-
tive 2007/5/EC  
- PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
Methomyl 1B - Non-inclusion: 
Decision 
2007/629/EC 
M&S per-
mission 
PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
Methoxychlor U - Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002 
Co-op per-
mission 
Not listed 
as PAN 
Bad Actor; 
WWF can-
didate 
POPs list; 
GP black 
list 
Methyl parathion  
Parathion-methyl 
     
Metiram U - Inclusion: Direc-
tive 2005/72/EC  
Co-op per-
mission 
PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
Metolachlor III - Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002 
- PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
grey list 
Metribuzin II - Inclusion: Direc-
tive 2007/25/EC 
- PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
Metsulfuron-methyl U - Inclusion: Direc-
tive 2000/49/EC  
- Not listed 
as PAN 
Bad Actor; 
GP grey 
list 
Mevinphos IA Rotterdam 
Convention: 2 
notifications 
Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002 
- PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
Molinate II - Inclusion: Direc-
tive 2003/81/EC  
- PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
Monocrotophos IB Rotterdam 
Convention: 
Annex III 
Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002 
M&S 
banned 
PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
Monolinuron U - Non-inclusion: 
Decision 
2000/234/EC  
- Not listed 
as PAN 
Bad Actor; 
GP grey 
list 
Naled II - Non-inclusion: 
2005/788 
- PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
Naphtylacetic acid 
hydrazide 
- - Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002 
- - 
Nitrofen Obsolete 
as pesti-
Rotterdam 
Convention: 2 
Prohibition: Di-
rective 
M&S 
banned; 
PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
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cide, not 
classified 
notifications 87/181/EEC GlobalGAP 
banned 
yellow list 
Noruron Obsolete 
as pesti-
cide, not 
classified 
- Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002 
- Not listed 
as PAN 
Bad Actor; 
GP yellow 
list 
Omethoate 1B - Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002 
Co-op 
banned 
PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
Oxamyl 1B - Inclusion: Direc-
tive 2006/16/EC  
- PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
Oxydemeton-methyl IB - Non-inclusion: 
Decision 
2007/392/EC 
- PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
P-chloronitro-
benzene 
- - Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002 
- - 
Paraquat II Rotterdam 
Convention: 1 
notification 
Inclusion: Direc-
tive 
2003/112/EC; 
annulled by ECJ 
- PAN Dirty 
Dozen; 
PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
Parathion(-ethyl) IA Rotterdam 
Convention: 
Annex III  
Non-inclusion: 
Decision 
2001/520/EC  
M&S 
banned 
PAN Dirty 
Dozen; 
PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
Parathion-methyl IA Rotterdam 
Convention: 
listed as haz-
ardous pesti-
cide formula-
tion; 12 notifi-
cations of sub-
stance, 1 ac-
cepted  
Non-inclusion: 
Decision 
2003/166/EC  
M&S per-
mission 
PAN Dirty 
Dozen; 
PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
PCP  see penta-
chlorophenol 
     
Pendimethalin III - Inclusion: Direc-
tive 2003/31/EC  
- Not listed 
as PAN 
Bad Actor; 
GP black 
list 
Pentachlorophenol 
(PCP) 
IB Rotterdam 
Convention: 
Annex III  
Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002; PHS 
under Decision 
No 2455/2001 
M&S 
banned 
PAN Dirty 
Dozen; 
PAN Bad 
Actor; 
WWF 
candidate 
POPs list; 
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GP black 
list 
Permethrin II - Non-inclusion: 
Decision 
2000/817/EC  
M&S per-
mission 
Not listed 
as PAN 
Bad Actor; 
GP black 
list 
Phenmedipham U - Inclusion: Direc-
tive 2004/58/EC  
- Not listed 
as PAN 
Bad Actor; 
GP grey 
list 
Phorate IA Rotterdam 
Convention: 1 
notification 
Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002 
Co-op 
banned 
PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
Phosalone II - Non-inclusion: 
Decision Direc-
tive 
2006/1010/EC  
M&S 
banned 
PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
grey list 
Phosmet II - Inclusion: Direc-
tive 2007/25/EC  
- PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
Phosphamidon IA Rotterdam 
Convention: 
listed as haz-
ardous pesti-
cide formula-
tion, 5 notifica-
tion as sub-
stance, none 
accepted  
Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002 
M&S 
banned; Co-
op banned 
PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
Pirimicarb II - Inclusion: Direc-
tive 2006/39/EC  
- PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
Pirimiphos-ethyl Obsolete 
as pesti-
cide, not 
classified 
- Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002 
- PAN Bad 
Actor 
Pirimiphos-methyl III - Inclusion: Direc-
tive 2007/52/EC 
- PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
Procymidone U - Inclusion: Direc-
tive 
2006/132/EC  
- PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
Profenofos II - Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002 
- PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
Promecarb Obsolete 
as pesti-
cide, not 
classified 
- Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002 
- PAN Bad 
Actor 
Prometryn U - Non-inclusion: - PAN Bad 
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Regulation No 
2076/2002; es-
sential use Regu-
lation No 
835/2004 
Actor; GP 
black list 
Propamocarb U - Inclusion: Direc-
tive 2007/25/EC  
- Not listed 
as PAN 
Bad Actor; 
GP yellow 
list 
Propazine U - Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002 
- Not listed 
as PAN 
Bad Actor; 
GP black 
list 
Propetamphos IB - Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002 
- PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
grey list 
Propham U - Non-inclusion: 
Decision 
96/586/EC  
- Not listed 
as PAN 
Bad Actor; 
GP grey 
list 
Propiconazole II - Inclusion: Direc-
tive 2003/70/EC  
- PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
Propineb U - Inclusion: Direc-
tive 2003/39/EC  
Co-op per-
mission 
PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
Propoxur II - Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002 
M&S 
banned 
PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
Propyzamide U - Inclusion: Direc-
tive 2003/39/EC  
- PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
Prothiocarb O - Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002 
- Not listed 
as PAN 
Bad Actor 
Prothiophos II - Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002 
Co-op 
banned 
PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
yellow list 
Prothoate Obsolete 
as pesti-
cide, not 
classified 
Rotterdam 
Convention: 1 
notification 
Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002 
- PAN Bad 
Actor 
Pyraclofos II - Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002 
- Not listed 
as PAN 
Bad Actor; 
GP yellow 
list 
Pyrazophos II Rotterdam 
Convention: 1 
Non-inclusion: 
Decision 
M&S 
banned 
PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
  
300
notification 2000/233/EC  black list 
Pyridafenthion III - Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002 
- PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
Pyridate III - Inclusion: Direc-
tive 2001/21/EC  
- Not listed 
as PAN 
Bad Actor; 
GP grey 
list 
Pyrimethanil U - Inclusion: Direc-
tive 2006/74/EC  
- Not listed 
as PAN 
Bad Actor; 
GP grey 
list 
Quinalphos II - Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002 
M&S 
banned 
PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
Quintozene (PCNB) U  Rotterdam 
Convention: 3 
notifications 
Prohibition as 
formulation: Di-
rective 
90/533/EEC; 
Non-inclusion as 
substance: Deci-
sion 
2000/816/EC 
M&S 
banned; 
GlobalGAP 
banned 
Not listed 
as PAN 
Bad Actor; 
GP black 
list 
Rimsulfuron U - Inclusion: Direc-
tive 2006/39/EC  
- Not listed 
as PAN 
Bad Actor; 
GP grey 
list 
Simazine U Rotterdam 
Convention: 2 
notifications 
Non-inclusion: 
Decision 
2004/247/EC; 
essential use 
Regulation No 
835/2004; PHS 
under Decision 
No 2455/2001 
M&S per-
mission 
PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
Sodium diacetone-
ketogulonate 
- - Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002 
- Not listed 
as PAN 
Bad Actor 
Sodium dimethyl-
dithiocarbamate 
- - Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002 
Co-op per-
mission 
PAN Bad 
Actor 
Sodium silver thi-
osulphate 
- - Restricted use: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002 
- Not listed 
as PAN 
Bad Actor 
Sulfotep IA Rotterdam 
Convention: 1 
notification 
Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002 
- PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
Sulprofos Obsolete 
as pesti-
- Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
- PAN Bad 
Actor 
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cide, not 
classified 
2076/2002 
Tecnazene U Rotterdam 
Convention: 1 
notification 
Non-inclusion: 
Decision 
2000/725/EC  
M&S 
banned 
Not listed 
as PAN 
Bad Actor; 
GP black 
list 
Temephos U - Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002 
- PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
Terbufos IA - Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002 
Co-op 
banned 
PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
Terbutryn U - Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002 
- Not listed 
as PAN 
Bad Actor; 
GP black 
list 
Tetrachlorvinphos U - Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002 
- PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
Thiabendazole U Rotterdam 
Convention: 1 
notification 
Inclusion: Direc-
tive 2001/21/EC  
- PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
Thifensulfuron-
methyl 
U - Inclusion: Direc-
tive 2001/99/EC  
- Not listed 
as PAN 
Bad Actor; 
GP grey 
list 
Thiodicarb II - Non-inclusion: 
Decision 
2007/366/EC 
- PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
Thiofanox IB - Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002 
- PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
Thiometon IB - Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002 
M&S 
banned 
PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
Thionazin Obsolete 
as pesti-
cide, not 
classified 
- Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002 
- PAN Bad 
Actor 
Thiophanate-methyl U - Inclusion: Direc-
tive 2005/53/EC  
Co-op per-
mission 
PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
Thiram III Rotterdam 
Convention: 
listed as haz-
ardous pesti-
cide formula-
tion 
Inclusion: Direc-
tive 2003/81/EC  
Co-op per-
mission 
PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
Tolclofos-methyl  U - Inclusion: Direc- - PAN Bad 
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tive 2006/39/EC  Actor; GP 
black list 
Tolylfluanid U - Inclusion: Direc-
tive 2006/6/EC  
- PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
Toxaphene (cam-
phechlor) 
Obsolete 
as pesti-
cide, not 
classified 
Rotterdam 
Convention: 
Annex III, 
Stockholm 
Convention: 
Annex A 
Prohibition: Di-
rective 
83/131/EEC 
M&S 
banned; Co-
op permis-
sion; 
GlobalGAP 
banned 
PAN Dirty 
Dozen; 
PAN Bad 
Actor 
Triasulfuron U - Inclusion: Direc-
tive 2000/66/EC  
- Not listed 
as PAN 
Bad Actor; 
GP grey 
list 
Triazamate II - Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002 
- Not listed 
as PAN 
Bad Actor; 
GP grey 
list 
Triazophos IB - Restricted use: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002; es-
sential use 
- PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
Tribenuron U - Inclusion: Direc-
tive 2005/54/EC  
- Not listed 
as PAN 
Bad Actor; 
GP grey 
list 
Trichlorfon II - Non-inclusion: 
Decision 
2007/356/EC 
M&S 
banned 
PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
Trichloronate Obsolete 
as pesti-
cide, not 
classified 
- Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002 
- PAN Bad 
Actor 
Triclopyr III - Inclusion: Direc-
tive 2006/74/EC  
- Not listed 
as PAN 
Bad Actor; 
GP yellow 
list 
Trifluralin U - Non-inclusion: 
Decision 
2007/629; PHS 
under Decision 
No 2455/2001 
- Not listed 
as PAN 
Bad Actor; 
GP black 
list 
Trinexapac - - Inclusion: Direc-
tive 2006/64/EC  
- Not listed 
as PAN 
Bad Actor; 
GP yellow 
list 
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Triticonazole U - Inclusion: Direc-
tive 2006/39/EC  
- Not listed 
as PAN 
Bad Actor; 
GP black 
list 
Vamidothion IB - Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002 
- PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
Vinclozolin U Rotterdam 
Convention: 2 
notifications 
Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
1355/2005 
M&S per-
mission; Co-
op permis-
sion 
PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
Warfarin IB - Inclusion: Direc-
tive 2006/5/EC  
- PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
Zinc-dimethyl-
dithiocarbamate 
(DADZ) 
- - Non-inclusion: 
Regulation No 
2076/2002 
- PAN Bad 
Actor 
Zineb U Rotterdam 
Convention: 1 
notification 
Non-inclusion: 
Decision 
2001/245/EC) 
Co-op per-
mission 
PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
Ziram III - Inclusion: Direc-
tive 2003/81/EC  
Co-op per-
mission 
PAN Bad 
Actor; GP 
black list 
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